On the Need of Ethical Foundations for Global Education

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Abstract

The concept of global education is based on the recognition of the world as a network of interdependencies and on realizing the fact that the current direction of the development of civilization is leading to environmental and humanitarian disaster. On the other hand, there is a belief that there is still a chance to change this state of affairs by means of education. The purpose of education is recognized as not only a transfer of knowledge, but also as a transfer of morals that are able to generate a shift in attitudes. In order to strengthen the impact of the global education project, it is necessary to provide a coherent description and axiological analysis of the values behind it. In the paper, we argue that ethicists should work on building philosophical arguments for the development and implementation of global education programs. We argue further that such a philosophical framework should be based on the ideas of new humanism (proposed by Aurelio Peccei) and global responsibility (formulated by Hans Jonas).

Key words: ecological conscience, global education, global responsibility, moral education, new humanism, sustainable development, sustainability

INTRODUCTION

Pondering upon the potential need for ethical foundations of global education one has to answer a crucial question of why we it is at all needed. The immediate answer that comes to mind is simple, but at the same time, quite weighty – we need it to change the world. It has to be altered because it is not sustainable. The current trend of global civilization development is moving in a direction that threatens not only the quality of life and survival of humankind, but also life on the planet. From that perspective, global education is a medium of sustainable development to reverse the trend.

If there still is a chance to escape a global catastrophe, it can be achieved by means of education that would have the power to change the morality and behavior of not only the ones responsible for making politically bearing decisions, but also those, whose actions have an impact on the natural environment, that is, every living human being. In order to bring forth that change, moral philosophers should propose a coherent and transparent axiological system that would possess a sufficient persuasive power to promote the values that constitute the framework of sustainable development.

A lot of work has been done so far to provide the policy-makers and the public with such a system. In our view, however, these propositions should be ameliorated by a thorough axiological analysis of the fundamental values that have led to the conception of sustainable development. Such an analysis, accompanied by a set of convincing arguments supporting the promoted values should become a basis for global education programs. For, it would positively influence their reception and impact on students.

In the section entitled "Sustainable Development and Global Education," the basic facts about the current state of the planet are provided. Sustainable development and global education, the latter conceived as a means to promote the former, are described as a response to a constantly worsening environmental situation. The main definitions of sustainable development, as well as their cardinal components are discussed and analyzed. The following part of the paper critically examines the existing characterizations of global education and its ethical foundations. The argument is given that these should be expanded to include responsibility as a constitutional factor of any axiological framework of global education. Further, it is argued that the need for ethical foundations for global education arises from, and is determined by the fact that it is not merely a transfer of knowledge, but also a tool of changing people's moral mindset, and in consequence, their behavior. The article concludes with the claim that knowledge about the environmental and socio-economic interdependencies of the current world is a necessary but not

sufficient condition to bring forth the required changes. Hence, there is a need for a well thought-through system of values and justifications to support global education and to strengthen its persuasiveness.

1. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL EDUCATION

In the opinion of the researchers working in the environmental sciences, climate scientists, economists, political scientists and sociologists, the current trend of civilization development is moving in a direction that threatens the quality of life and survival not only of the human race as the whole, but also the life on the planet. This diagnosis is not new. Already in 1972, the first report published for the Club of Rome – *The Limits to Growth*, in which the authors, by recognizing the challenges posed by the increasing human impact on the environment, sought to further define the future potential of the Earth's non-renewable resources (Meadows at al., 1972). The solution proposed by the Report's authors was an economic postulate of "zero growth," which is still present in the discourse on how to control technological development of human civilization, e.g. by reducing consumption (e.g. Elgin 2009), extending the product life cycle (e.g., Ekvall et al., 2005; Curran, 2012), or retardation (Kostecka 2010). However, the assumptions of the Report are not just confined to the sphere of consumption of resources, and the concept itself largely coincides with the formula of sustainability developed several years later (Ciążela 2007, 60). Axiologically the Report referred to the concept of "new humanism" developed by Aurelio Peccei (Peccei 1977; Peccei 1981), whose main postulate was the development of human conceived as a vocation to cross the existing divisions, so the condition for survival of humanity would become a global revolution of the spiritual and peaceful nature that allows for overcoming the limitations of existing inequalities and prejudices (Ciążela 2007, 63-64). The same assumptions are inscribed in the concept of sustainable development developed by the World Commission for Environment and Development, i.e. the Brundtland Commission and presented in the report *Our Common Future* in 1987, where sustainable development is defined as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (WCED 1987, 54). This very important global initiative is important not only because of its wide range, but also because of the moral questions it poses to all humanity.

The concept of sustainable development is an attempt to change the destructive trend in the development of civilization. It is a vision of a more just world that takes into account the interests of people living now, future generations as well as other living organisms.

This diagnosis of the current world situation and hence the prognoses for the future are not optimistic. We are dealing with a progressive deterioration of the environment. According to the report of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Committee that worked under the UN Secretary General entitled *Ecosystems and Human Well-being* (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005), approximately 60% of the existing ecosystems on the planet is threatened (degraded or used unsustainably), the number of species inhabiting the Earth is decreasing – today, approximately 10%-30% of the species of mammals, birds and reptiles are threatened with extinction, and the geographical distribution of species is becoming more homogeneous. Moreover, there is a noticeable decrease in genetic diversity within species, especially those grown / cultured by humans (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005, 1-8). Global warming is a fact – a report published by the US Agency National Climatic Data Center (NCDC 2014) states that October 2014 was the hottest month in terms of land and water surface since 1880, i.e. the year when the measurements began. The temperature was higher than the global average for October in the twentieth century by 0.74 degrees Celsius. The world of science no longer questions the anthropogenic causes of global warming. The latest, the fifth report of the International Panel on Climate Change leaves no room for doubt: "Human influence on the climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history. Recent climate changes have had widespread impacts on human and natural systems" (IPCC Climate Change 2014, 2). Awareness of the obvious fact that the human being is a part of the global ecosystem, and that the quality of life of individuals, societies, or even the survival of the entire species is directly dependent on the state of the environment should be an explicit call to action to address the situation.

The concept of sustainable development is not confined to the environmental dimension – it is also a socio-economic program of "equal opportunities" based on the principles of equality and justice. Right now, the increase in wealth does not translate into improving the quality of life of the poorest, nor does it positively influence a more just distribution of resources. Due to uneven distribution and redistribution of income within the national states, as well as on the global level, massive wealth is still accompanied by hunger and the inability to fulfil basic needs. According to the latest OECD report *How Was Life? Global Well-being since 1820* published in 2014, the income stratification within the vast majority of countries has been on the rise since the early eighties (Van Zanden 2014, 207). What particularly draws attention on the global level is a growing income gap between the increasingly rich North and the progressively impoverished countries of the South. Measured by the Gini coefficient, the inequality between countries of the world soared from 16 in 1820 to 54 in 2000. (Van Zanden 2014, 208).

From the above reports and data, it is clear that the development of technological civilization is not accompanied by an adequate development of consciousness, i.e. such, on account of which the resources are divided responsibly among the people living today in a way that does not detract from the ability of future generations to fulfill their needs. When analyzing the current development trend one has to, unfortunately, agree with the Austrian philosopher Dietrich von Hildebrand, who claimed that development does not always mean progress (von Hildebrand 1960, 74). The fact is that the development of culture and morality in particular, is progressing much slower, than the development of civilization understood as the structure of technological, economic, social, and political relationships.

Aurelio Peccei's concept mentioned above of "new humanism," the Report to the Club of Rome, and finally, the idea and the program (i.e., practical attempts to implement these ideas) of sustainable development were developed as an attempt to eliminate the difference in the rate of development of these two spheres of human activity – technologically determined civilization and ethics; as an attempt to divert the development of civilization in the direction of 'sustainability.' At the origin of these concepts and programs there is an idea to diminish the differences between the development of civilization and the spread of values and attitudes that may direct it to a proper, i.e. ethically responsible direction. For the recognition of the need of sustainable development speaks the fact that the current model of civilization ultimately leads to the destruction of the planet and the human race. What follows from this fact, assuming the value of humanity in general, is the obligation to change the current trend for sustainable development, i.e. to one that would avert global disaster.

Altering the prevailing destructive practices requires changes in attitudes and behaviors of policy-makers, businesses and individual consumers. A measure to achieve that is a shift in the public's awareness fostered by factual knowledge about the progressive deterioration of the natural environment, anthropogenic impact on the climate system and the escalation of socio-economic disparities. Hence, we need a global education that disseminates and perpetuates knowledge about the actual state of affairs of the planet and the possible ways to mend it, i.e. theoretical and practical sustainable development programs.

Sustainable development is a vision of a more just world which takes into account the interests of people living now, the future generations, as well as other living organisms. In order to realize that vision and reverse the current trend we need a change in knowledge and attitudes. The change should take place parallely on two interdependent levels: (1) top-down – legislation at all levels of government, including the transnational bodies has to be improved, and (2) bottom-up – the acceptance of pro-sustainability laws and regulations, grassroots initiatives and changes

behavior in everyday life. In both cases, it is necessary to generate conscious, eco-friendly and pro-sustainability attitudes, in other words, an ecological conscience (Tyburski 2003, 334-337), which can be achieved by implementing proper global educational programs.

The first step in bringing forth change is an adequate and thorough understanding of sustainable development, sustainability itself, as well the values they are built upon. It is not an easy task since the concepts are extremely complex and not unequivocal from the semantic point of view. In addition to the common-sense notion of sustainability as an attempt to achieve optimal results for both people and nature now and in the future, there are many definitions that focus on and emphasize different aspects of sustainability. Woodward, for example, defines sustainability as an inter-generational justice (2000, 581), for Cairns it is a utopian vision that requires a harmonious living with nature (2003, 43), while Kermath believes that sustainability represents an idealized social condition where people lead long, dignified, comfortable, and productive life by meeting their needs in an environmentally wise and socially equitable way that does not endanger other people's opportunity to live in the same way now and in the distant future (Kermanth 2007). On the other hand, Thomson gives a completely different approach – he introduces two general categories of sustainability, namely, balancing the sufficiency of resources and the functional integrity (in this concept sustainable development aims for an integrated order) (1997, 77-81).

Taking into account the most important theoretical approaches to sustainable development and sustainability and their axiological elaborations (e.g., Becker 2012, Gawor 2010, Hull 2008, Langhelle 1999, Papuziński 2013, Tyburski 2013) it is possible to explicitly indicate fundamental values underlying the concepts of sustainable development and sustainability, i.e. equality, justice and responsibility.

