Nowy wymiar etyki odpowiedzialności globalnej[*]

A New Dimension of Etihcs of Global Responsibility

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Abstract

The article addresses the issue of ethics of global responsibility approached from a new and cosmocentric point of view. Philosophical considerations enriched by current natural knowledge allow us to look at the world from a cosmic perspective and at human nature from the evolutionary point of view which should be taken into account when defining the scope of our moral obligations. Questions concerning the human moral condition and the scope of human responsibility and the impact of that responsibility on human behavior in relation to the Earth and the Universe gain a distinctive meaning in the fight against various global perils and problems. The paper provides a justification of why contemporary ethics requires reformulation and such a complementing that would broaden the scope of moral responsibility so it would include not only the current and future generations and other species, but also the whole living community of the earth. Responsibility is treated here as a link that is ontic, evolutionarily shaped and characteristic for the *homo sapiens* species, which connects the human beings with the surrounding world. Such a conceived responsibility is the foundation of the sense of planetary solidarity and provides reasons to include the whole cosmic ecosphere into the scope of moral care.

Key words: ethics of global responsibility, ontologization of responsibility, globalization, moral condition of *homo sapiens*

Streszczenie

Artykuł porusza zagadnienie etyki odpowiedzialności globalnej rozpatrywanej z nowego, kosmocentrycznego punktu widzenia. Rozważania filozoficzne wzbogacone o aktualną wiedzę

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przyrodniczą pozwalają spojrzeć na świat z perspektywy kosmicznej, na naturę ludzką zaś z perspektywy ewolucyjnej, co z kolei powinno znaleźć odzwierciedlenie w zakresie naszych zobowiązań moralnych. W obliczu różnorodnych zagrożeń i problemów globalnych pytania o moralną kondycję człowieka, zakres jego odpowiedzialności i wpływ tejże odpowiedzialności na jego funkcjonowanie na Ziemi i we Wszechświecie nabierają szczególnego znaczenia. W artykule uzasadniono, dlaczego współczesna etyka wymaga przeformułowania i uzupełnienia w kwestii poszerzenia zakresu odpowiedzialności moralnej nie tylko na obecne i przyszłe pokolenia czy inne gatunki, ale na całą ziemską wspólnotę życia. Odpowiedzialność została potraktowana jako ontyczny, ewolucyjnie ukształtowany i charakterystyczny dla gatunku *homo sapiens* rodzaj więzi łączący człowieka z otaczającym go światem. Tak rozumiana odpowiedzialność stanowi fundament poczucia planetarnej solidarności i daje podstawy do otoczenia troską moralną całej kosmicznej ekosfery.

Słowa kluczowe: etyka odpowiedzialności globalnej, ontologizacja odpowiedzialności, globalizacja, moralna kondycja *homo sapiens*

1. KOSMICZNY WYMIAR ETYKI ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚCI GLOBALNEJ

Myślą przewodnią moich rozważań będzie uzasadnienie twierdzenia, że dyskusja na temat poszerzenia zakresu odpowiedzialności na całą ziemską wspólnotę życia może wiele zyskać, jeżeli wzbogacimy ją o wiedzę przyrodniczą, w tym o wiedzę pozwalającą przyjmować tzw. wszechświatowy punkt widzenia[1]. Sądzę bowiem, że ów „wszechświatowy punkt widzenia" umożliwia dostrzeżenie współzależności losów i poczucie solidarności nie tylko ze wszystkimi ludźmi zamieszkującymi Ziemię, ale także ze wszystkimi istotami żywymi tworzącymi biosferę. I to poczucie planetarnej solidarności może skłaniać rozumny gatunek ludzki do podejmowania odpowiedzialnego działania na rzecz dobrostanu całej wspólnoty. Umożliwia także dostrzeżenie „kruchości" ziemskiego życia w obliczu zagrożeń ze strony kosmicznej ekosfery. Oba czynniki, zarówno świadomość wspólnoty losów wszystkich organizmów zamieszkujących ziemskie środowisko, jak i świadomość jego „kruchości" w obliczu różnorodnych zagrożeń globalnych, to mogą być czynniki jednoczące ludzi i motywujące ich do podejmowania odpowiedzialności za

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[1] Pojęcie „wszechświatowy punkt widzenia" wprowadziła Hanna Arendt w *Kondycji ludzkiej* (Arendt, 2000), analizując nowożytny przełom w nauce i filozofii. Rozważając problemy filozoficzne, będę swobodnie korzystała z dostępnej wiedzy przyrodniczej.

jego trwanie. Mówiąc o „kruchości życia", mam na myśli stosunkowo wąski zakres parametrów fizykochemicznych, w których życie może trwać i zwiększać swoje możliwości.

Wielu współczesnych filozofów, którzy przyczynili się do powstania etyki odpowiedzialności globalnej, uznaje, że dotyczy ona wartościowania oraz zasad postępowania wobec różnorodnych zjawisk o zasięgu globalnym. Chodzi zarówno o zjawiska dotyczące stosunków międzyludzkich, takie jak np. odpowiedzialność za zjawisko eksplozji demograficznej czy procesy polaryzacji świata na bogatych i biednych, jak i o zmiany wywołane działalnością ludzi w Przyrodzie, jak tempo narastania efektu cieplarnianego czy nadmierne eksploatowanie łowisk i wszystkich innych zasobów naturalnych (np. wyczerpywanie zasobów wody pitnej). Są to niezwykle ważne problemy współczesnego świata, które spychamy na margines dopóty, dopóki nie urosną do takich rozmiarów, że ujawnią się w postaci rzeczywistych zagrożeń wymagających doraźnego rozwiązania. Obecnie dzieje się tak w przypadku polaryzacji krajów na bogate i biedne. Już dawno dostrzeżono i przedyskutowano tę kwestię na płaszczyźnie teoretycznej, pewnego jednak dnia problem stał się wielkim, rzeczywistym wyzwaniem. Masy migrantów płyną do Europy, która mimo swojej dojrzałości politycznej okazuje się zadziwiająco bezradna. Wszak od czasu wielkiej rewolucji francuskiej sztandarowym hasłem polityki europejskiej była realizacja praw człowieka. W przypadku polaryzacji krajów na bogate i biedne widać jak na dłoni, że problemy globalne są rzeczywistymi problemami współczesnego świata, a ich rozwiązywanie wymaga nie tylko szlachetnych deklaracji, ale także gotowości dokonania radykalnych zmian we wszystkich dziedzinach życia społeczno-politycznego. W tym kontekście etyka odpowiedzialności globalnej rozumiana jako podejmowanie odpowiedzialności za wspólne dobro ludzkości nabiera szczególnego znaczenia, nie tylko dlatego że ma określać wartości i normy służące realizacji tego dobra, ale także dlatego że, uwzględniając „wszechświatowy punkt widzenia", zmienia dotychczasowy sposób myślenia. Zmienia – to znaczy poszerza granice świata, w którym zarówno wspólnota losu, jak i wspólne dobro mogą być zrealizowane.

Nowy, wszechświatowy wymiar etyki odpowiedzialności globalnej, na który pragnę zwrócić uwagę, może także dotyczyć odpowiedzialności za przeciwdziałanie zagrożeniom ze strony kosmosu. Chodzi o zagrożenia, które już wielokrotnie występowały w historii Ziemi, choćby takie jak zderzenia z wielkimi asteroidami. Ostatnia wielka asteroida o średnicy 13 km, która upadła w okolicach Jukatanu 65 mln lat temu, spowodowała masowe wymieranie 2/3 gatunków zamieszkujących Ziemię, w tym wyginięcie dinozaurów. Na obecnym etapie rozwoju astrofizyki potrafimy zaobserwować i obliczyć trajektorie komet czy wielkich asteroid, jesteśmy więc w stanie przeciwdziałać kolizji. Można by tego dokonać, rozbijając je lub umieszczając obok nich obiekty, które za pośrednictwem oddziaływania grawitacyjnego mogłyby spowodować

odchylenie toru wystarczające do uniknięcia zderzenia. Chodzi o to, że inteligentny gatunek ludzki obdarzony w przeciwieństwie do bezmyślnych dinozaurów poczuciem odpowiedzialności może wpłynąć na ewolucję i może to uczynić, rozwijając etykę, która dopełni to poczucie odpowiedzialności, w które wyposażyła nas Ewolucja[2]. Zmysł moralny, którego posiadanie także zawdzięczamy Ewolucji, nie zawiera komponentu poczucia odpowiedzialności za dalekosiężne skutki działania ani za losy przyszłych pokoleń ludzkich i pozaludzkich istot żywych. Poczucie odpowiedzialności, które mamy, skłania nas do odpowiedzialności za najbliższych krewnych (nepotyzm) i za członków wspólnoty, do której przynależymy (ksenofobia), ale tak ukształtowane poczucie odpowiedzialności nie wystarcza, by sprostać wyzwaniom współczesnego, globalizującego się świata. Zygmunt Bauman (Bauman, 2002), opisując ten deficyt zmysłu moralnego, zauważa, że nasz impuls moralny cierpi na krótkowzroczność, to znaczy, że im bliżsi są ci, za których mamy odpowiadać i z którymi mamy być solidarni, tym łatwiej nam to przychodzi. Z tego powodu wielu moralistów twierdzi, że trudno poczuciem solidarności ogarnąć całą Ziemię. Jednakże nasza skłonność do nepotyzmu i ksenofobii nie stanowi nieuchronnego ograniczenia, gdyż w przypadku człowieka ten naturalny impuls możemy świadomie modyfikować. Faktem jest, że na naszych oczach rodzą się próby poszerzenia wąskiego i krótkowzrocznego poczucia odpowiedzialności na zjawiska globalne.

Przykładem takiej przebudowy poczucia odpowiedzialności są różnorodne ogólnoświatowe inicjatywy, czyli tzw. szczyty Ziemi i kongresy klimatyczne, które mobilizują ludzi z całego świata, aby wspólnie debatowali nad rozwiązywaniem odległych w czasie zagrożeń w skali globalnej. Od pierwszego szczytu Ziemi w Sztokholmie w roku 1972 systematycznie podejmuje się bardzo trudny wysiłek globalnego współdziałania, który dzielą przedstawiciele wszystkich narodów, debatując o wspólnych sprawach bez względu na różnice rasowe, religijne oraz polityczne. W rezultacie powstają ogólnoświatowe programy (np. *Agenda 21*) i zostają podpisane odpowiednie konwencje (np. konwencja o ochronie bioróżnorodności, konwencja klimatyczna z Kioto czy ostatnio podpisana konwencja paryska). To są globalne próby przeciwdziałania niebezpiecznym zjawiskom narastającego efektu cieplarnianego czy równie groźnym zjawiskom niszczenia bioróżnorodności. Wcielanie w życie tych konwencji wymaga nie tylko odpowiednich decyzji ekonomicznych i politycznych oraz zastosowania najnowszych technologii bezpiecznych dla środowiska, ale przede wszystkim zmiany hierarchii wartości polegającej na dowartościowaniu biologicznych procesów życia i sprzężenia jej z realizacją cnót kardynalnych: umiaru, przezorności, sprawiedliwości i męstwa. Są to bardzo mozolne próby

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[2] Pojęcie „Ewolucja" pisane dużą literą będę odnosiła do mechanizmów, za pośrednictwem których Wszechświat stwarza się sam. Przyjmę więc metafizykę ewolucyjną jednoczącą ewolucyjny rozwój zarówno w dziedzinie przyrody nieożywionej, jak i ożywionej.

rozwiązywania problemów z zakresu etyki odpowiedzialności globalnej w odpowiedzi na wyzwania stwarzane przez współczesny świat. Co więcej, wiele wskazuje na to, że bez jej wsparcia nie rozwiążemy tych niezwykle trudnych problemów, które nie mają rozwiązań czysto technicznych. Wyzwania są trudne, gdyż po raz pierwszy – na forum ogólnoświatowym – ludzie dostrzegają globalne zagrożenia i solidarnie poszukują sposobów przeciwdziałania tym zagrożeniom. Jak to wielokrotnie sygnalizowałam (Piątek, 2010; Piątek, 2015a), takiego wspólnego (ogólnoświatowego) sposobu rozwiązywania problemów środowiskowych (ani żadnych innych) nie było dotąd w ludzkich dziejach i musimy się tego nauczyć. Musimy się tego nauczyć, pokonując ograniczenia zmysłu odpowiedzialności moralnej, którym obecnie dysponujemy. W rozważanym kontekście istotne jest to, że nasza skłonność do brania odpowiedzialności za doraźne skutki czynów jest niewydolna w rozwiązywaniu zagrożeń o zasięgu ogólnoświatowym i odległych w czasie. W nowej sytuacji, jaką stwarza wzrost ludzkiej mocy w przekształcaniu świata, wspomniana krótkowzroczność poczucia odpowiedzialności funkcjonuje jako niebezpieczne ograniczenie, które należy przezwyciężyć wszelkimi dostępnymi sposobami. Sądzę, że rozwijanie etyki odpowiedzialności globalnej jest jednym z takich niedocenianych sposobów przezwyciężania ograniczeń zmysłu moralnego. Jednakże nowa etyka jest jeszcze nieobecna w dyskusjach toczących się na szczytach Ziemi. Sądzę także, że rozwijaniu i umacnianiu tej etyki sprzyja poczucie wspólnoty losu i solidarności ze wszystkimi istotami żywymi zamieszkującymi Ziemię. To właśnie solidarność wynikająca z poczucia wspólnoty losu stwarza podstawy do współodpowiedzialności za to, co się wokół nas dzieje.

W nowej etyce odpowiedzialności globalnej podmiotem odpowiedzialności staje się wspólnota ludzka bez względu na różnice indywidualne występujące pomiędzy ludźmi, a przedmiotem współodpowiedzialności staje się cała Ziemia, czyli konkretne problemy o zasięgu ogólnoświatowym. Dlatego w moich rozważaniach dotyczących nowego wymiaru etyki odpowiedzialności pragnę zwrócić szczególną uwagę na wartościowanie Ziemi i ziemskiej wspólnoty życia z „wszechświatowego punktu widzenia" osadzonego w rzeczywistości współczesnego świata, a nie w sferze science fiction. Jest to punkt widzenia umożliwiający „zadomowienie" człowieka we Wszechświecie i postrzeganie Matki Ziemi jako ewoluującego, kosmicznego środowiska życia. Z kosmosu łatwiej doceniamy Ziemię. Kosmonauci, opisując swoje doświadczenia z pobytu na stacjach orbitalnych czy z wyprawy na Księżyc, opowiadają, jak niezwykłym przeżyciem jest spojrzenie na Ziemię z zewnątrz i postrzeganie jej jako błękitnej planety unoszącej się w przestworzach kosmosu. Wówczas Ziemia jawi się na tle Drogi Mlecznej jako jedyny obiekt, który znamy i który unosi ciągle jeszcze niedoceniane planetarne środowisko życia dostosowane do ludzkich potrzeb. Są to doświadczenia dostępne nie tylko kosmonautom,

ale także tym wszystkim, którzy oglądają zdjęcia Ziemi przesłane przez liczne sondy wysyłane w przestrzeń kosmiczną. Sądzę, że, używając określenia Stanisława Ignacego Witkiewicza, można je opisywać jako doświadczenia metafizyczne. Wystarczy spojrzeć na niebo gwiaździste i pomyśleć o ogromie Wszechświata, żeby tego doświadczyć. To wszystko, co na Ziemi kosmonauci mieli udostępnione w sposób naturalny: tlen, wodę, pożywienie i poczucie bezpieczeństwa, na statku kosmicznym jest osiągalne w sposób sztuczny i obarczony ryzykiem. Wiele wskazuje na to, że nie ma innego sposobu zapewnienia bezpiecznej egzystencji osobnikom gatunku ludzkiego niż podtrzymanie ziemskiego środowiska życia i zachowanie jego długotrwałej zdolności do ewoluowania.

Jak zauważyła Hanna Arendt w przywołanym już opracowaniu na temat kondycji ludzkiej, nowożytny przełom w nauce i filozofii polegał na tym, że będąc istotami związanymi z Ziemią, uczeni i filozofowie epoki nowożytnej zaczęli formułować uniwersalne prawa i myśleć w taki sposób, jakby byli mieszkańcami Wszechświata. Wszechświatowa nauka zmieniła wszystko – zarówno nasz sposób postrzegania Wszechświata, jak i miejsca Ziemi we Wszechświecie, a także miejsca człowieka w nim. Za pośrednictwem postępujących badań astrofizycznych dokonuje się odczarowanie nieba gwiaździstego nad nami, a za pośrednictwem badań kognitywistycznych prawa moralnego w nas. Sądzę więc, że zajmowanie kosmicznego punktu widzenia w rozważaniach na temat etyki odpowiedzialności globalnej jest kontynuacją nowożytnego przełomu, który umożliwia nie tylko dowartościowanie zamieszkiwanej przez nas planety jako kolebki ziemskiego życia, ale także pozwala dostrzec, że gatunek ludzki jest częścią planetarnej wspólnoty życia, która uczestniczy w niewyobrażalnie rozległym procesie ewolucji kosmicznej. W perspektywie ewolucji kosmicznej Ziemia i zamieszkujący na niej gatunek ludzki jest cząstką bezkresnego Wszechświata. Sądzę także, i postaram się to przekonanie uzasadnić, że ten punkt widzenia jest bardzo ważny w kontekście rozważań na temat etyki odpowiedzialności globalnej.

Zajmując ów kosmiczny punkt widzenia, rozpoznajemy, kim jesteśmy i co nas łączy ze Wszechświatem, a odpowiadając na to pytanie, które przecież stanowi osnowę rozważań nauk humanistycznych, sięgamy nie tylko do początku ludzkich dziejów (jak to czynią humaniści) i nie tylko do początku ewolucji ziemskiego życia (jak to czynią biolodzy), ale także do początku Wszechświata (jak to czynią astrofizycy). Korzystając z najnowszych zdobyczy astrofizyki, rozpoznajemy, że jesteśmy dziećmi Słońca i gwiazd, gdyż nasze ciała są zbudowane z pierwiastków, które powstały w jądrach gwiazd supernowych i gwiazd neutronowych, a potem zostały wyrzucone w przestrzeń kosmiczną w gwałtownych procesach eksplozji (rozbłysku) tych gwiazd. Z tego pyłu kosmicznego uformował się Układ Słoneczny, a w nim Ziemia i pozostałe

planety. Historia ludzkości poszerzona o wymiar kosmiczny pozwala wyjaśnić, że w sensie dosłownym jesteśmy dziećmi ewoluującego Wszechświata i nasz los jest ściśle związany z losem planety, którą zamieszkujemy. Z kolei los zamieszkiwanej przez nas planety jest związany z losem Układu Słonecznego, który jest odległy 26 tys. lat świetlnych od centrum galaktyki i znajduje się w przyjaznych okolicach „na przedmieściach" Drogi Mlecznej sąsiadującej z miliardami innych galaktyk we Wszechświecie. I właśnie świadomość tej lokalizacji Ziemi w kosmicznej ekosferze rozumiem jako zadomowienie człowieka we Wszechświecie. Ów „wszechświatowy punkt widzenia" pozwala także dostrzec niezwykłą wrażliwość ziemskiego życia na uwarunkowania toczącej się wokół nas kosmicznej ewolucji, gdyż Ziemia nie jest całkiem bezpieczną sceną, wokół której rozgrywają się losy świata, lecz jest aktywnym uczestnikiem tych ewolucyjnych przemian[3].

Kosmiczna ekosfera, oprócz zjawisk sprzyjających życiu, stwarza także wiele potężnych zagrożeń, które w jednej chwili mogą ziemskie życie unicestwić. Wskazując na zagrożenia ze strony kosmosu, astrofizycy rozważają groźbę wybuchu supernowej w pobliżu naszej galaktyki. Gdyby taka eksplozja wystąpiła, to trwałaby ułamek sekundy. Najpierw zobaczylibyśmy rozbłysk, a potem w strumieniach wyemitowanego promieniowania gamma rozpadlibyśmy się na atomy. Innym, bardziej prawdopodobnym zagrożeniem są kolizje z wielkimi asteroidami, a także ewolucja Słońca związana ze zużywaniem paliwa (wodoru) stanowiącego źródło jego energii. Stopniowe zużywanie wodoru w procesach fuzji jądrowej sprawi, że przeobrazi się ono w czerwonego olbrzyma i pochłonie Ziemię. Jeżeli ludzkości nie uda się do tej pory opuścić Układu Słonecznego (nastąpi to za 5 mld lat), to razem z naszą gwiazdą będziemy uczestniczyć w kosmicznym recyklingu i znajdziemy się w obłokach pyłu kosmicznego, z którego powstają gwiazdy, planety, księżyce, asteroidy i komety. Biblijne „prochem jesteś i w proch się obrócisz" okaże się prawdziwe w sensie dosłownym, pod warunkiem że mamy na myśli pył gwiezdny.

Tak więc kosmiczny punkt widzenia pozwala umieścić Ziemię w odpowiednim miejscu na niebie gwiaździstym i spojrzeć na kosmos jako na szczególny rodzaj ekosystemu, który mimo istniejących zagrożeń stworzył i podtrzymuje warunki potrzebne do zaistnienia i trwania ziemskiego życia. Analizując te warunki na obecnym etapie kosmicznej ewolucji, doceniamy Ziemię jako planetę o stabilnej orbicie, przyjazną życiu ze względu na stosunkowo niewielkie wahania temperatury na powierzchni i posiadającą silne pole magnetyczne osłaniające biosferę przed nadmiernym szkodliwym promieniowaniem. Ziemia zajmuje także korzystne miejsce w Układzie Słonecznym, gdyż jest położona na jego „przedmieściach", nie jest zbyt blisko Słońca (byłoby wtedy bardzo gorąco i woda nie mogłaby występować w stanie ciekłym) ani zbyt

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[3] Hipotezy dotyczące ewolucji Słońca w kontekście ewolucji Wszechświata omawia M. Reese w książce *Nasz kosmiczny dom* (Reese, 2001).

daleko (byłoby wtedy bardzo zimno i woda występowałaby w postaci lodu). Czynnikiem sprzyjającym życiu jest także to, że Ziemia ma w swoim otoczeniu dużą planetę (Jowisz) o silnej grawitacji, która osłania nas przed niszczycielskimi asteroidami. Życiu na Ziemi sprzyja także wiele innych warunków, takich jak stosunkowo duży księżyc stabilizujący jej orbitę i powodujący pływy mórz i oceanów. Pływy sprzyjają mieszaniu wód i zawartych w nich substancji odżywczych, a odpowiednia atmosfera i wspomniane już pole magnetyczne osłaniają powierzchnię Ziemi przed szkodliwym promieniowaniem kosmicznym.

Jednakże podobnie jak wszystkie obiekty w ewoluującym Wszechświecie Ziemia jest także narażona na przypadkowe kolizje i katastrofy, które trudno przewidzieć na obecnym etapie rozwoju astrofizyki i trudno je pojąć ze względu na niewyobrażalną skalę czasu, w której się rozgrywają. Sadzę, że świadomość tych uwarunkowań, a zwłaszcza zagrożeń ze strony kosmicznego ekosystemu, wpływa na dowartościowanie ziemskiego życia i jest dodatkowym argumentem na rzecz rozwijania etyki odpowiedzialności za jego trwanie. Z „kosmicznego punktu widzenia" i w kosmicznej skali czasu ziemskie życie jest szczególnym, krótkotrwałym i unikatowym zjawiskiem stanowiącym „wielką wygraną" na loterii kosmicznych zdarzeń. Sądzę także, że właśnie owa świadomość niezwykłości ziemskiego życia i wspólnoty losu ze wszystkimi istotami zamieszkującymi Ziemię może być źródłem tak silnego poczucia solidarności, że w obliczu globalnego zagrożenia ludzkość potrafi się zjednoczyć, a wszystkie konflikty oraz różnice kulturowe współczesnego świata okazują się drugorzędne. Właśnie to poczucie wspólnoty losu może być motywem do podejmowania działań w zakresie współodpowiedzialności globalnej. Jest także oczywiste, że analiza odpowiedzialności z kosmicznego punktu widzenia wykracza daleko poza kontekst stosunków międzyludzkich i poza relacje ze stworzonym przez nas światem antroposfery, a więc wykracza daleko poza granice zainteresowania tradycyjnej filozofii.

Nie będę więc przedstawiała w sposób systematyczny bogatej tradycji sporów terminologicznych dotyczących zarówno podmiotu, jak i przedmiotu etyki odpowiedzialności. Z tradycji skorzystam wybiórczo, przywołując tylko te koncepcje, które pozwolą mi lepiej wyjaśnić badany problem. Zainteresowanych filozoficznymi koncepcjami odpowiedzialności globalnej odsyłam do monograficznego opracowania Heleny Ciążeli na temat problemów i dylematów etyki odpowiedzialności globalnej. Autorka przedstawiła w nim wyczerpująco najważniejsze filozoficzne konteksty używania tego pojęcia, zwracając uwagę na to, że obecnie ta nowa dziedzina etyki ciągle ma więcej krytyków aniżeli zwolenników (Ciążela, 2006). Po to by ze zrozumieniem rozważać kosmiczny wymiar etyki odpowiedzialności globalnej, należy określić

dwa podstawowe pojęcia związane z tym problemem. Należy odpowiedzieć na dwa pytania: czym jest odpowiedzialność i na czym polega globalizacja.

2. CZYM JEST ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚĆ?

Pojęcie odpowiedzialności należy do grupy pojęć podstawowych, które trudno zdefiniować. Należą do niej także pojęcia bytu, dobra, wartości, czasu oraz pojęcie informacji. Filozofowie nazywają je transcendentaliami. Mimo że nie potrafimy ich zdefiniować, podobnie jak wszystkich innych pojęć pierwotnych, to jednak używając ich, potrafimy się porozumiewać. Jak już zauważyłam, moje rozważania na temat etyki odpowiedzialności globalnej nie będą się koncentrowały na poszukiwaniu różnych definicji pojęcia odpowiedzialności, lecz na analizie problemu odpowiedzialności globalnej. Interesuje mnie poszukiwanie istotnych aspektów zjawiska odpowiedzialności i próba odpowiedzi na pytanie, na czym polega fakt bycia odpowiedzialnym i jak ten fakt bycia odpowiedzialnym wpływa na funkcjonowanie człowieka na Ziemi i we Wszechświecie. Mówiąc o kiełkującym wszechświatowym aspekcie etyki odpowiedzialności, mam na myśli normy nakazujące sterylizację łazików wysyłanych np. na Marsa czy na asteroidy, po to by uchronić ich środowisko od infekcji ziemskimi formami życia, oraz inne propozycje ochrony obiektów kosmicznych przed inwazją człowieka, w tym ochronę przestrzeni wokółziemskiej przed zaśmiecaniem satelitami.

Przyjmę więc pogląd reprezentowany przez Jacka Filka, który uznaje, że stanowisko człowieka w świecie jest stanowiskiem odpowiedzialnym, a pojęcie odpowiedzialności jest pojęciem ontologicznym opisującym strukturę bytu ludzkiego i szczególny rodzaj więzi człowieka ze światem (Filek, 1996). Filek podkreśla, że odpowiedzialność rozumiana ontologicznie jako istotowa charakterystyka bycia człowiekiem przysługuje człowiekowi obiektywnie, niezależnie od tego, czy ją sobie uświadamia czy nie. Subiektywne uświadomienie sobie odpowiedzialności to poczucie odpowiedzialności związane z poczuciem sprawstwa i stanowi ono element konstytutywny prawniczego pojęcia odpowiedzialności. Odpowiedzialność prawnicza jest odpowiedzialnością za sprawstwo czynu przed trybunałem (przed sądem). Natomiast odpowiedzialność moralna dotyczy odpowiedzialności przed własnym sumieniem za dokonany wybór wartości i norm postępowania. W zależności od tego, jak określimy, kto, za co i przed kim jest odpowiedzialny, możemy wyróżnić różne rodzaje odpowiedzialności. Jednakże, jak wcześniej zadeklarowałam, moje rozważania będą ograniczone do analizy szczególnego rodzaju odpowiedzialności stanowiącego przedmiot badania etyki odpowiedzialności globalnej.

Przedstawiony przez Filka zarys struktury odpowiedzialności, zawarty zarówno w jego książce, jak i w niezwykle esencjalnym artykule opublikowanym w *Znaku* (Filek, 1995), daje się interpretować na rozmaite sposoby. Ja interpretuję strukturę odpowiedzialności przedstawioną przez Filka w sposób naturalistyczny. Czynię to w odróżnieniu od jego interpretacji fenomenologicznej. Odpowiadając na sformułowane przez niego „pytania do odpowiedzialności" o to: kim jest ten, który jest odpowiedzialny, za co jest odpowiedzialny, od kogo pochodzi odpowiedzialność i przed kim odpowiadamy, odwołuję się do wiedzy, jaką dysponują współczesne nauki, i jestem skłonna twierdzić, że ontologizacja odpowiedzialności prowadzi do naturalizacji odpowiedzialności. Powyżej przedstawiłam fragmentaryczny zarys takiej naturalistycznej interpretacji kosmicznego wymiaru odpowiedzialności.

We wstępie do swojej książki poświęconej ontologizacji odpowiedzialności Filek przyznaje, że jego rozważania są twórczą kontynuacją poglądów Romana Ingardena, które zostały przedstawione w drugiej części jego *Książeczki o człowieku* (Ingarden, 1972). Ingarden odróżnia cztery sytuacje, w których występuje zjawisko odpowiedzialności: „1. Ktoś ponosi odpowiedzialność za coś albo, inaczej mówiąc, jest za coś odpowiedzialny. 2. Ktoś bierze odpowiedzialność za coś. 3. Ktoś jest za coś pociągany do odpowiedzialności. 4. Ktoś działa odpowiedzialnie" (Ingarden, 1972, s. 78). Moja uwaga skupia się głównie na dwóch sytuacjach, czyli na braniu odpowiedzialności za coś oraz na odpowiedzialnym działaniu. Interesuje mnie odpowiedź na pytanie, jakie czynniki wpływają na branie odpowiedzialności za coś, oraz określenie działania odpowiedzialnego, a także tego, za jakie działania jesteśmy odpowiedzialni, a za jakie nie ponosimy odpowiedzialności. Analiza kosmicznego wymiaru odpowiedzialności ułatwia wskazanie zjawisk, za które nie jesteśmy odpowiedzialni, gdyż nie mamy na nie żadnego wpływu. Ingarden, zastanawiając się nad ontycznymi podstawami odpowiedzialności, rozważa przyczynową strukturę świata i substancjalną strukturę osoby, ale nie rozważa świata w perspektywie kosmicznej ani natury ludzkiej w perspektywie ewolucyjnej. Naturalizacja odpowiedzialności sprawia, że filozoficzne pytanie o źródłowy sens odpowiedzialności staje się pytaniem o biologiczne podstawy ludzkiej wolności i odpowiedzialności. Współczesna wiedza o naturze ludzkiej i o naturze świadomości pozwala twierdzić, że poczucie odpowiedzialności ewoluowało w odpowiedzi na wyzwania społeczne. Pozwala także oczekiwać, że rozpoznanie miejsca człowieka w świecie (w kosmosie) i rozpoznanie wartości istniejących obiektywnie w środowisku mogą skłaniać ludzkie podmioty moralne do podejmowania odpowiedzialności za wspólny świat stanowiący środowisko życia. Filek wyraża to przekonanie, stwierdzając, że człowiek jest odpowiedzialny za rozpościerający się przed nim byt, który został mu „powierzony". Sugeruje on, że akt nałożenia odpowiedzialności ma charakter „powierzenia"

komuś czegoś. I chociaż samego tego aktu powierzenia możemy nie doświadczać, to dają się rozpoznać jego konsekwencje i dlatego musimy dźwigać „ciężar" nałożonej odpowiedzialności.

Filozofowie moralności wskazują mnogość instancji nakładających odpowiedzialność, takich jak Natura, Bóg, kodeks prawny, obyczaje, przywódca itp. Wskazują także mnogość instancji, przed którymi człowiek jest odpowiedzialny: własne sumienie, bogowie, sądy, kolektywy itp. Jak już wcześniej zauważyłam, śledząc ludzkie dzieje, można wskazać różne rodzaje odpowiedzialności w zależności od tego, jak odpowiemy na pytanie, kto, za co i przed kim jest odpowiedzialny. W drugiej części swojej książki Filek analizuje odpowiedzi udzielane przez Sorena Kierkegaarda, Fryderyka Nietzschego i Edmunda Husserla. Przeprowadzone przez niego rozumowanie doprowadziło go do konkluzji spójnych z moim naturalistycznym rozumieniem odpowiedzialności, że odpowiedzialność sprzężona z wolnością i rozumiana jako szczególny sposób bycia człowiekiem jest oparta na wzajemnej zależności pomiędzy człowiekiem a światem. Mogę zrozumieć więź ze światem – konkluduje Filek – tylko wtedy gdy należę do świata, gdy jestem częścią świata. Filek twierdzi, że wszelkie filozoficzne próby odzyskiwania wolności poprzez zerwanie więzi rozumianych jako podległość wobec świata okazały się nieporozumieniem, gdyż prowadziły do wyizolowania człowieka ze świata. Nawiązanie głębszej więzi z otaczającym światem jest po prostu odpowiadaniem za ten świat niezależnie od tego, czy sobie tę więź uświadamiamy, czyli niezależnie od tego, czy doświadczamy poczucia odpowiedzialności czy nie, i niezależnie od tego, czy podejmujemy odpowiedzialność, a także niezależnie od tego, czy jesteśmy pociągani do odpowiedzialności. Uznaje on także, że odpowiedzialne więzi ze światem Przyrody muszą się opierać na respektowaniu przyrodniczego porządku, czyli na działaniu na miarę świata, a nie na iluzorycznym zerwaniu więzi ze światem i „na nieograniczonym pochłanianiu świata danego do dyspozycji człowieka".

Z mojego naturalistycznego punktu widzenia człowiek jest odpowiedzialny za świat, czyli za swoje środowisko życia, mimo że byt nie został człowiekowi „powierzony" ani też oddany do dyspozycji człowieka, gdyż świat nie wyewoluował dla człowieka ani też przebieg ewolucji nie dba o ludzki los. Żadne mechanizmy ewolucji nie gwarantują trwania gatunku ludzkiego w ewolucyjnej skali czasu, a takie trwanie byłoby niezbędne, po to by człowieka rozpatrywać jako „pasterza bytu" umocowanego w bycie w sposób wyróżniony. Trwanie gatunku ludzkiego w ewolucyjnej skali czasu jest jedną z otwartych możliwości. Przyszłość jest w naszych rękach, jak to trafnie określił Aurelio Peccei w jednej ze swoich książek, i tworząc Klub Rzymski, podjął działania zmierzające w tym kierunku.

Jednakże Filek ma rację, stwierdzając, że akt odpowiedzialności ma charakter „powierzenia" komuś czegoś, jeżeli nakładanie odpowiedzialności odnosi się do świata ludzkiego

(antroposfery), w którym ład jest zagwarantowany przez odpowiednie instancje nakładające odpowiedzialność i przez instancje pociągające do odpowiedzialności. Warto jednak zauważyć, że rozważając odpowiedzialność za ziemską wspólnotę życia, rozważamy odpowiedzialność za ład istniejący obiektywnie od miliardów lat i za obiektywne wartości, które – podobnie jak samo zjawisko odpowiedzialności – dopiero odkrywamy, a nie ustanawiamy. Człowiek nie może odnosić się do świata, który istnieje niezależnie od niego i ma wartość sam w sobie, w taki sam sposób jak do świata, który został stworzony przez ludzkość w procesach historycznego rozwoju. Niedostrzeganie tej różnicy jest jednym z kardynalnych błędów tradycyjnej filozofii. Po to by obiektywnie istniejący ład obowiązujący np. na rafach koralowych stał się przedmiotem odpowiedzialności obowiązującej w świecie człowieka, trzeba go wprowadzić do zakresu odpowiedzialności za pośrednictwem konwencji o ochronie raf koralowych i jednocześnie wprowadzić odpowiednie sankcje. Etyka odpowiedzialności globalnej ma ludzi motywować do poszerzenia odpowiedzialności na sferę stosunków pozaludzkich sięgających aż do granic kosmicznej ekosfery i ma te działania legitymizować.

3. NATURALIZACJA ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚCI

Badając procesy uczłowieczenia, badamy mechanizmy, które sprawiły, że stanowisko człowieka w świecie jest stanowiskiem odpowiedzialnym, a poczucie odpowiedzialności ewoluuje i może być rozwijane. Odpowiedzialność jawi się jako rodzaj więzi w międzyludzkich stosunkach odwzajemnienia, które umożliwiły proces uspołecznienia i ewolucyjny sukces gatunku ludzkiego. Rozważając ontologiczny status odpowiedzialności jako rodzaj więzi człowieka z bytem i pytając o to, kto powierzył rodzicom odpowiedzialność za dobro dziecka, dostrzegamy, że odpowiedzialność rodzicielską nałożyła na nas Natura. Uczyniła to ta sama siła, która „powierza" lwicy odpowiedzialność za dobro lwiątek. Dlatego w przypadku ludzkiej rodziny, podobnie jak w przypadku lwów, odpowiedzialność za dobro potomstwa podejmujemy instynktownie, nie oczekując odwzajemnienia. Natura uczyniła to przez wbudowanie w ludzką psychikę odpowiednich mechanizmów opiekuńczych wyzwalanych przez określone bodźce, takie jak np. bezradność noworodka i jego wygląd. Niestety, Natura nie „powierzyła" nam w ten sam sposób odpowiedzialności za dobro raf koralowych, dlatego musimy ją ustanowić na zasadzie dobrowolnej decyzji. Podobnie na zasadzie dobrowolnych decyzji podejmujemy odpowiedzialność za porządek ludzkiego świata. Ten porządek został ustanowiony przez ludzi jako branie odpowiedzialności za coś i został nałożony przez odpowiednie instytucje, systemy

praw, a także przez autonomiczne decyzje podmiotów moralnych obdarzonych sumieniem i wolną wolą.

Tak więc w dyskusji o odpowiedzialności za świat istotne jest uświadomienie sobie, że oprócz porządku ustanowionego przez ludzi w obrębie antroposfery istnieje także obiektywny porządek ustanowiony przez Naturę rozumianą jako Natura rodzicielka, czyli Ewolucja[4]. Odpowiedzialność ustanowiona przez ludzi na zasadzie dobrowolnego zobowiązania może być kształtowana przez rozum, a więc przez wiedzę oraz odpowiednio ukształtowane emocje. Dlatego etyka odpowiedzialności globalnej odwołuje się do świadomych motywów. Jednakże w odniesieniu do odpowiedzialności rodzicielskiej ustanowionej przez Naturę nie potrzebujemy wiedzy z zakresu embriologii, żeby się troszczyć o noworodka, czując się za niego odpowiedzialnym. Inaczej jest w przypadku odpowiedzialności ustanowionej przez ludzi, gdzie wiedza o wspólnocie wszystkich ludzi i współzależności wszystkich istot żywych na Ziemi jest potrzebna, po to by budzić poczucie solidarności i skłaniać do podejmowania współodpowiedzialności za dobrostan raf koralowych, lasów tropikalnych, szelfów przybrzeżnych, czyli biosfery jako całości.

Tradycyjna etyka rozwijana jako dyscyplina humanistyczna uznaje, że podmiotem odpowiedzialności może być jednostka ludzka, wolna, świadoma i działająca w warunkach umożliwiających wybór różnych opcji działania i w tym sensie odpowiedzialna za swój wybór i za swoje czyny. Przyjmuję zatem, że odpowiedzialność jest w szczególny sposób sprzężona z wolnością, a także to, że działający podmiot jest wyposażony w poczucie odpowiedzialności, które jest elementem składowym zmysłu moralnego i stanowi jeden z mechanizmów stymulujących zarówno ludzkie działania, jak i sposób wartościowania świata. Niektórzy moraliści, tacy jak np. Hans Jonas, uważają, że poczucie odpowiedzialności ma charakter instynktu, gdyż wskazany przez niego podstawowy wzorzec odpowiedzialności to jest właśnie przywoływana już odpowiedzialność rodzicielska, czyli odpowiedzialność rodziców za losy dziecka. Jest to poczucie odpowiedzialności spontanicznej, w które wyposażyła nas Natura. „Poprzez ten stan natura już nas wychowała i przygotowała nasze poczucie dla wszelkich innych rodzajów odpowiedzialności, nie popartych w taki sposób instynktem" (Jonas, 1996, s. 166). Tak więc oprócz naturalnej odpowiedzialności rodzicielskiej, która jest archetypem wszelkiej odpowiedzialności, Jonas rozważa także odpowiedzialność „kontraktową", sztucznie ustanowioną przez dobrowolnie przyjęte zobowiązania. Cechą charakterystyczną

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[4] Jak wcześniej wyjaśniłam, używając pojęć „Natura" i „Ewolucja" pisanych dużą literą, odnoszę je do mechanizmów, za pośrednictwem których Wszechświat sam się stwarza. Rozumiane w ten sposób pojęcia „Natura" i „Ewolucja" mają ten sam zakres i będę ich używała zamiennie.

odpowiedzialności rodzicielskiej jest jej niesymetryczność – rodzice podejmują ją, nie oczekując odwzajemnienia. Jest to szczególny rodzaj odpowiedzialności, w którym „jest" zbiega się z „powinieneś", gdyż samo zaistnienie noworodka rodzi zobowiązanie do zaopiekowania się nim. Sądzę (ale nie jestem pewna), że ontologizacja odpowiedzialności, którą prezentuje Jacek Filek, jest zbieżna z tym stanowiskiem. Kajetan Młynarski określa tego typu fakty odpowiedzialności jako „fakty powinne" i twierdzi, że: „Świat okazuje się etyczny. Oczywiście nie w tym znaczeniu, iżby miał być »etycznie dobry«, ale w tym, że etyczność w nim występuje, jest jego częścią, zasadą, jest jego prawem" (Młynarski, 2012, s. 108). Młynarski, podobnie jak Jonas, uznaje dychotomię Hume'a, ale nie przypisuje jej waloru absolutnego. Uważa bowiem, że nie wszystkie fakty są powinnościowo obojętne, a emocje i zmysł moralny są faktami wbudowanymi w świat i są to fakty, które generują określone powinności, w tym odpowiedzialność sprzyjającą zachowaniu życia. Podobną funkcję spełniają skłonności, takie jak np. skłonność do unikania bólu i dążenie do przyjemności. Są to bowiem fakty pierwotne, do których – począwszy od Epikura – odwołują się twórcy niemal wszystkich systemów etycznych. Ontologiczna etyczność świata nie wyklucza istnienia zła fizycznego ani moralnego, podobnie jak istnienie prawa grawitacji nie znaczy, że nie można mu się przeciwstawić. Jednakże etyczność świata nie dostarcza nam (ludziom) gotowych wzorców moralnych dotyczących realizacji dobra wbudowanego w świat, jak to błędnie postulowali socjaldarwiniści. Sprzyjanie życiu, uznane za przejaw dobra i wartość nadrzędną w etykach środowiskowych, nie mówi nam jednak, jak należy postępować, sprzyjając życiu. Czasami w środowisku zasobnym w środki do życia działaniem odpowiedzialnym za sprzyjanie życiu będzie konkurencja stymulująca twórczą moc Ewolucji, natomiast w warunkach trudnych dla przeżycia będzie to współpraca oraz wszystkie mechanizmy zmniejszające konkurencję i sprzyjające przeżywalności. W ten sposób rozumiana etyka i moralność jako ewolucyjne mechanizmy adaptacyjne nie mają absolutnej pozanaturalnej sankcji, podlegają bowiem sankcji doboru naturalnego, podobnie jak wszystkie inne funkcje istot żywych.

Ewolucyjne rozumienie etyki, które przywołałam w kontekście naturalnej odpowiedzialności rodzicielskiej Jonasa, jest niewspółmierne z tradycyjnym rozumieniem, które podkreśla, że etyka i moralność to zjawiska autonomiczne i nigdy nie pełnią funkcji adaptacyjnych ani żadnych innych funkcji instrumentalnych. W moich rozważaniach przyjmuję jednak naturalistyczne rozumienie etyki uznające, że etyka pełni funkcje adaptacyjne, ale to nie znaczy, że sposoby wartościowania świata i treści norm etycznych są wyznaczone przez ewolucyjne procesy przyrodnicze. Ewolucyjna osobliwość gatunku *homo sapiens,* czyli osobliwość istniejąca z ustanowienia Natury, polega na tym, że jest on świadomym, rozumnym i autonomicznym podmiotem moralnym obdarzonym emocjami oraz wolną wolą i może

swobodnie określać normy swojego postępowania. A to znaczy, że mogą to być zarówno normy o negatywnych walorach adaptacyjnych, jak i bezinteresowne normy altruistyczne realizujące cele autoteliczne oraz normy instrumentalne, np. normy zabarwione szowinistycznie, a także normy nakazujące realizację dobra wszystkich ludzi, a nawet wszystkich istot żywych zamieszkujących Ziemię. Autonomia moralna *homo sapiens*, jako autonomia właśnie, jest nowym eksperymentem Ewolucji w przystosowaniu do środowiska i w tym sensie służy celom biologicznego przetrwania. Natura (Ewolucja) „mówi" mrówkom, na czym polega ich dobro i jak mają się zachowywać, aby to dobro urzeczywistnić. Spełniając wrodzone instrukcje, mrówki zachowują się altruistycznie wobec swoich sióstr oraz braci i realizując ten program (ewolucyjnie wyselekcjonowany), trwają od milionów lat w ziemskiej wspólnocie życia.

W przypadku człowieka Natura (Ewolucja) wprawdzie obdarzyła nas instynktem samozachowawczym i instynktem opieki rodzicielskiej, ale „nie mówi" nam jednoznacznie, w jaki sposób mamy te dobra (życia i opieki nad potomstwem) urzeczywistnić[5]. Autonomia polega na tym, że Ewolucja wyposażyła nas w rozum, emocje oraz wolną wolę i pozwoliła, żeby tak wyposażone podmioty moralne dokonywały swobodnego wyboru sposobów samorealizacji. Wyrażając to samo w języku biologii, można powiedzieć, że geny płynące przez pokolenia w „rzece genów" instruowały budowane przez siebie organizmy i przekazywały im dokładne instrukcje, jak mają się zachowywać, aby je (geny) zachować przy życiu. Natomiast powołując do istnienia organizm obdarzony autonomicznym, samoświadomym umysłem i wolną wolą, geny skierowały pod adresem istot ludzkich jedynie luźną instrukcję, którą w języku pojęciowym można sformułować w sposób następujący: wykorzystując swoją autonomię, rozum i wolną wolę, uczyńcie wszystko, co będziecie uważać za stosowne, aby nas (geny) zachować przy życiu[6]. Tak więc geny konstruujące podmiot moralny niezależny od przyczynowości przyrodniczej – jak twierdził Kant – obdarzyły czysty praktyczny rozum wielkim zaufaniem, powierzając mu swoją ewolucyjną przyszłość.

Ewolucja stworzyła także odpowiednie warunki umożliwiające ową autonomię, czyli wolność podmiotów moralnych. Ludzkie niemowlę rodzi się jako istota „niegotowa" i ma potencjalne możliwości różnorodnych sposobów samorealizacji w zróżnicowanym środowisku kulturowym, które także jest wytworem ewoluującego gatunku. Ewolucja, która powołała do istnienia gatunek ludzki, dopuściła taką możliwość (ryzykowną możliwość), że wolny

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[5] Antropomorfizacja Ewolucji zawarta w tym twierdzeniu jest skrótem myślowym. W świecie przedludzkim ewolucyjne stwarzanie dokonuje się bez Stwarzającego za pośrednictwem skomplikowanych mechanizmów ewolucyjnych działających w konkretnych warunkach środowiskowych. Odwołujemy się do nich, używając określeń „Ewolucja stworzyła…" czy „Ewolucja »mówi« istotom żywym", ale wiemy, że ewolucja „przemawia" w języku informacji genetycznej.

[6] Jest to sposób rozumowania stosowany przez Richarda Dawkinsa w książce *Samolubny gen* i w wielu innych jego książkach (Dawkins, 2012).

i autonomiczny podmiot moralny może na zasadzie swobodnej decyzji przyjąć zarówno takie sposoby samorealizacji, które będą prowadziły do rozkwitu życia, czyli będą działaniami odpowiedzialnymi za dobrostan ziemskiego życia, jak i takie, które doprowadzą do samozagłady, czyli będą działaniami nieodpowiedzialnymi, sprzeniewierzającymi się imperatywowi sformułowanemu przez Jonasa, że gatunek ludzki musi istnieć. Imperatyw Jonasa wyrażony w języku biologii na poziomie genetyki populacyjnej jest równoważny twierdzeniu, że ludzkie geny, które obdarzyły nasz samoświadomy umysł tak wielkim „zaufaniem", muszą istnieć. Historia ludzkości, zarówno ewolucyjna, jak i kulturowa, pokazuje, że ludzkość (ludzkie umysły), korzystając z możliwości danych jej przez „ufne" geny, mozolnie poszukuje odpowiednich zasad i wartości, które umożliwiają zarówno swobodną samorealizację, jak i przeżywalność oraz ewoluowalność ziemskiego życia. Rozwijając etykę, a także politykę sami ustanawiamy zarówno zasady naszego postępowania, jak i porządek ludzkiego świata, czyli używając określenia Kazimierza Twardowskiego, „(…) to, co u zwierząt spełnia instynkt, to u ludzi spełnia wyrozumowana teoria" (Twardowski, 1973). Dlatego, pozostając istotami biologicznymi, jesteśmy wolni. Jednakże wolność została sprzężona z odpowiedzialnością i doświadczamy jej jako „ciężar" oraz ryzyko przegranej, gdyż za wykorzystanie tej autonomii odpowiadamy nie tylko przed ustanowionymi przez nas trybunałami sprawiedliwości, lecz także przed trybunałem doboru naturalnego. Jest to uniwersalny trybunał, ważny w całej biosferze, przed którym stają wszystkie gatunki istot żywych. Od jego wyroków nie ma apelacji, gdyż jak to zauważył Karl Popper, wskazując na meduzy, wszelkie pomyłki i usterki adaptacyjne są eliminowane. Tylko ludzie dysponujący językiem pojęciowym i zdolnością symulacji możliwych stanów rzeczy mają szanse korygowania błędów i uczenia się na błędach. W tym kontekście warto zauważyć, że Ewolucja wbudowała jednak w naturę ludzką instynkt opieki rodzicielskiej, gdyż bez tego naturalnego wsparcia w postaci ścisłej instrukcji ewolucyjny eksperyment autonomicznego (wolnego) wyboru różnych sposobów działania mógłby się nie powieść. Istniało bowiem ryzyko, że istoty autonomiczne i „niegotowe", także pod względem opieki rodzicielskiej, nie przeżyją. Z ewolucyjnego punktu widzenia ludzka rodzina nie jest wynalazkiem chrześcijaństwa, lecz wynalazkiem Ewolucji, liczącym wiele milionów lat. Jest ona warunkiem koniecznym do zaistnienia autonomicznych podmiotów moralnych, tzn. organizmów wyposażonych w luźne instrukcje dotyczące działania w środowisku i być może wśród naszych odległych przodków byli także i tacy, którzy nie opiekowali się potomstwem, ale my nie jesteśmy ich potomkami.

Jeżeli przyjmiemy, że autonomiczna etyka pełni jednak ważne funkcje adaptacyjne, to rozpoznanie tych funkcji umożliwia tworzenie nowych adaptacji moralnych. Rozpoznając poczucie odpowiedzialności, jakim dysponujemy na obecnym etapie ewolucji, możemy je

korygować, poszerzając jego zakres poza tu i teraz, poza ksenofobiczną odpowiedzialność plemienną na odpowiedzialność obejmującą całą wspólnotę życia. Wiele wskazuje na to, że w świecie, który się globalizuje, zarówno ksenofobia, jak i trybalizm tracą walory adaptacyjne, które miały na wcześniejszym etapie ewolucji. Trzeba je zatem korygować, „oświecając emocje" związane z ksenofobią, poprzez rozwijanie tolerancji i skłonności do współpracy ze wszystkimi członkami społeczeństw zamieszkujących Ziemię we wspólnocie biosfery. Czynią to różne odmiany etyki środowiskowej mające na uwadze nie tylko realizację ludzkich dóbr i wartości moralnych, które były przedmiotem rozważań tradycyjnej etyki, ale także realizację dobra własnego wszystkich istot żywych[7]. Etyka odpowiedzialności globalnej, podobnie jak etyki środowiskowe, jest próbą dopełnienia tradycyjnie rozumianej odpowiedzialności troską o całą wspólnotę życia. Możemy to uczynić, wykorzystując różne rodzaje odpowiedzialności ustanowionej, czyli odpowiedzialności kontraktowej w terminologii Jonasa, wynikającej ze świadomie przyjętych, dobrowolnych zobowiązań trwających tak długo, jak długo obowiązuje kontrakt. Zarówno Ciążela w przywołanej już analizie etyki odpowiedzialności globalnej, jak i Bauman w analizie odpowiedzialności za świat przedstawionej w *Rozmowach na nowy wiek* podkreślają, że odpowiedzialność za świat nie ma charakteru odpowiedzialności spontanicznej ustanowionej przez Naturę. Argumentują oni, że odpowiedzialność za świat, która jest przedmiotem etyki odpowiedzialności globalnej, wymaga odwołania się do poszerzonego poczucia odpowiedzialności podyktowanego potrzebą rozwiązywania zagrożeń w skali globalnej. Są to głównie zagrożenia generowane przez rozwój cywilizacji technicznej, która daje ludziom nieosiągalną dotąd moc przekształcania świata. Nowy rodzaj odpowiedzialności dotyczy nie tylko poszerzenia zakresu odpowiedzialności na całą wspólnotę ziemskiego życia funkcjonującego w kosmicznej ekosferze, ale także wymaga zmiany natury odpowiedzialności. Chodzi o to, że następuje zmiana podmiotu odpowiedzialności, gdyż oprócz indywidualnych podmiotów pojawia się zbiorowy (kolektywny)[8] podmiot odpowiedzialności, który może być odpowiedzialny lub współodpowiedzialny za sprawstwo czynów, w których bezpośrednio nie uczestniczy. Kupując meble z drewna tropikalnego, mogę się czuć współodpowiedzialna za wycinanie lasów deszczowych nad Amazonką, a marnotrawiąc żywność, bogate społeczeństwa Zachodu mogą się czuć odpowiedzialne za śmierć dzieci umierających z głodu w Sudanie. Są to szeroko dyskutowane, rzeczywiste problemy współczesnego świata, których rozwiązanie wymaga przebudowy i uzupełnienia naszego zmysłu odpowiedzialności moralnej.

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[7] Więcej na ten temat pisałam w artykule *O banalności dobra rozumianego jako dobro własne istot żywnych* (Piątek, 2015b).

[8] Interesującą koncepcję „kolektywów" jako podmiotów działania przedstawia Bruno Latour w książce *Polityka natury* (Latour, 2009).

Globalny wymiar odpowiedzialności urzeczywistnia się nie tylko w skomplikowanej sytuacji współodpowiedzialności za sprawstwo czynów, w których bezpośrednio nie uczestniczymy, ale także w skomplikowanej sytuacji określanej jako „nieprzejrzystość świata". Polega ona na narastaniu współzależności procesów decyzyjnych dotyczących zarówno działania, jak i podejmowania decyzji. Faktem jest, że wraz z rozwojem cywilizacji wzrasta potencjał globalnych zagrożeń spowodowanych wzrostem mocy ludzkiego działania i w związku z tym na plan pierwszy wysuwają się ryzyko i niepewność podejmowanych decyzji. W dziedzinie odpowiedzialności globalnej pojawiają się bardzo trudne problemy oceny ryzyka i jego kontroli. Andrzej Kiepas zwraca uwagę na to, że ryzyko i niepewność stanowią charakterystyczne cechy świata ponowoczesności, gdyż po odrzuceniu klasycznego rozumienia prawdy i rozumu obiektywnego społeczeństwo ponowoczesne nie jest w stanie wytworzyć trwałego i obiektywnego porządku świata (Kiepas, 2000). Dla zaistnienia ryzyka – argumentuje Kiepas – istotne jest napięcie pomiędzy określonym poziomem bezpieczeństwa a poziomem zagrożeń i w konsekwencji następuje podejmowanie działania w sytuacji niepewności, gdyż ryzyko jest rozumiane jako odstępstwo od stanu pewności. Społeczeństwa ryzyka cechują się tym, że łączy je nie tyle dążenie do czegoś czy realizacja określonych wartości, ile strach przed zagrożeniem, a poczucie strachu utrudnia podejmowanie zarówno odpowiedzialnych decyzji, jak i odpowiedzialnego działania. Ważne jest, że niepewność, o której mowa, dotyczy nie tylko doraźnych decyzji indywidualnych, lecz przede wszystkim decyzji odległych w czasie i o zasięgu globalnym.

4. LUDZKIE SUMIENIE I POCZUCIE ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚCI W ŚWIECIE, KTÓRY SIĘ GLOBALIZUJE

Ludzkie sumienie oraz poczucie odpowiedzialności zostały ukształtowane na miarę świata przejrzystego, świata, w którym człowiek mógł przewidywać konsekwencje własnego działania i brać za nie odpowiedzialność. Była to odpowiedzialność *ex post* za własne czyny zlokalizowane w teraźniejszości lub w nieodległej przyszłości. Procesy globalizacji i wspomniana już nieprzejrzystość świata zmieniają tę sytuację i skłaniają do posługiwania się zmodyfikowanym pojęciem odpowiedzialności. Uwzględnia ono ryzyko oraz kolektywne sposoby działania i podejmowania decyzji o dalekosiężnych skutkach obarczonych niepewnością. W związku z tym na plan pierwszy wysuwa się pojęcie współodpowiedzialności, które wynika z powiązania wielu jednostek funkcjonujących jako podmioty działania i podejmowania decyzji. Kiepas zwraca uwagę na to, że różnorodne, kolektywne jednostki są od siebie zależne, zatem w ocenie odpowiedzialności staje się niezwykle ważne uwzględnianie tych zależności.

Sądzę, że przywołując Heglowski schemat rozwoju Rozumu (Ducha) w dziejach, można mówić o trzech poziomach odpowiedzialności, które w jego fenomenologii Ducha stanowią trzy etapy rozwoju odpowiedzialności. Są to: odpowiedzialność na poziomie subiektywnym (indywidualnym), która w dziejowym rozwoju historycznym osiąga obiektywny, trzystopniowy poziom odpowiedzialności plemiennej, narodowej i państwowej, a następnie poziom odpowiedzialności ogólnoludzkiej, czyli poziom uniwersalny. Ten najszerszy, uniwersalny poziom odpowiedzialności obejmuje całą ludzkość, ale w przeciwieństwie do współcześnie rozwijanej etyki odpowiedzialności globalnej brakuje w nim wyraźnie wyartykułowanej odpowiedzialności za losy ziemskiej wspólnoty życia i to jest zasadniczy brak tradycyjnej filozofii moralności. Tradycyjna filozofia moralności jest uprawiana z pozycji człowieka *wobec* świata przyrody lub *ponad* światem przyrody, a nie z pozycji człowieka *w* świecie przyrody. Analiza etyki odpowiedzialności globalnej wzbogacona o wymiar kosmiczny uczy nas pokory i wykracza daleko poza granice tradycyjnej filozofii.

5. NA CZYM POLEGA GLOBALIZACJA?

Bauman w wywiadzie udzielonym z okazji nowego tysiąclecia zatytułowanym *O odpowiedzialności za świat* stwierdza: „Czy tego chcemy czy nie, czy uznajemy ten fakt, czy mu zaprzeczamy, ponosimy odpowiedzialność za to, co się dzieje na świecie. Moralność zaczyna się od momentu, kiedy świadomie przyjmujemy tę odpowiedzialność i staramy się kształtować nasze życie, nasze działania w taki sposób, żeby jej sprostać. Odtąd bierzemy pod uwagę nie tylko to, co wydaje się naszym bezpośrednim interesem, ale także to, co wynika ze współzależności losów" (Bauman, 2002, s. 227). Mówiąc o odpowiedzialności za świat i o współzależności losów, Bauman ma myśli ludzki świat, czyli antroposferę i współzależność ludzkich losów, gdyż w jego analizach nie ma śladu troski o losy pozaludzkich istot żywych. Stwierdza on, że daleko nam jeszcze do osiągnięcia tego poziomu świadomości moralnej, która swoim zasięgiem obejmowałaby szacunek dla wszystkich ludzi. Bauman twierdzi, że postulat zaistnienia nowej, uniwersalnej moralności uwzględniającej współzależność losów wszystkich ludzi zamieszkujących Ziemię utrudnia życie i napełnia je niepokojem. Jego niepokój wynika stąd, że podejmując to wyzwanie, startujemy ze świata skłóconego, obejmującego tradycje o odmiennych systemach wartości i odmiennych sposobach życia. I co najważniejsze, nie nawykliśmy do tego, aby inne sposoby życia i interesy innych ludzi traktować jako równouprawnione w budowie wspólnego świata. Od siebie dodam to, o czym Bauman w ogóle nie myśli, że nie nawykliśmy także, aby w naszych działaniach w środowisku traktować jako równouprawnione interesy pozaludzkich istot żywych.