Articulation of these values is extremely important, because in order to be able to shift to a sustainable model of development, it is necessary, at the global level, to change the state of knowledge and morality conceived as historically shaped, biding in a given society set of values, ideals, norms, axiological motivations and assessments, principles and rules that regulate the conduct and coexistence of individuals and social groups in terms of good and evil. Essential changes, in this context, can only occur by increasing the level of knowledge of the environmental and social interdependence and by generating a pro-environment and pro-sustainable attitude at every level of decision making – from singular decisions made by individuals to legislative directives of national and supranational bodies.

This idea is not new. Many authors have tried to indicate the direction and methods to achieve a new sustainable trend of the development of civilization. Hans Jonas, whose concept of

the principle of responsibility (Jonas 1985) converges with the project of sustainable development. The philosopher gives a diagnosis that an ethical vacuum emerges as a result of the increasing power of the human being. The power that gives them the tools to such far-reaching intervention into the natural world, the consequences of which can cause irreversible changes leading to the extinction of humanity (Ciążela 2006, 108); the power that already has significantly changed the way humans think about reality and their place in it (Bernat 2010). Nigel Dower, on the other hand, focuses on the concept of "global citizenship," understood as both an ethical obligation and institutional structure. The author believes that it may become an efficient means for creating a sense of identity with other people, which then could translate into the sense of responsibility for the world (Dower, Williams 2002). Other authors, such as Gosseries (2001), Shelton (2010) and Woodward (2000) derived axiologically motivated need to implement sustainable development from intra- and inter-generational equity and justice.

However, regardless of where the stronger accents are placed, the condition to reverse the current trend is the change in knowledge and attitudes, which can be obtained i.e., by global education.

2. GLOBAL EDUCATION IS MORAL EDUCATION

The concept of global education is based on the recognition of the interdependence of the world as a network, on realizing the fact that the current direction of the development of civilization leads to disaster, but also on the belief that there is still time to change this state of affairs by means of education. The purpose of education comprehended in such a way is not only a transfer of knowledge about the contemporary world, but also generating attitudes and changing the perspectives of thinking. Suchodolski in his book *Education for the Future* claims that this current new situation requires from people a new attitude, which would include the ability to think in terms of global, not only local problems. Such an attitude would require, above all, the awareness of the consequences of our actions, which are not immediately visible, because they have an impact on distant places and people as well as the realization that we are also dependent on the analogous distant conditions (1947, 25-26). Suchodolski, as in the case of Jonas and Peccei, recognizes the lack of symmetry in the pace of the economic and technical development and in the emergence of the new attitude, on account of which a sense of global human unity could arise (Suchodolski 1974, 26). In other words, in order to change the level of knowledge and people's mindset an "education for the future" or global education is required."

As defined in the Maastricht Global Education Declaration, "Global Education is education that opens people's eyes and minds to the realities of the world, and awakens them to

bring about a world of greater justice, equity and human rights for all;" and further on: "Global Education is understood to encompass Development Education, Human Rights Education, Education for Sustainability, Education for Peace and Conflict Prevention and Intercultural Education; being the global dimensions of Education for Citizenship" (MGED 2002, 2). In the definition promoted by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Education the accents are distributed somewhat differently. The aim of global education, as elucidated here, is to broaden the scope of civic education by adding a global perspective so students become aware of the existence of the phenomena and relationships that connect people and places. The purpose of global education is to prepare the public to meet the challenges shared by the whole of humanity (Lipska-Badoti et al. 2011, 4). The definition further explains that dignity, justice, solidarity, equality, peace, freedom are the values that global education is based upon. The incentive of teaching and promotion of these values is to shape the attitudes of responsibility, respect, honesty, openness, accountability, personal involvement and readiness for lifelong learning (Lipska-Badoti et al. 2011, 4).

From the perspective of moral philosophy this definition is not fully adequate. The need for global education is based on several fundamental values. Dignity, equality (including intergenerational), and justice should be accompanied by responsibility. For, it is responsibility, as argued by Jonas and Peccei that can ensure the realization of global education and sustainable development projects.

In previous studies on global education (*Global Education Guide* 2009; *Global Perspectives* 2008; Hicks 2003; Lipska-Badoti et al. 2011; MGED 2002), the authors refer to human rights, the principles of sustainability and justice, sometimes name the values global education should be built upon but never properly analyze them systemically and do not try to examine the dynamics between them. In order to strengthen the impact of the global education project, it is necessary to provide a coherent description of the values promoted by this framework of education and upbringing. Such an elucidation should include a thorough philosophical justification of the discussed values.

That gap must be bridged. A coherent description of the values supporting the idea of global education, their analysis in the special context of the challenges that we, humankind, face today and will have to deal with in the future, and finally, deeply embedded philosophical arguments for the development and implementation of global education programs are crucial, we believe, for the success of global education. While carrying out this task, one should remember who the potential recipients are and on that account prepare arguments that can be understood not only by a narrow circle of philosophers, but which will also intellectually, conceptually and

terminologically be available to other groups, including teachers and educators, managers, politicians, legislators and representatives of the authorities at all levels. It is important to keep in mind that global education is a practical project. It, as we argue in this paper, requires solid theoretical foundations, but its goal is to reverse the destructive trend and assist in implementing sustainable development, which can be achieved only by cooperation of many various people from many various walks of life. Hence, our postulate for communication between philosophers, providing the axiological analysis of global education, and the recipients of that work to be as simple and clear as possible.

Global education should be conceived as one of the means of making sustainable development become reality. Its very concept, just like sustainable development, is based on the recognition of the interdependence of the world as a network, and on realizing the fact that the current direction of the development of human civilization posts a dire threat. On the other hand, there is a belief that there is still a chance to change this state of affairs through education. The purpose of global education should be recognized as not only a transfer of knowledge, but also as is a transfer of morals, which would generate and a shift in the mindset and, what is even more significant, a change of attitudes and everyday practices.

It is a crucial moment to understand the need for a complex, well- adjusted and justified axiological framework for global education. For, the fact that it aims at altering people's morality bears severe consequences. If we want to change people, their moral world-view and hierarchy of values, as we do, we have to, in order to keep our integrity, be entirely convinced about the validity of our claims. Moreover, we need a well-worked out system of values and justifications also because of its persuading power. We need it to be compelling enough to urge the people responsible for education, as well as the students. In other words, in order to be effective, global education has to be perceived as moral education, as a coherent set of educational programs that are based on and promote certain values, i.e. the values of sustainable development.

CONCLUSION

The goal of the paper was to present a preliminary reflection on global education as a tool for implementing sustainable development. It was argued that axiological analyses of the sustainability point at its three cardinal values, i.e. equality, justice, and responsibility, so, in consequence, the global education programs should convey and promote them. In order to change people's morality, which is a necessary step in changing their behavior to become more sustainable, they have to acknowledge an obligation they have towards other people, both, the currently living, and those who will come after us, as well as towards the global ecosystem. To

divert the disastrous trend we need our laws and everyday life practices to be more environment-friendly. It is impossible to achieve without people taking responsibility for their actions, i.e. perceive themselves as accountable for their decisions and behavior.

For global education programs to be successful, it is not sufficient to reduce it to teaching about the current global state of affairs. The outcomes of the sustainable development project depend on a change in human morality (achieved by means of proper global education) towards taking more responsibility for the natural environment and the well-being of current and future generations. To realize this goal, global education must include teaching global ethics that assumes and promotes sustainability values like equality, justice and responsibility. Furthermore, those values, in order to be adopted and fostered, must be expressed in a coherent and understandable manner, what will strengthen a persuasive power of such a framework.

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Economics Imperialism and some of its Unintended Consequences

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Abstract
Studying the problem of the invisible hand may be very insightful, but also it brings up some dangers. As an ethicist, I would like to mention one very important axiological danger that occurs in some studies conducted by social scientists on the market especially linked to the invisible hand assumption. It is a danger of moral reductionism that results from assumption that rules of invisible hand are scientific laws. We might say that economic imperialism is not anything special. It is popular that when a scholar develops good theory, he tries to apply it to the widest possible range of phenomena, but in most cases, he is put in his place by fellow scientists. Economists, surprisingly, succeeded in widening the scope of their investigation without any loud objections. In my paper, I would like to explore the idea that economic imperialism is a leading paradigm in many spheres of science which has resulted in unintended social consequences. If we want to overcome this paradigm, we need to start with redefining, reinventing, revaluing the language we use.

Key words: economics imperialism, neoliberalism, commercialization, values in economics, definition of economics

*Nowadays people know the price of everything
and the value of nothing.*

Oscar Wilde

INTRODUCTION

I would like to explore one very important axiological danger that occurs in some studies, procured by social scientists, on the market that is especially linked to the invisible hand assumption. It is the danger of moral reductionism that stems from the assumption that the rules of the invisible hand are scientific laws. The famous Polish moral sociologist Maria Ossowska stated that:

> Although science disclaims valuations and tries to get rid of them, in various ways they slip into theoretical considerations and guide, in various ways, the defining processes. Allergy to their presence is rather recent and more and more often someone discovers axiological assumptions tacitly accepted in such fields as for example demography and economics; they are unnoticed assumptions, as you never notice that our Civil Code stipulates the superiority of monogamy over other forms families (Ossowska 1985, 15; own transl.).

In his paper "Economic Imperialism," Edward Lazear stated that economics is more than a social science. He said that qualities of economics such as

> [..]the construct of rational individuals who engage in maximizing behavior […], equilibrium as part of theory , […] focus on efficiency […] have allowed economics to invade intellectual territory that was previously deemed to be outside the discipline's realm (Lazear 2000, 2).

If Lazear is right, it is only a matter of time when economics will solve most social dilemmas. This approach is supported by researchers who assume invisible hand as a crucial part of their scientific inquiry, but if we assume that the invisible hand is a crucial part of many spheres of social life, are we not already approving economic imperialism?

We might say that economic imperialism is not anything special. We may find examples of imperialistic aspirations in many spheres of scientific and humanistic enquiries. Plato set philosophers as the rulers of the state he designed in his "The Republic," August Comte views sociology as the centerpiece of all sciences. There are disciplines like the physics of love and

biology of happiness. It is common that when a scholar develops a good theory they try to apply it to the widest possible range of phenomena, but in most cases they are brought down to earth by their fellow scientists. Economists, surprisingly, succeeded in widening the scope of their investigation without any loud objections.

In my paper, I would like to explore the idea that economic imperialism is an important paradigm in economics that has brought about unintended social and moral consequences. I will start my presentation by defining Economics Imperialism. Next, I will proceed to show the historical background of the development of Economics Imperialism and the process of its implementation. In the following part, I will show unintended results of implementing that idea.

1. ECONOMICS IMPERIALISM

In order to understand the role and significance of economic imperialism as is represented by Lazear, we need to do two things. First, we should define what economic imperialism (EI) is, and in the process we will see that there are more than one EI. Secondly, we need to do research into the historical background of the EI assumptions.