W takim skłóconym świecie obejmującym różnorodne i wielopoziomowe zależności niemożliwe jest sformułowanie jakiegoś jednoznacznego systemu moralnego, który byłby pomocny w rozstrzyganiu wszystkich globalnych dylematów moralnych. Wiele wskazuje na to, że w nieprzejrzystym świecie są tylko możliwe drogowskazy nakazujące jedynie kierunek działania, a konkretne decyzje moralne musimy podejmować zgodnie z własnym sumieniem. Stąd niepokój moralny, o którym wspomina Bauman i o którym pisał także Albert Schweitzer, zauważając, że „czyste sumienie jest wynalazkiem diabła”. Jednakże Bauman, w przeciwieństwie do Schweitzera, należy do tego nurtu tradycji humanistycznej, który uznaje, że człowiek jest demiurgiem świata, w którym żyje, a jego postulat odpowiedzialności za świat dotyczy jedynie antroposfery. Jak podkreśla w wielu swoich książkach (Bauman, 2000; Bauman, 2005), ludzki świat jest tworzony w oderwaniu od Natury, bo uczłowieczenie polega na transcendowaniu porządku naturalnego. Pragnę z naciskiem podkreślić, że rozważając problem odpowiedzialności za świat, Bauman ma na myśli świat stworzony przez ludzi i co więcej, uznaje on, że to Europa dokonała uczłowieczenia świata Natury i przeniosła go z półmroku „bytu w sobie” w rzęsiste światło „bytu dla siebie”, czyli nadała Naturze postać świata kultury. „To Europa wyszkoliła się w roli krawca szyjącego świat na zamówienie” (Bauman, 2005, s. 22). Jest to punkt widzenia humanisty całkowicie odseparowanego od wiedzy przyrodniczej, który nie dostrzega, że „szycie świata na zamówienie” odbywa się z materiału dostarczonego przez Przyrodę i podlega ograniczeniom przyrodniczym wbudowanym zarówno w wykorzystywany materiał (surowiec), jak i w naturę krawca. Lekceważenie tych ograniczeń sprawia, że ubranie wpija się i coraz bardziej pęka w szwach. Korekty wymaga także jego twierdzenie, że to Europa pierwsza dokonała uczłowieczenia świata Natury i nadała temu światu postać świata kultury. Wbrew temu, co twierdzi Bauman, badania paleoantropologów pokazują, że proces uczłowieczenia rozpoczął się w Afryce, gdzie badacze odkrywają pierwsze narzędzia używane do przekształcania „świata w sobie” w „ świat dla nas”. Śledzą tam oni nie tylko tworzenie narzędzi używanych przez naszych praprzodków do polowania i ślady wykorzystywania ognia, ale także sposoby uprawy ziemi i hodowli zwierząt potrzebne do tego, żeby istnienie krawca i szycie świata na zamówienie było możliwe. Okazuje się, że to właśnie z Afryki nasi przodkowie wyruszyli na podbój świata, zasiedlając tereny Bliskiego Wschodu i Europę. Tam też, w plemiennej szkole przetrwania na afrykańskich sawannach, rozpoczęło się kształtowanie zarówno ludzkiego umysłu, jak i zmysłu moralnego rozwijanego następnie w Europie, zmysłu skrojonego na miarę plemiennych potrzeb, który obecnie musi podołać wyzwaniom stawianym w kontekście odpowiedzialności za cały świat.

W zglobalizowanym świecie los każdego człowieka w każdym zakątku świata wpływa na losy innych i jest przez innych kształtowany – twierdzi Bauman. Dlatego na obecnym etapie rozwoju historycznego los wolności i demokracji rozstrzyga się na globalnej scenie i tylko na globalnej scenie można bronić globalnych wartości oraz dostosować (przebudować) tradycyjne systemy wartości do jednoczącego się świata.

Tak więc globalizacja w rozumieniu Baumana i w rozumieniu wielu innych autorów podnoszących problemy globalizacji polega na europeizacji świata i odzwierciedla pragnienie Europy, aby przerobić świat na własną modłę. Przyznaje on także, że dla Europy „reszta świata" była nie tyle przedmiotem wyzwań poznawczych, ile wyzwań eksploatatorskich. Bauman dostrzega jednak, że obecnie następuje odwrót od dominacji Europy. Dzieje się tak dlatego, że po pierwsze, kraje pozaeuropejskie odkrywają własną wartość i niektóre z nich domagają się rehabilitacji swoich rodzimych wartości, a po drugie, to zeuropeizowana Ameryka, a ściślej Stany Zjednoczone, które stały się światowym mocarstwem, zepchnęły Europę do drugiego rzędu i obecnie starają się uporządkować świat na własną modłę. Bauman nie ocenia jednak tej nowej sytuacji pozytywnie, nie jest entuzjastą sukcesów Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki ani w dziedzinie militarnej, ani gospodarczej, ani kulturowej. Zauważa bowiem, że Ameryka, głosząc gotowość zaprowadzania światowego porządku, stwarza nieład i potęguje przemoc, gdyż *de facto* strzeże własnych przywilejów i służy własnym interesom.

Równie sceptyczną ocenę roli Stanów Zjednoczonych w budowie ładu światowego przedstawia Noam Chomsky (Chomsky, 2000), który analizuje procesy globalizacji na modłę amerykańską na przykładzie interwencji USA w Ameryce Południowej. Jeżeli w propagowanym systemie wolnorynkowym zysk jest ważniejszy niż ludzie, argumentuje Chomsky, to znaczy, że pomysły zwiększające zyski są oceniane pozytywnie nawet wtedy, kiedy prowadzą do powiększania obszarów nędzy mas ludzkich. Tego typu zjawiska pauperyzacji społeczeństw obserwujemy w krajach Ameryki Południowej, w Meksyku, Brazylii, Chile i we wszystkich innych krajach na świecie, które wcielają w życie zasady wolnego rynku. Zasady wolnego rynku stanowią podstawowy towar eksportowy w polityce amerykańskiej. W przywołanym opracowaniu Chomsky skrupulatnie wylicza liczne przykłady protekcjonizmu stosowane przez amerykańskie rządy na własnym rynku wewnętrznym.

Mimo że Europa na obecnym etapie rozwoju historycznego przestała dominować, to Bauman sądzi, że świat nadal potrzebuje Europy obdarzonej poczuciem globalnej misji, czyli takiej misji, w której interesy Europy będą zbieżne z interesami ludzi znajdujących się poza Europą. Z jednej strony Bauman opisuje degradację idei charakteryzujących europejskość oraz obserwowaną utratę znaczenia Europy na światowej scenie politycznej, z drugiej strony nadal

przypisuje jej zbawczą misję w dziejach świata. Wygląda na to, że tylko Europa posiada możliwości, by ustanowić nowy ład na planecie pokrytej gęstą siecią wzajemnych zależności. Najważniejszą z nich jest wielokulturowość Europy, która jest ubocznym skutkiem podbojów kolonialnych. Od dawna „inni" są nieodzownym składnikiem europejskiej tożsamości, a ten fakt skłania mieszkańców Europy do akceptowania wielorakich różnic w sferze publicznej i do negocjacji zamiast stosowania przemocy. Bauman jest także przekonany, że to Europa albo lepiej – europejskość – może dostarczyć tworzywa dla jednoczącego się świata. „Myślę, że problem, przed którym stoimy, polega na dopasowaniu naszego systemu wartości do globalizującego się świata. Wartości, takich jak wolność człowieka, godność ludzka, prawo jednostki do samostanowienia, prawo ludzi do pokojowego współżycia z sąsiadami. Wartości te przekładaliśmy do tej pory na język terytorium" (Bauman, 2002, s. 222). Od siebie dodam, że po to by rozwiązywać problemy globalizacji, która „toczy się nad naszymi głowami", i by urzeczywistniać wyżej wyliczone wartości, należy poczuciem odpowiedzialności ogarnąć całą planetę. Ziemię taką, jaką widzimy z kosmosu, gdyż dobrostan gatunku ludzkiego jest sprzężony z dobrostanem ziemskiej wspólnoty życia.

Bauman przyznaje, że realizacja planetarnej solidarności to wielkie wyzwanie, które wymaga nowej jakości ludzi, podobnie jak przejście do fazy przemysłowej wymagało nowej jakości narzędzi. Doceniając to wyzwanie, stwierdza, że „Stworzenie ram dla zgodnego współistnienia rozmaitych sposobów życia i nakłonienie ludzi do pokojowych negocjacji w duchu współpracy ku wzajemnej korzyści jest obecnie sprawą życia i śmierci" (Bauman, 2005, s. 66). Sądzę, że wykonanie tego zadania może ułatwić „wszechświatowy punkt widzenia", który umożliwia przebudowę zarówno antropocentrycznej, jak i europocentrycznej wizji ludzkiego świata, zastępując ją konsyliacyjną wizją kosmocentryczną.

W rozumieniu Baumana globalizacja jest procesem żywiołowym, jest czymś, „co nam się stało i toczy się nad naszymi głowami", gdyż nie wiadomo, gdzie są autorzy tego procesu. Przywołując jego metaforę z krawcem, nie bardzo wiadomo, kim jest krawiec szyjący globalny ład ludzkiego świata, i nie wiadomo, na czyje zamówienie go wykonuje. Z mojego naturalistycznego i ewolucyjnego punktu widzenia krawcem szyjącym wspólny świat jest ewoluujący gatunek ludzki szyjący świat (antroposferę) na zamówienie doboru naturalnego, który w ten sposób testuje wartość krawca (gatunku *homo sapiens*), jego autonomię i odpowiedzialność za jakość swoich wytworów. Jakość tych wytworów jest oceniana w odniesieniu do tego, jak one przystają do ewoluującego świata przyrody pozaludzkiej. Wygląda na to, że krawiec nadęty pychą nie dokonywał żadnych przymiarek, gdyż odkrył, że to właśnie on jest „miarą wszechrzeczy" i narzuca światu porządek, że z racji swojej natury ustanawia porządek w sposób absolutnie wolny

i autonomiczny zgodnie z akceptowanymi wzorcami Dobra, Prawdy i Piękna. I jeżeli są jakieś odstępstwa od tych idei (wzorców), jakieś mankamenty w udoskonalaniu światowego tworzywa, to są one przemijające i w procesach historycznego rozwoju zostaną wyeliminowane. Jednakże wbrew iluzorycznym oczekiwaniom okazało się, że świat szyty na zamówienie przez europejskiego, a obecnie także przez amerykańskiego krawca prowadzi do załamania. Okazuje się, że naśladowanie zachodniego modelu życia we wszystkich krajach świata nazywane globalizacją zamiast do powszechnego dobrobytu doprowadziło do sytuacji określanej mianem kryzysu środowiskowego. Świat pęka w szwach i nadaje się do gruntownej poprawki, świadczy o tym zarówno raport U Thanta, jak i raporty o stanie świata opracowane na zamówienie Klubu Rzymskiego.

Ze względu na objętość mojego artykułu nie mogę tych szeroko dyskutowanych raportów omawiać. Zwrócę jedynie uwagę na to, że pojęcie odpowiedzialności za świat i problem sformułowania zasad etyki odpowiedzialności globalnej pojawiają się w kontekście poszukiwania odpowiedzi na bardzo trudne pytanie o to, jak przebudować zachodnioeuropejski model świata, który w procesach globalizacji staje się modelem ogólnoświatowym, aby zażegnać narastające globalne zagrożenia. Chodzi o takie rzeczywiste zagrożenia jak nadmierne rabowanie przez ludzi zasobów surowcowych planety, gdyż już wiemy, że są to zasoby, które są także do dyspozycji pozaludzkich istot żywych. A także pytanie o to, jak ograniczyć zjawisko antropopresji polegające na pozbawianiu przestrzeni życiowej roślin i zwierząt żyjących w stanie dzikim przez ekspandującą ludzką populację. Jak zmniejszyć tempo narastania efektu cieplarnianego, jak rozwiązać wiele innych problemów współczesnego świata generowanych przez nieodpowiedzialne, krótkowzroczne działania człowieka? Słowem, jak zbudować nowy model trwałego (zrównoważonego) współistnienia gatunku ludzkiego i ludzkiego świata we wspólnocie biosfery. Etyka odpowiedzialności globalnej, która ma określać zasady tego współistnienia, wzbogacona przez nowy kosmiczny wymiar poszerza zobowiązania moralne nie tylko na całą ludzkość, ale także na całą ziemską wspólnotę życia. Może zatem dostarczyć motywów do podjęcia odpowiedzialności za jednoczący się wspólny świat, mimo lokalnych konfliktów i podziałów politycznych.

Podsumowując moje rozważania, pragnę podkreślić, że przedstawiłam odpowiedzialność jako ewolucyjnie ukształtowany i specyficznie ludzki rodzaj więzi człowieka z otaczającym światem. Zwróciłam także uwagę na rodzący się globalny wymiar odpowiedzialności i umieściłam ją w planetarnym środowisku ziemskiego życia, które istnieje w kosmicznym ekosystemie.

Sądzę także, że zaproponowany „wszechświatowy punkt widzenia" umożliwia najpełniejszą odpowiedź nie tylko na pytania o naturę odpowiedzialności, ale także na odwieczne

filozoficzne pytania: skąd pochodzimy i co nas łączy z kosmosem, kim jesteśmy, a także i o to: jaki jest sens naszego istnienia?

Odpowiedź na trzecie pytanie zależy od odpowiedzi na pytanie drugie, które jest wspierane przez odpowiedź na pierwsze pytanie. Teoretyczne podłoże moich rozważań stanowiła metafizyka ewolucyjna związana z odpowiedzią na wyliczone pytania. Przyjęcie tej metafizyki skłania do uznania, że gatunek ludzki nie jest „panem stworzenia" ani „pasterzem bytu". Żyjemy w głębi niewyobrażalnie rozległego, ewoluującego Wszechświata i uczestniczymy w zdarzeniach rozgrywających się w niewyobrażalnej skali czasu. Jesteśmy jednak odpowiedzialni za sprawstwo czynów wywierających wpływ na zdolność ewoluowania naszego wspólnego świata, który stanowi środowisko ziemskiego życia. Nie mamy żadnego wpływu na procesy rozgrywające się w głębi Wszechświata i nie jesteśmy za nie odpowiedzialni, chociaż w mgnieniu oka mogą one doprowadzić zarówno do zagłady ziemskiego życia, jak i do zniszczenia cywilizacji.

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Creating an image of people with disabilities in formal education. Analysis of the textbooks used in the chosen European countries

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Abstract

Creating an image of people with disabilities in formal education is an important element of educating young people into a full and unbiased understanding of the needs and reality of these people. Consequently, it is an element of creating a social climate around people with disabilities and influencing state policy in this area. Therefore, I find it extremely important to analyse and compare ideas worked out in different countries in order to correctly assess our own situation and find inspiring and applicable solutions. In the text, I focused on one component of the system of formal education, i.e. selected textbooks used in Poland and Sweden in which I highlighted their disability-related content. The starting point for the analysis was the definition of disability and explanation of the social identity theory which provided the framework for the research questions. The presented analysis and comparison of the chosen teaching material, fragmentary as it, might form the basis for further investigation in this area.

Key words: addressing disability, stereotypes, English textbooks, comparative education

1. INTRODUCTION

Formal education is a broad term that comprises different forms of institutionalized training based on a curricula with objectives defined by educational authorities. An inevitable part of formal education is textbooks whose content, derived from the curricula, mirrors values, norms and attitudes present and dominating in a given society. Thus, textbooks, often in an indirect way,

can perpetuate stereotypes and influence the social perception of chosen groups either by the way they are presented or by omitting them at all (Bourdieu, Passeron, 1990, p. 60-64; Chomczyńska-Rubacha, Pankowska, 2011, p. 19-20; Janowski, 1989, p. 66-82; Meighan, 1993, p. 75-76). The role of textbooks in shaping collective awareness, including the attitude towards people with disabilities, cannot be underestimated as they authorize given knowledge, draw attention to some phenomena and fail to sensitize us to others (Hardin, Preston, 2001, p. 45).

An analysis of numerous textbooks for various subjects and school levels carried out in Poland over the last few years has revealed that they do not represent social diversity and often perpetuate stereotypes and prejudices, also in relation to people with disabilities. The main objections given to textbooks concern misrepresentations of people with disabilities and, in the case of their appearance, showing them in the context of their disability, usually as people needing care and protection (Pawlęga, Chustecka, 2011, p. 138-144; Jonczy-Adamska 2011, p. 203-206).

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

The theoretical framework for this paper is based on two assumptions. Firstly, the guideline for the paper is the definition of disability provided by the World Health Organization (WHO) that states that "Disabilities is an umbrella term, covering impairments, activity limitations, and participation restrictions. (…) Disability is thus not just a health problem. It is a complex phenomenon, reflecting the interaction between features of a person's body and features of the society in which he or she lives. Overcoming the difficulties faced by people with disabilities requires interventions to remove environmental and social barriers" (World Health Organization, 2014). In this model of disability, rooted in bio-psycho-social paradigm, the society is perceived as the essential power in creating favourable conditions for people with disabilities. In such a model, it is particularly important to equip the younger generation with relevant knowledge, skills and attitudes towards people with disabilities. It is only in this way will they be able and willing to change their environment into a place where people with disabilities will meet social acceptance that will also result in creating relevant facilities for them. Thus, in the context of education, it is necessary to create the a positive image of people with disabilities, e.g. by removing all content that carry stereotypical views.

Another element of this framework is connected with the social identity theory based on the way people identify their social belonging in the process of creating social categorization. Within this theory, I have found the model of personalization or de-categorization particularly relevant in the analysis of the teaching material. In this model, it is crucial to perceive the representative of the

stereotyped groups as an individual, not just a member of a social category. In the case of disability, it means seeing not only disability-related features but the whole person, with their personal traits, interests, skills, integrated with the social group other than labelled "people with disabilities." This model can be also used by taking the perspective of the representative of the group by empathizing with situation of the discriminated person (Grzymała-Moszczyńska, 2013, p. 66-67; Nelson, 2003, p. 315-316).

When preparing my research questions, I also relied on the tips for evaluating books that address disability and particularly the things that should be **avoided** when dealing with the topic:

- Cast people with disabilities as victims and evoke pity, sorrow or sentimentality toward them.

- Include characters with disabilities only in tokenistic ways, or as objects of curiosity, rather than as developed characters with distinct lives and personalities.

- Define characters' personalities by their disabilities and portray them as sad, incomplete, bitter, or angry in disproportionate ways (rather than as distinctive individuals with the full human range of character traits).

- Characterize people with disabilities in stereotypically positive ways that compensate for their "deficiency," such as having unusual emotional or physical characteristics, special spiritual or moral insights, superior intellectual abilities or wisdom, or unnaturally inspirational qualities.

- Represent the achievements or ordinary actions of people with disabilities as heroic.

- Never show people with disabilities as independent, but rather depict them as overly helpless and in need of excessive support and assistance from people without disabilities in order to lead a functional life.

- Portray people with disabilities as overly preoccupied with their conditions and consumed with the hope of recovery or cure.

- Represent people with disabilities or the disabilities themselves as shameful, unattractive, or something to be hidden.

- Utilize condescending or pejorative language (e.g., special, crazy, sick, slow, cripple, dumb, retarded, idiot).

- Only show people with disabilities in passive roles and never show them in active or leadership positions.

- Show people with disabilities only in "special" settings and programs, and never show them participating in activities considered typical for their age group.

- Dwell on what people with disabilities *can't* do rather than what they *can* do.

- Represent disabilities as deficiencies rather than differences.

- Present disabilities as problems only for the people who have them and not for the broader society (i.e. prejudice, discrimination, inequity, access).

- Depict adolescent and adult people with disabilities as asexual and without the same emotional or sexual needs and attachments as other people their age.

- Portray allies to people with disabilities as inspirations or "saints" for helping them, or as especially wonderful simply for simply being their friends (*Anti-Defamation League*, 2005).

Taking into account the WHO definition of a disability and the social identity theory, I focused my textbooks analysis on detecting whether the textbooks perpetuate the stereotypes and reinforce social categorization or counteract them by creating an appropriate image of a person with a disability. Thus, the main questions applied in investigating the contents of the textbooks were as follows:

- Are the people with disabilities present in the texts and visual material?

- Are they presented in a stereotypical way (as dependent, less happy, passive, helpless)?

- Do people with disabilities appear in ordinary life or mainly in the context of care?

- Do we know their interests, personality and skills?

- Are they presented as heroes, victims or other characters as well?

- Do the textbooks teach to react to discrimination?

- Do they allow students to face their own stereotypes?

- Are there different types of disability presented?

- How are they divided according to gender and who, in this respect is a caretaker?

For my analysis, I have chosen English textbooks used in Sweden and in Poland and belonging to the most popular series in both countries.. The choice was on one hand determined by their linguistic availability. On the other hand, it was equally as important that in case of Swedish textbooks, they were written mainly by Swedish authors who, either consciously or unconsciously, transmit the set of values rooted in the culture they come from. In case of textbooks used in Poland, they were written and consulted by both English and Polish authors. Last but not least, the choice of textbooks for English resulted from universality of teaching English in both Sweden and Poland.

The Swedish textbooks employed in the analysis belong to the series *What's up*, written by Jorgen Gustafsson, Eva Osterberg and Andy Cowle, published by Bonnier Utbildning AB (the

company has belonged to Sanoma Utbildning since 2011). The material is intended for the last three grades of the Swedish comprehensive school (students aged 13-16). Thus, this level is comparable with the Polish last two grades of junior secondary school and the first grade of senior secondary school. Bearing this in mind and relying on my own experience as an English teacher and consulting other in-service teachers, I chose a sample of relevant textbooks used in Polish schools. The bibliography listed below contains the details of the analysed teaching material. Applying the method of content analysis, I firstly identified the texts and images related to the main topic of the research which were next subjected to further analysis.

3. GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE TEXTBOOKS

In the analysed books, I followed the presence of people with disabilities understood in its most common sense, as mental or physical impairment, but I also focused on less obvious examples such as dyslexia or excessive weight.

As for the first research question (Are the people with disabilities present in the texts and visual material?), it should be concluded that the common feature of both Swedish and Polish textbooks is absence of people with disabilities on the pages of the teaching materials. As David Sadker notices, "the most fundamental and oldest form of bias in instructional materials is the complete or relative exclusion of a group" (Sadker, n.d.).

Another characteristic of the teaching material from the two countries is the general message they carry concerning personal appearance and health. This message involves promoting the cult of body, sport, fitness, physical activity with a healthy, slim, beautifully dressed and cared for average teenagers without any disabilities and health problems. This way, textbooks authorize the image of society with their "typical", "desirable" and "acceptable" individuals among whom people with disabilities hardly ever appear.

3.1. POLISH TEXTBOOKS

Out of the six analysed textbooks, disability is addressed in three of them: *My matura success. Pre-Intermediate. Students' Book*, *Egzamin gimnazjalny z języka angielskiego. Podręcznik i repetytorium z testami* and *New Exam Connections Pre-Intermediate 3. Workbook*. In the first of the books mentioned above, *My matura success ...*, there is a text titled *Hidden talents* devoted to famous people who had dyslexia and who sometimes had a hard time, especially at school. Nevertheless, they were intelligent and creative in different areas as the examples of Agatha Christie, Albert Einstein, Leonardo da Vinci, Ludwig van Beethoven, John Lennon, Thomas Edison show. The comment accompanying the text reads: "Of course, that doesn't mean that everybody with dyslexia is a genius, but it

shows that sometimes people can be a lot more intelligent than they seem" (McKinlay et al., 2012, p. 29). Although students can find useful information in the text on dyslexia and its whole message is positive, it also presents people with disabilities as unnaturally gifted, thus far from an average person. In the same publication, we find a photograph of a woman in a wheelchair, dancing with a healthy male partner. Next to the picture a small text appears that states: (…) "I saw a video on YouTube. It showed a couple dancing. The woman was on a wheelchair but they were dancing beautifully and really enjoying themselves! I was amazed. It was totally inspiring!" (…) (McKinlay et al., 2012, p. 40). It is worth noticing that the word "but" in this context may be interpreted as the expression of a surprise or disbelief and thus carrying a discriminatory attitude. Later on, in the text entitled *A new life* we find a story of boy who was overweight, because got depressed after his parents' divorce, but he started a diet and now "he feels much happier, fitter and is more energetic" (McKinlay et al., 2012, p. 125). Optimistic as it is, the story seems a bit simplistic. In another of the analyzed books, *Egzamin gimnazjalny z języka angielskiego. Podręcznik i repetytorium z testami*, there are only a few separate words related to disability. They are located in the chapter "Health" and represented by "wheelchair", "deaf", "overweight" and "disabled" (Fricker et al., 2008, p. 110-115, p. 195). The last book that does not contain any references to disability is *New Exam Connections. Pre-Intermediate 3. Workbook*. In the text entitled *Extraordinary people* there are three stories about people who lived with serious disabilities or illness: Stephen Wiltshire – an autistic child who had excellent talent (he drew incredibly accurate and realistic pictures' of what he saw), Evelyn Glennie – the famous percussionist who was almost deaf and Ben Underwood – a person suffering from rare form of eye cancer who lived without eyes, but who learnt to do everything his peers were doing and who was 'extraordinary in every way' (Garside, Spencer-Kępczyńska, 2011, p. 10).

Generally, out of the eleven people who lived with disabilities or illnesses distinguished in the textbooks, ten were somehow special and extraordinary: six famous people described in the text on dyslexia, one dancer, and three people depicted in the last text. Although the texts do challenge the stereotype of a person with disabilities as dependent, passive and helpless, the students hardly have any chance to see them in everyday context. Their image is unnaturally positive and heroic. Moreover, students cannot get acquainted with different types of disabilities or related discrimination, let alone ways of preventing unfair treatment.

3.2. SWEDISH TEXTBOOKS

References to people with disabilities can be found in four out of five of the analyzed textbooks: *What's up. Textbook 8, What's up. Workbook 8, What's up. Textbook 9, What's up. Workbook 9*. The first relevant text, from *What's up. Textbook 8*, is entitled *The year I loved him best* and its narrator – Lisa is

the cognitively disabled boy's (Michael) sister. Michael is described as sensitive, gifted, loving person and the story is focused on the process of Lisa's transformation from being ashamed of her brother to accepting his disability and appreciating his artistic gift and being proud of him. An additional value of the text is its presentation, in a very realistic way, the unfriendly and cruel reactions of the outside world towards Michael's disability (McIntyre, 2006, p. 35-36). In another story, the narrator is a boy with Asperger syndrome and readers get to know the world he lives in from his perspective (Haddon, 2006, p. 37-39). The workbook accompanying the textbook contains references to the material described above. In the same textbook we also have images of people who have recovered from their illnesses and were extremely successful in sport. It is *Wilma Rudolph – The Black Pearl*, about a runner who, as a child, had to overcome serious illness and whose words are quoted in the text: "The most important thing is to be yourself and have confidence in yourself" (Gustafsson, Osterberg & Cowle, 2006a, p. 62). Another text, *Lance Armstrong – Mr Tour de France,* tells the story of a famous cyclist (Gustafsson, Osterberg & Cowle, 2006a, p. 63). In part nine of the same series, both in the textbook and workbook, there is a story of a successful pianist who was born blind and mentally handicapped. The text, titled *A Genius – in spite of all*, describes all the limitations and great talents of the pianist and bears the message of hope even if prospects are unpromising in the beginning (Gustafsson, Osterberg & Cowle, 2007a, p. 14-15; Gustafsson, Osterberg & Cowle, 2007b, p. 19-20).

In the Swedish series, there is one more text that has transformative potential and can be indirectly related to disability. The author of *Noughts and Crosses* presents a world consisting of first- and second class citizens. The story can illustrate all kinds of social exclusion, mechanisms of stereotyping, maintaining prejudices and discrimination, and it gives space for students to discuss and reflect on the nature of intolerance (Blackman, 2007, p. 44-46).

4. CONCLUSIONS

The analysis was based on a sample of teaching materials used in Poland and Sweden and fragmentary as it is, it allowed me to draw some conclusions in response to the research questions:

- in the textbooks used in the two countries, images of people with disabilities appear only exceptionally; it can be said the textbooks both reflect and contribute to relative absence of such people in the society
- in the textbooks used in Poland, there is a visible overrepresentation of people with disabilities who are pictured as heroes. While such an image can indeed serve as a counterbalance to the functioning stereotypes as it emphasize activity, independence

and talents of people with disabilities, it refers to a limited number of people and cannot be used as an example to follow for the average person

- the authors of the Swedish textbooks introduce characters – people with disabilities – who are ordinary and more credible from the educational point of view, because teenagers can easily identify with them

- both in the textbooks used in Sweden and in Poland there is severe lack of images of people with disabilities presented in everyday situations, as individuals integrated in society and as a part of a given socio-cultural environment. Thus, readers cannot see such people going to school, travelling, shopping, working or dating. They are never portrayed as characters in love stories, sides of arguments or daily conversations. They usually shown as separate individuals living *next to*, not *in* the social milieu

- in the chosen textbooks, people with disabilities (cognitively disabled, blind and handicapped, suffering from Asperger syndrome) are also shown as gifted, sensitive, compassionate and caring people. In this way, students may learn to perceive handicapped people not only through the prism of their disability or as mere beneficiaries of somebody's help and mercy, but as ones who actively create reality, by using their strength and determination

- gendered analysis of the textbooks reveals some striking features presented both in the material from Poland and Sweden. In Polish textbooks nine out of eleven characters with disabilities are men or boys. Considering that, as I have mentioned above, they are presented as heroes who overcame difficulties, such an approach also suggests that successes have male background regardless of health status. In Swedish teaching materials, people with disabilities are also mainly boys or men and it is them who show determination, power and talents. On the other hand, the female characters, a grandmother, a mother or a sister, are indicated in the text in the context of taking care of a person with disability. This is well visible in the quoted story about a cognitively disabled boy. The father, although he obviously exists, is not mentioned individually, thus we may guess that he is present by the use of the expression "parents", ("parents became worried", "Heart-broken, they sent him to private institution"), but only the mother is individualized by what she says or does. It is mother who was afraid whether another child would be disabled too: "My mother held breath for a year, wondering if I would be like Michael". She is also the one who seems responsible for a cognitively disabled son, which might be concluded from her daughter's utterances: "I decided to be patient for Mom's sake", "I helped her fix up

the guest room for Michael", "Mother gave me a letter he had written" (McIntyre, 2006, p. 35-36). Also, characters from the textbooks used in Poland are looked after either by a single mother or by a grandmother

- generally, the authors of the textbooks insufficiently develop the topics connected with reacting to discrimination or facing students' own stereotypes. As for the last research question, as the presence of people with disabilities is so limited, it cannot be surprising there are only a few types of disability represented.