I will use a definition formulated by Uskali Mäki in his text "Economics Imperialism: Concept and Constraints," which, in my opinion, has been the best, so far, philosophical summary of the EI. In this article he stated:

> The conventional expression used in this literature is "economic imperialism," but this suffers from an ambiguity. The expression denotes both the imperialism of the discipline of economics in the academic realm and the economy-driven imperialism in international relations and the global economy. I have proposed using "economics imperialism" (Mäki 2008, 2).

That is the first distinction we need to make. Secondly, we need to understand that before making an invasion on someone else's property one has to gather their own forces. Before economists were able to enter other than social sciences fields of inquiry, they needed to get together around a dominant paradigm. The first phase of EI is forming a strong, dominant paradigm in economics. This phase I call – **Economics imperialism inside economics**. A neoclassical approach has occurred the dominant modern paradigm economics needed.

When economists gathered they could move forward to the next step:

> Economics Expansionism
> Economics expansionism is a matter of a persistent pursuit to increase the degree of unification provided by an economic theory by way of applying it to new types of phenomena. (Mäki 2008, 9)

In the process of implementing this expansion economists created EI:

Economics Imperialism
Economics imperialism is a form of economics expansionism where the new types of explanandum phenomena are located in territories that are occupied by disciplines other than economics (Mäki 2008, 9).

Hence, as we can see, there is, of course, a possible non-imperialistic approach:

Non-Imperialistic Economics Expansionism
Non-imperialistic economics expansionism is a form of economics expansionism where the new types of explanandum phenomena are located in unoccupied territories, that is, territories unoccupied by disciplines other than economics (Mäki 2008, 10).

Economists willingly refer to Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of the market, while silently ignoring his moral comments: negation of the merchants' greed or support for workers' wage demands. While referring to the thoughts of Adam Smith, Thomas Jefferson and other early liberal economists, they often exaggerate laissez-faire and free market threats, but they silently bypass the moral admonition formulated by the authors they refer to. When we talk about the invisible hand of the market, we need to look back to Adam Smith's famous quote where he speaks about businessman:

> He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effactually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good (Smith 2004).

This quote is not as obvious as it may sound. Experts in the history of the Chicago School of Economics distinguish two interpretations of Adam Smith's legacy: a "Chicago Smith" – more focused on the invisible hand, and a "Kirkcaldy Smith" who also takes into consideration the theory of moral sentiment (Evensky 2005). The first approach is crucial for the development of EI, because it bypasses all moral inquiry and focuses only at egoistic goals of individuals. The welfare of society in this perspective is only an unintended consequence. This concept, expressed before by Mandeville and Thomas Malthus, laid a solid ground to develop the theory of "homo oeconomicus."

2. SOURCES OF THE IDEA OF ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

The concept of the man driven only by his own desire for accumulating goods, an egoistic, self-centered capitalist called "homo oeconomicus" is often associated with John Stewart Mill.

However, in order to understand what he meant by using this construct we should remember what he wrote in his political economy writings about the "homo oeconomicus" aproach:

> (...) does not treat of the whole of man's nature as modified by the social state, nor of the whole conduct of man in society. It is concerned with him solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end. (...) *Not that any political economist* was ever *so absurd* as to suppose that mankind are really thus constituted, but this is the mode in which science must necessarily proceed (Mill 1967, 321-323).

The dichotomy between science and the art of economics was introduced by William Nassau Senior and John Stuart Mill in 1836. This division is not a result of the authors' reluctance for moral reflection, but rather it stems from a methodological postulate of specialization in sciences. They pointed to the need (already expressed by Adam Smith) of the development of science, the subject of which will be a multifaceted analysis of wealth. The science of prosperity and people's welfare stood as a separate area for them. The main presupposition behind it was setting the desired goals of the society and the economy.

This was a typical approach of the 19th century economists. For example, William N. Senior wrote:

> Because the economist restricts his inquiry to wealth, his conclusions [... – do not authorize him in adding one syllable of advice (Senior 1938, 3).

To offer advice in the arena of "legislation." the economist must enter into a very different world in which economic analysis has its place, but is not primary. Similarly Mill,

> was concerned that an overreliance on economic theory uninformed by the debates over value was giving economics a bad name (Yuengert 2000, 17).

John Cairnes, following in the footsteps of Senior and Mill, says that economic researchers should not deal with any form of advice (Blaug 1992, 122), which he stated emphatically writing:

> Economic science has not more connection with our present industrial system the science mechanics has with our present system of railways (Cairnes 1965, 38).

Thus, these thinkers maintained the traditional primacy of moral reflection on the economy.

From the very beginning, the division of economics into science and art has aroused much controversy and has been not applied without reservations. It is worth noting that even Mill did not follow his own theoretical and methodological recommendations. In "Principles of Political Economy," he smoothly passes from science to art of economics, not noticing that he crossed the border by introducing teleological and ethical judgments (Hutchison 2010, 29).

John Neville Keynes has further developed the discussed division by adding a new category – normative science. The aim of positive science is to establish a co-existence; the purpose of normative science – definition of ideals; and the purpose of art is to formulate recommendations (Keynes 1955, 35). This proposal, although it seems interesting, was not adopted and most economists still applied the dichotomous distinction. However, the terminology introduced by Keynes, the division of economics as a normative and positive science, adopted and repudiated division of economics into science and art. It should be noted that by introducing this division Keynes, like his predecessors, did not deny the normative sphere of scientific economics. He treated it only as a separate realm of scientific inquiry – a different kind of knowledge (Hands 2012, 219-240).

At the beginning of the 20th century, the approach of economists to the scope of economical enquiry changed radically. It was clearly declaredby new definitions of economics introduced by Alfred Marshal and Lionel Robbins:

- Economics is a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life; it examines that part of individual and social action which is most closely connected with the attainment and with the use of the material requisites of wellbeing (Marshall 1920).
- Economics is the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses (Robbins 1935, 15).

No one had ever put such a large emphasis on the separation of positive economics from normative as did Lionel Robbins in his text published in 1932: "An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science." Robbins does not stop where his predecessors did, i.e. at emphasizing the separate nature of judgments. He went further and claimed that ethical judgments in the science of economy are unfounded and unjustified. Robbins thus believes that any reference to moral values is a breach of discipline of the economics framework. In his reasoning and argumentation we can see a clear inspiration from neopositivistic and emotivistic statements (Yuengert 2000, 23-24; Hands 2012, 1-21).

> If ethics is purely a matter of private tastes, which cannot be debated reasonably, then economics and ethics become even more alien to one another. Not only are statements of economic fact disconnected logically from ethics: economic statements are amenable to reasoned analysis, and ethical statements are not. In short, there is nothing to talk about in ethics (Yuengert 2000, 21-22).

Milton Friedman, in his famous essay "The Methodology of Positive Economics," developed and popularized a concept of the division of positive and normative economics as scientific and nonscientific. He recognizes that the inclusion of moral values into the sphere of discourse results in automatic exclusion of such discourse from science, and hence the sphere, which uses the categories of truth and falsehood. He argues that ethical issues are matters of

individual conscience, which should be resolved by everyone individually. Friedman acknowledges that differences in economic views between people can be reduced to issues objectively decidable by progress in positive economics and it does not necessary to refer to moral values. Thus, he states that the sphere of interest of economics is ethically neutral. This is a key division of inquiry that breaks the tradition within economics, which divided the technical realm of positive economics from the realm of normative economics related to moral outcomes. Friedman postulates resigning of normative economics as inquiring "obviousness."

There is a general consensus among economists that Robbins gave the theoretical basis for understanding the distinction between positive and normative economics as "scientific" and "unscientific." However, Friedman's influential essay popularized this approach and contributed to the dominance of this view among economists over the next half century. As David Hausman points out, Friedman's essay:

> (…) is by far the most influential methodological statement of this (20th) century. It is the only essay on methodology that a large number, perhaps a majority, of economists have ever read (Hausman 1992, 162).

3. PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

Although the methodological statement alone could not change the social perception of the economy so easily, there were many social, political (for example, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel awarded since 1969), and scientific events that created the social space for EI. I would like to point out the most important of them. The first step of introducing EI was the foundation of Mont Pelerin Society in 1947, which "Statement of Aims" set up following goals:

1. The analysis and exploration of the nature of the present crisis so as to bring home to others its essential moral and economic origins.
2. The redefinition of the functions of the state so as to distinguish more clearly between the totalitarian and the liberal order.
3. Methods of re-establishing the rule of law and of assuring its development in such manner that individuals and groups are not in a position to encroach upon the freedom of others and private rights are not allowed to become a basis of predatory power.
4. The possibility of establishing minimum standards by means not inimical to initiative and functioning of the market.
5. Methods of combating the misuse of history for the furtherance of creeds hostile to liberty.
6. The problem of the creation of an international order conducive to the safeguarding of peace and liberty and permitting the establishment of harmonious international economic relations (Statement of Aims, 1947).

The role and significance of these aims was clearly pointed out by Friedman in his "Capitalism and Freedom:"

> Only a crisis actual or perceived produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable (M. Friedman, Chicago 1982, p. IX).

This approach was strengthened later on by the so-called neoliberal economists who believed that:

- we need to construct a new capitalism (Foucault 2008, 267 - 296),

- politics should be considered as a branch of economics (Foucault 2008, 267 - 296),

- "homo oeconomicus" is the best model describing human behavior (van Horn, Mirowski 2010, 197),

- corporations can do no harm (van Horn, Mirowski 2010, 197), the free market is the highest value and social rule, but economics is ethically neutral.

New capitalism was introduced as the only possible scientific form of dealing with matters of economics – there is no alternative (TINA). This was the final step of what I have named earlier *Economic imperialism inside economics*. In the next phase, economists start to explore and explain *new types of explanandum phenomena located in territories that are occupied by disciplines other than economics – Economics Expansionism and Economics Imperialism*. The following publications may serve as examples of this process:

- Becker, Gary S - *The Economics of Discrimination* (1957),

- Down, Anthony - *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957),

- Becker, Gary S. - *Crime and punishment: an economic approach* (1968),

- Becker, Gary S. *A -Treatise on the Family* (1981),

- Becker, Gary S.; Becker, Guity Nashat - *The economics of life: from baseball to affirmative action to immigration, how real-world issues affect our everyday life* (1997).

- Levitt, S. D., & Dubner, S. J. - Freakonomics (2010).

- Levitt, S. D., & Dubner, S. J. Superfreakonomics(2009).

As a result of these processes, economists do not see that they not only do not prove the scientific status of economics, but they commercialize many areas of human life by a peculiar form of symbolic violence. This process has provided us with formulations such as: human capital, intellectual capital and human resources management etc. We were told to believe that GDP and economic growth automatically improve the quality of life of all society. As a result of this implementation of the model in the end of the 20th century, we "measure" the financial

effectiveness or ineffectiveness of culture and science, and push beauty and truth into the background. Economists forget that crowding-out morals may bring unexpected, unintended consequences.

4. COMMERCIALIZATION OF VALUES – AN UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF EI

Neoliberal economists have created a theory worthy of attention from the axiological point of view, as the exemplification of one of the models of reductionism in the sphere of values. This reductionism is based on excluding certain spheres of human life from the realm of morality and giving them the "scientific" character, understood as freedom of valuation. Such approach to the problem allows reductionists to defend their domain of research as "fully scientific," "not tainted by values." In their analysis, economists silenced the evaluative nature of the assumption treating the human being as a "rational machine" maximizing the return on the undertaken activities. They have constructed an image of economics as a science ideologically and ethically neutral and they have hidden the moral consequences of the market mechanisms' functioning.

In the case of the economy, we have to deal with an additional phenomenon. If we consider a sphere of life as free from moral values while subjecting it to the laws of the market, we shall end up with the marketization of this sphere. Thus, the next revaluation occurred. Neutralized and repressed, moral values are replaced by economic values. This process can be called the commercialization of values – giving to some form of good commonly associated with morality a market value usually interpreted as a price. It is a displacement of a value from the sphere of *dignitas* – values that hold value because of their relationship to human dignity and cannot be exchanged, to the sphere of *pretium* – values that can be exchanged / sold, because they can be measured (Seneca, ep. 71,33).

Michael Sandel describes this process in his book "What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets." He writes:

> This a debate we didn't have during the era of market triumphalism. As a result without quite realizing it, without ever deciding to do so, we drifted from having a market economy to being a market society. The difference is this: A market economy is a tool – a valuable and effective tool – for organizing productive activity. A market society is a way of life in which market values seep into every aspect of human endeavor. It's a place where social relations are made over in the image of the market (Sandel 2009, 10).

To show how this was possible, he indicates that economist commonly believe in two tenets of faith in the market:

> The first is that commercializing an activity doesn't change it (Sandel 2009, 125).

The first dogma is based on the conviction that the introduction of financial incentives to any activities does not change it. However, there are many experiments in social psychology that conclude the opposite. In case of the emergence of a financial incentive people are not thinking about what their duty is but only what is most profitable (Schwartz 2009). It turns out that the introduction of financial incentives (and penalties) displaces crowd-out moral motivations rather than coincides with them.

There are few major studies that support the thesis that the commercialization of activities causes change. The first one is a classical study on blood donation conducted by Richard M. Titmuss and depicted in his book published in 1970 entitled "The Gift Relationship." He compared the United Kingdom's system of blood collection where all blood comes from volunteer donors, and the American system where some blood comes from donors and some is bought by commercial blood banks. Titmuss's finding was that the British blood collection system works better than the American one in all aspects. The quality of blood was higher, there were fewer blood shortages, less blood was wasted, the risk of contamination was lower, and the process was cheaper. His final conclusion was that financial incentive erodes the sense of civic duty. There was some controversies over Titmuss's conclusion, but discussion abate quickly due to the lack of an analytic framework and new empirical evidence to support it.

The situation changed when two economists were able to conduct a study in Wolfenschiessen, Switzerland. In 1993, shortly before local referendum on whether citizens would vote to accept a nuclear waste repository in their community, Bruno S. Frey and Felix Oberholzer-Gee conducted a survey. They asked 305 people (of 2 000 inhabitants of village) if they were willing to accept the proposal to build a repository for low and mid-level radioactive waste in their hometown. Surprisingly, 51% people answered "yes." They were aware of the danger, of problems it may cause, of the reduction of the value of their properties, but answered "yes," because their village was chosen as best place for what? by the Swiss parliament, they also were conceived that it was their civic duty to take responsibility for the waste. Later, they asked the respondents whether they were willing to accept the proposal to build the repository for low and mid-level radioactive waste in their hometown if parliament decides to compensate all residents of the host community with 5 000 francs per year per person. In this second case the level of acceptance dropped to 25%. The researchers reached similar outcomes in later studies they conducted in six towns considered as a place for second repository where they conducted over 2000 surveys. They concluded that:

> Our theoretical and empirical knowledge has progressed significantly since Titmuss's intuitive contention that monetary compensation destroys altruistic values. We can now draw on a well-established Crowding Theory moving far beyond the example of blood donations. This theory is consistent with rational choice and can therefore be integrated into economics. The crowding-out effect explains why the support for a noxious facility decreased when monetary compensation to host it was offered (Frey, B., & Oberholzer-Gee, F. 1997, 753).

The first two example studied situations where people had financial incentives to do something. The last example covers a slightly different case. Two Israeli economists Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, studied how the financial penalty would change human behavior. The deterrence hypothesis assumes that the initiation of the penalty (fine) that assures that everything else will be unchanged will in result reduce the appearance of the action that have been penalized. The researchers conducted a field study in a group of day-care centers in the city of Haifa that contradicted this prediction. They introduced a fee for parents late for picking up their children in half of the centers. As a result, the number of parents late to pick up their children in the centers where the fine was introduced doubled. After three months, when the fine was removed the number of parents late stayed at a high level. The Israeli economists concluded that parents threated the fine as a price and they focused on the question whether being late suits their interests instead of asking what was their responsibility. The other important conclusion from that study is the fact that when something becomes a commodity it stays a commodity, and that effect is hard to reverse.

The second tenet of faith in the market introduced by Sandel states that:

> (…) ethical behavior is a commodity that needs to be economized (Sandel, 2012: 126).

The second dogma is based on the assumption that altruism is like coal or oil, and its resources can be exhausted at some point. Economists will argue that we should entrust more actions to the free market, to protect the meager resources of altruism before exhaustion. Sandel provides some quotations from three eminent economists who obviously agree with that tenet. Kenneth Arrow in his article responding to Titmuss's book wrote:

> I do not want to rely too heavily on substituting ethics for self-interest. I think it best on the whole that the requirement of ethical behavior be confined to those circumstances where the price system breaks down […] We do not wish to use up recklessly the scarce resources of altruistic motivation (Arrow 1972, 354-355).

A classic statement of that kind comes from Sir Dennis H. Robertson, a Cambridge University economist. In his lecture he asked: "What does the economist economize?" He starts with a claim that the economist serves a moral mission. In his opinion, the main moral work is conducted by preachers.

> It is the humbler, and often the invidious, role of the economist to help, so far as he can, in reducing the preacher's task to manageable dimensions (Robertson 1978, 148).

Economists, of course, may help by promoting self-interest whenever it is possible. They save our altruism and spare us moral considerations. They save the society from wasting its narrow supply of virtue.

> If we economists do [our] business well, (…) we can, I believe, contribute mightily to the economizing (…) of that scarce resource Love, (…) most precious thing in the world (Robertson 1978, 148).

Sandel's most recent example comes from the economist Lawrence Summers, the former president of Harvard University. During Morning Prayer in Harvard's Memorial Church, he talked about how economists can contribute to moral questions. He referred to Robertson and stated:

> We all have only so much altruism in us. Economists like me think of altruism as a valuable and rare good that needs conserving. Far better to conserve it by designing a system in which people's wants will be satisfied by individuals being selfish, and saving that altruism for our families, our friends, and the many social problems in this world that markets cannot solve (Summers 2003).

Economists seem not to see, or maybe just do not want to see, that from the time of Aristotle (Aristotle 2007) ethicists, without any reservations, assumed that virtues are like muscles – they grow, not get smaller when exercised. It is hard to become generous by saving all the money you have or by spending all of it, one need to learn how to share by practicing it. You cannot become brave by avoiding challenges or by unwise daredevilry. Does a couple in love need to be careful not to overdose signs of affection, because their love maybe "exhausted" and they cease to love each other? In my opinion, these two tenets are the basic elements of an "axiological fraud" economists commit. It derives from the recognition of the value-assumptions behind the concept of "homo economicus" as scientific and therefore ethically neutral.

Economists did not plan to crowd-out moral inquiry, they only wanted to let the invisible hand of the market to set everything in place for us. What are the outcomes of this aspiration? To answer this question, we need to look at the recent findings of moral psychology.

5. WHAT WENT WRONG?

Jonathan Haidt in his recent book, "The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion" states that our mind is divided, the rational part is a rider on an elephant (instinct reactions), and the rider's job is to serve the elephant. He gives a lot of evolutionary and cognitive science arguments to support his thesis (Haidt 2012, 12-77). He suggests that our

morality is mostly intuitive not rational. The role of rationality (riders) is to deliver the best possible explanation for a decision we have already intuitively made (elephant), and to encourage others to do the same as we did (riders serve the elephants).

If we use this metaphor to understand what modern neoliberal economists are trying to do, we could say that they are trying to put blinders on the elephant so that they could take control. Some of them were so successful in narrowing the field of view of the elephant that they blindfolded it. What happens were we lose our moral intuition? In his book, Haidt gives two examples of people who are unable to listen to their elephants. The first group are people who suffered a specific head trauma, and part of their brain ventromedial prefrontal cortex was damaged. These people cannot feel any emotion and are unable to make significant and meaningful decisions (Haidt 2012, 35). The second group are psychopaths who cannot feel any empathy but are fully rational and some of them may learn fit in society. The problem is that they do not care about others, even their family or relatives. Paul Verhaeghe, a professor of psychology at Gent University stated this clearly in the title of his article in *The Guardian*: "Neoliberalism has brought out the worst in us." Verhaeghe claims that:

> Thirty years of neoliberalism, free-market forces and privatization have taken their toll, as relentless pressure to achieve has become normative. If you're reading this skeptically, I put this simple statement to you: meritocratic neoliberalism favours certain personality traits and penalizes others (Verhaeghe 2014).

He says that we live in a society that gives us one purpose – to achieve success. Neoliberal meritocracy says that we have the freedom to reach our dream. We only need to force authorities to deregulate everything and let the free market do its job. If we do so, success will depend only on one's effort, talents, perseverance and endeavor. If someone fails, the responsibility lies entirely on him. Of course, this is a fairytale. Our success depends on many factors and do we really want to sacrifice our social relations for individual achievements?

Robert Hare, best known for his psychopathy checklist (Psychopathy Checklist-Revised PCL-R) – one of the mostly common used tools to diagnose psychopaths, addresses this topic in his research on the corporate professionals. In the article he wrote with Paul Babiak and Craig S. Neuman, they summarized a study conducted on psychopathic tendencies on a sample of 203 corporate professionals. Their main discovery was that 4% of studied professionals had a PCL-R score 30 or higher, which is a strong indicator to diagnose them as psychopaths. This score is four times higher than in the general population where the level of psychopaths was estimated as 1%.