To sum up, referring to the social identity theory, the textbooks only partly contribute to de-categorization of people with disabilities, i.e. to their perception as the members of a common group or community. The authors of the teaching material put some efforts to present people with disability as successful, creative and independent people. However, with such underrepresentation of disability-related topics in the books, the students are unable to get to know various forms of disability, symptoms of discrimination or ways of combating it. What is more, as people with disabilities are usually shown as separate cases and not as integral part of a peer group, it can be difficult for young learners to imagine them as community members. Finally, students are also rarely required to face the perspective of a person with a disability and such an approach would definitely contribute to better understanding the specificity of disability.

I hope that presented analysis, focused on a little excerpt of educational material, will be inspirational both for further research in this area and for the authors of the textbooks.

*

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Global digital genre-communication forms in the process of flow to local Polish memosphere: the case of Facebook art memes[*]

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Abstract

We analysed the mechanisms generating specific genres in the digital network and described the phenomena which result in shaping new forms of modern communication genres. New digital genre-communication forms are exemplified by Facebook "art memes", which should be studied from two perspectives: literary research and social studies. The art of painting remediated in digital forms of so-called "memes" illustrates the global flow from the Western centre to the Eastern semi-peripheries of digitalizing Euro-Atlantic civilization. We applied analytical framework consisting of six criteria: sender, recipient, message, code, context and contact. Our conclusion is that the process of global-local flow, as exemplified by Facebook art memes, results in local enrichment of the global medium and content.

Key words: social media, digital genres, memosphere, memes, global media, local expression, Poland

1. INTRODUCTION: OUR RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The aim of this study was to analyse the local dimension of global Facebook "art memes". To achieve this goal, we asked three research questions.

Firstly, what modifications, no doubt associated with earlier models, have been subjected to the new forms of communication? When we consider changes of the medium and changes in the structure of the message, a number of specific issues emerge: to what extent can we speak of new online genres? How should the new forms of communication be reconciled with the tradition of genres? What new genre determinants need to be taken into account? Which ones need to be omitted so that to recognize their different specifics, i.e. a new, different perception to communication and a response within it?

Secondly, how do technological capabilities in conjunction with the activities of Facebook network users and their past experience allow creating new forms of communication both in a group and on an individual level?

Thirdly, viewing Facebook art memes through the prism of global social processes leads to questions about the transfer or journey of the theme and especially the form. Polish reception is therefore confronted with the digitalizing Western memosphere and especially with its sub-sphere visible within the "walled garden" of Facebook.

We describe some mechanisms and processes that are responsible for generating new digital-genre communication forms – exemplified by Facebook art memes.

2. OUR METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: GLOBAL FLOW OF GENRES

The presented research project is a detailed analysis of the issues of organizational forms of texts on the network as visible on Facebook: (1) formal organization, understood as a publishing frame, which provides for specific visual organization of the content, (2) organization of content, and (3) organization of social circulation enabling dialogue between the sender and the audience, creating a social bond, implying an agreement, sometimes even community activities. Therefore, three research areas are subjected to our "X-rays": the use of communication techniques (including in the technological dimension), the construction of distribution and opinion-sharing networks.

Our project required a detailed analysis of multimedia writings published on the most popular communication platform. Facebook, having many features and modes of operation, has also become a field of formation of many versions of one genre: memes. While many versions of memes appear on Facebook, Twitter and Pinterest, , as well as on Instagram or within one-to-one digital communication, these platforms are only places of distribution, not of the creative processes as such. Facebook and other current digital platforms emerged in the United States, but they are perfectly suited to the communication needs of customers in other countries (Gumkowska, Toczyski, 2016). The American origin of Facebook and the memosphere clearly suggest that globalization is one of the drivers of new genres in the Polish cyberspace. Polish users acquire these forms of communication with a slight delay, which suggests the U.S. market and digital parts of American society have leading role in the emergence of the new media. It is therefore a phenomenon of Westernization, one of the aspects of globalization in today's world, a clear direction of which – West to East – cannot be overlooked when we describe the international and transnational social process of diffusion of new technologies and the transfer of the related forms of communication. These are exemplified by Facebook art memes in our study.

While the origins of genre studies date back to ancient times, the information revolution of recent decades has brought a number of changes in this respect. There are no more permanent genre indicators, only parts of structural forms that make up short connections, and then migrate further. On the one hand, these changes show the anachronism of substantial amount of research, oriented towards the existence of permanent genre types even in digital space. On the other hand, they allow us to appreciate the wealth of the new forms and their momentary applications, based on personal, individual awareness of online users. Using a metaphor, we could say that before the digital multimedia age, genres were like stalactites, and today, they are more like a pyrotechnic show. A thorough analysis of the dynamic genre-evolving processes on these sites will lead to new conclusions about contemporary literary culture and the digital society.

Our research certainly fits into the current modern genre theory, which is a branch of science attempting to unify the research perspectives on artistic and non-artistic genres. Within modern media theory of genres, genres consist of factors such as: repeatability of the combination of tricks, targeted communication and dependence of the genre on communication technology (medium). While topics such as blogging seem to be sufficiently elaborated on from the perspective of literary and social studies, the budding genre of memes is a new ground, requiring analysis. We decided to use the word "blogosphere", describing the sphere of blogging, and apply it to the sphere of meme creation and distribution, naming it the "memosphere". Facebook art memes, on which we focus, are part of both local and global memospheres.

Capturing the protean nature of modern genre forms of communication occurring on the Internet (websites and mobile) is not an easy task. It requires great flexibility and continuous observation. It also requires an innovative research workshop. On one hand, it is a transfer of information (but not knowledge) possessed still mostly by business onto the testing ground of electronic discourse. On the other hand, it is a use of this knowledge for in-depth analysis of literature. The tools used will combine existing literary research experience with new communication situations in the world of new technologies. Multimedia writings and pictures on Facebook should be examined both in terms of their technological capabilities and semiotic aspects.

3. STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ON DIGITAL GENRES

In the traditional sense, genre science (genology) is defined as a branch of poetics dealing with types and literary genres, examining definitions of these concepts, their forms of existence, descriptions of structure, typology or systematization of literary material, as well as the historical development of genres, historical systems of genres, layers of genre awareness and the use of names and genre concepts (Cudak, 2007). The term "genology" appeared only in 1920 in the work of a comparatist and literary research methodologist Philippe van Tieghem, although it is assumed that this kind of reflection had gained the status of science much earlier, in the second half of the nineteenth century, through the work of the critic Ferdinand Brunetière (Skwarczyńska, 1966).

The different understandings of genology emerging throughout history can be divided into: genology until nineteenth century as an universalist stage, genology in late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when the literary science was developing as a separate branch of science (Gajda, 2001). The origins of Polish genology, which made a substantial contribution to the development of science (conferences, symposia, collections) was usually associated with the activities of Stefania Skwarczyńska.

Further developments in the so-called New Genre Theory (Balcerzan, 1999) occur in parallel and different directions, on the one hand, by developing research of new literary forms (Grochowski, 2000), on the other hand, by including par literary and utility texts in the range of genre researcher's interests. New faces of genology were also created, such as know media genology, intersemiotic genology. Researchers of linguistic genology have slightly different positions (Witosz, 2002).

There is a growing collection of hybrid texts that cannot be placed on a taxonomic grid. Some researchers wonder whether this means that the genres are not inevitably doomed (Balbus, 2000). Still, modern genre theory evolves (Balcerzan, 2000). The Modern Genre Theory is a discipline understood more broadly than traditional genre science, which, as a rule, is limited to literary genres. Proponents of the Modern Genre Theory postulate stretching the concept of "genre" to encompass the whole sphere of social communication situations. After Bachtin, they argue that "we speak using only certain genres of speech… Genres of speech are given to us in almost the same way as the native language, which we use without difficulty even before the theoretical mastery of grammar" (Bachtin, 1986, p. 373). In this sense, modern genre science deals with every utterance, both printed by a prestigious publishing house and written on the Internet by an anonymous user. As Bolecki wrote, understanding of the genres as solid forms referring to the new media must turn into situational genres (Bolecki, 2007, p. 217).

As can be seen from the above discussion, the term "genre" entails many historical, terminological and ideological complications, which will be analysed during this project. According to its earlier (prior to Bachtins') definitions, genre required durability, permanence, constitution of individual parameters and awareness of the existence of both the sender and the recipient to exist, figuratively speaking, crystallized as the stalactite: a form which is relatively stable over time. However, the Internet does not crystallize genres. Genre is not a stalactite, but rather a pyrotechnic show, because all forms of communication are highly dynamic processes of change, are more fleeting and momentary, are closer to types of speech, are not covered in the previous taxonomies and are created in specific communication situations. The variability of the forms of online communication can be easily illustrated with the example of blogs or Facebook art memes, which played a completely different role at first. Blogs have grown directly from the specific technological tradition which came to Poland from the West (Winer, 2004). The presence of blogs on the Polish web space is a manifestation of the afore-mentioned process of Westernization.

The internet exerts a growing influence not only on literary practices, but also on social, economic, cultural and even civilizational processes in general. Texts created online attract increasing attention from researchers. However, to what extent can the current state of knowledge be used to study new forms produced by the information society, otherwise referred to by sociologists as the new society, media civilization, digital society, network and e-society?

Multimedia writings are predominantly composed of functional texts that emerge outside of literature and become literature only in exceptional cases. Memes and Facebook art memes in general are not objects of aesthetic perception, but the social means of interpersonal

communication in the dimensions of the ethical, emotional and reference (Lejeune, 2007). If there is any way to incorporate them into literature, it is only by providing them with the terminology of applied literature as defined by Stefania Skwarczyńska (1932). However, "genre systems are governed, like other social institutions, by the force of inertia (which secures the continuity of facilitating communication) and the force of change (literature lives only as long as it transforms expectations of the readers). Literature should not be understood as an autonomous whole with post factum attempts to tie to the social phenomena. Its independence is very relative, because she is primarily a social system." (Lejeune, 2007, p. 57, 92) Therefore, memes and Facebook art memes are treated as an important and significant social phenomenon that also requires analysis with the tools available for the science of literature, including genre theory.

The thesis of the existence of genres in the Internet has been unanimously adopted and popularized although there is no definition that would allow clear identification of what an online genre is and on what basis it is to be isolated. It is especially important from the perspective of the past 20 years of the emergence and subsequent mutating of online communication forms. All modern genre research on the Internet undertaken so far has shown the difficulty of reconciling the different orders of current genre knowledge with online communications practices. Researchers dealing with multimedia writings are struggling with the definitions of the genres, their implementations and classifications (Gumkowska, Maryl, Toczyski, 2009).

To describe the difficult nature of the world wide web, genre researchers usually rely on the concept of remediation proposed by media experts Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin (2000). Remediation is the logic "according to which new media are transforming the earlier media forms" (Bolter, Grusin, 2000, p. 273). No new media form is born from the scratch, the researchers say, all new media technologies rely on old technology transformation, modernization and addition of the newest media technologies. Each new form is therefore "a representation of one medium in another".

In addition, genres can be understood mainly by reference to their social aspects (Hare et al., 2007; Trammel et al., 2006; Wojcik and Dryll, 2008; Gill, Nowson and Oberlander, 2009; Cywińska-Milonas, 2002). The book entitled *Liternet.pl* (Marecki, 2003) was the first anthology of electronic literature in Poland. However, the author focused on literary societies, the problem of hypertext, blogs and copyright websites. The issue of modern genres was not raised. Similarly, in *Literature and the Media After 1989* (Hopfinger, 2010) you can find an entire chapter devoted to electronic literature, but no resolution of modern genre issues. Researchers analysing the new communication phenomena often turn to tools of poetics media (Szczęsna, 2007) or to Intersemiotics (Balbus et al., 2004). The modern genre theory called for the research stage of

online texts, mainly blogs. This is evidenced by the recent work of Marta Więckiewicz, who analyses blogs from a multimedia modern genre standpoint (Więckiewicz, 2012), or by the works of Maciej Maryl (2010).

Genre classification is important not only for purely theoretical but also for practical reasons. There are ongoing projects creating search engines which automatically identify genres to facilitate the orientation of online surfers on the net. This is not an easy task due to insufficient standardization of websites, lack of modern genre research conducted on multimedia writings and new digital competence of the audience, which does not stem from historical knowledge. Referring to the definition of the medium by McLuhan (1994), Danah Boyd (2006) proves that some media have different distribution channels, such as television, which can be accessed through satellites, cable connections or radio waves. The Internet, according to this researcher, is a multimedia channel that reveals the processes of media convergence. One of the media in the context of the Internet is the blog and meme. Thus, the researcher does not treat blogs as a genre, but as a medium.

Internet users also actively engage in discussions concerning online genres, unfortunately without much success. The definitions generated by them in American literature are referred to as Meta-Genre (Giltrow, 2001). However, from the point of view of literary experts, it does not seem right to use the term Meta-Genre in this sense or to define genres only by reference to user awareness. This is because there are usually standard rules operating as a collection of unwritten and even unconscious rules and regulations, which govern a given text.

4. STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ON THE MEMOSPHERE

Memes are the viral part of online culture, and can gain so much attention that they spread into mainstream popular culture (Chen, 2012). Memes are also a type of an online social game. Their definition is expanding: they can be funny images, captured at the right moment, with a comment, or short animations in the form of GIF files, or videos shared by social media users. Internet users often refer to them as online phenomena, good or catchy ideas, humour, cutting retorts, virals, graphic commentary, graphics with captions (Hatalska, 2013). What is interesting is that references to comic books are rare, as they are associated with a story told over several stages, while a meme captures just a single point in time without any continuation.

What are the origins of memes? We are not going to argue that authors of memes are aware of their association with the Greek μίμνήσκω. Then search for etymology of modern

expressions in the Antiquity often ends in a blind alley (Shifman, 2013), but in this case a short analysis of the concept will allow us to highlight the characteristic features of online memes.

Once again, we should stress that in general reception of the word "meme" is a derivative of "memory". The name did not appear on the Internet thanks to academic discourse or debate on etymology or the Dawkins theory. It emerged as a result of economics of online communication and the need to find new names for a new communication practice (Grzenia, 2006).

However, if we wish to consider the Greek root, we have two options. *Mem* could be derived either from the verb μιμνήσκω, which is related to memory and means "to memorize, to remind" (Jurewicz, 2001, p. 58) and gave the name to the Greek goddess Mnemosyne, the mother of the nine muses, or from the verb μιμεομαι meaning "to imitate, to present, to replicate" (Jurewicz, 2001, p. 57). On the one hand, it is a message memorized in communication, on the other, it can be imitated or replicated. These meanings can be placed in a certain hierarchy: when it comes to its existence on the Internet, memorizing a meme plays the most important role (the meme must be interesting enough so that the innovative combination of an image with a comment is easily memorable and the users want to share it with their friends), while imitating and replicating (independent creation of new versions) is secondary to that.

In the world of science, the word *meme* was first used by an Austrian physicist Ewald Hering in 1870, who derived it from μιμνήσκω (Shifman, 2013, p. 363). Next, it was used by a German biologist Richard Semon to describe memory trace in 1904 (Semon, 1909). Later, the term appears in a 1927 book entitled *The Life of the White Ant* by a Belgian playwright and essayist Maurice Maeterlinck (Laurent, 1999). However, scholars associate the concept mainly with the theory of Richard Dawkins (1996).

Numerous researchers (Knobel, Lankschear, 2007) have tried to recontextualize Dawkins' idea of a meme in the context of digital culture through analysis of online memes. Limor Shifman, who tries to reconcile both orders (Dawson's theory and online practice), starts with a famous statement: "Memes are a pain. Or so at least a glance into the world of academic literature would suggest" (2013, p. 362).

Description of the heated debate over Richard Dawkins' *The Selfish Gene* of 1976 would exceed the limits of this publication. Further discussion requires the adoption of a general definition of online memes. The broadest and most encompassing definition is provided by Limor Shifman. In her book entitled *Memes in Digital Culture* she defines memes as "digital content units with common characteristics of content, form, and/or stance, created with awareness of each other, and circulated, imitated, and transformed via the Internet by many

users." (2013, p. 27). Shifman differentiates memes from virals, analyses the reasons for their success or failure and categorizes them. She believes that memes are a new way of participating in democratic political life and considers them "agents of globalisation".

Among the Polish proposals, the definition put forward by Wiktor Kołowiecki seems similar to the ones quoted above: „An online meme is a digitized unit of information (text, image, video, sound) distributed online, which is copied, processed and published in such processed form on the Internet" (Kołowiecki, 2012). The author presents the concept from the perspective of cultural studies.

Some of the noteworthy Polish works on memes include *Niecne memy. Dwanaście wykładów o kulturze Internetu* (Kamińska, 2011) and several articles: *Memy internetowe jako nowy język internet* by Wiktor Kołowiecki (2012), *Memy internetowe – tworzenie, rozpowszechnianie, znaczenie społeczne* by Marta Juza (2013), papers by Adam Walkiewicz or *Demotywatory. Graficzne makra w komunikacji i kulturze* by Sieńko (2009). An approach from the perspective of media studies can be found in works by Marta Juza, who focuses on the functioning of memes on the basis of mechanisms similar to those governing gossips, urban legends, rumours or jokes. She also refers to *Diagnoza Internetu* (Milewski, Toczyski, 2009) and the *World Internet Project 2012* (Toczyski et. al., 2012), which show that "only some Internet users use the web in an active way (in the study they are called Authors). Most users (referred to as Observers and Consumers) use the web as a source of information and method of maintaining contacts with other people. Authors actively participate in the life of online forums, write blogs, comment on current events and publish the results of their own work (including memes). It should be stressed that all creative online work is posted mainly by young people… We could presume that they would pursue their passions even without the Internet or, more generally speaking, without digital technologies, although with them, their activity becomes much easier" (Juza, 2013, p. 53).

5. FACEBOOK AS AN ORGANIZATION FOR SOCIAL CIRCULATION OF MEMES

Facebook is a machine created for social networking, but also for social distribution of content – including memes. The entire system, its connections, mutual contents, algorithms – they all aim to deliver information and opinion to the largest possible number of recipients. The aim and its mechanism is simple: to display and share interesting messages to encourage users to return to the website or mobile application – if not make them connected permanently – because they know that they will find interesting content, adjusted to their needs, which has already been proofed by their friends. They do not have to search through thousands of messages to get to

those that deserve their attention. This is an advantage of Facebook feed over Google. It is primarily a strictly confidential, well-protected algorithm of Facebook that decides which posts should be displayed and in what order. It is not known for how long the news feed should work to capture individual needs and interests of its users, to respond with the most interesting posts selection. Its adjustments seem to be dynamic and real-time.

Allegedly, the algorithm takes into account over fifty different factors, the most important ones being: with whom the user interacts most often, which posts he/she "likes" or comments on, whom he/she sends private messages to or chats with, which links he/she usually clicks. Very often, recipients are not aware of how this system works and that the information in their profiles is automatically filtered. Dynamic changes of posts shown in the news feed with peritexts illustrating their chronology conceal the interventions of an intermediary who shapes the reality we see and access. It is quite obvious that posts with texts and images are rated higher by the algorithm. Because this fact is concealed, the "virality of information" grows especially towards pieces of logo-visual content. Posts appear relevant and credible – because they are recommended by one's friends. Specific senders and recipients are unaware that they are assigned to a one or another "filter bubble".

Information published on one profile is automatically posted within the news feed of one's friends and fans. Given its current reach, this platform is like an Internet within the Internet – a huge network of connected users who can interact with each other as long as they remain within the "walled garden" of Facebook. So the entire system inside the website works towards internal content distribution and prefers such information and opinion spread over redirecting to the external websites. Participants of such communication recommend posts to each other. Distribution works on several levels: in a systemic way (as a new version of blogroll, but multiplied) and through virals (as in the case of memes), based on recommendations.

There is a hidden automated intermediary present in the Facebook communication process, which is constantly modified – although not necessarily improved from the user experience perspective. In such digital environment, narrow topics are distributed within a group of interested users, while universal themes can count for a wide reach. But the interest in the given post is short-lived, especially in the case of memes. The life of a message in this communication-intense environment is becoming shorter and shorter. However, there are mechanisms analogous to blogs which should be taken into account within the analysis of Facebook. It is the participation of other media, which are looking for interesting information on this platform. Facebook serves as cross-media tool for monitoring social interest and raising the

status of posts by quoting them and treating them as a source of information and opinion forming, not just entertainment.

We decided to describe Facebook in a more detailed way than it usually is considered in such studies. It is because of the platform's significance for a new digital genre-communication forms.

6. THE INNER STRUCTURE OF "ART MEMES"

As we have already mentioned, within the "walled garden" of Facebook there is a sub-category of memes called "art memes". These are memes based on works of known artists. Some of them enjoy high popularity on Facebook and can have ca. 1.2 million likes, which is comparable to big, professional websites: https://www.facebook.com/classicalartmemes/?fref=ts. Upon closer look, art memes also have vulgar and hateful versions – and not only those. To find out more, one can visit the following websites: https://www.facebook.com/ClassicaIArtMemes/?fref=nf; https://www.facebook.com/groups/RenaissanceAnonymousArt; https://www.facebook.com/Artmemephoto; https://www.facebook.com/medievalartmemes. These fanpages illustrate the existence of a global English-language space for "art memes". Its local, Polish version, which we will analyze in detail, is called "Sztuczne Fiołki" ("Artificial Violets"). Its author himself considers Facebook art memes to be new forms of expression (Tengowska, 2013) and describes them as: "free voice of a pseudo-historical comical- tragic magazine which insures liberty [concealed leftist option]" or as "classical paintings with absurd inscriptions" (Klimowicz, 2014). What we know is that the author comes from Białystok, is a graduate of English Studies and studied fine arts in the United States (Klimowicz, 2014). The name of the profile ("Artificial Violets") stems from the word "art" for "Artificial" to the *Letters with Violet* by K.I. Gałczyński (Klimowicz, 2014). Such composition of global digital medium and its genres with the local language and cultural space – based in semi-peripheries of Europe – illustrates international and cross-cultural transatlantic flow of new media as correlated with local experience.

Global socio-cultural processes are of our interest, but we look at the phenomenon in more detailed way in order to describe the genre-communication form of Facebook art memes in terms of poetics. We are interested in the inner organization of content in the context of a communication setting by reference to the sender, recipient, message, code, context and contact projected within the text, which are the basic elements of communication identified by Roman Jakobson. This will allow us to identify recurring principles characteristic of the genre, and the

accompanying style of both single messages and the entire genre as such. Repeatability at a certain level (usually at the level of structure) is the basic condition for defining a new genre, even in the case of such dynamic media as the Internet. After Aleksandra Okopień-Sławińska we could say that: "on the one hand, each statement (…) proves the existence of a sender outside that message, just as every product proves the existence of its maker, and, on the other hand, presents the sender through its characteristic, inner semantic organization" (Okopień-Sławińska, 1987, pp. 31-32). Moreover, "each use of language corresponds to some social experience. The implicated metalinguistic message about the manner in which language is used in the given text, proves the existence of a sender as the provider of certain social practice" (Okopień-Sławińska, 1987, p. 34).

The fanpage we analyze is an example that even in the mass media one can draw the attention of a recipient used to popular entertainment to art. The author provides works of great artists with bubbles with his own commentary. He says that "the violets" (this is what he calls the individual Facebook art memes micro-posts) are created with a specific recipient in mind: a person dealing with literature, broadly understood humanities or culture" (Klimowicz, 2014). Moreover, he adds that he wants to remain anonymous, because "the Violets do not need an Author (capitalised). As you can see, they are doing just fine without him" (Tengowska, 2013).

6.1. SENDER

The sender is exposed through the automated system (information on the sender is displayed by each Facebook art meme), but he does not manifest his/her existence in the text too much. The sender fulfils his role without unnecessary self-presentation. He does not refer to his private life, and any autobiographic elements are limited to presentation of content connected with the sender's interests and opinions. The sender is not present through information coming from the extratextual world – which, in the case of Facebook profiles, ensure credibility – but mainly through the message embedded in the communication. The sender is the main narrator, he sends information and decides on its form. But it is the message itself that constitutes a representation of the sender's views. The author's introduction in the form of a comment is much different from the recommendation typical of a blog. There are hardly any comments referring to the author's childhood memories, current family life or career. The sender tries to hide himself to highlight the topic, and to manifest his subjective point of view through that topic.

On the profile called "Sztuczne Fiołki", each image with a bubble is preceded by a micro-comment, in which the sender pretends to take a neutral stand, as if coming from a different order of things; it provides metatextual information on the real author of the image and the relevant dates. Micro-posts are usually composed of four elements. The first element consists of

the information on the sender, delivered by the system (1), followed by the author's comment (2) and an additional element in the form of an image or some other multimedia material (3). The last element, provided by the system, is the date of publication with comment and share options (4), so that users can engage in a dialogue with the author. Below, one will find an example from "Sztuczne Fiołki" – the micro-post refers to the social campaign called "Eat apples to spite Putin", propagated by the media after Russia's embargo on Polish fruit and vegetables in August 2014.

Fig.1. Meme published at:
https://www.facebook.com/SztuczneFiolki/photos/a.483789074973669.115138.483774998308410/831703326848907/?type=1 [access: May 2016]

The sender's metatextual micro-comment preceding the meme such as: "Sturtevant J. Hamblin (1817-1884) – American painter (the meme was published in the last issue of "Duży Format") informs the recipients of the desired semantic approach to the text, facilitating their interaction with and comprehension of the message. It is a signal suggesting a semantic game based on irony and comedy. It categorizes the message under an appropriate reading style.

A digression: Dorota Łagodzka points out that Facebook texts contain information about the author of the processed painting, but outside of the platform, the meme loses that information. Łagodzka writes: "Sztuczne Fiołki provides the authors of the paintings, but the users who share those memes elsewhere do not always do that. It is as if Sztuczne Fiołki had painted a given 19th-century landscape or a painting by Malewicz. The meme spreads in this form,

with a new author. It is as if we considered a person quoting someone the author of the quote" (Łagodzka, 2014). Hence, a meme found outside of the Facebook platform is deprived of its typical publication framework (the text frame), which signals the proper interpretation of the Facebook art meme.

Fig. 2. Meme published at:
http://bialystok.gazeta.pl/bialystok/1,35241,15498803,Sztuczne_Fiolki__Mam_w_sobie_duze_poklady_wscieklosci.html [access: May 2016]

In the case of Facebook art memes, the sender appears on four levels: in the system-generated author information (1), in the author's micro-comment (2), in the attached logo-visual material (3), in the comments exchanged with recipients (4). So the sender is not the feature point here – the topic is. There is no author's ethos. But the sender is aware of the dialogue and community-building process, so he nurtures his relationship with the recipient, as shown by such posts as: "A goodnight meme for you. Tomorrow you will find Pires with the Nocturnes at the National Philharmonic as part of the "Chopin and his Europe" festival" or "To all you night owls: Jean-Philippe Rameau (1683-1764), a French composer and music theorist from the baroque era. Ralph Kirkpatrick (1911-1984), an American musician, harpsichordist and musicologist". The sender tries to moderate the recipient's actions. In what form is the sender present in the logo-visual message? In the case of Sztuczne Fiołki, the comments placed on known paintings consistently covey the sender's worldview and attitude.

The sender's attitude to the world is reconstructed through the cyclical nature of the posts. The sender of the logo-visual texts on "Sztuczne Fiołki" appears as an anticlerical person

with negative attitude to the capitalist world and continuously sceptical about the situation in Poland. This is reflected e.g. in the following memes, published among many other texts commenting on current events (changes in open-ended pension funds, burnt rainbow in capital city Plac Zbawiciela square, gender debate in Poland).

Fig. 3. Meme published at:
https://www.facebook.com/SztuczneFiolki/photos/a.483789074973669.115138.483774998308410/8213636278828
77/?type=1&permPage=1 [access: May 2016]

Fig. 4. Meme published at:
 https://www.facebook.com/SztuczneFiolki?fref=ts [access: May 2016]

Fig. 5. Meme published at:
https://www.facebook.com/SztuczneFiolki/photos/a.483789074973669.115138.483774998308410/731349956884245/?type=1&theater [access: May 2016]


Fig. 6. Meme published at:
http://www.wysokieobcasy.pl/wysokie-obcasy/1,114377,15498803,Sztuczne_Fiolki__Mam_w_sobie_duze_poklady_wscieklosci.html
[access: May 2016]

Apart from new topics and images, published texts include recurring images or characters, such as the painting by George Grosz or Henrie de Toulouse-Lautrec.

Fig.6. http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/prasa/sztuczne-fiolki-narzekanie-na-swoj-kraj-to-takze-forma-patriotyzmu/j6td4 [access: May 2016]

Fig.7. https://www.facebook.com/SztuczneFiolki/photos/pb.483774998308410.-2207520000.1409602911./638153552870553 [access: May 2016]

Fig.8. http://culture-flow.blogspot.com/2012/12/sztuczne-fioki.html [access: May 2016]

Fig.9. https://www.facebook.com/SztuczneFiolki/photos/a.483789074973669.115138.483774998308410/822043691148204/?type=1&permPage=1 [access: May 2016]

Marta is one of the most frequently recurring characters of the posts and seems to be the author's alter ego. The sender has an educational mission, but it is not about promoting art in the mass media. The sender offers critique in the form of a Facebook art meme, which evokes the values of the Enlightenment. As the author explains: "I have recently come to the conclusion that

Marta is my alter ego. Her opinions are closest to mine. Doesn't Marta like Poland? I think that she dreams of Poland ruled by wise people, and with wise citizens" (Tengowska, 2013). By combining old paintings with present-day statements, the author comments mainly on the situation in Poland. The seriousness of historical painters with current commentary sends a stronger message to Internet users than any treatise from the Age of Enlightenment.

6.2. RECIPIENT

The implied recipient of Facebook art meme thematic profiles has both the characteristics of a blog recipient and of a meme recipient. He is interested in the topic, actively searching for originality and novelty. He appreciates uniqueness and even combination of high culture with popular messages as part of an innovative concept, which allows him to get away from mediocrity. He receives a lot of information from many different sources. He comes from the same world as the sender and is part of the community around the Facebook art meme. He is much more concerned with his own image and building his own brand, so he does not enter into a student/master relationship. The relationship between the sender and the recipient is more democratic. It is based on opinion-sharing between equal partners, although the recipient can only affect the shape of the Facebook art meme through his comments, while the author determines its reach, so the roles are asymmetrical. The immanent sender can receive the encoded message, understands the intertextual references, and is encouraged to interfere with the message, engage in its reception, interpretation, future life.

However, he is not as creative and active as the recipient of a meme. Facebook art memes are less dialogic in nature than memes. Fixed location of the message means that its reception is more like consumption than a social game; consumption combined with a recommendation system. The recipient is able to read the ironic and parodying message and the poetic extension of meaning, but does not stimulate his own "ludic, playful spirit" as strongly as in the meme genre. No new, original texts are created as part of the series. The sender remains the chief creative author.

Nevertheless, there are cases where recipients of a fanpage become more engaged in the game and start creating their own works as part of the series initiated by the sender. They post them either on the thematic or their personal profile walls. In terms of scale, this is not as popular as in the case of memes outside of Facebook platforms. The ever-present sender, who started the topic, to a certain degree assumes responsibility for the "production" of content.

6.3. MESSAGE

The analysed Facebook fanpage posts present a more sophisticated form of intertextual and intersemiotic game. "Sztuczne Fiołki" uses mainly classical works, rarely resorting to contemporary art. The author explains this in the following way: "Contemporary art is not really a narration, it does not have characters that look at each other or interact with each other so that we could suggest some kind of dialog between them" (Klimowicz, 2014).

The sender of "Sztuczne Fiołki" uses mainly paintings which Wallis describes as presenting – "replicating", "imagining", "displaying" different real or imaginary objects, also known as "subjective" or "semantic" works (Wallis, 1983, p. 59). They have two layers: the representing layer (lines, spots, coloured shapes) and the layer of presented objects. When the representing layer is concrete (as opposed to abstract, associated with the emergence of Impressionism), it stimulates both our sensitivity and emotionality, and presents in an easily recognizable, "legible" way different items whose iconic elements are clearly marked; in which there is a balance between the representing and stimulating factors" (Wallis, 1983, p. 59). The choice of the painting is the key: the sender contacts the recipient through messages that facilitate reception, which present a concrete and not an abstract reality, where representing elements dominate over the stimulating ones.

Wallis divides works into "independent" ones, which do not require any additional knowledge of art to be fully comprehended, and non-independent ones (Wallis, 1983, p. 60). In most cases, the fanpage publishes independent or well-known works and paintings considered as artistic masterpieces. The aim is to facilitate communication and ensure massive scale. The sender does not have to know the system of code-words in ethnic languages or even recognize the painting. There are scenes of everyday life, nudes, landscapes and still life, provided with semantic enclaves. In order to understand the message of a meme, to experience and receive it, you do not have to be proficient in artistic conventions. In other words, you do not need to be an expert in the art history.

As we have already mentioned in the paragraphs on memes' genesis, the strategy of using images and combining them with words is not a new cultural phenomenon. When analysing "Sztuczne Fiołki", we should review the theses put forward by Mieczysław Wallis, quoted above, concerning texts incorporated into paintings, which the scholar refers to as the "semantic enclaves" of the painting. He defined this separated piece of a different reality as "that part of a work of art which consists of signs of a different kind or from a different system than the signs from which the main body of that work consists" (Wallis, 1983, p. 191). Wallis is interested in such enclaves as inscriptions being invocations, author statements concerning the topic of the

painting, maxims and 20th-century phrases concerning the enrichment and extension of painting meanings, crossing the barriers between different forms of art (including pseudo-inscriptions appearing in the works by Kle or Zbigniew Makowski).

In describing semantic enclaves, Wallis assumes that: "they are autonomous entities within those paintings in which they occur, they have a different semantic structure, they speak a "separate" language. Inscriptions are also a medium for elements of rich and complicated systems of conventional signs to penetrate into the painting… Semantic enclaves of paintings in the form of inscriptions are usually meaningful for a narrower audience than the iconic signs of those paintings"(Wallis, 1983, p. 191).

However, the case of "Sztuczne Fiołki" seems different. The inscription placed in the painting is addressed to mass audience; it is legible and straightforward thanks to its references to an extratextual world. Wallis analysed inscriptions in Western paintings – medieval, modern and contemporary ones. While Facebook art memes use artistic works, they are part of the mass culture. They comment on the offline reality and present artistic works as a material with an element of surprise. A work of art becomes part of a concept, its use strengthens the surprise effect of image and word, their incompatibility or even absurd. It is a confrontation of strikingly different worlds, and that confrontation means that the extremes must engage in a dialogue. They begin to communicate, creating semantic extensions similar to the poetic function of memes.

Hence, we could speak of historical verbal graphy related to high culture on the one hand, and to ludic tradition, currently visible in the mass culture, on the other. The posts on Facebook art memes are periodic in nature, there is a constant sender and, in the case of the analysed profiles, recurring characters (Marta on "Sztuczne Fiołki", "Kot Doktorant" (PhD Student Cat), sophisticated concepts on "Głupie teksty pisane Helveticą" or historical figures on "Facecje"), so we could speak of narration and refer to the theory or history of comics: "The fact that comics first appeared as a humoresque is no co-incidence… Comics offered their readers a world which was not only drawn, but also exaggerated: deformed, overstyled and unmasked in its grotesque form" (Szyłak, 2009, p. 7). Jerzy Szyłak identifies the precursors of comics in the illustrations to the Pickwick Club and in the satirical drawings of William Hogarth (Szyłak, 2009, p. 9). Early traces of comics can also be found in magazine illustrations and zins. Three illustrators played the key role here. The first one was Rodolphe Tőpffer (1799-1846), a pedagogue and a writer, who published a cycle of albums with pictures which commented on each other, using the effect of narration and humour. The second important figure was Tőpffer's student, Gustave Doré (1832-1883), who illustrated the works of Rabelais, Byron, Balzac, Dante. He was the first person in the history of comics that used irony in his work.

In 1854, when he was working on illustrations to *The Life of Gargantua and of Pantagruel*, he dared to make a graphic joke. He illustrated the *Histoire de la Sainte Russie*, a work similar to the pictured stories of his mentor, based on perverse, anarchic humour, built on such means as nonsense resulting from the contrast between the meanings suggested by pictures and their captions" (Szyłak, 2009, p. 9). The above quote comes very close to my concept of memes described in previous chapters. Wilhelm Busch (1832-1908) is the third key illustrator in this group. He created several sequential picture stories for *Fliegende Blätter*, in which, apart from the narration, he focused on presenting movements and emotions (Szyłak, 2009, p. 9).

In the early history of comics, the place and form of publication were of great significance: the fact that they appeared periodically in magazines. "Comics emerged thanks to the emergence of the press, so their existence is closely tied to the mass media", Szyłak says (Szyłak, 2009, p. 10). This resembles the situation of blogs and hobbyist magazines. It is no coincidence that "Sztuczne Fiołki" is described by its author as a "comical-tragic magazine".

Initially, newspaper comics were connected with a story in the form of a one-threaded episode with a punch line, based on situational or verbal humour (Szyłak, 2009, p. 23). Hence the original name of the comics: a comic strip, so comical pictures forming a characteristic strip (Szyłak, 2009). Another name, "cartoon", was applied to single-picture jokes based on situational or verbal humour (Szyłak, 2009). This, again, seems analogous to Facebook art meme profiles.

The discussion on whether comics can be classified as a form of art has continued up to this day (Beaty, 2012). Most scholars agree that comics are part of the media culture. Jerzy Szyłak takes a clear stand on the matter, writing: "True comics exist outside the cinema or the computer screen, they cannot be broadcast on television. As a work distributed in the form of a booklet, album or newspaper section, they belong to the print culture, which is giving way to electronic media" (2009, p. 130). Perhaps Facebook art memes are something of a comic strip transferred to the new media, at an early stage of its generic journey.

A deeper discussion of the nature of comics exceeds the limits of this work. What we are getting at is the simple conclusion that memoidal Facebook art memes are not based on hand-made drawings, they are not a sequence of story-telling frames, and it would be excessive to describe them as picture narration based on the unity of icon and language (Toeplitz, 1985, p. 21). They also fail to meet the criteria currently set by researchers of comics in many other important ways (Szyłak, 2013). Nevertheless, when we refer to the origins of this genre, we can see certain analogies (in terms of functioning and role) connected with the emergence of a new medium (press – in the case of comic strips and now – the Internet), and the needs of the mass audience. Both genres exist within the mass culture, are based on the relationship between

drawing and writing, are easy to read and have their own poetics (Szyłak, 2000), can be used to convey propaganda or didactic content. As it has been already mentioned, Facebook art memes understood as thematic profiles usually have some entertainment, but also educational purpose. They constitute learning through play, and if that should be too ambitious, they at least encourage reflection.

The first social game resembling the creation of online memes was connected with comics and the "Relax" magazine set up in 1975, described by Stanisław Barańczak as "monotonous" and "fitting the model of socialist mass culture". He wrote: "one can never reconcile the two opposing needs: the persuasion needs of the state (which, in funding the mass media, hopes to gain propaganda effects) and the ludic needs of a society" (Barańczak, 1990). Despite this blatant description, "Relax" brought some innovation in the sphere of communication: it published pictures with bubbles without texts and invited readers to create their own dialogues. The use of known masterpieces instead of comics and encouraging recipients to place their own comments in the bubbles is something that we can currently observe in the activities of the Fala Kultury Association as part of an educational project called "Talking Paintings", which aims to promote art. As the organizers of the campaign explain: "it is a game, but also a way to remind people of the artistic achievements of past decades, forgotten artists and their works… We hope that people will realise that you should become familiar with art already as a child, and that art should not only be associated with dusty museums".

Messages within Facebook art memes are oriented towards a goal related to their topic. The art memes on "Sztuczne Fiołki" ("violets") are an efficient weapon because they violate the principles of appropriateness, confirm that art has been democratised and that every communication participant has the right to use his authority and semiotic message to give it his own, current meaning. The figures in the painting by Gustave Caillebotte talk about jobs in Warsaw, Laurence Stephen Lowry is inspired by dogs and the 14th-century painting by Giotto di Bondone mocks Polish antisemitism.

Fig. 10.
https://www.facebook.com/SztuczneFiolki/photos/a.483789074973669.115138.483774998308410/812056238813616/?type=1 [access: May 2016]


Fig. 11.
https://www.facebook.com/SztuczneFiolki/photos/a.483789074973669.115138.483774998308410/569628033056439/?type=1&theater [access: May 2016]

Fig. 12.
https://www.facebook.com/SztuczneFiolki/photos/a.483789074973669.11518.483774998308410/677990672220174/?type=1 [access: May 2016]

The message on Facebook art meme thematic profile is even more strongly entangled in the interdependencies between two semantic systems (image and word) than other memes. It is less schematic and less repeatable, thanks to more sophisticated intertextual and intersemiotic references. The text in the micro-post, based on previous works of art from a different semiotic order, engages with other texts and modifies them. Intertextual relations can be observed within the text itself, between its various levels, e.g. between the image and the words of the characters. In the case of Facebook art memes, we could speak of a relation of text to text and of text to reality. The message is based on the semantic extension, on the coexistence of and the game between the combination of the given icon and word.

There are more sender platforms, in the form of the author's comment preceding the multimedia text, which is also part of the entire message. Just like in the case of memes, such things as concept, conciseness, clarity, drawing the recipient's attention and standing out from other messages play an important role. The message is humorous and ironic by nature. This contributes to the poetics of the message. The world of media-processed digital images becomes a "natural" communication setting. The message of Facebook art memes functions inside an intricate web of information, among hundreds of thousands of possible information streams. Hence, in order to be heard and stand out, they resort to tricks applied by memes to an even greater extent.

6.4. CODE

Just as in the case of comics, in their early days, Facebook art memes use the code of perverse, anarchist language with a tint of irony and a great deal of contradictions. They also provide for confrontation of meanings derived from presented allosemantic messages (in the case of "Sztuczne Fiołki", the given painting evokes different associations than the added commentary; in the case of "Głupie teksty…", a reflective picture is contrasted with down-to-earth commentary) or from the nonsense of the information in the context of our knowledge of the world (knowledge of historical figures and their modernised use).

A painting showing peasants working in the field is provided with a conversation which is inappropriate in the circumstances and concerns an inadequate topic. A peasant wearing leather slippers and with a sickle in his hand explains the concept of gender to his daughter, who is working in the field along his side: "It is a constructed set of attributes, behavioural patterns, perceptions and social expectations as well as norms related to one's biological sex, determining

the role of a given person in the society and culture as well as his or her status and rights" (Oakley, 1972).

Hence, we could stress the combination of high style with trivial topics, certain parody. In this case, a parody of every-day epiphany, mocking of the "éminence grise of awe". The logo-visual text imitates the model, modifying its meaning. The result is ludic, comical. Such playful imitation of clear and recognizable models of stylistic statement structures lends them a completely new colour and new meaning (Nycz, 1995, pp. 199-246). It completely transforms their message. We could speak of the double-coding of messages.

These are just a few examples of contrast used in micro-blogs. Such contrast enables exaggeration, emphasis on the absurd, encouraging reflection. Facebook art memes re-arrange and recontextualize various statement models, leading to the creation of a new, original work structure (formal, thematic and ideological) through dialogic interaction with other texts and their underlying ideas or conventions. Ryszard Nycz distinguishes four functions of parody: the ludic function, which shows off the parodist's skills and reveals the secrets and limitations of the model's style in a humorous way; the satirical function, which mocks and unmasks a certain phenomenon; the critical function and the constructive functions, seen as ancillary to the critical function, aiming to deconstruct or expose the inefficiencies of the targeted convention.

The researcher explains that parody can be a style-forming or a genre-forming phenomenon (Nycz, 1995). In the case of memes one can speak of both the style-forming and the genre-forming dimension. The genre is also connected with situational or verbal jokes which comment on the offline reality. The kinaesthetic mode – capturing movement and emotions – makes it even more dramatic. Just as in the case of memes, the selected manner of presenting the given object has both a promoting and an interpreting aspect. Because art memes are more of an author's form, they use ready, conventionalized graphic signs less often than other memes. More sophisticated signs, referring not only to mass culture, but also to high culture, can have a didactic purpose.

6.5. CONTACT

Contact within Facebook art memes is the combined form similar to the one known from blogs and memes. Just as in the case of blogs, there are such elements as dialogue, proximity or even familiarity between sender and recipient, and cooperation based on shared interests and opinions. The sender is also the person that determines the ultimate form of the communication, but because the contact is voluntary, he tries to ensure the comfort of the recipient. There is no

student-mentor relationship. It is more like visiting the website of one's favourite magazine where the reader has the possibility to talk to the author.

Just like other memes, Facebook art memes strive to stand out and be memorable. The message is structured in such a way so as to ensure that the contact is misleading at first, and then reveals the hidden meaning of the message and invites the recipient to engage even further in the communication. However, it does not encourage the recipient to take over the initiative. Once again, we can find an analogy with the origins of the comic strip printed in newspapers: a Facebook art meme is like a micro-magazine, or a column devoted to logo-visual, humorous commentary of the reality. This is why the violets are also a successful recurring column of newspaper's supplement in the offline world.

6.6. CONTEXT

Intertextuality has already been mentioned several times in reference to memes, in the immanent context of the communication setting of Facebook art memes. The memoidal thematic profiles are intertextual constructs referring both to high culture and to topics known mainly from mainstream mass media. They combine different stylistic (high style and low style) and semantic (image and word) orders. The word does not have a dominant function; it is a carrier of meaning of equal importance to the word.

Facebook art memes use sociolects understood "not as grammar and vocabulary, but as a warehouse of social myths. They are represented through topics, circulating phrases and descriptive systems (stereotypical metonymy networks around a given lexical nucleus)" (Riffaterre, 1995, p. 107). This is why their reception does not require professional knowledge. Ryszard Nycz talks about intertextuality in the context of mediatisation. He points out that the frame plays the most important role in this process (1995, p. 107). The frame can be famous paintings ("Sztuczne Fiołki"), symbolic photos and poetry quotes ("Głupie Teksty…"), the PhD Student Cat ("Jesteś Kotę…") or well-known historical figures ("Facecje"). A frame provides for repeatability, prefabrication, it is a basic element of intertextual processes. "Analysed without reflection, it ensures: transparency (thanks to homogeneity), probability (as a factor of consensus, dox), objectivity of presentation (because its typifying properties enable the identification of the object regardless of the circumstances or points of view: it acts as the structural invariant). Analysed critically, it is the basic material for meaning regeneration techniques (such as dis-automation and estrangement), the tools of parody, the strategy of "unmasking the tricks" of realistic illusionism in meta-novel forms, intertextual collage etc. These properties make it "easy to put together", ready to use under various writer strategies" (Nycz, 2000). In the case of

Facebook art memes, it is not only about references to other texts, but also about the extratextual relations with social, historical and cultural reality.

Hence, we could say that Facebook art memes borrow certain migrating form-shaping elements from blogs and memes. Those derived from blogs are connected with the cyclical nature of publications; rooting of the communication in one place; metatextual elements. Moreover, memes resemble blogs in that they discuss specific topics corresponding to the name of the profile (global vision); the topics of neighbouring posts are related; there is constant dialogue with the recipients; the author has a subjective opinion on the problems discussed. The elements borrowed from memes include: concept (surprise effect), distance to the presented world reflected in a mocking ethos (comedy and parody), structure, which helps memorising the text and encourages its sharing, intertextual and intersemiotic references. However, many features of blogs and memes cannot be realized in a Facebook art meme, and those which can, have their own, specific dimension, due to confrontation of different messages. This is why a Facebook art meme, as a form of communication, transforms the specific characteristics of a blog, such as the dominant position of the author (personal perspective), the resulting media intimacy and characteristics of memes related to participation in a game. Compared to memes, the sender of a Facebook art meme is not as clearly defined, with no references to his personal life, and is not as strongly engaged in the creation of a text series. It is more of a "reading" genre, for sharing with others something one has found, and for pursuing one's own instant creativity.

As a rule, local Facebook art memes are more refined and "sophisticated" as compared with the memes circulating on the Internet. It also seems that they are created with greater awareness as to the use of allosemantic messages.

7. FACEBOOK ART MEMES IN POLISH MEMOSPHERE AS LOCAL RECEPTION OF GLOBAL DIGITAL FORM

The genre characteristics appear with different intensity in different online genre-communication forms. We could speak of genologic gradation, which may be key to understanding the different characteristics of each particular online genre, although all of them look for models in a common base of elements. For example, the sender is most exposed (in terms of the degree of dialogue) in the genre of blogs, and least exposed in memes (degree of spontaneity, situationality). The recipient is most strongly motivated to act by the text in memes (degree of spontaneity, situationality), and least strongly in blogs.

Generally, as any online genre, Facebook art memes have multimedia, dialogic (resembling a familiar conversation) features. They are spontaneous, situational (highly

referential) and based on the immediacy of mutual relationship between the sender and the recipient. Memes differ from other semantic forms in their relationship between image and word. Facebook art memes are based on the play between contrasts, contradictory meanings (polemic relationship). This is one of the reasons why we can speak of their dominant poetic function.

The most important characteristics of Facebook art memes include: using the effect of surprise, concepts which should surprise the recipient, incorporating the message into a web of intertextual relations and irony and distance towards the presented world. As part of this genre, the sender controls the message. There is irony and humour, confrontation of image and the world, which leads to semantic extension. Appropriate reception of a message requires the recognition of cultural frames and abstract thinking. The image is usually kinaesthetic and captures an emotional moment. The image, which is part of the text, illustrates a symbolic gesture, can be inscribed in the iconography as a carrier of specific feelings, becomes a convention. It seems like a distant echo of *pathos formulae* (*Pathosformel*) formulated by Aby Warburg, a precursor of visual culture. The term refers to an illustrated gesture based on a load of mental energy flowing from primary experience[1]. The entire message must be concise, oriented towards capturing and maintaining the recipient's attention, often through a surprising punch line. It is a provocative, spontaneous interaction. The concise or even mnemotechnical message employs different cultural texts.

What is characteristic about the local Polish version of Facebook art memes analysed above? It turns out that their strength comes from the combination of their reach, impact and quality of performance. In other words: the localised global genre-communication form has aptly addressed the needs of the local population of digital media (and other) media recipients. Their genological characteristics have occurred more and more suitable for the new audiences: "Sztuczne Fiołki" appeared in 2012, in August 2014 had nearly 89 thousand fans and 159 thousand fans in May 2016.

"Sztuczne Fiołki" is referred to as a cultural phenomenon on the Polish Internet. In 2012, the profile was nominated for "Polityka's" Passport award in the visual art category (Sarzyński, 2012). This competition aspires to be one of the most prestigious awards in Poland and has honoured distinguished authors of literature, films, popular music, art music, visual art and theatre since 1993. The popularity of "Sztuczne Fiołki" is also studied by art historians. As Dorota Łagodzka comments: "Typical of postmodernism, of Dadaistic origin and pop culture

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[1] More at: Warburg, A. (1999). Wstęp do Mnemosyne, Warburg Archive, no. 102.I.I.6. In: M. Rampley (ed.), Archives of Memory:Walter Benjamin's Arcades Project and Aby Warburg's „Mnemosyne Atlas". In: A. Coles (ed.), *The Optic of Walter Benjamin*. London: Black Dog Publishing. p. 105; Rampley, M. (1997). From symbol to allegory: Aby Warburg's theory of art. *Art Bulletin*, vol. 79*; Rampley, M. (2000). *The Remembrance of Things Past. On Aby M. Warburg and Walter Benjamin*. Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden.

affiliations, a sister to found footage, a cousin to pop art... appropriation art. (I am not fond of this concept; another English neologism in the Polish art history, which finds it hard to cope with terminology). They may be seen as a form of online culture, the art of mass production of memes, making jokes mixed with constructive criticism and social commentary through works of art. Profanity, to the extent that Dadaism was profanity" (Łagodzka, 2012).

However, the media widely commented on four memes from "Sztuczne Fiołki" gone missing from an exhibition during the ART.eriawe festival in September 2013. Ten images were displayed along the avenue leading to Jasna Góra. The four lost ones were later found at the episcopal curia, and the spokesman argued that they had disappeared from the exhibition because they offended religious feelings (Piersiak, 2013). In this context it is worth noting that even Facebook team themselves have shut down the profile twice. The first time, probably due to the system's misunderstanding of the ironic message – the moderators probably classified one of the paintings as pornography and Nazi content.

Despite that, restored "Sztuczne Fiołki" Facebook art memes fanpage is highly popular and was even transferred offline – there are exhibitions of the memes and publications in "Duży Format", a supplement to "Gazeta Wyborcza". This is one of the rare instances where an online genre-communication form is procured by editors of high-circulation opinion-forming nation-wide newspaper. Thus, the art of painting remediated in digital forms of so-called "memes" illustrates the global flow from the Western centre to the Eastern semi-peripheries of digitalizing Euro-Atlantic civilization.

While the inner structure of "art memes" may be similar regardless of their origin and language, there is an unbridged difference in their local semantic details. It leads to differences in reception and in influence on collective imaginations, debates and opinions. Undoubtedly, Polish Facebook art memes are the example of flow from West to East, which results in local enrichments of the global medium and content. Why does it follow this direction – and could there have been similarily semantically rich local Facebook art memes not preceded by those of Western origin? This question remains to be investigated further.

At least some parts of the Polish memosphere, as illustrated by Facebook art memes, reveal mechanisms of global form's local reception. However, the analysis of the emerging genre of Facebook art memes in Poland leads to the conclusion that even the new genres can be exceptional in their local role of public opinion-forming. With their partially global, and in part locally developed inner structures, they can be more successful than the examples of the same genre preceding them. This mechanism also remains to be investigated further.

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Testimony as Political Argument

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Abstract

On the one hand, when compared with the 'original meaning' of politics in the Classical or Christian thought, contemporary liberal democracies in general understand politics in a reduced sense. On the other hand, however, democratic debates constantly allow for opening new horizons of interpreting politics. One way to radically renew politics is accepting authentic testimonies as political arguments. To illustrate this point, I offer the reflective analysis of a concrete case concerning the hotly debated topic of migrants in Europe: a Benedictine monastery receives and hosts illegal migrants in Hungary. This example deserves our interest for – when not tendentiously misinterpreted – it can neither be classified as an argument of the conservative approach to migrants nor does it support the liberal reading of the events. It implies, at the same time, a positive and a negative critique to both approaches by simply going beyond the usual political categories.

In order to see how testimony works as a political argument I undertake three steps: 1) Instead of defining testimony, I show through a phenomenological analysis three characteristics of the given example that are both, essential and relevant for political discourse: a) the essentially indeterminate meaning of testimony; b) self-exposure and self-sacrifice; c) the particular political message of authentic testimony.

In the next step, I offer a brief analysis of contemporary political discourse to highlight those aspects concerning which authentic testimonies may transform the meaning of politics: a) mediatization; b) lack of authenticity and credibility; c) technical scientific language; d) impersonal approach to political issues.

As a third step, I unite these two analysis by asking what counts as a political argument in general and whether and how testimonies can function as political arguments.

In my conclusion, I distinguish two types of politics according to their attitude towards testimony: one that is open to authentic testimonies and one that rejects them. By showing some fatal consequences of the latter option I argue for recovering some of politics' original meaning.

Key words: testimony, politics, religion, value, immigrants

One of the most relevant political issues in Europe concerns the situation of refugees along and within the frontiers of the EU. There is a complex political, moral and socio-cultural debate not just about what the responsible policy is, but also about how to interpret the very problem caused by massive migration. While some focus on the rights of the refugees, others stress the interest of European citizens. It seems quite a challenge to harmoniously unite the point of view of the 'others' with that of 'us'. Curiously enough, both parties often refer to European and Christian values to support their position; they interpret the situation in terms of hospitality, love of the other, mercy, solidarity, freedom of religion, dignity of woman, etc.

The Hungarian prime minister's decision indubitably marked a turning point of the debate; Mr. Orbán ordered to raise fences on the green frontier of Hungary establishing official gates where migrants needed to register. Rather than arguing *pro* or *contra,* I will focus simply on a peculiar event that happened afterwards and has been often characterized as a *testimonial act*. I am not so much interested in the specific moral value of this act, as on its role as a political argument.

In the midst of rather turbulent events such as violence along the border and inside the camps, as well as the Primate of Hungary, Card. Péter Erdő claiming that, legally speaking, hosting refugees is tantamount to migrant smuggling, the Benedict monastery of Pannonhalma offered to receive a large group of refugees and migrants.[1] It is a highly symbolic act for the monastery was founded by Saint Stephen, the first Christian King of Hungary who in his famous letter(regarded as the foundation of the country's constitution) points out to his son, Saint Emeric the importance of integrating and loving foreigners as a method to strengthen the country's power, safety and peace.

It is important to see that the decision did not only concern the community of monks. The monastery is a complex social reality consisting of a rather famous boarding school with approximately 350 students, a home for the elderly, a library, a restaurant, tourist office, winery

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[1] See the news in the Hungarian newspaper Népszabadság: http://nol.hu/mozaik/a-pannonhalmi-apatsag-is-befogadja-a-menekulteket-1561359 (20.05.2016) According to the Archabbot, a decision not to receive migrants would be contrary to the message of the Gospels. Besides, this also the very history of the monastery exemplified through Saint Vilmos Apor and Saint Martin of Tours obliges them to do so. The Austrian Primate Christoph Schönborn follows the same example when encouraging people to receive migrants in their home.

and a factory of natural products and mineral water. Refugees and migrants were embraced by this extended community of families and monks, professors, students, workers, etc. They did not only receive shelter and food but also were invited to actively participate in the life of the monastery. Some of the migrants even offered a concert together with the boys of the boarding school.

This example will help us to both, (1) specify what a testimony is and (2) how it works as a political argument. In the third part of this essay, I try to elucidate in general terms the political relevance of testimonies.

1. CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF TESTIMONY

Instead of offering here a complete phenomenological analysis of testimony,[2] I limit myself to consider only those features that are essential to capture the political relevance of this phenomenon.

1.1. THE ESSENTIALLY INDETERMINATE OF TESTIMONY – THE TESTIFIER'S INTENTION

Is this a testimony at all? – Somebody could ask concerning not just the deeds of the Pannonhalma community, but also concerning each and every testimony. For it is essential to any authentic testimony to leave its own interpretation open.[3] One can hardly talk about an authentic

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[2] It is, however, necessary to state that my usage of the term testimony is closer to the meaning in common language than to the usual philosophical interpretation according to which testimony is any information acquired through a second person. (See the definition and analysis for example by Andreas Sofroniou, in his work *Politics and Philosophy*, p.55). Receiving traffic directions in this broad sense would also be a testimony. I use the word in a more narrow sense, for I only would call a testimony that which involves an essential reference to some transcendent value. Such testimonies are often called moral testimonies. I would resist applying this term here because it suggests that morality is a separate field of the life-world. Testimonies – as I would like to argue – precisely demonstrate the unity of different values. Moral testimonies are not the only kind; one could equally talk about aesthetic, religious or political testimonies. Yet, it is more pertinent to talk about testimonies that are as such at the same time morally, politically, aesthetically relevant, precisely because they not just refer to but also embody a whole set of values in their very unity.

[3] What makes a testimony authentic? – I tried to answer this question by looking for the essential characteristics of testimony concerning Edith Stein and Jan Patočka: Szalay, M. (2017) Politics and Testimony, Pensamiento, forthcoming.