Later in the book he also wrote with Paul Babiak entitled "Snakes in suits: When psychopaths go to work," they focus on how the modern economy promotes psychopathic traits

in work places. Authors enlist four factors that enable psychopaths to make career in modern corporations. From our perspective two are important:

> (…) some companies quite innocently recruit individuals with psychopathic tendencies because some hiring managers may mistakenly attribute "leadership" labels to what are, in actuality, psychopathic behaviors. For example, taking charge, making decisions, and getting others to do what you want are classic features of leadership and management, yet they can also be well-packaged forms of coercion, domination, and manipulation (Hare & Babiak 2006, VII).

Probably most of them are focused on outcomes, not processes, and this is why they do not see this difference. Most of the managers are evaluated by profits and the short term results of their job. If you want to have something done you may not bother if a low level employees followed their leader willingly or they were forced to do they work by coercion or manipulation.

> With the need to embrace change came a switch from hiring "organization men and women" who would maintain the status quo to hiring individuals who could shake the trees, rattle cages, and get things done quickly. […] Egocentricity, callousness, and insensitivity suddenly became acceptable trade-offs in order to get the talents and skills needed to survive in an accelerated, dispassionate business world (Hare & Babiak 2006, VIII).

Overreliance on the free market in most cases leads to crowding-out morals. The moral will is cheeped away by creating work relations without empathy. Any work involving other human beings is a moral work and any invisible or visible hand will not change it. However, economists believe that the omnipotence of "law of invisible hand" and "spontaneous order" led to situation were empathy and kindness are perceived as weakness, while egocentricity and selfishness becomes virtues. I do not want to say that all businessmen are psychopaths. I would like want to say that some of them are, and that we have created social institutions that reward that kind of personality traits.

CONCLUSION

I have shown that economists moved from theoretical model of homo oeconomicus that was supposed to explain one of many human motivations to economical imperialism where they try to explain all aspects of human life using this model. Derived from the concept of invisible hand generating spontaneous order from selfish actions they created a set of "scientific" rules and laws that they apply to many spheres of human life. The unintended consequence of their actions is crowding-out morals and the creation of systems of social interaction promoting psychopathic traits.

Perhaps it is high time to return to the sources of economics and to the distinction made by Aristotle and separate: oikonomikae – the art of housekeeping and administration of goods,

from chrēmatistikae - the art of acquiring money. This distinction may be very fruitful for concerning new approaches to economics and economy. Aristotle understood that the administration of goods is more complex than just acquiring money. We need to re-moralize economics and economy. If we want to overcome this paradigm, we need to start with redefining, reinventing and revaluing the language we use. We need to remember that human behavior and decisions depend on many values and by exaggerating role of any of them we will not get true or desirable image of society.

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Self-Constraint: Ethical Challenges for Contemporaneity

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Abstract

The paper deals with issues related to self-constraint examined in the context of the social, environmental or economic threats and challenges generated by the contemporary civilization. The ability to limit one's own needs, and hence the issue of the reasonable use of goods is nothing new for ethics. However, after having realized the finite nature of natural resources, growing economic disproportions, and especially the exceeding consumption, that problem gains importance and calls for the recapitulation. The article, based on references to alternative models of consumers' behavior (sustainable consumption, voluntary simplicity) and sustainable strategies of development (degrowth), provides an argument why reflection on self-constraint is one of the critical areas of ethical reflection today. Self-constraint was presented as a voluntary, and individual approach of the moral agent towards other people and the natural environment.

Key words: consumer choice, degrowth, "freedom to" consumption, "freedom from" consumption, self-constraint, sustainable consumption, voluntary simplicity

While (…) all pleasure because it is naturally akin to us is good,
not all pleasure is worthy of choice.
Epicurus

INTRODUCTION

The deepening ecological crisis, as well as the constantly changing social, institutional-political, and economic background encourage the redefinition of essential concepts and categories, such as the need, prosperity, justice, wealth, poverty, community (Latouche 2009, 35; Jackson 2009, 16). They also call for reviewing the recognition of the breadth of the meaning and ways of usage of terms like moderation, restraint, or self-constraint. In the light of continually growing local and global problems like depletion of natural resources, climate change, threats to biodiversity, rising social inequality, the weariness of aggressive capitalism and prevailing economization of life the capacity of limiting one's own needs and therefore the issue of reasonable and responsible using of goods gains a significant role. The culture of limitation, namely living according to the ideas of voluntary simplicity and minimalism is called for more and more often. These ideals are treated, e.g., by Tim Jackson and Serge Latouche not merely as a real possibility but rather as a political necessity, especially for citizens of well-developed and economically robust countries.

However, in the congestion of the signaled threads, the philosophical context of reading self-constraint and recognizing in it not only a political or economic challenge but also an ethical one, which requires involvement at the individual, community or international level gets lost.

The paper attempts to justify why the reflection on self-constraint should be considered as a still-current, yet the currently crucial area of ethical reflection. In order to do so, I will refer to alternative models of consumer behavior, as well as to the problems of needs and choices. However, firstly, I will elucidate the proper understanding of self-constraint, what are its ethical connotations, and what place it occupies in contemporary considerations on sustainable life, consumption, and development.

1. WHAT SELF-CONSTRAINT? DEFINITION AND METHODOLOGICAL TRAILS

The preliminary reflections on the idea of self-constraint follow the well-defined by millennia path of reflection on good, happy life, and the ability to make the right choice. In European thought, we will find them in virtue of moderation, the concept of constraint, continence, the order of renunciation, the stoic autarky and apathy, or in the principle of "the golden middle." The praise of the self-limitation is also firmly rooted in the Eastern tradition, i.a., in Taoism or Buddhism. Nowadays, these topics return in cases of promoting alternative consumer strategies, such as voluntary simplicity, downshifting, alternative hedonism, degrowth and sustainable consumption projects, or more broadly in the context of the idea of sustainable development.

In the face of this rich philosophical-ethical tradition few questions occur. First, is it legitimate to introduce into the language of morality the category of constraint since there are already other notions like moderation, restraint, temperance, renunciation? Secondly, the clarification of whether self-constraint, referred to in the contemporary narratives, is, in fact, convergent in its meaning with the aforementioned tradition-laden notions? And if so, with which ones? Can they be treated as synonyms? And finally, why should self-constraint be an ethical challenge for contemporaneity?

Answering to some of the questions and defending the undertaken research efforts let us call for two arguments. The first of them refers to one thesis posed by Elisabeth Anscombe in her text entitled Modern Moral Philosophy (Anscombe 1970, 211-234). The British philosopher claims that the moral vocabulary used by the contemporary researchers is anachronic and out-of-date. In consequence, it is not adequate for the current socio-cultural background. Moderation, restraint, although convergent in their essence with self-constraint, are today terms that have enshrouded with additional meaning that goes beyond their original understanding. In that sense, the category of self-constraint, associated with minimalism, sustainability, or the slow movements seems to be a clear notion, and hence much easier to adopt by the contemporary theory of morality. The second argument is related to the first one and points at the necessity to adjust the

postulate of self-constraint to the contemporary requirements and moral challenges. Such intuitions can be found in the thought of Roger Scruton, and earlier in Hans Jonas' works. The British philosopher believes that traditional ethics is unable to provide a satisfactory response to the contemporary crises (Scruton 2012, 409). The thesis uttered by Jonas in his Imperative of Responsibility is even stronger for it states that "the changed nature of human action calls for a change in ethics" (Jonas 1985, 1). In their own way, each of the mentioned researchers points out that the altered circumstances condition the change of interpretational perspective. Therefore, there is a need for creating new ethics or to reformulate and re-read the theses of, e.g., Kantians or Aristotelians, which, in their traditional form, may not be clear and easily adopted principles for the contemporary generation. That is why the efforts undertaken to explain, elucidate, and update the denotation of the term "self-constraint" can, in lines of Charles Taylor's argument, become a good available to people; something the moral agent can relate to, and what they can consciously choose, and in consequence, bring into practice (Taylor 2001, 179).

For the purpose of these considerations, we shall use a tentative definition. Following the path set by Henryk Elzenberg and on the basis of his analyses of renunciation, self-constraint can be understood as a voluntary, reflected upon, and intentional act of abandonment of the goods we possess and desire, or we strive for (Elzenberg 2012 [1925], 149). According to the distinction made by the Polish philosopher, it may take the form of a change in the external world (e.g. reduction of the amount of goods held or purchased), or a change in attitude of the acting agent (e.g. readiness to limit one's will to possess material goods) (Elzenberg 2012, 151-152). In practice, the external dimension usually entails the internal one, and the quantitative change is accompanied by the qualitative one. However, it is worth remembering, as Elzenberg shows, that we are not always faced with their concomitance (Elzenberg 2012, 152-153).

Apart from the distinction between external and internal self-constraint, we can adopt from Elzenberg the division between constraint due to the necessity of choice, and constraint for positive reasons, as well. The former refers to every-day situations, whereby making a decision we at the same time resign from alternative solutions (Elzenberg 2012, 163). The latter, on the other hand, affirms the very act of self-constraint and recommends it because of good outcomes it leads to.

The last understanding and quality context lead us undoubtedly towards an ethical, and therefore normative reflection. Hence, the next step will be a clarification of the purpose and reason for undertaking the effort of self-constraint.

2. THE CONTEMPORARY DIMENSION OF SELF-CONSTRAINT

Looking at the current research on the issue of constraint, we discover that the focus is put on two problem areas: the production system and the consumption system; both are inextricably linked to the growth dilemma and the environmental crisis, which is its after-effect. In a nutshell, the economic problem refers to the allocation of scarce resources in the face of infinitive needs; the political problem touches upon a fair distribution of commodities and minimizing social inequalities; the socio-cultural problem focuses on the issue of changing ways of thinking and the patterns of meeting consumer needs; and the ethical problem relates to the questions how we should live and how to make responsible choices.

All those areas condition one another. However, from the perspective of the adopted definition of self-constraint it is the analyses of needs, behavior models, and consumers' attitudes that are the most significant, or to put it more precisely, they are the issues that lie at the basis of preferences and ways of justification. This is why, if the project of self-constraint, and in consequence, sustainable consumption and degrowth, is to succeed, we must, according to Jackson, answer a number of questions: "Why do we consume? What do we expect to gain from material goods? How successful are we in meeting those expectations? What constrains our choices? And what drives our expectations in the first place?" (Jackson 2005, 20).