The question of the authenticity of a testimony is a very complex issue. It is widely acknowledged that there are two main aspects highlighted by Reid (Reid, T. (1983). Inquiry and Essays, R. Beanblossom and K. Lehrer (eds.), Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company) and Hume (Hume, D. (1977 [1748]), An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Eric Steinberg (ed.), Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company). The disagreement is very well summarized by one of the most important experts, Jennifer Lackey in an interview by Richard Marshall: "One of the central questions in the epistemology of testimony is how, exactly, hearers acquire justified beliefs from the testimony of speakers. Answers to this question have traditionally fallen into one of two camps: non-reductionism or reductionism. According to non-reductionists—whose historical roots are typically traced to the work of Thomas Reid—testimony is a basic source of justification, on an epistemic par with sense perception, memory, inference, and the like. Given this, non-reductionists maintain that, so as long as there are no relevant undefeated defeaters, hearers can be justified in accepting what they are told merely on the basis of the testimony of speakers.

testimony that boasts to be as such, for this would diminish testimony to an act of personal exemplification of a thesis, i.e. to a mere rhetorical figure. Although testimony has a special rhetorical value, it is certainly not about persuasion. The one who gives testimony does not only renounce to promote categories to interpret his own action: he radically exposes himself and his act to the judgment of others. His primary intention is not persuading the audience of the moral or spiritual validity of his or her action or even of the value or truth in question that it pretends to affirm. What can rightly be recognized as authentic testimony has the primary intention of a simple affirmation of a truth or value that is questioned or doubted.

The fact that the testimony is essentially indeterminate and that this is recognized by the subject is certainly co-responsible for the relative fragility of testimonies in terms of persuasive power. A testimony is only convincing for those who are touched by the value that it holds up. For them, however, testimony becomes more convincing than any other argument due to the fact that the content of testimony does not appear as matter of mere intellectual reasoning, but rather as incarnated truth, and thus in some ways unquestionable truth.

In contrast to non-reductionism, reductionists—whose historical roots are historically traced to the work of David Hume—maintain that, in addition to the absence of undefeated defeaters, hearers must also possess non-testimonially based positive reasons in order to be justified in accepting the testimony of speakers. These reasons are typically the result of induction: for instance, hearers observe a general conformity between reports and the corresponding facts and, with the assistance of memory and reason, they inductively infer that certain speakers, contexts, or types of reports are reliable sources of information. In this way, the justification of testimony is reduced to the justification for sense perception, memory, and inductive inference.

There are two different versions of reductionism. According to global reductionism, the justification of testimony as a source of belief reduces to the justification of sense perception, memory, and inductive inference. Thus, in order to be justified in accepting the testimony of speakers, hearers must possess non-testimonially based positive reasons for believing that testimony is generally reliable. According to local reductionism, which is the more widely accepted of the two versions, the justification of each instance of testimony reduces to the justification of instances of sense perception, memory, and inductive inference. So, in order to be justified in accepting the testimony of speakers, hearers must have non-testimonially based positive reasons for accepting the particular report in question." (See: Marshall, R. (2013), On Testimony Interview with Jennifer Lackey, Retrieved from: http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/on-testimony/ (10.05.2016)) The important point here is that the sources of authenticity, in the sense of why some testimony appears to be reliable, are the person and the message itself. Authenticity epistemologically speaking is a combination of these two aspects: in order to be recognized as authentic, testimonies should come from a person that appears to be reliable and the received message supposed to be true. It is obvious that ontologically speaking the message can be true while the person is anything else than a reliable expert concerning the very topic and vice versa, the testimony can be false because also the reliable expert can be wrong sometimes. What we usually call authenticity is a combination of both epistemological and ontological aspects.

But even if these two requirements are simultaneously fulfilled, i.e. there is a true message coming from a reliable person there is still another relevant meaning of authenticity that is not thematized. Whenever somebody transmits a message, he or she also implicitly informs us about his or her attitude towards the very content of the message. It is his attitude that is most informative about the value embodied in the testimony. It is this point that I particularly would like to draw attention to. Religious testimonies – that I regard as par excellence testimonies – are especially relevant in this sense for they illuminate this aspect in any testimony. The typical fundamental attitude here is well resumed as 'ontological humility'.

On epistemological issues see the excellent article hereto of Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, in: Adler, Jonathan (2015). "Epistemological Problems of Testimony", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/testimony-episprob/>. (10.05.2016); See also the original theory of Lackey, in: Lackey, J., & Sosa, E. (Eds.). (2006). The epistemology of testimony. Clarendon Press.

The political relevance of this characteristic is that testimonies appear in the political discourse as rather unique and somewhat paradoxical arguments[4]: they do not intend to be arguments, yet they are – especially for those who are sensitive enough to perceive them as such – more persuasive than any other rhetorical figure. Even though testimonies are only attainable for a select group that is open towards its intentional object, they experience a very persuasive unity between theory and praxis.

The example of the Benedict monastery clearly shows this point concerning unity – and not just because of its principle *ora et labora*[5]. Receiving the migrants in the monastery meant for some politically active Hungarians nothing but the rejection of the government's policy, the story of monastery lining up with the critique of the political opposition and against the EU leadership. For those however, open to not just the political dimensions of this story, the same actions were rather an example containing a personal invitation to host the other and integrate the foreign; the story not just worked politically, it worked on them personally.

We have every reason to believe that the community of the Benedictine monks was aware of at least some of the political implications of their decision.[6] Among other and more important purposes, they even might have wanted to perform a symbolic act that could promote a specific policy. Instead, their principal wish was not to support a political movement, a political party or some political idea[7]; they simply followed the tradition of their own Christian faith and that of

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[4] This paradox has been very well described by Michal Givoni in his groundbreaking article 'Witnessing/Testimony concerning the Israeli soldiers testimonies on Gaza war, called Breaking the Silence' report. Those soldiers were clearly not aware of the possible political torments their testimony caused. Givoni finds here an important point: „This first-person account attests to the fact that testimony is an utterance whose message lies less in what is said than in what transpires." Givoni rightly points out concerning the paradox nature of testimony that it was also grasped by other philosophers when remarks: „For poststructuralist thinkers such as Jean-François Lyotard, Shoshana Felman, and Giorgio Agamben and for psychoanalysts such as Dori Laub, testimony represented an impossible and yet a necessary act. Rather than a form of evidence or a source of information, it was a gesture that laid bare the limits of knowledge, representation, and justice by enacting traumatic and ineffable experiences.", See: Givoni, M. (2011). Witnessing/Testimony, in: Mafte'akh. Lexical Review of Political Thought, Retrieved from: http://mafteakh.tau.ac.il/en/issue-2e-winter-2011/witnessingtestimony/, (10.05.2016)

[5] As it is well known, the spirit of St. Benedict's Rule is summed up in the motto *ora et labora* ("pray and work"). Contemplation as prayer and work as practical activity are different yet inseparable dimensions of the good life, life in God. The work of monks is not simply a mere necessary physical activity for mental health; it is rather the corporal way of giving oneself lovingly away for the community. Moreover by their work monks collaborate with Christ in transforming the created world in and through love. Their prayer is also not an individual activity that simply alternates with the practical ones; it is the commemoration of the eternal events of the life of Christ. In their prayer, it is the Church that prays for the whole extended community of all of God's children.

[6] See the interview with the Archabbot of the monastery in: http://hvg.hu/itthon/20155152_bajban_vannak_akik_eddig_pokollal_meg_ke (12.05.2016). It is clear that Father Asztrik Várszegi is very much aware of the political implications of the decision made by the monastery. Moreover, he argues that being well informed in concerning the current political situation is a moral responsibility for it helps to make good decisions.

[7] It is good to bear in mind that there are several points concerning the specific way of how refugees and migrants were treated that some liberal would find rather restrictive. People were asked to adopt the rather rigorous time-table and the specific way of life within the monastery.

their own monastery: they responded to the poor who knocked on their door as refugee and migrant.

This example shows that being persuasive in order to promote a project of improving the life of the community is not the principal interest of the testifier, even though there is a desire to see the given truth and value being realized. The monastery community, as in general any testifier, did not so much promote the triumph of the truth and values in question in the world; they did not have a political agenda. Moreover, testifying seems precisely to renounce to political programs of *gradual* solutions and of assuring one's own success or the victory of ideas. Instead, testimony implies an unconditional *complete affirmation* of truth and value in question. Testifiers act not 'politically' in this sense, although, at the same time, they recognize more than perhaps anybody the political character of values and truth: they are constitutive for communities[8].

1.2. SELF-EXPOSURE AND SELF-SACRIFICE

To say that the subject of the testimony might only want to persuade us of the relevance of some value or of the truthfulness of some claim leaves a question open: what is the main intention to carry it out? Rather than having a specific desire to realize a value, the testifier simply finds himself faced with a given value or truth that calls for an adequate response: any testimony is a radically responsive act.

The urge of responding adequately to the value or truth determines the act to the point that the sometimes fatal consequences appear as less significant than the righteousness of the affirmation of the given truth and values. The attitude of the testifier, besides the humility needed to acknowledge a value as such, is well characterized as "here I am and I can't do otherwise". Needless to say that being unable to do otherwise is not due to a lack of freedom; rather on the contrary: being completely free enables to testifier to fully respond to the compelling call of the value.

It is this simple exposing of oneself to the consequences of 'the right thing to do', that implies undergoing suffering and even, in extreme cases, risking one's own life. A good understanding of this attitude in relation to sometimes life-threatening danger can help us to delineate testimonies of two phenomena: value-responses in general and a heroic act for the community.

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[8] Values can be constitutive for communities through and thanks to testimonies that allow for a renewed intimacy with them. (See to this point: Dulong, R. (1998). Le témoin oculaire (les conditions sociales de l'attestation personnelle, Recherches d'histoire et de sciences sociales). This intimacy with a reality beyond the current epistemological, aesthetical and spiritual limits of the given community is at the same token an experience in language in a broad sense. Testimonies are poetic forms of communications and thus by renewing language they also renew the identity and the epistemological limits of the community.

Although any authentic affirmation of a value is a testimony of the value's existence and specific nature, certainly not all value-responses are acts of testimonies in the strict sense. What makes testimonies special is the readiness not necessarily to die but rather to a loving self-exposure to anything that might be the consequence of the value-response, and in this sense, to self-sacrifice.[9] Even though death is the most significant risk here, the general attitude of testimony implies more than accepting one's own death. What a testimonial act requires is a sometimes even more difficult self-transformation of the self when met with a specific truth and value. Part of this complex process of understanding one's own identity in relation to the intentional object, i.e. to what has to be witnessed and affirmed as really existing , leads to self-renunciation. The old self has to die so that the new and transformed self can live fully.

One thing is that the value or truth affirmed for its own sake seems to have a higher dignity that the testifier's well-being or even his own life. Testimonies therefore are not just responses to values or better to say the very origin of all values[10], but they also manage to inform us about the right 'ranking' of the given value or truth. Authentic testimonies in this sense realize something what was called in the Christian tradition as *ordo amoris*.[11]

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[9] Sacrifice means precisely "sacerfacere", doing the holy. Testimonies require sacrifice in the sense that they require holy and pure acts, manifestations of the noblest good. Since this is against the mediocre moral and oft false spirituality of the world, it might certainly have bad consequences. What a testimony genuinely implies is not suffering *per se*, but the readiness to suffering the consequences of one's righteous act. The suffering itself is rather accidental to affirmation of a truth or value that is not merely theoretically proposed but also existentially realized. In this sense sacrifice goes along essentially with the insight that it is more important to live in a certain way, i.e. righteously up to the point of being ready to suffer for others than to simply promote some set of values – or it is better to say whatever one regards as such.

[10] I thematized the difference between testimony understood as value response and as a response in an interpersonal relationship through personal self-donation. See: Szalay, M. (2017) Politics and Testimony, Pensamiento, forthcoming.

[11] See this important notion St. Augustin, *De civitate Dei,* XV. book. ch. 22.. See further: St. Augustin, *De doctrina cristiana*, L. I. C. XXVII, 28.: „Ille autem iuste et sancte vivit, qui rerum integer aestimator est; ipse est autem qui ordinatam, habet dilectionem, ne aut diligat quod non est diligendum, aut non diligat quod diligendum est, aut amplius diligat quod minus diligendum est, aut aeque diligat quod vel minus vel amplius diligendum est."

The notion of *ordo amoris* has been revivied by contemporary philosophy. The perhaps most disntiguished representats rely on Max Scheler. See: Scheler, M. (1954-97). Ordo amoris, in: Gesammelte Werke, Bern und München-Bouvier/Bonn: Franke, 1954-1997, 15 vols., vol. X. p. 345-376. It is worth recalling here the two main ideas of Scheler:

„Wer den ordo amoris eines Menschen hat, hat den Menschen. Er hat für ihn als moralisches Subjekt das, was die Kristalformel, für den Kristal ist. Er durch-schaut den Menschen so weit, wie man einen Menschen durchschauen kann. Er sieht vor sich die hinter aller empirischen Mannigfaltigkeit und Kompliziertheit stets verlaufenden Grundlinien seines *Gemütes,* welches mehr der Kern des Menschen als Geistwesen zu heissen verdient als Erkennen und Wollen. Er besitzt in einem geistigen Schema den Urquell, der alles heimlich speist, was von diesem Menschen ausgeht; ja noch mehr: das Urbestimmende dessen, was dauernd Miene macht, sich um ihn herumzustellen – im Raume seine moralische Umwelt, in der Zeit sein Schicksal, d.h. der Inbegriff des Möglichen zu werden, das ihm passieren und nur ihm passieren kann." (op. cit. p.48)

„Jede Liebe ist eine noch unvollendete, oft einschlafende oder sich vergaffende, auf ihrem Weg glecihsam rastende Liebe zu Gott. [...] Also ist der ordo amoris der Kern der Weltordnung als einer Gottesordnung. In dieser Weltordnung steht der Mensch. Er steht als dienstwürdigster und freiester Diener Gottes, und nur als solcher darf er auch Herr der Schöpfung heissen." (op. cit. p. 356)

Another and even more important fact is that the encounter with the truth or value in question appears as constitutive to one's own self, to the point that not affirming it or not fully acknowledging it would seriously compromise one's own identity. *Heroism* might be part of testimonies, but it is only a necessary element to some testimonies, while the re-orientation of self that leads to self-exposure is indispensable.

There is a political implication hitherto that is once again well illustrated by the example of the Benedict community: they truly practiced self-exposure for they did not shy away from a real encounter with whoever entered their community. By introducing the migrants into their personal and community life, they opened themselves to the possibility of meeting 'the stranger', i.e. somebody who is supposed to be completely different. They let themselves to be affected by the differences: they were open to be transformed by the other. It was the beautiful paradox of their Christian faith that enabled them to engage in such a radical openness and charity towards the other. The absolute other for them is Christ as the divine person, but it is the same Christ who is at the same time the most intimate to them, even more intimate than their own self[12]. Analogically, the migrant's strangeness could affect them on the basis of the even higher strangeness their found in their own self[13]: appropriating the one means appropriating the other.

In this process of encountering each other in order that the migrants could find their refuge under circumstances they probably never imagined, those who were supposedly at home accepted the opportunity to become foreign to themselves. – There can hardly be a more significant political change, for it meant the transformation and the extension of the community.[14] Political thinking, i.e. reflecting on themselves and their common good, included those who lived under the same roof and were fed around the same table. Even when reflecting on issues of the world outside of the monastery, and especially the way of thinking of others who found themselves at the Hungarian borders and crossing through the country was transformed as well, for suddenly there were concrete faces and stories attached to abstract political problems and issues.

See further: de Moine, I. (2009). El ordo amoris como principio inspirador del pensamiento personalista, Veritas, vol. IV, nº 21 p. 267-286; as well as Dietrich von, H. (2005). El corazón. Un análisis de la afectividadhumana y divina. Madrid: Palabra.

[12] See St. Augustin, Confessiones, Liber Tertius, 3.6.11.

[13] Ricoeur, P. (1995). Oneself as another. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[14] In the words of Michal Givoni: „This intrinsic logic of testimony – the minimal formal requisites that may be activated by its consumers as much as by its producers but must be set in motion in order for this practice to have any political meaning – becomes fully decipherable when testimony is considered alongside the notion of indifference, which forms its backdrop and *raison-d'être*. Testimony, which is often accompanied by slogans such as "that the world may know", ascribed the unending task of expanding the political imagination that indifference depletes and retying the social bonds it has undone. It is first and foremost an act of moral weaving, an attempt to (re)establish a human relation where one is denied or presumed to be nonexistent." in: Givoni, M. (2011). Witnessing/Testimony, in: Mafte'akh. Lexical Review of Political Thought, Retrieved from: http://mafteakh.tau.ac.il/en/issue-2e-winter-2011/witnessingtestimony/, (10.05.2016).

1.3. BEING A TESTIFIER – BEING A POLITICIAN

Not everybody is capable of making the gesture of self-exposure that implies suffering. Who can then be a testifier? Paradoxically enough, nobody can and anybody could. Giving testimony – as we argued above – is not our choice in the sense that we do not create the situation in which there is a need for testimony: its responsive character is essential. The testifier is somebody who is faced with a value or truth in question, or it is better to say, the testifier is somebody who knows, that beyond the problematic issue he is facing there is a human face and subject to be cared for. It is this recognition of the personal aspect of problems that enables an affirmation of truth and values of a peculiar kind (that includes self-exposure and self-sacrifice): affirming the other person without reducing him or her to the actual meaning as limited to the given context (of the problematic issue). A testifier is somebody who has met XY, who at that time happened to be a refugee, rather than meeting a refugee with the name, origin, ethnic and religious background, etc. Since the care for the other to be demonstrated in the testimony is previous to the concrete encounter with this or that other, the testifier is somebody endowed with a peculiar type of imagination: even without knowing XY, he imagines the concrete uniqueness of the person to be affirmed.

It would not correspond to the facts if we contrasted here the positive account of the testifier to the supposedly negative example of the politician – as we think of the latter in rather cynical terms of contemporary political experiences, darkened with corruption, misuse of power, etc. The political *vocation* of human being shall not be confused with the way the profession of the politician is sometimes or even most time exercised contemporarily.[15] Methodologically speaking, it is better to start with the first phenomenon and then draw some conclusion of the analysis thereof to then proceed to the second one.

Since we are members of different communities– even many at the same time – we have a co-responsible to shape them; our responses to values, our attitudes towards people certainly

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[15] There is a strong interrelationship and at the same time and important difference between *vocation* and *profession*. Their relation was blurred when Luther translated vocation into (Berufung) as Beruf (profession). His idea based on 1 Kor 7,20 (Ein jeglicher bleibe in dem Beruf, darin er berufen ist. – as Luther translated it in the King James Version: "Let every man abide in the same calling wherein he was called.") Luther argued that it means that there is no priority to religious vocation as compared to serving others and the community with the specific talents one was given. The Second Vatican Council made important clarifications concerning the vocation of the laity. John Paul II stated in his Exhortation *Christifideles laici (30th of December 1988)*: "It is no exaggeration to say that the entire existence of the lay faithful has as its purpose to lead a person to a knowledge of the radical newness of the Christian life that comes from Baptism, the sacrament of faith, so that this knowledge can help that person live the responsibilities which arise from that vocation received from God." According to this idea, anybody who is politician by profession responds to his or her call and has the same mission given to the children of God. It is noteworthy here that the profession of being a politician does not coincide with the general mission of the children of God. It is rather that this profession – as any other – has a participative relation to the general vocation by responding to a special mission, i.e. it is a specific form of how to love God and the others.

have an impact on how the common good is to be manifested and realized in these communities. The German term, 'mitgestalten' is very precisely capturing how all members are working on a 'shape' of the community. Many actions and deeds of this co-forming that are not intended to be political, even acts that are supposed to be very private, have an incalculable effect on the final happiness of the community. We do not regard these acts (often with a clear moral and spiritual content) as political activity, and yet it is politics in the best sense of the word.

The phenomenon of testimony invites us to rethink the apparent necessity of separating the *private* and *public* sphere of political life,[16] for testimonies are precisely transformations of morally and spiritually relevant acts – that are often supposed to be private issues – into important public affairs. Testimonies lift up the artificial veil (of modern political thinking) separating the *individuality* from the *community* and help us see the hidden participative and responsive character of our existence – before being engaged in any explicit political action.

Let us see again how this is illustrated by the Benedictine community. They were not acting politically in the sense of trying to be for or against any party or policy of the government. Yet they acted politically for they introduced the migrants into their own community and into what is probably one of the most precious gift at their care, the young students. Their decision was both private and public as it was a decision concerning faith. It does not need to be praised for it is normal, but it nevertheless becomes interesting given the many fears in Europe that these teachers and monks were not the least bit afraid to welcome in their homes and in their school a large community of mostly Muslim people, while allegedly the European task is to defend Christian values, the "defense" of the Christian tradition proposed by this community was the simple imitation of the gesture of Saint Martin of Tours (the monastery's hill is named after him) who famously gave half of his garment to the poor, which in itself is an imitation of Christ.

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[16] Even though it is not the main topic of this essay, I would like to mention that such a profound rethinking of the separation of the private and the public sphere – our very questionable modern heritage – goes along with an even more complex and more profound task for political philosophy today: rethinking the allegedly also necessarily separation between the sacred and the profane. Modernity arguably led us here to several dead ends both culturally, politically and spiritually. It is not just a task for different religious communities, but it is also a proper challenge for pro-laïcité thinkers and politicians to show a way out of the complex paradoxes of post-modern politics. Think for example of the paradox of the democratic commitment of supporting religious freedom – is usually not understood in religious terms as individual freedom, but rather as a public affair – and the claim of the neutrality of state. For, if religion is not reduced to an individual right – and this is inacceptable on the basis of religious freedom – then there is no neutrality of the state, since the state supports one group more than the others: religion becomes politics. It is even worse for the modern state, which was established precisely to be religiously neutral and thereby to guarantee peace among different conflicting religions. How a state that puts itself can above all forms of religion, prevent itself from becoming an object of religious devotion? Not only communism and Nazism are profane state-religions, but also the post-modern liberal democratic and secular state is similar in several aspects to how religion "functions". See this: Cavanaugh, W. T. (2011). Migrations of the Holy: God, State, and the Political Meaning of the Church. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing; as well as: Cavanaugh, W. T. (2009). The myth of religious violence: Secular ideology and the roots of modern conflict. Oxford University Press.

The invisible personal (and if you want private) gestures of welcome on the part of each and every member of this complex community within which they accepted the migrants and from which they opened their hearts to them in different ways, were manifested through 'private' expressions, but had an indubitable 'public' effect: those migrants probably have encountered the first time real European culture – not one showcased on television with its economic wealth and social stability they reported as inspiring them to come to Europe, but the one that is truly responsible for Europe's unique cultural transformation in times of migration of Peoples: the Christian spirit of Benedictine monasteries, places of cult and culture with a 'stability' beyond history.

2. POLITICAL DISCOURSE

In order to see how testimony can become politically relevant and used as an argument we first have to grasp first the main features of current political discourse of Western democratic societies and then the meaning of a 'political argument'.

2.1. THE ACTUAL CURRENT POLITICAL DISCOURSE

However different the political discourse might look like in different Western countries, there are certain common features that could be singled out and that are important in our context.

2.1.1. Mediatization[17]

Democratic societies are governed through a representational political system. Rather than immediately established between these two poles (those in the government and the governed citizens) the political discourse is orchestrated almost completely by the media. Today, like never before, it would be more than naïve to think that the media's role is truly 'mediation' and that it would simply transmit and broadcast relevant information that matters for a given community. The power of media lies rather in creating and in silencing events, and thereby shaping the political life; by *virtualizing* politics almost entirely it is they who choose and form both poles of the discourse according to the logic of their own interest.

It is important to see this point for at least two reasons: a) Understanding the artificiality and arbitrariness of the mediatization of politics helps to maintain some distance from the

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[17] See on this topic: Mazzoleni, G., & Schulz, W. (1999). "Mediatization" of politics: A challenge for democracy? Political communication, 16(3), 247-261.

political discourse in which the testimony will be embedded. b) It also contributes to grasping how some political events that the media does not recognize as such can nevertheless be really political.

Testimonies certainly fall under this latter category — it is rather impossible to capture them through the means (vocabulary, images) of the media for what usually makes a testimony what it is, is clearly invisible and by no means 'spectacular'. To continue with our example: it is just some students of a Benedictine boarding school playing ethno-rock music together with migrants. The real event, i.e. the silent change of their attitude, the identity of the participants, however well expressed, remains invisible for the cameras and in general for the mind-set of main-stream journalism.

Even granted that reality sometimes is poetic enough to seduce even the language of the mass media, a testimony might be recognized as something 'interesting'. However, it takes a long way from this first reaction to appreciate a testimony for what it really is. These steps can only be performed by each individual person, for it implies an affirmation of the value that has been held up by the testimony.

2.1.2. Lack of Authenticity and credibility[18]

Another feature of political discourse that is important in this context is its openly admitted lack of authenticity. Whatever is labeled to be a political message is considered as a product that has to be sold just as any other product on the market. If we understand by authenticity the truthfulness and honesty of a political discourse, i.e. that it truly describes both the facts and the intentions of the speaker, then a political discourse is never truly transparent: behind what is communicated to the voters there is a hidden agenda serving very different interests. It seems that the political discourse is only the surface, the veil that covers the perhaps dark issues of real politics. Even when one rejects any conspiracy theory – as I do – one cannot notice the need to read between the lines of political communication.

The lack of transparency in political discourse is often responsible not just for disguising certain political affairs, but more generally, also for disguising the very nature of politics itself. Political marketing, i.e. politics reduced to the level of commercial messages, runs the risk of truly understanding politics as nothing more than a product to sell. For those, however, who recognize

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[18] If this point needs to be proven at all one might want to compare in any liberal democracy the program of any elected candidate with what really has been realized during the time in office. The abysmal difference cannot be explained away by referring to unfortunate external circumstances. The fact that statistically the adult population for example in Great Britain believes that politicians are significantly less trustworthy than anybody on the street (even a used-car salesman) certainly is an important aspect to be taken into account when characterizing political discourse. See: https://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/Veracity%20Index%202014%20topline.pdf (10.05.2016); see as well: http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/sep/27/trust-politicians-all-time-low (11.05.2016).

authentic testimonies as such politics reveals its real nature: behind the scene of an economically dominated ideological discourse they can envision the divine-human drama and the beautiful complexity of interpersonal relationships in which love, forgiveness and self-sacrifice play the most important role.

2.1.3. Technical-scientific[19]

In the current political discourse, philosophy plays as little role as possible. It is deeply significant that at major universities political science is conceived as closer to psychology and communication than to philosophy and theology. There is an obvious technical character of the discourse that comes to the forefront when we analyze the disagreement between the left and right wing parties: there is far fewer differences in metaphysical, anthropological and ethical terms than in concrete solutions offered. The conceptual network they use to approach the political realist is strikingly similar, most of the time their analysis of political issues coincide and there is a common reflection on what is legitimately considered to be a 'problem'. To illustrate this point, it is enough to read the electoral programs of different parties in different Western European democratic societies.

Whatever the solution might look like, it is usually seen in technical terms, in economic restructuration in different ways of handling very complex systems to reach the desired outcome. Parties try to position themselves in order to satisfy better that part of the population whose votes guarantee to access to or permanence in power.

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[19] In general, I do not mean how science are present in political discourse (like astrophysics or genetics), but it is noteworthy to see some other natural and human sciences are increasingly important as arguments in political debates. Let me mention here three of them. 1) Both the presidential campaign in the USA and the work of the British Parliament are basically unthinkable without a constant reference of carefully chosen *statistical data*. 2) Undoubtedly, but quite strangely at the same time, political discourse primordially revolves around *economic issues*; most politicians see their own principal role to create positive circumstances for economic growth and thereby to contribute to the welfare of a nation. 3) Reaching this objective seems to legitimate many other questionable political decisions. The third important science to mention here – besides statistics and economics – is *psychology* with special regard to manipulation or as it is called euphemistically: public relation techniques. One of the most decisive political issues in modern liberal democracies is the so called spin doctor how he runs the electoral campaign of the leading parties. Some of these people elaborate strategies to get to power almost independently of the given historical or cultural circumstances and certainly independently of any moral sphere. It is noteworthy that often in one country they work for the political left in another country for the right – one can add with a bit of sarcasm: always on a strong scientific and neutral basis.
In the contemporary post-modern and post-Christian world, i.e. after the reduction of theology as a master discourse to philosophy and metaphysics and later on to politics, we can observe now how political issues are increasingly reduced to economic ones. This leads to a new orchestration of political communication. One important point here is this: while politics has a certain tendency of understanding reality in poetic terms, trying to do justice to the superabundant meaning the escapes our linguistic categories, economics is certainly less poetic when reducing all kinds of complex realities to numerical relations. Politics, therefore, by completely subduing itself to economy is tempted to give up its own essence: being a complex art of dealing with interpersonal (divine-human and human-human) relations. Politics thereby becomes a mere methodology of mass-programming in a code that is less and less human, because it is radically inadequate when applied to complex human relations. The new codification of political communication made up of a quite powerful mixture of moralism and sentimentalism, usually serves to veil the hidden economic agenda. See on this: Molnar, T. (1992). *L'hégémonie libérale. L'Age d'Homme.*, especially ch. 3.

Once again, testimonies offer a very different approach to political reality. Instead of technical language, testimonials are rather poetic and inspire philosophical and theological reflections on the topic. Technicalities, let it be actual solutions to problems or the very power-techniques, are marginalized when the suffering reveals its hidden dimensions. It becomes evident that however necessary they are, technicalities are radically insufficient when faced with unique lives and destinies and destroyed communities. These are the moments when professional politics and its technical discourse has to give the floor to real politics that is less technical and rhetorical but probably more ritual and more poetic.

2.1.4. Impersonal[20]

A further salient feature of contemporary Western political discourse is its impersonal character. It is impersonal in three senses: a) concerning the speaker, b) the content and c) the addressee.

a) The politician who is for the greater part responsible for the formation of political discourse is more than ever an image heading a very careful elaborated product, the political message. The exaggerated interest for his or her personality, his or her (moral) character, and above all, for his or her sex-appeal is nothing but a poor compensation for the constant annihilation of his or her personality due to the systemic coercions. Postmodern politics tried so hard to avoid any trace of personal cult and dictatorship that it came to the verge of getting rid of the politician as such. He was replaced by a technician and the reliable administrative or negotiator with no personality and vision, who is at the same time a public figure: something both easily to commercialize and to control.

b) The content of current political discourse is impersonal because of the deep aversion towards (theological and) metaphysical issues. Consequently politics refuses to deal with the complete reality of a person rather than just with individual aspects of human existence. The terms in which human existence is thematized in contemporary western politics far too often stems from juridical discourse and use rather the juridical-economical and psychological logic than proper political reasoning. Politically relevant issues are approached for example in terms of "this type of individual at this type of problematic situation falls under this type of measures", and the way to "sell" this

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[20] Giorgio Agamben speaks about the despersonalization and the reduction to the bare life. See: Agamben, G. (1998). *Homo Sacer*. Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics).The problem of loss of personal identity in totalitarian systems was famously noted and described concerning its political implications by Hannah Arendt: in: Arendt, H. (1973). The origins of totalitarianism (Vol. 244). Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. See also: Esposito, Roberto; (1988) *Categorías de lo impolítico*, Buenos Aires: Katz.

solution is through influencing public opinion, for example by increasing the emotional pressure on the target group.