The American researcher is of the opinion that in the Western culture there are two contradictory patterns of behaviors. The first one encourage consumption according to the rule: "the more we consume, the better off we are;" the second, which is a response to overproduction and hyper-consumption is expressed by the maxim: "live better by consuming less" (Jackson 2005, 21). The first model is founded upon radical hedonism and feeds on the belief that the people's will of ownership is outstanding (Jackson 2005, 21), and even if it gests satisfied, it is still characterized by an inclination for excess (Latouche 2009, 54). The second pattern, by revealing the individual, social, and environmental costs stemming from an irrational logic of consumerism calls for conscious constraint and sustainable response to the needs (Jackson 2005).

The growth society upholds the consumers' insatiability of material goods by convincing them that quantity goes hand in hand with quality. It is facilitated by the symbolic role that is assigned to material goods – the role they play on shaping the individual, social and cultural meanings, in creation and consolidation of identities, belonging, as well as the position within the group (Jackson 2005; Jackson 2009). However, as it stems from the analyses carried out by social psychologists and some economists that postulate degrowth, the increase of GDP is not

necessarily followed by the personally perceived increase of quality of life and life satisfaction. Moreover, as Jackson argues: "the relentless pursuit of novelty may undermine well-being" (Jackson 2009, 102). The need of changing the amount and standards of consumption begins with the recognition of disproportions between the material status and life satisfaction. It is not a new claim. Already Aristotle noted, in his description of the virtue of fairness, that pleonexia or relentless pursuit of possession is an obstacle for having a good life; and the one who excessively strives for owning things cannot be happy (Aristotle 1999, 118-119). It is worthy to remember, however, that the author of Nicomachean Ethics lived in times when the scale of using resources, consumption, and thriftlessness was much different than today.

Moreover, the proponents of degrowth turn attention to social and environmental benefits of self-constraint. Duane Elgin, the eulogist of voluntary simplicity, argues that behind the slogan "live better by consuming less" there are benefits such as harmonious relations with nature, promotion of justice and equality, or an increase of resources available for future generations (Elgin 2010, 4). Jackson shares that opinion and believes that sustainable consumption gives a chance to realize two benefits: to increase of quality of life and to reduce a negative impact on the environment (Jackson 2005, 25). The American researcher also states that although referring to the well-being of the humankind and nature are ones of the most common strategies of justification of the necessity for reducing consumption, the reasons of psychological nature that are an expression of care for oneself and their closest surrounding have the strongest impact on consumers. Jackson realizes that it is difficult to leave behind the anthropocentric optics of looking at the environmental issues: "It is the question of whether and to what extent current levels and patterns of consumption are or not "good for us" – not just in terms of environmental impact but in terms of individual and collective well-being" (Jackson 2005, 21). This is why the most efficient arguments for self-constraint in regard to the need of possession are the ones that show that the strategy of maximizing goods is linked to individual costs like a sense of regret and discontent caused by both, the excess of commodities, and the fear of shortage, as well as a constantly fuelled concern whether the choice we have made is good enough because it could have always been better (Kasser 2003; Schwartz 2004). On the other hand, there are social costs, i.a., the disintegration of interpersonal relationships and communities, growing social inequalities, the decrease of a sense of trust and safety (Willkinson, Pickett 2011; Jackson 2009). Therefore, one may get the impression that care for the individual, as well as current and future global well-being, predates or condition care for the natural environment. However, it should be remembered that due to the ecological crisis the discussions on self-constraint and restraint flared up anew.

The proponents of degrowth, sustainable consumption, and voluntary simplicity agree on the reasons for constraining the need of possession and point at three ways justifying why that effort should be undertaken (care for oneself, care for the current and future well-being of humankind, care for the natural environment). They are however not undivided regarding the scope of self-constraint. Latouche (degrowth) argues for the reduction of consumption (Latouche 2009, 37); Elgin (voluntary simplicity) is in favor of more restrictive, close to renunciation, form of self-constraint (Elgin 2010), while for Jackson (sustainable consumption) not growing consumption is a success (Jackson 2011). The turn towards small scale that presupposes reduction of consumption and at the same time allows to maintain comfort is also proposed by Scruton: "The solution, it seems to me, is to care for one's home, meanwhile living not frugally but temperately, not stingily but with a prudent generosity, so as to embellish and renew the plot of earth, and the community, to which one is attached" (Scruton 2012, 412). As we can see, the horizon of the self-constraint scale extends from a rigorous version to a more moderate version, and the decision how and to what extent one should satisfy their needs by natural or artificial goods stays open. Similarly to the Aristotelian moderation, which is not an arithmetic average but a measure proper for a particular moral agent (Aristotle 1999, 26-27), the decision belongs to a free and autonomous individual. They should voluntary and consciously decide how they should constrain their own needs, while taking into account well-being of other people and natural environment, today and in the future.

3. SELF-CONSTRAINT IN THE LIGHT OF CONSUMERS' CHOICES – "FREEDOM TO" AND "FREEDOM FROM" CONSUMPTION

Keeping in mind the definition of self-constraint, according to which its essence is a voluntary, conscious, and intentional act of resigning from goods we possess, or we strive for, and placing the reflection on it in the context of a change of thinking about the ways of satisfying needs, it is worthy to take a closer look at the problem of free choice, or to put it more precisely, to consider it in reference to the "freedom to" and the "freedom from" consumption.

By colliding the perspective of positive freedom (freedom to) that gives the individual the right to decide for themselves, which quintessence is the right to unlimited consumer freedom, with the perspective of negative freedom (freedom from) that is measured by the lack of obstacles in realizing possible choices and actions, and thereby protecting consumers from external, institutionalized forms of coercion, we unveil a number of critical problems related to the implementation of the idea of self-constraint.

There are no doubts that self-constraint implies a change of one form of restriction to another. Although it liberates the individual from the coercion of unsustainable consumption, from manipulating their needs and desires, it is always at the expense of the freedom of decision-making concerning the way and scope of satisfying material needs because the freedom to consume has been somehow limited.

However, a question of the scope of intervention of the state or other collective life institutions into the freedom of consumers' decisions comes to the fore. Adopting the self-constraint attitude is a voluntary and individual choice of the moral agent, and as it seems, it is impossible to impose conscious and long-term self-constraint from enjoying goods and satisfying one's needs by an external institutional ruling, e.g., by legislation. On the other hand, however, can we even think about changing consumers' habits without employing a form of top-down forms of coercion? Jackson explicitly points out that individual efforts are not enough to implement the sustainable consumption plan: "It's clear that changing the social logic of consumption cannot simply be relegated to the realm of individual choice. In spite of a growing desire for change, it's almost impossible for people to simply choose sustainable lifestyles, however much they'd like to. (...) The chances of extending this behavior across society are negligible without changes in the social structure" (Jackson 2009, 153). Elsewhere, he adds that creation of a society, where one lives better by consuming less and in a more humane and environmentally friendly way is a supra-individual project: "This is not, in any sense, a simple task, nor one that can easily be pursued by any given individual or set of individuals. On the contrary, it is a fundamentally social and cultural project, which will require sophisticated policy interventions at many different levels" (Jackson 2005, 32).

On the other hand, if a free and autonomous individual, in line with the positive freedom, wants to satisfy their consumptive appetites in an unsustainable way, can the state or other bodies prevent that? Isaiah Berlin pointed out that a free human being from the point of view of the "freedom to" wants to be masters of their fate: "I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside" (Berlin 2018, 14). For positive freedom presupposes full unconstraint of the way and scope of satisfying material needs. Therefore, it seems that all external regulations limiting the individual in that regard unjustifiably compromise their autonomy. However, the situation is not as simple as it may seem at first glance.

First, today's consumers are not entirely the masters of their destiny. They are subjects to a range of socio-technical tricks. They are influenced by advertisements and other media

discourses that drive the need to possess and guide the mass imagination toward material goods, and in consequence pose a threat to a stable future of the planet (Jackson 2009, 149).

Secondly, with today's surplus of offers, we should rather talk about the illusion of free choice. As the research carried out by Schwartz demonstrates, the excess of possibilities is not a sign of freedom at all. On the contrary, for consumers who have found themselves in the thicket of the proposed to them solutions, it becomes distress (Schwartz 2004). Ultimately, the average consumer does not choose in a reflected and rational way but merely goes through the choices that others have made earlier and thus is even more susceptible to manipulation.

Thirdly, according to the theory of symbolic interactionism, if we express ourselves through shopping to the point that in order to maintain our position and prosperity we are ready to exploit others (growing social inequalities both locally and globally), and the vision of dematerialization of social and cultural needs is moving away, should there occur, after all, institutionalized forms of coercion to support the elimination of unfavorable habits?

The question remains whether top-down attempts of introducing sustainability will actually make individuals more resistant to consumptive temptations. But even in the face of small chances of success, it is worthwhile to consider how to promote the attitude of self-constraint and strengthen the possibility of implementing it.

Interestingly, Jackson sees the hope in, i.a., the aforementioned symbolic interactionism, which, by changing the way of marking, and hence the vector of social motivation and behavior, may, according to the American thinker, contribute to the change to the existing consumption model: "(…) it seems to me that the symbolic interactionist approach does offer some particularly promising insights for sustainable consumption. At the very least, the social anthropology and philosophy of consumer behavior does not preclude the possibility of negotiating or renegotiating the conditions and the means under which "marking services," for example, are exchanged. Moreover, the insight that a certain amount of consumer behavior is dedicated to a pursuit of meaning opens up the tantalizing possibility of devising some other, more successful and less ecological damaging strategy for pursing personal and cultural meaning" (Jackson 2005, 32).

In the first place, a key for protecting individuals against the disastrous influence of consumerism and the economic model that perpetuates it would be reliable environmental and economic education carried out by the state apparatus and other non-state bodies; education that would create conscious and mature participants of socio-economic and ecological life. According to Jackson, one of the primary policy objectives should be to keep consumers informed about the environmental impact of their daily choices, and also where, by whom, in what conditions, and

how the goods are manufactured and what is their environmental impact (Jackson 2005, 23). Only then we can expect consumers will take them when making, and in consequence, they will become more open to practicing self-constraint.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, let us ask once again why the self-constraint may become an ethical challenge for contemporaneity?

It should be remembered that the considerations related to how we should live, what choices to make, what to do in order to want less, and how to convince others, so they wished to have less have been present in the philosophical-ethical reflection since the dawn of history and are still significant. The problem remains, and as it seems, ethical claims on that issue will stay relevant. What has changed about that problem is the way it is interpreted and justified because it depends on the socio-cultural background that determines the ways we deal with it.

The question on an ethical relevance of self-constraint, as indicated in the article, springs from ecological reflection and the concept of limited growth, and in a unique way it affects issues related to the dominant paradigm of consumption. The main ethical problem is broken down by translating theoretical claims associated with limiting our needs and the will to possess into practice. As shown by the experiences so far, it is not an easy task. Even the proponents are skeptical about the chances of success and, despite the necessity of implementing it, they recognize the difficulties it poses. Although they do not formulate such far-reaching conclusions as Jean Baudrillard, who states that "the desire to moderate consumption or to establish a normalizing network of needs, is naive and absurd moralism" (Baudrillard 1968, 24), but they aware of the tremendous top-down and bottom-up efforts that have to be undertaken, individual and collective work that has to be done in order to create conditions conducive to the practice of self-constraint or sustainability (Jackson 2005).

Self-constraint by closely biding the act with the acting agent directs the attention towards a particular moral agent and thus does not allow to forget that top-down attempts to build a specific social, economic or moral order must be approved by specific individuals if they are to be successful. Therefore, in the end, hoping that the self-constraint project will not remain merely in the realm of the declaration, we give the voice Scruton who has perfectly recognized these nuances and interdependences: "No large-scale project will succeed if it is not rooted in our small-scale practical reasoning. For it is we in the end who have to act, who have to accept and

co-operate with the decisions made in our name, and who have to make whatever sacrifices will be required for the sake of future generations" (Scruton 2012, 2).

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Witch-Hunt in the Twenty-First Century.
Helen Ukpabio's Activity and Its Consequences –
An Analysis of the Phenomenon

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Abstract

The aim of the paper is to describe and analyze the activities of Helen Ukpabio, a Nigerian preacher, who operates in the Akwa Ibom state. She combines elements of Christianity with African traditions in order to induce the fear of witches in people. Her activities bring forth massive expulsions of the accused of witchcraft children from their homes and villages. The Nigerian's actions have met with a protest of the humanitarian organizations defending human rights. The article attempts to analyze the phenomenon in the social and cultural context, as well as to reflect on it from the perspective of universal humanistic values.

Key words: children's rights, Helen Ukpabio, human rights, Nigeria, violence against children, witchcraft, witch-hunt

INTRODUCTION

The witch-hunt is a phenomenon that has occurred many times in the history of humankind. Such situations occur in places where the fear of witchcraft is linked with hostility or hatred towards people accused of performing it, which in consequence leads to going after and punishing them (Evans-Pritchard 1976).

It has got a long tradition, also within the European cultural area, both in the pre-Christian times and in the period of its domination. At the end of the 15th century, when J. Sprenger and H. Kramer published their famous *Malleus Maleficarum* (Hammer of Witches), the repressions by the Catholic Church against alleged witches escalated. The book sparked the interest in witchcraft and in consequence sparked the best known wave of persecution of witches in history – the 16th and 17th century witch-hunt in Europe and its colonies. Among the most famous incidents in the latter are the processes that took place in Salem, Massachusetts at the end of the 17th century.

The treatise points at women as particularly vulnerable to the influences of evil. In the authors' opinion, the very etymology of the Latin word *femina* means that women have less faith than men. One may also read there that they give their offspring to Satan. Since the devil's activity may be overcome through sanctions towards his subordinates, the book also includes ways of identifying witches and further actions that should be undertaken at such an occasion (Sprenger, Kramer 1968; Michelet 1961).

In Europe, admittance of guilt by the accused person was considered to be the most important evidence of being a witch. On that account witchcraft trials involved intricate tools of torture such as the Iron Chair upholstered with spikes. During the trials other various methods were used like ordeal by water – if the person accused of witchcraft sank, they were considered innocent; if they floated, they were guilty. Another way of identifying a witch was piercing the body of the accused and looking for a supposed devil's mark that would be impervious to pain (Levack 1995; Pilaszek 2008).

Nowadays, the term "witch-hunt" is used most often in the metaphorical sense, sometimes in the context of a situation bordering the ridiculous to emphasize the nonsense of accusations and that one is seeking someone to put the blame on them. In European culture, the "witch-hunt" became a symbol of manipulation and abuse of religious beliefs and superstitions to attain particular goals (Girard 1987). Currently, the term is used to describe directing social emotions towards a group of people that are unable to defend themselves – people who can easily become the subject of society's anger and discontent in order to diver the attention from real problems and conflicts.

Today, the very idea of witch-hunt in the strict sense of the word seems unthinkable. However, while in Europe and North America witch-hunt is a thing of the past[1], in Africa there are still cases of persecution based on that idea.

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[1] One should remember that nowadays there are lot of migrations, and in consequence many beliefs and traditions moves together with the migrants and refugees. That problem is well depicted in the documentary "Muti Murders"

The data was collected from the Internet sources, press releases, information published on webpages of humanitarian organizations, documentaries, and movies produced by Ukpabio. The information was gather for the aim of obtaining the fullest possible picture. The goal was to analyze the phenomenon from the cultural and social psychology perspective, as well as provide the reader with the knowledge about the state of affairs.

1. WESTERN STANDARDS – ENLIGHTENMENT AND SCIENTISM

When discussing the current opinions about magic, it should be stated that the attitude towards it was created during the processes forming European culture. At first, it may seem to be an expression of Eurocentrism. One should keep in mind however that the legal and worldview standards imposed in the processes of colonial expansion up to today have played a decisive role in socio-political practice in the majority of states. Such a situation occurs even in societies that do not share the experiences European socio-political practices stemmed from.

Of course, the political dimension is only a part of the problem. Magic plays a large role in cultural tradition. It is an element of the broad spectrum of modern cultural phenomena as well as a very popular theme appropriated by mass culture and the entertainment industry. It stems from the fact that it has been the subject of continuous fascination as an important moment constituting the historical identity of the human being. The latter is strongly emphasized by cultural anthropology. Regardless whether once adopts its evolutionary-historical or functionalist-ahistorical interpretation, magic appears to be a phenomenon that has continually accompanied humankind and has been a reason for many deep emotions and dramatic events in its history.

In the European cultural area and the cultures conditioned by it, magic and witchcraft in the contemporary world are phenomena that are treated marginally and without any significant meaning. This is due to two main reasons. The first was an increase, at the beginning of the modern era, of the interest in magic as well as the fear of it that led to witch-hunts. The criticism of those "hunts" and unveiling the inhuman nature of the practices accompanying them became one of the sources of Enlightenment. Its message depreciated both the witch-hunts and their cause, i.e. the belief in the power of magical practices. The second factor that buried the belief in magic was the development of technology stemming from the success of mathematical and natural sciences in the 19th century. That development, which due to its achievements, went beyond all expectations about the possible effects of magical practices became the foundation of

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(directed by O.G. Becker, 2004), which shows an investigation conducted by Scotland Yard on a ritual murder that took place in the United Kingdom.

a new social consensus regarding recognizing science as the basic intellectual value of civilized societies.

After these experiences the magic of today is "tamed," inscribed in the context of entertainment and culture of leisure time. Even if it is a reference point for existential searches and concerns, it exists in the framework enforced by the cultural capital that consists of the two above described experiences (Bourdieu, Passeron 2012). Furthermore, recognition of Western achievements became a premise to accept these standards outside of Europe in the colonial epoch (Appaduraj 2005). The currently dominating culture is based on the principle that the phenomena related to magic are treated as entertainment and going beyond that sphere is perceived as pathology that undergoes certain actions of the judicial system.

For such cultural mechanisms to be effective, there has to be a certain cultural consensus characteristic for the Western culture and the domination of its Enlightenment-scientific formula on a global scale. If horror and fantasy literature is created and read, or movies about magic are watched, or if someone reads horoscopes, buys talismans, or goes to a fortune teller, it does not mean that such a person will look for a hangman's rope, light candles made of human corpses, or kill infants on an altar during "black masses." If such an excess occurred, it would be treated as a manifestation of significant exceeding of social norms, but also as a rather bizarre case of alienation of individuals committing such crimes. Nowadays, no one seriously treats postulates to fight against black magic in the form of witch-hunts. Only conservative circles sometimes put forward demands for censorship, bans, etc. against such products of mass culture such as the series about the wizard Harry Potter (Krajski 2002), or point at a detrimental effect of wearing jewelry with certain symbols.

In Africa, there are still cases of magical practices that are truly shocking from the perspective of widely accepted standards of the modern world. The best known example of such practices are the so-called "albino hunts" in Tanzania – murders stemming from the belief about the magical power of people suffering from albinism (Pytko 2010; Stefanicki 2013). Parts of their bodies are stored and sold as talismans or lucky charms. It also happens that parts of the living victim's body are cut off. Moreover, appallingly European point of view, such actions go sometimes unpunished due to social acceptance, and no actual action carried out by the authorities stemming from their acceptance of such practices. A consenting or inconsistent attitude of the governments hinders the eradication of the phenomenon. It was already the 20th century when Presidents Mobuto and Bokassa used magic during their rule (Nikodemski 2006).

Due to the presence of beliefs and practices of magical character and their consent by authorities, Nigeria, for example, became a fertile ground to foster the activity of the preacher

Helen Ukpabio as well as other preachers of the Pentecostal Church in that country. Their actions are a manifestation of blurring the existing boundaries of reality – using a peculiar mixture of magic and religion as well as the possibilities given by the contemporary technology.

2. HELEN UKPABIO AND WITCH-HUNTS IN THE CONTEMPORARY NIGERIA

Helen Ukpabio is a charismatic preacher leads the Evangelical Gospel Liberty Church in the Nigerian state of Akwa Ibom. She enjoys the status of a celebrity in Nigeria. She participates in mass events. She has released i.e. records of gospel music. She is one of the wealthiest and most influential women in the country. Ukpabio is involved in the Liberty Foundation Gospel Ministries organization, which she has founded.

The preacher's activities focus on identifying and tackling witches (both male and female), who, in her view, are possessed children. Helen Ukpabio is also the author of books and films addressing the topic of alleged demonic possession, which results in children becoming witches who pose a threat to their families and the whole community (Foxcroft 2014).

Identifying witches leads to undertaking rather expansive countermeasures in the form of exorcisms. It happens quite often however that parents, whose children were thought of as possessed, and who do not have the means to cover the cost, expel them from their homes in the name of alleged care for their safety and the safety of the whole community (Gavan, van der Valk 2008).

Helen Ukpabio's actions in Nigeria, and especially in the Akwa Ibom state, have brought about persecution of children accused of service to the powers of evil. The children have become victims of psychological and physical violence. They are stigmatized, maimed, beaten, and expelled from their homes by their own parents. Their parents spend sums of money significantly exceeding their monthly income on exorcisms. It is estimated that the number of children thrown out – the victims accused of witchcraft since 1998 may amount to 5000. Another problem is that the success of Ukpabio's activities encourages others to undertake similar actions – other preachers of the Pentecostal Church have also adopted such practices. The problem accusations of witchcraft was a rather marginal phenomenon twenty years ago, but now – due to the actions described above – it has become a serious social problem.