Another typical consequence of this shortcoming of contemporary political discourse appears when operating with the metaphysically silent presupposition according to which the subject matter of political actions are rather individuals, than persons embedded in the complex socio-cultural context. Only some argue explicitly that people have to be neutralized and personhood has to bed is regarded so that it becomes accessible to politics. In order to establish a just and well-functioning political system – and these criteria are often prioritized – it seems politics should be neutral to all features that are crucially important for our identity.

Testimonies, on the contrary, are *per excellence* personal expressions for they are not only a unique answer to values that are highly important for human nature, but also expression, in which the subject's identity is best captured: testimonies are self-revelations of who this person is in accordance with his or her own personal vocation. While the anthropological reality with which contemporary politics deals is reduced to pure neutrality, testimonies are manifestations of the whole person, of all faculties of the soul expressed in a bodily self-gift; they are acts in which the fragmented existence encounters a new unity.

c) Testimonies in this sense once again challenge the mainstream political discourse by revealing the real subject of politics, human person as an irreducible unity of body and soul endowed with a unique vocation irreducible to being part of political communities. Testimonies, when illuminating the eschatological dimensions and the purpose of human life, do not only challenged the idea that the political discourse is the most profound and most encompassing context to understand and to interpret human existence, but they also reorient political discourse by giving clear guidelines about how to conceive the destiny of human life of which politics is only a part.

2.1.5. Value-neutrality

The contemporary political discourse in Western democracies set for itself a yet another paradoxical task: value-neutrality.[21] On the one hand, it cannot opt for any desirable life-style for

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[21] This claim can be traced back to the reflections of the very controversial idea of John Rawls about the Veil of Ignorance that itself is a reinterpretation of a long tradition of understanding political participation in terms of social contract. (Think of the prominent works of Immanuel Kant, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Thomas Jefferson.) See: Rawls, J. (2009). *A theory of justice.* Harvard University Press. Another quite different example of proposing certain value neutrality in the political sphere might be the influential theory of Habermas, See: Habermas, J. (1985). The theory of communicative action, Volume 2: Lifeworld and

it allegedly lacked any anthropological, metaphysical and ultimately speaking any theological foundation; on the other hand, it is inevitable to propose certain values on which political agendas have to be oriented. Rather than discussing here the dramatic consequences of this inner contradiction that affects not only the modern democratic political discourse, but also the praxis of concrete policies, I limit myself to point out how this creates a considerable tension to accept testimonies within the political discourse.

Testimonies are expressions of dramatic encounters with a value or a set of values the affirmation of which implies a sacrifice for the subject. The integration of testimonies into the political discourse requires the suspension of the principle of neutrality and to accept real existing values with their appeal to be affirmed and realized. Moreover, since authentic testimonies are, by the same token, existential demonstrations of the *hierarchy of values* in the sense of *ordo amoris*, taken them as politically serious also implies subscribing to this ideal as well.

Welcoming migrants into the monastery of Pannonhalma is an act that indicates not just a hierarchy of values, but also the affirmation of their complex unity. Loving one's neighbor whoever she or he might be is certainly ranked as very high, for it is the principle of action. However, would it not be a lack of the same love if, for example, keeping the well-established order of the monastery would not also be considered important?

In this sense, their testimony as any authentic testimony, demonstrates that the affirmation of a set of values in the sense of *ordo amoris, i.e. an objectively existing hierarchy of values* implies at the same time the affirmation of all values as such, for all stem from the same origin. The right value-response means precisely not absolutizing values that are important but that cannot be the leading principle. It would be not only contradictory, but even morally reproachable to insist, for example, on the Christian identity of the monastery as a value that has to be preserved even at the cost of shutting its doors to migrants. This would be as contradictory and morally reproachable as, for example, to insist on the rights of the migrants to enter into the monastery and install themselves as if it were their home. Both policies would impede what is at stake here: the free and loving response to each other within a genuine encounter.

If in any sense politics should be neutral, it is perhaps this: allowing that genuine encounters can take place within and on the margins of community.

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system: A critique of functionalist reason.). What lurks in the background of this discussion of political theories is an ontological and ethical issue concerning the separation of facts and values. See: Oppenheim, F. E. (1973). "Facts" and" Values" in Politics: Are They Separable?. Political Theory, 1(1), 54-68. See as well the classical article of G.E. Moore (Moore, G. E., & Baldwin, T. (1993). Principia ethica. Cambridge University Press.) and its recent critique by Ruth Anna Putnam (Putnam, R. A. (1998). Perceiving facts and values. Philosophy, 73(01), 5-19.) and Hilary Putnam (Putnam, H. (2002). The collapse of the fact/value dichotomy and other essays. Harvard University Press.)

As a summary of these five characteristics of the contemporary Western political discourse with respect to testimonies we can claim that testimonies, usually coming from the margins of political reality and especially from those domains where moral, spiritual and legal disorder causes at times immense suffering, they offered the possibility to recalibrate the political discourse. In order to do so they need to overcome difficulties inherent to the actual political discourse such as its mediatization and virtualization, its lack of authenticity, its technical-scientific qualities and complex impersonal character, and finally its contradictory aspiration to value-neutrality. Authentic testimonies, when taken seriously, offer a cure to political discourse and thus are a considerable step towards more human policies.

To take political testimonies seriously, they not only have to be recognized as such, but they also have to be regarded as politically relevant within the current discussion: they have to be understood as arguments.

2.2. WHAT COUNTS AS A POLITICAL ARGUMENT?[22]

There are formal and material criteria to decide if something is or is not a political argument or not. For it is clear that there is a difference between a bad argument and something that is not an argument at all. The minimal formal criteria is that the given claim must have a valid logical relation to the thesis it pretends to sustain. According to this, all arguments that pretend to logically sustain a politically relevant thesis is a political argument.

Clarifying the material criteria concerning political arguments is a more complex issue, for it partially implies to subscribe to those thesis that are considered politically relevant.

If in postmodern times the validity of scientific theory depends only on whatever the scientific community accepts as a good scientific explanation, it seems to be reasonable to claim that in a democratic society the criteria to regard something as a political argument depends on whether at least some of the political formations accept it as argument. This is certainly a significant but problematic aspect when taking into account that the political community is usually very divided and that it includes fundamentalist groups as well. It is risky to accept that something can rightly be considered as a political argument just because some fundamentalist group regards it as such.

Now, for any given political community, there are always issues that lie at the center of interest while others are marginal to the point that they are completely neglected. Obviously, this negligence can be justified as well as it can be morally and spiritually completely illegitimate and

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22 Govier, T. (1993). When logic meets politics: Testimony, distrust, and rhetorical disadvantage. Informal Logic, 15(2).

reproachable. This point is important for, as argued above, the political discourse in contemporary democratic societies has a tendency to reduce the very political sphere in a disturbing manner, for example by tacitly declaring that nothing is beyond politics since everything is political. Whatever counts as a political argument, it does it not only at the mercy of the current members of the political discourse (with their specific spiritual, moral and intellectual limitations), but it also depends on the inherent limitations of a specific political discourse at a given historical time.

Having this in mind, it seems that whatever the criteria might be for regarding something as a political argument within the current political discourse, the best political arguments by far are certainly those that elevate the horizon of the discourse, demonstrating for example that something that was not politically relevant, is very much so.[23] Political arguments are above all those claims that change how we think of politics by broadening its meaning.

In this sense, testimonies are *par excellence* political arguments, for with their specific poetic language, with their decisive personal character, their being authentic expressions of human sacrifice and self-giving for the sake of others, make precisely the type of claims that are capable of pushing politics beyond its limits. Once accepted as politically relevant arguments – if not distorted and misused - testimonies restore the dignity of politics by reestablishing its original theological, metaphysical, cultural and social relevance.

Let us see how this applies to the example of the Pannonhalma monastery.

Whatever their message may be on a political level, it cannot be fitted into the interpretative schemes of political forces found in contemporary Hungarian or in international discourse. Their actions somehow represent a set of liberal values just as they exemplify some conservative arguments, and yet again they contradict the interpretation of the situation of all political forces on important points - not because they want to do so, but rather because reality is always both more meaningful and more exigent than the political discourse is able to grasp and to do justice. This superabundant meaning is only more or less well captured and responded to by concrete and personal actions like the loving welcome of a host.

Once the act of the community of Pannonhalma monastery finds its laborious ways into political discourse – just like many more testimonies of human suffering and forgiveness have

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[23] See on this: Lackey, J. (2008). *Learning from words: Testimony as a source of knowledge.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. She argues that whereas according to the traditional view "testimony is a merely transmissive, rather than a generative, epistemic source, where this means that testimony can only transmit epistemic properties from one person to another and is thus incapable of generating new epistemic properties in its own right", indeed this is possible. She points out that „there are scenarios revealing that unreliable knowers may nonetheless be reliable testifiers and, accordingly, that the testimony of speakers who do not possess knowledge of a given fact can nonetheless be the source of knowledge that hearers acquire of this very fact." (See: Marshall, R. (2013), On Testimony Interview with Jennifer Lackey, Retrieved from: http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/on-testimony/ (10.05.2016)

found their way into the debate – significant political action can begin. Our conclusion is not surprising: what truly makes politics is the acceptance of the migrants beyond the grasp of political categories.

3. POLITICS OPEN TO TESTIMONY VERSUS POLITICS OVERRULING TESTIMONY

We have made three important preparatory steps by clarifying what politically relevant testimonies might look like. We have introduced five relevant aspects and later we have characterized the current political discourse from different points of view which have allowed us to briefly outline the criteria of what a political argument is. These steps were necessary in order to see what is at stake when testimonies enter into political discourse.

Doubtlessly those who are conforming (mitgestalten) this discourse have a special responsibility that, however complex their task might concretely look like, comes down to a simple alternative: whether to listen to testimonies or not.

For there are two radically opposed styles of making politics in this respect: a type of politics that is open and listens to testimonies on the one hand, and another that is closed and cannot listen, but its own voice on the other hand. The latter is an understanding of politics that considers itself as the master discourse and that claims that every other discourse is subordinated to it. No doubt the main stream political machinery today is very much capable to ignore the weak and special voice of testimonies, and if it does listen, cannot hear anything but what suits its own purposes.

Given that the politically most relevant testimonies report arguably from the margins of political life[24] about things that are often outside the focus of the actual discourse and that they are very often the only expression of the immense suffering of those who have no language and no voice, not to admit testimonies into the political discourse not only leads to politics becoming abstract and out of touch with life, but also to inhuman discourse and policies.

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[24] Yúdice, G. (1996). Testimonio and Postmodernism. In: Georg M. Gugelberger. (1996). *The real thing: Testimonial discourse and Latin America*. Duke University Press.

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New beginnings?
The refugee "crisis," the "Other," and Islamic religious education in Germany

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Abstract

The recent influx of refugees has been in the headlines for more than a year in Germany. On a daily basis, new items about refugees, asylum policies, disasters, or xenophobia makes it into print, visual, or social media. Everybody has an opinion about this issue. In this essay, I record some of my own observations in this regard, as someone, who, in different ways, has been involved with refugees and "Others". I am trying to make some sense of the discourses and actions that the so-called "refugee crisis" has produced. It has become evident that the discourse about the refugees is as much about the "Other" as it is about the "Self". It is my argument that Germany is at a crossroads as a consequence of the arrival of relatively large numbers of refugees mainly from a Middle Eastern context – it can either lead to Germany closing in on itself, trying to exclude the "Other", which in a globalized world would probably be a disadvantage; on the other hand, the "refugee crisis" has the potential of a new beginning, expanding on the already existing efforts to integrate "Others" into one's own society. One example for such integration efforts would be the fairly recent introduction of Islamic Religious Education in state schools. The success or failure of this experiment can provide an indication of the willingness and ability of Germans to find constructive ways to integrate refugees into their communities.

Key words: refugee crisis, the other, Islam, Islamic education, Germany

"Islam doesn't belong to Germany." On my way to work one morning in April 2016 I heard reports on the radio that an old debate has flared up yet again. Some right-wing politicians announced that "Islam was against the German Constitution," that "Islam is a political ideology that is incompatible with the Constitution," and that while many Muslims belong to Germany, "Islam does not and never will" (https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/afd-257.html). On the one hand, I wanted to brush it aside as just another case of those hateful comments that we have heard so often in recent months. On the other hand, I am painfully aware of the danger that lurks beneath such remarks for the future of the whole society. In this essay, I take issue with some of the debates that have marked public discourse in Germany in 2015-16. Many of them are in one way or another linked to "Islam." I scrutinize some of the main arguments put forward in those debates and argue that what we are able to witness is not just another episode in the construction of the "Other," but also an exercise in rediscovering an imagined "Self" through a variety of discursive strategies. One such strategy is the dynamics between "hidden" and "public" transcripts in the relationships of power in society. As I will try to show shortly, this balance between what can and cannot be said in public (or in private) about the "Other" (religiously or otherwise defined) has been disturbed as a consequence of the arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees[1] in Germany. This "crisis" of "Self," which Germany as a nation can be said to be going through, has the potential of being the beginning of a new understanding of self-identity that provides room for "Others" in its midst. On the less optimistic side, it has the potential of letting Germans close in on themselves and forcefully exclude "Others."

This essay is mainly informed by personal experience and is not always academic nor systematic in nature: As a lecturer in Islamic theology/pedagogy (educating future school teachers of Islamic religious education), a subject that is still in its infancy, I am faced on almost daily basis with the debates about the right (or otherwise) of Muslim pupils to receive education in their own religious tradition in state schools in Germany like their Catholic or Protestant fellow pupils.

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[1] I use the term "refugee" to denote a person, who has fled their country of origin "seeking refuge from war, political oppression, religious persecution, or a natural disaster" (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/refugee). In contrast, I refer to "migrants," when I mean a person, who "leaves one country to settle permanently in another," often for economic rather than political reasons (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/migrant). Unfortunately, this distinction is not always clearly made in public discourse in Germany.

Many of the pupils that my students will teach in the future will have a refugee background. Opposite the university I work at a new facility is being built to house refugees. As I am a fluent speaker of Arabic, I am personally involved in volunteer work with refugees. We rented out a small flat in our house to an Afghan refugee family. My husband is Palestinian (Christian) and has just received a 9 month residence permit. In other words, it is at times difficult for me to keep a distance when it comes to the issues discussed here. I am too personally involved. In this essay, however, I attempt to academically and scientifically come to grips with these issues. It is written in the anthropological tradition of participant observation, my academic home turf. Let me begin with some observations on the "refugee crisis."

1. CRISIS?

The German Ministry for Migration and Refugees reports that in 2015 almost half a million people, mainly from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, asked for asylum in Germany. In 2014, it was about 200,000, and in the first three months of 2016, by the time of writing this paper, refugee numbers had already reached almost 200,000 (BAMF 2016). This was preceded by a period of relatively low numbers of refugees asking for asylum in Germany and paralleled only by the numbers in the early 1990s (ibid.). However, as an independent media service on integration reports, these numbers reflect only those who officially applied for asylum; those who arrived in Germany, but have not yet applied for asylum, numbered just above one million in 2015 alone (Mediendienst Integration). Over the past 25 years or so, 3.7 million refugees have come to Germany (BAMF 2016). It must also be noted that no other European country has opened the doors to equal numbers of refugees (ibid.).

These figures may seem daunting and to many Germans they are indeed indicators of a deep "crisis." Put into perspective, however, they must appear manageable: Lebanon, a country of only 4.5 million inhabitants has received just over one million Syrian refugees; Jordan has become home to more than 600,000 refugees with the number of citizens being only 6.5 million; finally, Turkey has received more than 2.7 million Syrian refugees with a population of around 75 million (UNHCR). To bring this numbers game to an end, it must also be noted that the population growth in Germany has been negative for 12 years in a row (between 1999 and 2011), before it began to increase slightly to about 0.5% in 2015 (countrymeters).

A thought imposes itself: Germany *needs* the refugees to stop its negative population growth. This kind of argument and discussion also took place in the early 1990s after the

disintegration of the Soviet Union and the influx of thousands of Soviet "Germans" into Germany. This was also the time when, after about ten years of negative growth rates, the population grew in both numbers and rate (worldometers). Statistics also indicate that the average age of Germans has been increasing from 35 in the 1950s and 60s to 46 in 2015 (ibid.). Looking into the future, it has been forecasted that the proportion of under-20s will fall from 18.1% in 2013 to 16.2% in 2050 (BPD 2015). In the 1950s, this proportion was about one third of the population (ibid.). In parallel to that, the proportion of over-60s has increased from 14.6% in 1950 to 27.1% in 2013 and is forecasted to further increase to 37.6% in 2050 (ibid.). I have my methodological reservations about statistics and am generally sceptical about forecasts, but what these figures indicate is that Germany will be facing problems in the future, not least of which will be financial in nature: who will provide for the millions of pensioners and senior citizens in need of care when the number and percentage of young people and working people is steadily decreasing? This scenario is often employed to show the influx of refugees and migrants into Germany in a positive light. It has been calculated that in order to revert the decrease in the number and percentage of the working population (between 20 and 66 years of age), Germany would need a yearly influx of 470,000 young migrants, i.e. 11 million over the next 25 years (Gillmann 2016). This could also reverse a trend observable in the area of vocational training: the number of young applicants for crafts training has been decreasing notably (Ländermonitor 2015). Some hope that refugees and migrants could fill this gap.

This numbers game can, however, also be turned on its head: instead of seeing refugees and migrants as beneficial for the German economy and society, they are seen as a threat. What used to be expressed behind closed doors or in the pub over a beer (or two), has become a vibrant part of public discourse. While it used to be (and in some circles continues to be) politically incorrect to speak negatively about refugees in public, utterances in this vein seem to have become socially acceptable. We can hear and read of "avalanches" of refugees "overrunning" Germany and the Germans. And while in the past politicians tended to be on the "politically correct" side of the debate, some of them started outing themselves, not only from the far right. The Minister of Finance, for instance, is (mis)quoted as having warned of an "escalation of the refugee crisis" as a result of an "avalanche-like influx of refugees" that could lead to "dramatic distress" for Germany (Tagesschau 2015). Some inflate the numbers in an effort to stir up emotions: the website "Politically Incorrect," for instance, expects 35 million refugees coming to Germany and quoting the Hungarian foreign minister as observing a "massive migration of peoples with endless reserves" (Politically Incorrect 2015). I could go on infinitely, but I think the message is clear.

How can we explain what is going on at this discursive level? In other minority-majority contexts I have found Scott's (1990) concept of public and hidden transcripts very useful (Droeber 2014). This construct is particularly useful for the analysis of dominant-dominated relationships, but can shed light on less hierarchical social relationships as well. There is no space to go into much detail of the two concepts here. A few landmarks will do. First of all, Scott (1990:18) describes the public transcript as "the *self*-portrait of dominant elites as they would have themselves seen." It is a narrative that "is designed to be impressive, to affirm and to naturalize the power of dominant elites" (ibid.). In the case of the refugee "crisis" in Germany, this self-portrait seems to have, for some time at least, been one of "well-meaning, humanitarian minded, philanthropic do-gooder." There are, according to Scott (1990: 18f.), at least four reactions to this elite narrative. One is to publically adopt this discourse, to make use of the "small rhetorical space" that this ideology offers to further one's own interests (Scott 1990:18). The second scenario is the hidden transcript *per se* – a "sharply dissonant political culture," taking place offstage (ibid.). The third strategy is a "politics of disguise and anonymity" in the shape of rumor, gossip, folktales, jokes, songs etc. (Scott 1990:19). The final response is the "rupture of the *cordon sanitaire* between the hidden and the public transcript" (ibid.). This open defiance can lead to "either a swift stroke of repression or, if unanswered, lead[s] to further words and acts of daring" (ibid.).

It appears to me, from my cursory observations of the scene that public discourse on the refugee "crisis" has passed through all of those four reactions in almost chronological order, but also existing simultaneously. While in the first phase of the new "wave" of refugees, when refugee numbers were still small and not big news items, the "welcome culture" appeared to dominate the public transcript. There can be no doubt that at the same time, many hidden transcripts replete with dissonant voices existed. As the numbers of refugees increased, however, this dissenting culture gradually rose to the surface of public discourse and appeared in anonymous rumors, conspiracy theories, or jokes. What we have been able to witness during the course of the last year or two, however, was the fourth response, i.e. an often violent rupture between public and hidden transcripts. The hidden transcripts have exploded into the public domain. Since violent repression is hardly an option in a democratic system, further "acts of daring" were indeed the consequence.

One must not forget, however, that the reactions we have been witnessing during the past couple of years have a pre-history. If we have a cursory look at the developments in criminal statistics, it becomes immediately evident that violence against or hatred of "foreigners" has been increasing steadily over the past 25 years or so. These statistics indicate that the first rupture of

the "cordon sanitaire" between public and hidden transcript in terms of the discourse about "Others" actually happened in 1991, shortly after the unification of the two Germanies and the disintegration of the socialist block. Willems et al. (1994: 99) mentions, based on reports by the Federal Police (BKA), that in the second half of 1991 a significant rise in xenophobic crimes could be observed. While in the previous years there were about 250 such crimes per year, in 1991 police registered 2427 xenophobic crimes (ibid.). The first half of 1991 was similar to the previous years in terms of level of xenophobic attacks (around 50 per month). August then saw a rise to around 100 cases, September to 313, and October to 964 (ibid.). This outbreak was followed by a slight decline until mid-1992, when in September another stark increase was registered to more than 1000 cases per month. In 1992, thus, there were 6336 crimes with a xenophobic background, almost three times the level of the previous year (Willems et al. 1994: 100). Early 1993 again saw a decline until June, when the number of xenophobic crimes skyrocketed to more than 1400 (ibid.). Herbert (2001: 383) provides the figures up to 1998: after peaking in 1993, they continually went down until 1996 (similar level to 1991) before rising again in 1997 and 1998. In 2000, the definition of "xenophobic crimes" was amended to become more encompassing, so a comparison becomes difficult. If we, however, compare the years to which this new definition is applied, a similar trend can be observed: "right-wing" crimes after 2005 continually increase until 2008, then decrease slightly before rising again after 2012 (statista 2016a). Xenophobic crimes have increased steadily between 2010 and 2014 (statista 2016b).

These figures are to be understood with some caution. Definitions and statistics have not been without criticism. I am, however, not so much interested in absolute figures as in trends, which are, to my mind, clearly reflected in these statistics. What these statistics also illustrate quite clearly is one of the issues discussed by Scott (1990): when the hidden transcript bursts into the public domain, it usually happens after a triggering event. These events were, in chronological order, the xenophobic riots in Hoyerswerda in September 1991, similar riots in Rostock in September 1992, and an arson attack on a home for asylum seekers in Solingen in May 1993 (Willems et al. 1994: 99f.). Interestingly enough, and in line with Scott's analysis, the levels of violence never went back to their pre-attack levels, but stayed relatively high and increased from there.

This is the climate in which expressions like the one mentioned at the beginning – "Islam doesn't belong to Germany" – are made possible. Views like this were previously confined to hidden transcripts, but have now become part of certain public transcripts. They have become socially acceptable in many situations. We must not, of course, forget that there are a number of different public and hidden transcripts and that the picture is less clear cut than I have outlined

here. In some circles, political correctness continues to determine public discourse. It is, however, also a sign for the validity of Scott's concepts that a German political party (AfD) was able to write xenophobic slogans on its banners and to be consciously politically incorrect with regard to foreigners. In other words, in German public discourse an "Other," who seemingly does not belong to "Us," has again made a strong appearance. Who is this "Other" that is so vividly described in discussions about Germans and Germany, about an imagined "Self?"

2. WHO IS THE "OTHER"?

As the expression at the beginning of this essay suggests, Germany's current "Other" are Muslims and Islam. That this has a long history is no secret (see, for instance Said 2001). For centuries, Muslims and Islam have been depicted in political, theological, academic, and popular literature and discourse as "different", "strange", and "other". This history in and of itself is an interesting subject, but shall not be belabored here. Suffice it to note that the current discourse on the "Muslim Other" is yet another wave in what has been a long tradition of marking boundaries around a "Christian" or "enlightened" German "Self". There is, however, at least one problem with this depiction: neither is Germany particularly "Christian" (in terms of religious practice), nor are those who arrive in Germany all Muslims. The majority of the refugees that have come to Germany are from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, i.e. from Muslim majority societies (BAMF 2016). This does, however, not mean that all of them are Muslims, indeed many Christians have fled the extremism of the "Islamic State."

In German public perception, however, the newcomers are exclusively "Muslims." This is not a new phenomenon and does not concern refugees only. As I have argued elsewhere (Droeber 2014), it is particularly members of the Christian minority communities in the Middle East that are suffering from and complaining about this misconception. In their home societies they often feel discriminated against and suppressed to different degrees. Now, many of those who fled the worst oppression under the regime of the "Islamic State," feel that in "Christian" Germany they are also not particularly welcome. In conversations with Christian refugees I have time and again listened to their complaints about how Germans, if not discriminate against them, at least treat Muslims "too friendly" for their liking. Many times I have heard accusations that Germans were too welcoming to Muslims, who they – in similarly broad brush strokes – see as their "oppressors." Instead of the expected Christian solidarity, many Christian refugees find that Germans have sided with their enemies. One Christian refugee once told me, clearly aggravated,

that the volunteers, who look after the refugees once they move out of the camps into other accommodation, brought his Muslim flatmates a Christmas tree, but not for him. Even the label "Muslims" brushes over the diversity within the Muslim community, and Shia refugees, for instance, also often feel overlooked in their religious specificity. They, too, often complain about how Germans treat Sunni Muslims better than them.

This anecdotal evidence indicates that Germans are not very well educated about the political, social, and religious situation in the wider Middle East, where most refugees of the most recent wave come from. Their actions and behaviour must be understood against a background of rather simplistic and dualistic perceptions of the "Muslim world," or even the so-called "Third World." Again, this is nothing new. Edward Said (2001) and others have shown that this "strange" world, often called the "Orient," has often been seen in one of two ways: either as threatening, violent, and generally unpleasant (the ubiquitous image of the "Muslim terrorist") or as mystical, wonderful, alluring, and mystifying (the "Thousand and One Nights" image). It seems that in the current debates about refugees in Germany, these two perceptions appear in various disguises in the public and hidden transcripts. The political and elite discourse, which has made for most of the public transcript so far, seems to emanate from the "wondrous" image of the Muslim world, producing a quintessential "innocent" refugee, who as a victim had to flee murderous circumstances and must be supported. The hidden transcript, that admittedly is no longer merely "hidden," appears to be nourished by the threatening image, generating a quintessential "terrorist" refugee, who is perpetrator and intruder.

While these two images are diametrically opposed to each other and engender very different behaviour, they have one thing in common: they discursively create refugees that are fundamentally "other" and usually "below" Germans. The first image renders refugees as poor helpless victims that are dependent on support by Germans. The second image positions them as morally inferior since they are supposedly less enlightened and closer to the animal kingdom than Germans (with violence seen as something more typical for animals). These images are "fed" by such events as the so-called "*taharrush jama'i*" (collective sexual harassment) that has taken place in several big German cities during the New Year's celebrations 2016. These two discursive strategies, divergent as they are, serve one particular purpose: portraying the "Self" as morally superior, either as the "Good Samaritan," who helps the helpless, or as the less animal-like, who has supposedly reached higher evolutionary levels (notwithstanding the fact that the violence that this thinking engenders, as described earlier, is just as animal-like as any other kind of terrorism). In this way most Germans, who have something to say or have taken a certain position within

the refugee-debate, contribute in small or major ways to a discursive construction of German "Selves."

This phenomenon of "Othering" has long been an issue of debate in social anthropology and other social sciences. One might refer at this point to an anthropological classic, "Ethnic groups and boundaries" by Fredrik Barth (1969), who has turned our attention to the processes involved in maintaining, manipulating, and transgressing (essentially fluid) boundaries between ethnic and other social groups. He explained that "boundaries persist despite a flow of personnel across them" (Barth 1969: 9). Despite changing participation and membership in such groups, discrete categories are maintained (Barth 1969: 10). In other words, social and ethnic boundaries are so fluid that they threaten social stability and require a discursive framework that constructs such stability. Barth (ibid.) also pointed out that "stable, persisting, and often vitally important social relations are maintained across such boundaries, and are frequently based precisely on the dichotomized ethnic statuses." I find these remarks particularly useful in trying to understand the processes of marking boundaries and of "Othering" that have been going on in Germany concerning the refugee "crisis" in recent years. In this view it appears that most of the views held by Germans regarding refugees are part and parcel of an exercise of building walls around an "imagined community," to use Anderson's (1991) time-honoured expression. That this community is indeed only imagined in a globalised world, where almost everything is in flux appears to be unknown to most Germans. They imagine the German nation as "both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson 1991: 6). In this view, refugees, particularly as they have come in noticeable numbers, pull at these limits and boundaries and threaten German sovereignty. What then is to be done with this "Other" that has arrived on the scene so unexpectedly? Without wanting to fall into the trap of generalising and dishing out platitudes, it appears to me that a gut reaction would be to control this "Other." A variety of ways have been devised to do so: policies to limit the numbers, to control their movement and behaviour, to enforce integration, particularly with regard to language learning, activism and volunteerism to provide refugees with what *we* think they need, talking about them (not with them) in a variety of ways as I have indicated above, and finally violence and hatred to make them go away again.

From an academic perspective we have seen that these strategies serve the purpose of maintaining boundaries between "Us" and "Them." Most of these strategies are, however, counterproductive when it comes to dealing with the challenges posed by the influx of large numbers of people. As Barth (1969) has pointed out, the flux of people across boundaries is the norm rather than the exception and is usually accommodated within different cultural systems. The sudden arrival of around one million people within the space of a year or so is on a different

plane altogether. Tried and tested strategies will in all likelihood fail. This situation requires a path that has not been trodden before. In other words, this situation bears the potential of opening up new beginnings for Germany. Would a plural or multicultural Germany be such a bad idea?

3. INTEGRATING MUSLIMS

Once the basic needs of the refugees have been taken care of and once they are able to stay (even if only temporarily), the main task must be how to integrate them in society. It has become clear that this is a major endeavor, and a difficult one at that. The main hurdle is language. Most refugees arrive without any knowledge of German. Many are also not familiar with other European languages, such as English or French, which would facilitate communication. Many are illiterate, both in their own and in European languages. While many of the adults (particularly males) are keen to work, both the legal framework as well as the language barrier prevents them from finding sources of their own income. There is much to be said on these issues, but this is not the subject of this essay.

Here, I shall focus on the integration of children, which is a somewhat easier task. Children, for reasons of unfinished neurological development, have a much larger potential to pick up a new language. Within a short space of time, once they are admitted to schools and kindergartens, they are able to communicate reasonably well in German. This is not to say that the influx of refugee children does not put enormous pressure on the German educational system, but the integration of children in schools and kindergartens pays indeed. Many of them are quickly able to fully participate in an educational environment.

One aspect of integration has been under discussion in Germany for over ten years: religious plurality in the education system. The number of Muslims in Germany has risen to about four million, due to political reasons: after World War II the German government invited temporary "guest workers" to rebuild the war-torn country. Many of them came from Turkey and while many returned after some years, a good number decided to stay. Apart from refugees from the former Yugoslavia, citizens of Turkish origin form the majority of the Muslim communities in Germany at the beginning of the 21st century. Their religious affiliation and practice varies greatly, adding to the plurality of the German religious landscape.

The German Constitution grants pupils and their parents the right to receive religious education in governmental schools. It reads: "Parents and guardians shall have the right to decide whether children shall receive religious instruction" (https://www.gesetze-im-

internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0040, 24/5/2016). It further determines that "[r]eligious instruction shall form part of the regular curriculum in state schools" and that "without prejudice to the state's right of supervision, religious instruction shall be given in accordance with the tenets of the religious community concerned" (ibid.). These tenets have been used to argue for the introduction of Islamic religious education in schools in some federal states (cf. Darwisch 2012: 62ff.). In the federal state of Baden-Wurttemberg, for instance, after long political discussions, a pilot project was initiated in 2006. Teachers were trained to offer Islamic religious education mainly in primary schools. Since 2015 Islamic theology has become a regular subject in teacher training faculties and can be studied as a major subject at the bachelor and master levels. Other federal states have gone into different directions. Some offer religious education for all, beyond denominational boundaries, others have not included Islam in the denominations on offer. I shall focus on the situation in Baden Wurttemberg here, as this is the case I am most familiar with (for experiences in other federal states see Darwisch 2012:83ff.).

It would be wrong to assume that the introduction of Islamic religious education was based on respect and the realization of constitutional rights on the side of the politicians. Representatives of the Muslim religious associations, of which there are many, of course insisted on the constitutional right of Muslim children to receive education in their own religious tradition. The motivation in the political and educational arena, however, was much more practically oriented. The common theme that runs through those debates seems to be one of damage control and prevention. In a conversation about her desire to introduce Islamic religious education in her school, a headmistress told me that during the time slot for Protestant and Catholic religious education, Muslim pupils often hung around the school not knowing what to do with this extra time and being prone to causing trouble. Not every school offers alternatives to religious education, such as moral studies or philosophy, so that pupils have to be supervised during the time of RE lessons. This was not the first time I have heard this line of argument. Muslim pupils should also have somewhere (useful and structured) to go, when the time for RE comes around. Another aspect that is emphasized by many in favor of the introduction of Islamic RE is that, from experience, the parents of Muslim pupils appear to become more interested in participating in school life once their children take part in Islamic RE.

Yet another argument put forward in favor of Islamic RE is the yet unproven assumption that Islamic teaching that is controlled by the state and offered in state schools was an effective tool to prevent the radicalization of Muslim youth. This argument reads as follows: Muslim young people receive religious education in "mosque schools" (if they receive any religious education at all). There is very little control over what is being taught in these schools, not only

are they extremely diverse (different Muslim associations run their own mosques and hence mosque schools), but also the teachers very often come from abroad and teach in languages other than German, most notably Turkish. There appears to be evidence that some radical teaching and preaching takes place in some mosques in Germany (Ceylan 2010). To prevent and counterbalance the assumed radicalization of young Muslims in such mosque schools, the idea seems to have been to offer a controlled religious education for Muslims, in which the content of the curriculum is, while developed in cooperation with Muslim associations, effectively state-controlled.

The pilot phase was concluded successfully and the IRE project moved into a new phase of offering Islamic theology as a major subject at universities. More and more schools turn to the Ministry of Education with requests for IRE teachers. It appears that the idea of offering IRE in state schools fell on fertile ground (after some initial misconceptions and holding back) both on the side of Muslim pupils and their parents as well as policy makers and educators. The as yet unanswered question remains: what can IRE do for the integration of Muslim children and youth into a non-Muslim majority society? There is anecdotal evidence that Muslim pupils and their parents do indeed feel to be taken more seriously once they are offered and able to participate in IRE in their schools. Furthermore, there appears to be evidence that non-Muslim fellow pupils and colleagues become interested in the subject and start asking questions despite initial, often grave reservations about the issue. In other words, the introduction of IRE seems to bring some movement and inter-religious interest into the daily routines in schools and the lives of school populations.

On the didactic and pedagogical level, it must be noted that the curriculum focuses not only on the transmission of religious knowledge and dogma, but also to a large extent on the development of inter-religious competencies, i.e. the capability to enter into a dialogue with non-Muslims. In other words, IRE has a strong potential of becoming an effective tool for the integration of Muslims with non-Muslims in Germany. With some additional effort it also seems to be a good way of alleviating the fears of those who are undecided about how to think and feel about the Muslim "intruders." Those who are ideologically and violently opposed to the idea of Islam and Muslims being or becoming a part of German society and culture will, however, in all likelihood also remain opposed to the introduction of IRE in the German school curriculum. Whether IRE can also be a tool for the integration of refugee children remains to be seen, since most of those arrived recently do not yet participate in regular classes, but focus on language learning first.

4. CONCLUSION

Where do we go from here? I frankly do not know. The recent influx of large numbers of refugees seems to have created a watershed for Germans. The carefully and slowly developed culture of acceptance of difference is still very fragile. Germany has never been an "immigration country" the way the United States or Australia have been and it has taken over forty years for Germans to come to grips with the Muslim/Turkish presence in their midst. The hitherto carefully controlled influx of foreigners into Germany meant that there used to be plenty of time and space to come to terms with an increasing diversity of society. The vastness of the numbers of refugees that suddenly arrived in Germany disturbed that balance and that "organic process" of adapting to "Others". I have tried to show that on an objective and material level this "disturbance" is relatively easy to manage. The problem arises on an emotional level, on which most of the current debate on refugees in Germany takes place. It is on this level that a "crisis" is created. And it is on this level that imagined "Selves" and imagined "Others" are built that make realistic human(e) relationships increasingly difficult. A discourse that has recently emerged from a "hidden" sphere into the public domain is one of relatively open xenophobia. Indeed, Scott (1990: 203) has observed that it may be a sign that a revolution or "political breakthrough" is afoot. This "breakthrough" would be in the sense of cementing the boundaries between an imagined "Self" and an equally imagined "Other," as I have tried to show above. History has shown us, where this kind of discourse can lead.

I am, however, carefully optimistic that this kind of hateful discourse and action will not become the dominant climate in Germany. On the one hand, many Germans are fully behind this "welcome culture" as it is often dubbed. This is evident in the large number of volunteers who take care of the refugees and without whose help there would be chaos. I have observed that, while there may some misgivings about the situation, there is also a sense of "pull up your sleeves and get done with it". Integration of "Others" has become a major issue on the agendas of countless organisations and institutions. Particularly on the level of inter-religious dialogue much is being done everywhere. I have pointed at these efforts by referring to the so far successful experiment of integrating Muslim children through Islamic Religious Education. One must also note that, as in 2016 the numbers of refugees arriving has decreased significantly, the public discourse about them has calmed down somewhat. There is hope that the slogan proposed by Chancellor Angela Merkel "We can do it!" might (yet again) be true.

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Moral Vertigo, Moral Panic, and Moral Disengagement – Preliminary Searching for Useful Notions to Examine the Migrant Crisis in Europe

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Abstract
This article is an introductory attempt to find such notions that could serve as descriptive tools for the migrant crisis in Europe in the vocabulary of ethics and related disciplines. The adopted perspective to tinker on the notions allows to traverse the narrow frames of theoretical ethics and reach for other resources. This paper contains a preliminary analysis of the notions of moral vertigo, moral panic, and moral disengagement, as well as an overview of potential benefits and problems stemming from using those terms.

Key words: ethical notions, ethics, European migrant crisis, moral disengagement, moral panic, moral vertigo

1. STARTING POINT – REVISION OF THE VOCABULARY

The considerations carried out in this paper are exclusively preparatory in nature – they focus on the problem of the language we use or may use for narration about moral practices before attempting to reach any normative solutions. Two positions are accepted as main reference points in the article. The first one is borrowed from Maria Ossowska, the program of "small philosophy" that was formed under the influence of her studies under Tadeusz Kotarbiński at the

Warsaw University, and whose central element was "an ineffective but necessary effort of notion-related enquiries aiming at giving philosophical problems a form allowing for a responsible attempt of solving them" (Kiciński 1983, 561; own transl.). The second patron is Charles Taylor and his postulate of narrative ethics derived by the author of *Sources of the Self* from Socrates and that can be expressed by the formula: "We aren't full [human] beings (…) until we can say what moves us, what our lives are built around" (Taylor 1989, 92).

The main task here, generally speaking, is to construct and continuously improve a vocabulary (i.e. the program of seemingly only purely semantic undertakings) that on account of constant revision, polishing, confrontations and fitting to practice the technical motions describing moral practices, ultimately brings us closer to normative judgements. It is accompanied, again, by a Taylorian intuition that we search for notions that succeed in making sense of our life, which "have to make sense across the whole range of both explanatory and life uses" (Taylor 1989, 58), and may become "part of the story that makes best sense of us, unless and until we can replace them with more clairvoyant substitutes" (Taylor 1989, 58).

We should remember, however, that while Charles Taylor's reflections are pertinent to ambitious theoretical aspirations – a specific elaboration of philosophical narration about moral identity, our goal is far more modest: we want to evaluate (or even just initially propose a possibility of performing such an evaluation) the usefulness of a few arbitrary chosen notions for one of the current debates and, at the same time, to unveil some important, more general issues related to the ways of how a technical language of ethical reflection is shaped.

2. *LAMUS* – LAPIDARIUM – LABORATORY

In order to create a space for reflections for the aforementioned notions and their potential usefulness for describing the phenomena of the migrant crisis in Europe – because it will be the background for my argument – let us introduce a certain metaphorical scheme of a threefold understanding of the approach towards the resources of the ethical vocabulary. It should be said however that the term "vocabulary" is understood here very broadly, because it does not only contain single technical notions, but also the ways they are collocated, aggregated, synthesized and arranged in theoretical constellations.

2.1. *LAMUS*

The starting point of the notional triad that I want to construct here is the Polish word *lamus* – a word that in a sense has devoured itself, because it has ended up in the semantic *lamus* (i.e. warehouse, storeroom) of rarely used terms. Nowadays it seems archaic for it shaped its meaning in an already bygone culture: traditional agricultural holding. In consequence, we do not know its material designata, and its usage today is limited to literary phrases and idioms. The word *lamus* derives from the Middle High German word *lēm-hūs* meaning a house or mud hut, and in time a lumber room or utility building for storing grains, armor, documents, valuable items. As a rhetorical figure it has obtained the meaning of "rarely visited lumber room where useless and rarely or never used things end up" (Dubicz 2006, 397; own transl.).

This dual "falling into oblivion" – of the term itself as well its source and material basis is the foundation of a powerful metaphor of the forgotten moral notions and constructed with their use ageing descriptions of moral practices. Just like in the *lamus,* we may find anachronistic terms such as "knavery" or "boorishness," but also notions that change their meaning by narrowing them down (like for example in the Polish language virtue understood as chastity), undergo the process of external associations, break away from their original context (dependability understood by some as dependency), or notions that have moved even more radically by totally changing their meaning and now are to be found on the side of virtues in spite of the initial description of negative features ("wicked" – evil or morally bad is now often used in the meaning of "great" or "cool").

Generally speaking, the metaphor of *lamus* serves the depiction of an approach where ethics is understood and eventually condemned as using an archaic vocabulary that is not adequate for the rapidly changing world; contrary to other, more swiftly developing disciplines like sociology or psychology. A critique of hermeneutical disease ("*morbus hermeneticus*") may serve as an example of such an approach. Spelt out by Herbert Schnädelbach, the critique was meant to refer to the way of doing and teaching philosophy (Schnädelbach 2001), and when reformulated it can be applied to ethics. "*Lamus* ethics" constructed in such a way would suffer from "historical illness" as recognized by Friedrich Nietzsche: "there is a degree of sleeplessness, of rumination, of the historical sense, which is harmful and ultimately fatal to the living thing, whether this living thing be a man or a people or a culture" (1997, 62).

After Schnädelbach and by narrowing the perspective to ethics, we can understand Nietzsche's words quoted above as an accusation of too extensive pondering the history of ethics instead of cultivating a direct reflection on good and evil, or in other words, of focusing on not

only the problems themselves, but classic theories that examine them. Another objection quite handy in characterizing the "ethical *lamus*" formulated by that author is over-reliance to the text – or more generally, to the language, not the problems, and in our context – to moral practice.

It is not the role of this concise essay to enter into discussion about Schnädelbach's objections. The evocation of that strand serves merely as an illustration; it enables us to draw the problem of "ethics as *lamus*" more clearly. In the proposed conceptualization, it would come down to the accusation against moral philosophers that they escape to the safe realm of historical research in the veil of classic theories and that, on the account of their anxiety over being too hasty in their evaluations, they distant themselves from the most current ethical challenges, even at the cost of moral vigilance. In consequence, the wide-ranging and controversial issues of the contemporary world are taken over by other actors – politicians, journalists, more seldom by economists or sociologists. The latter claim will be partially strengthen when we see that only one of the notions presented below that are relevant for the analysis of the problems of the migrant crisis was coined by a philosopher, while the other two are of sociological and psychological provenience respectively.

2.2. LAPIDARIUM

The second rhetorical figure we want to use here is lapidarium. This term is directly linked to the previous one, because it refers to the concept, which stems from Renaissance, of amateur gathering of historical stone artifacts, which itself goes into the terminological *lamus*. Amateur collections have been replaced by professionally managed museums, which incorporate these stubbornly persistent pieces of stone into broader sets of exhibits representing a given epoch. Access to the artifacts remains difficult for amateur collectors and given into the custody of the state or other institutions. Moreover, our contemporary forms of life seem not to harmonize with the concept of collecting a pile of stale stones in a corner of the garden. Hence, if we want to use this concept, we should do it in a metaphorical sense, i.e. in the sense it has been popularized in literature by Ryszard Kapuściński and his "*Lapidaria*." Let us try to shed some light on that.

Since the 16th century, the term lapidarium has been used as a name for a collection of stones gathered due to collectible reasons. They were mainly flaked off reliefs, remains of tympana of long non-existent buildings, sculptures, especially those strongly worn by the time (let us take a look at the icons of the Antiquity that dazzle with their mutilated rudimentary outlook like *Nike of Samothrace* or *Venus de Milo*). What is important here is that cast into a corner of a garden, often carelessly, they were stripped of their original context they had been created in. Lapidarium was not a systematized collection, a complete collection in the current sense, but

rather a loose compilation of things, where each one of them tells their own story that does not create a coherent narration, apart from the one that the collection in its whole referred to the past riveted in stone. One may walk around lapidarium freely and with no rush, and take from it whatever the visitor finds interesting.

Equipped with such an understanding, we shall treat ethics-lapidarium as a metaphor of a stockyard of scattered fragments, splinters, contents taken away from their original surroundings. It resembles the *lamus* described above with a difference that as far as *lamus* remains closed within the lapidarium of ideas, from time to time, a poacher snicks in and randomly looks for something useful, being apparently unaware of Nietzsche's words that "worst readers are those who behave like plundering troops: they take away a few things they can use, dirty and confound the remainder, and revile the whole" (Nietzsche 1996, 245).

That poacher, whom many deconstructionists would find delightful, is not necessarily an ethicist, i.e. a thinker systematically reflecting about good. They would be rather a homespun moralist, who, although not willing to dismiss the whole moral heritage of their culture to the *lamus*, has no patience for systematic studies of that culture either. They poach searching for ready-made and simple recipes, concise, preferably aphoristic (lapidary!) expressions, moral recommendations of the instant type that can be implemented at once, written down in a diary for the future, tattooed on the body in a visible place and treat as a primary life motto.

We should note that vitality of lapidarium is situated above all where the meaning of the adjective "lapidary" has taken root. It partially remains in connection with a kindred "laconic," which has a different source (although there are attempts to distinguish between and reserve "laconic" for human beings and "lapidary" for artifacts and things). Lapidarity is mainly about briefness, but about contrariness of a kind as well. Therefore, proverbs, aphorisms, bon mots, and mottos are elements of it. This vitality partially translates into its range; exhibits in the lapidarium of ideas appear to be important, inspiring, meaningful, although as devoid of the original context they turn out to be empty. For they are fuelled not by the primary energy flowing from the adequate recognition and naming the practices, which there were incorporated in, but an inertia of moral codes that are valid only apparently. To list just a few examples: the category of chivalry in the bourgeois culture, the notion of melancholy in contemporary psychology and psychiatry, or the aforementioned virtue reduced to chastity. Ultimately, it may turn out that at a closer look, these "stone" debris of old ethical stories should occupy only historians of morality or the collectors of past ethea. For they are the only ones for whom they still possess a contextual value.

2.3. LABORATORY

The third rhetorical figure closing the triad is laboratory. In the common parlance, laboratory is understood as a place where science is practiced in a systematic way. Another less popular tradition refers to the opposition of the notions of *laboratorium* and *desidiabulum* from the Latin word *desidia* (idleness), i.e. an idyllic place of resting, relaxation, but also of reflection. It brings to the forefront the labor, but not in the ancient meaning of innate and indelible effort that the gods sentenced human beings to, and which is supposed to stem from the same source as *labare* ("to stumble under a burden") (Arendt 1998, 48).

Our understanding follows rather towards the process of "overworking," or "essaying," "trying," and "tinkering." A peculiar ally of such understanding is Bruno Latour who carried out a great amount of work to rearticulate the notion of scientific practice, including the notion of laboratory. Within such a grasp, laboratory, contradictory to the popular common linguistic intuitions, is not an isolated space of that what is technical, scientific, theoretically ordered, sterile, but becomes a place of a particular game between *the internal* (scientific) and what has remained *external*: elemental, disorganized, disrupted, complex. Latour uses the example of the "outside" of Ludwig Pasteur's lab and aims at the thesis that, generally speaking, laboratories are created to contravene or dismantle the very distinction between "inside" and "outside" (Latour 1999, 143). For this essay, let us only take the perspective where "laboratory of ethics" is a space of mutual interference. On the one hand, there are ethical theories and their technical language and conditioning, on the other – an element of common intuitions (also the moral ones) and subsequent articulations in the language, including literary and informal ones, as well as the languages of other humanities, where reflection manages and develops such intuitions in the framework of their own methodological assumptions and research approaches.

Bringing the abovementioned plots together we see the following picture: on the one hand, there is a more common melancholic perspective of *lamus* and *lapidarium*, which of both stem from weariness of richness of classic ethical theories and moral directives. Even if we are not ready to unequivocally subscribe to the view of epigonic nature of ethical narrative, we should somehow refer to the seductive intuition of ethics-*lamus*, because it is widely manifested in the form of all kinds of reductionisms, exchanging the philosophically grounded ethical reflection with the sociological or psychological approach. On the other hand, however, a few present day nostalgics would like to save some pieces of this fleeting richness. However, if someone plays with those pieces, they inevitably end up in *lapidarium* that may be enjoyed only by eccentric collectors and curators. The one who can potentially overcome such a difficulty would be only a handyman-ethicist operating in a specifically understood *laboratory*, who courageously reaches for

remains of stone tablets or chipped fragments of codices, but not to gather them in a museum, but to apply them to seemingly not adequate contexts, including the most up-to-date ones, and try them make fit and "work over" again and again. Language remains the original place of that "work" in accordance with Taylor's perspective adopted here. Equipped with such presuppositions, we may begin tinkering with the terms that, although much of them may not stem from the tradition of philosophical ethics, they can, without any doubt, contribute to it.

3. THREE HANDY NOTIONS

3.1. MORAL VERTIGO

The first notion that I want to put under "tinkering" perfectly, at first glance, fits into the crisis related set of problems, including the migration crisis. For, it – just like "crisis" – simultaneously annunciates difficulty, conflict, ambiguity, helplessness, and at the same time – as very voluminous and vague it leaves vast room for re-articulation; and, in consequence, adaptation to various contexts and phenomena. It is the term "moral vertigo."

It is difficult to point at the precursor of using the term, but it undoubtedly appears at the beginning of the 20th century in writings of Fernand Pessoa. This Portuguese writer, still hiding behind the masks of many identities, diagnosed the following dramatic psychological state:

"At the end of it I felt again one of those symptoms which grow clearer and ever more horrible in me: a moral vertigo. In physical vertigo, there is a whirling of the external world about us; in moral vertigo, of the interior world. I seemed for a moment to lose the sense of the true relations of things, to lose comprehension, to fall into an abyss of mental abeyance. It is a horrible sensation, one that prompts inordinate fear. These feelings are becoming common, they seem to pave my way to a new mental life, which shall of course be madness" (Pessoa 2001).

Moral vertigo, comprehended in this way, occurs itself as a sign of the fall or total decomposition of moral agency. In this radical form, the term seems not very convenient, because it is pertinent to broader situations. This is why, in broader consciousness and maybe independently from its literary source, it may take root only when it is used as a part of a diagnosis of certain backwardness of the ethical language towards the advances of science and medicine. Such a diagnosis was formulated and disseminated by Michael Sandel, who evokes the category of moral vertigo in the first paragraph of his renowned article *The Case against Perfection* (Sandel, 2014) (and later on does it again in a book based on that article):

"When science moves faster than moral understanding, as it does today, men and women struggle to articulate their unease. In liberal societies, they reach first for the language of autonomy, fairness, and individual rights. But this part of our moral vocabulary is ill equipped to address the hardest questions posed by genetic engineering. The genomic revolution has induced a kind of moral vertigo" (Sandel 2007, 9).

Moral vertigo in its mitigated version – as a diagnosis of a certain confusion a moral agent can sense towards swiftly altering social reality, which traditional forms of naming and evaluating human actions do not keep up with or keep up with a substantial effort seems a quite handy tool. It could be used, for example, to describe the state of mind of the young Alasdair MacIntyre, who during his studies experienced deep discomposure caused by the contradiction of the narrations surrounding him: Catholic – interwoven with the tradition of the Gaelic language he grew up in, liberal – developed at the university, and Marxian – popular among the academic youth of Western universities in the mid-20th century (Boradori 2008, 139-140). This diagnosis cannot be belittled, because according to MacIntyre himself, it provided the grounds for the plan of cracking down the moral culture of modernity and eventually resulted in his important book *After Virtue* and others that were its continuations (MacIntyre 1991).

The main problem with the "moral vertigo" category is that the notion remains a wide-ranging tool only in the domain of the description of the agent's starting position – it enables us to diagnose the crisis and on that account, undertake reflection on whether the actions actually lead to overcoming it. However, in no way this provides the direction for such reflections or actions. Squandering with this notion is additionally laced with a certain conservative or anti-progressive approach that may have either a political significance or at least disclose certain presuppositions and pre-judgements of the researcher diagnosing the state of the contemporary moral culture. Finally, the tempting power of moral "confusion" evokes doubts similar to the ones that can be referred to the notion of "crisis" – both these categories are easily abused, and in consequence, they can undergo a certain inflation of the meaning and lose their explanatory power.

3.2. MORAL PANIC

In the framework described above, where a general, wide-ranging, but difficult to develop metaphor of "moral vertigo" dominates, there are two other notions that fit better. They are, what is important, coined not by ethicists, but by sociologists and psychologists. The first of them is "moral panic."

The author of the notion "moral panic" is Stanley Cohen, the author of *Folk Devils and Moral Panics* (Cohen 1972), who was supposed to be inspired by an idea of his university colleague Jack Young in 1971. At the beginning, it served as a tool to describe the phenomenon of using drugs among the youth, for whom the category of "folk devils" was formulated. In time, the notion of "moral panic" has become canonical in social sciences and many various researchers referred to it: Erich Goode, Nachman Ben-Yehuda, (*Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance* 1994, 2009), Kenneth Thomson (*Moral Panics* 1999), and recently, quite successfully, in a book of a Polish author Iwona Zielińska, where the category of moral panic was used to examine the presence of homosexuality in the media (Zielińska 2015).

In the most general grasp, where differences or evolution of this category are not considered, it is worth noticing a few elements that seem to be useful for the current migration crisis. The first one of them is a structure of the dynamics of the moral panic phenomenon, which consists of the following phases: concern, fear, hostility, consensus or agreement regarding the universal nature of the chosen phenomenon, its negative evaluation and, what appears to be especially interesting, unpredictability that accompanies panic. It may refer to both an unpredicted occurrence of panic that breaks out unexpectedly, supported by sudden appearances of fear in various periods of the recent history like AIDS, threats related to prostitution, computer games, increase in crime, and in the Polish context – the dangers related to religious sects, the increase of diagnoses of demonic possession, the crisis pertinent to 'legal highs,' and finally the newest problem – the migration crisis. What is interesting, however, is that this unpredictability manifests itself also in the lack of signs heralding the subsiding of the panic, which quite often happens spontaneously. It becomes particularly striking when we put together the panic phenomena and note how trifling they seem today. This distance towards future cases of panic bears a great potential for developing in oneself a distance towards fears currently haunting us; and, in consequence, creating foundations for factual reflection and discussion about real problems and ways of solving them.

3.3. MORAL DISENGAGEMENT

The second notion that stems from a non-philosophical context – this time from the domain of social psychology – is moral disengagement. The creator of the term is a Canadian psychologist Albert Bandura (Bandura et al. 1996), who in the 1990s described the phenomenon of the agent disabling their moral engagement or in other words, a progressive process of displacing responsibility, either by delegating it outside, or by the manipulation of its subject. The process of that moral disabling consists of the following elements: displacement and diffusion of

responsibility, euphemistic labelling, dehumanization others (the ones the responsibility was directed to), manipulation of the description language: advantageous comparisons, and general disregard and distortion of responsibility. With time, the category has gained a wide context of research, just like moral panic in social sciences, it has settled in in social psychology for good.

The category of moral disengagement is distinguished here because it has been already used in analyses of the phenomena connected with the migration crisis in Europe. The analyses have demonstrated a significant usefulness of that form of diagnosis of social phenomena about the reports on that crisis in the Czech press (Motal 2015). It is of importance also in the context of the above formulated description of moral panic, because in the two described phenomena, the role of the media has become key for the development of negative massive moral phenomena.

4. CONCLUSION

The attempt drafted here of adaptation of the category of moral vertigo and the other two non-ethical ones – because coined in the framework of social sciences – moral panic and moral disengagement is merely a fitting for completing a vocabulary of handy notional tools that may be used in a diagnosis of the migration crisis in Europe. While moral vertigo, the only strictly philosophical category, has turned out to be non-developmental already at the stage of its clarification, due to its ambiguity and fuzziness, the two other ones seem to be charged with a certain level of usefulness, and one of them (moral disengagement) has already been employed in analyses of the signalized crisis issue.

The handiness and usefulness of the notions presented here, even if merely signalized in a very introductory and sketchy way and still requiring deepened analysis allows to draw a few issues of more general nature.

Firstly, the notions stemming from the context of social sciences seem to be more useful and reflecting the nature of the described phenomena in a more subtle and precise way than philosophical ones. It is not yet a premise for a thesis that the discourse of traditional ethics loses the battle over the explanatory functionality to moral sociology or social psychology (but also, in a wider perspective, pedagogy or economics). There are no doubts, however, that it is a good basis for reflection on the interferences between moral philosophy and those disciplines, and an incentive for a broader opening for cooperation with them.

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The second problem is the fact that the disciplines described as the sources of new notions are social sciences. It is an important signal about the subordination of attention of the current humanistic discourse to non-individual phenomena and related ways of describing those phenomena. The emergence of sociology as a separate discipline and its later rapid development was a true hallmark of this process. It could be that the most important, in this context, challenge for ethics is reorienting its classical approach to the individual agent and their relations with the other towards collective categories 'we' or 'you (all),' instead of fostering solely the traditions of lonely dreamers, egotistic, self-perfecting perfectionists, or even the ethical relation defined only in the 'I – you' categories.

While the thread described above is obviously not new, because it is deeply rooted in the history of social sciences and their relation with philosophy, they took their beginning in the 19th century, the last issue is the one that to the greatest extent gets closer to the challenges of modernity. Let us notice that for both, moral panic and moral disengagement, one of the key constitutive elements is the media, perhaps also including the ones of the new generation – the social media, where the dynamics of expansion of the emotional formulas is even bigger than in the traditional media. It is especially clear in reference to the category of moral panic because the authors mention the media context in the titles of their books (Zielińska 2015), or treat it as a starting point for their analyses (Thompson 1999, 2-7).

Making social sciences, including the media sciences, more sensitive to these processes could undoubtedly be applied also to ethics and would salvage a moral philosopher, from being 'wise after the event,' (like the Hegelian Minerva's owl) and unable to take a clear stand during the crisis, including the migration one, or directly linked to it the problem of Brexit that is taking place before their eyes.

The last but not least issue that has to be indicated here is connected with a serious difficulty permanently fixed together with the relation of ethics to other disciplines examining moral phenomena. It is about the translation of the descriptive language into a normative message, which ethics does not want and cannot resign from. Indeed, it is possible that on account of the measures described in the article, we gain the tools for describing moral and para-moral phenomena far more precisely than if we take them directly out of philosophers' thoughts. However, the work consisting in the articulation of a precise response not strictly related to the question "what are we doing?" but rather "what should we be doing?" still awaits 'figuring out.' A modest consolation may be the fact that a diagnosis, especially in ourselves, of symptoms of moral panic or moral disengagement could be a good introduction to a deepened ethical reflection.

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