2.1. SOCIAL BACKGROUND

Today, Nigeria is a dynamically developing African country with the largest economy on the continent. Since 1999, it also has been a country where democracy, as the political system, has stabilized. However, the benefits of economic development have not been distributed in a just

way. They end up in the hands of only a few, while the majority often bears the costs of the deterioration of living conditions due to extensive exploitation of the natural environment. Moreover, Nigeria is a country with a very high population growth.

In 1960, there were 46 million inhabitants and in 2010 – 158.5 million. From 2000 to 2010, the population grew by 35 million. Such a sharp increase is directly related to the fact that the majority remains poor. In 1990s, when the problem started to occur, most of the people there were deprived of basic goods and social services, such as health care, public transport and education (Falola, Heaton 2008).

In such conditions, the level of education of the majority of people remains very low. Traditional views and beliefs fall on fertile ground and are widely accepted. The consequences of lack of knowledge and education have been well shown, for example, in a documentary entitled *Saving Africa's Witch Children* (Gavan, van der Valk 2008). When there are no fish in the sea, the Nigerians do not associate it with oil spillage into the water, but rather explain the phenomenon by referring to evil powers.

Helen Upkabio's actions, in such circumstances, has caught the attention of many international charity organizations that monitor the humanitarian situation in Nigeria.

2.2. HOW HELEN UKPABIO WORKS?

Helen Ukpabio's activity is based on skillfully inducing the feeling of being threatened. In her actions, Ukpabio combines Christian contents with traditional African beliefs. She emphasizes the ideas related to magic, wizardry, and witchcraft described in the Bible and the Christian tradition of possessions and exorcisms, which she skillfully associates with autochthonic African belief in magic, spirits of predecessors, and water ghosts – sirens. In that way her activity falls within the area of the work of religious communities and she is able to use legislation they fall within.

It is worth mentioning that the Christian religion in Africa is combined with some elements of African faiths (McVeigh 2007). The phenomenon of blending elements and interweaving of traditions is nothing exceptional. One should remember that similarly, in times when Christianity was gaining in popularity, many pagan traditions were assimilated. The name of Easter in English and German derives from the name of the goddess Eostre (Matthews, Matthews 1988). Some elements of her cult were also adopted, like for example, Easter bunnies. The holiday of Yule related to the winter solstice, correspondingly, has a great influence on the way Christmas is celebrated. Among traditions belonging to the Yule celebration were decorating a fir tree and adorning the house with mistletoe and holly. Nowadays they are typical components

of Christmas celebrations in the Anglo-Saxon countries. The evidence of the confluence of the traditions is seen in placing the Christian cross and Germanic Thor's hammer on an amulet. There are numerous other similar examples.

Ukpabio invokes the authority of religion and undertakes actions aimed at creating credibility and her own image as a trustworthy source. To this end she uses respect that is commonly enjoyed by the clergy. In her talks the preacher emphasizes that all she does is for God's glory and that she fulfills his mission (Encomium 2016). She also claims that she herself in her teenage years was destined to become Lucifer's wife (Kurkowski 2008). The image of ecclesiastical authority is completed by the whole entourage, such as elegant outfit and the interior of the church.

Helen Ukpabio is a public persona. She is not afraid of visibility; on the contrary, she aspires to obtain the position of a well-known and respected person, who represents the official world of religious life and the establishment of the Akwa Ibom province. Undoubtedly, this status guarantees her impunity and results in a lack of decisive actions from the government that could stop her activities (Foxcroft 2014).

What is also worthwhile mentioning, when analyzing the personage of Helen Ukpabio, is the fact that she is a woman, what is somehow exceptional in the world, where usually it were men who accused women of being witches, also in order to strengthen the patriarchal order. On that account, her actions gain in significance in the eyes of her followers (Foxcroft 2014).

By inducing fear and the feeling of threat, she creates not only by her "pastoral" activity. Helen Ukpabio is an author of books and films that address the alleged demonic possession of children, who then become witches also are dangerous for their parents and communities. In her publication dedicated to black magic, the book *Unveiling the Mysteries of Witchcraft* one may find pieces of advice, life e.g., the information that when a child under two screams at night, has constant fever and they health worsens, it means that they are servants of Satan and soon will direct their activity against the parents, whom they, following the orders of their lord, will murder and even feed on them. Ukpabio describes various magical practices, including necromancy, i.e., communicating with the dead, clairvoyance, or putting spells on people. Witches' Sabbaths take place at night. One may obtain magical powers not only by being possessed, but also by i.e. cutting the body, reading occult books, and volunteering and purchasing magic. The author distinguishes four main princes of darkness responsible for evil and wrongful conduct of humanity: Lucifer, Satan, Belial, and Leviathan. The preacher argues also that over 60% of fertility problems in Nigeria is caused by witches (Humanist against Witch Killing and Stigmatization, 2009).

Furthermore, Ukpabio harnesses the mass culture by producing suggestive movies, an example of which may be a 1999 blockbuster *End of the Wicked*. Europeans would classify it as a B-Class primitive horror movie. However, in the case of the discussed phenomenon, we witness a manipulation consisting in the blurring of genres and transforming a horror movie into a documentary, or even a popular science or educational film that joins together the information with instructions how to deal with the shown cases. The preacher employs technological means used in filming horrors and simultaneously emulates the style of documentaries by including the real people, i.e., Ukpabio herself in the role of the preacher performing exorcisms.

In the movie magical practices are presented: Sabbaths with the presence of Satan, flying and transforming people into animals. Witches put spells on innocent and unaware people. There are also scenes of attacking people in their sleep, macabre murdering and maiming people, and even incidents of eating human flesh. All that serves to convince people that witches and Devil's servants are responsible for diseases and calamities (Benson 1999).

The message that invokes fear in the viewers is more effective, when they are given the way to be saved and how to avoid the threat. Hence, Helen Ukpabio encourages to use her services, such as performing exorcisms, freeing from possession, or freeing from the spirits of ancestors.

There are no doubts that including the means of mass culture into the "pastoral" or "religious" conduct is nothing original. Nonetheless, it is significant how persuasive is the communication. In spite of the primitive means, the message turns out to fall onto fertile ground. Moreover, the parents of the allegedly possessed child are anxious of not only the supposed threat from their offspring, but also, in case of not undertaking the proper action, a negative reaction of other members of their community. Thus, the family has no other option but to call for an exorcist of expel the child (McVeigh 2007).

3. THE REACTION OF THE WORLD PUBLIC. THE FIGHT OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS AGAINST HELEN UKPABIO'S ACTIVITY

The activity of Helen Ukpabio has met with a decisive protest of the humanitarian organizations that monitor the observance of human rights. Publicizing and exposure of the preacher's actions have become the goal of many humanitarian organizations, including the British Humanist Association (BHA) and Witchcraft and Human Rights Information Network (WHRIN) that keep track of her endeavors to use magical and religious beliefs to induce the feeling of threat among the people of black Africa (Owen 2014). Gary Foxcroft, the founder of WHRIN, created a shelter for the expelled children in Nigeria (Gavan, van der Valk 2008). In Great Britain an

information campaign was organized that showed Helen Ukpabio's activities and called for banning her from entering the UK (Brown 2004).

Ukpabio claimed that her films do not encourage people to harass and refuses to accept the charges against her. In her opinion, "white people understand nothing." She is she convinced about the harmful character of the Harry Potter series (Gavan, van der Valk 2008). She invokes the idea of multiculturalism and argues that her activity is of a very different nature, and that she is a victim of misunderstanding. The campaign against Helen Ukpabio resulted in banning her from entering the United Kingdom in 2014. The preacher, who also runs a large-scale business in the UK and USA, in response, brought a case for defamation and demanded legal redress for abuse she had suffered in the horrifically high amount of 500 million GBP from the organizations attacking her (Owen 2014).

Unfortunately, the problem of witch-hunt is still present in Nigeria. In 2016 a photo of a Danish aid worker, Anja Ringgren Lovén with a 2-year-old boy accused of witchcraft and expelled by his family became famous. The little boy, who was later named Hope, was emaciated and riddled with worms (Polityka 2016, Whitnall 2017).

CONCLUSIONS

Having analyzed Helen Ukpabio's activities and methods on the basis of the available information, the conclusion has to be drawn that she uses her authority of a religious persona and celebrity to strengthen her position and to grow even richer. From the perspective of human rights her actions are directed against children, i.e. people, who are unable to defend themselves.

Helen Ukpabio's activities and their results are a warning that in the contemporary world the problems, which from the European perspective seem long ago overcome and anachronistic may turned out to be an actual threat. Although at first sight the phenomena like hunting alleged witches or albinos in Tanzania may not appear as a very significant margin, they may become potentially dangerous in the world where education and progress often lose against poverty and constantly growing social inequalities.

Would such phenomena also be possible in the world of well-established western standards and values? Not likely, because it is linked not only with cultural differences, but with the usually higher level of education and wealth as well. It does not mean however that representatives of the western cultures behave entirely rationally.

Although we perceive science as a value and believe in it, in the new world of digital media we face progressively larger problems indistinguishing the difference between scientific and pseudo-scientific facts, between true and untrue information. Not everyone possesses

sufficient knowledge in, e.g. biology to critically analyze the content of particular information. Some information would be simply too difficult to verify. Sometimes the source itself, such as the Internet, television, or a person communicating a message, is perceived as sufficient to establish the credibility of the information. Often chain letters and urban legends become popular in that a way.

A well-known and documented case of massive spreading of information from a pseudo-scientific source is the so-called brochure from Villejuif, which has been in circulation in France and some other European countries since 1976. The origin of the leaflet is not known. It allegedly came from a "hospital in Paris" or a "hospital in Villejuif" (a town near Paris). It contained a list of substances written in the E330 type of notation. It falsely informed about carcinogenicity or harmlessness of particular substances. Believing in the authority of the broadly recognized hospital many people stopped buying products containing the allegedly harmful substances (Aronson, Pratkanis 1992).

Not many people are seriously afraid of magic, although many out of caution try to avoid the number 13, or tie a red ribbon to the baby stroller that supposed to keep the baby safe. Many people, however, show far more modern fear of the influence of hidden subliminal conditioning, which one is not aware of, and which is impossible to defend against. Proponents of conspiracy theories would see hidden propaganda, erotic and satanic contents in many places. Some would even see hidden messages in songs audible when played backwards (i.e. backmasking). Allegedly even cartoons for children are full of subliminal contents that influence unaware consumers and hence form them from an early age.

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Buying Food for a Hungry Person in Poland:
A Case of an Internet Discussion

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Abstract

The goal of this paper is to investigate the communication emotions used by internet users when facing a situation in whichwhen a needy person asks for food; and, as well as to explore socio-emotional discourse practices for constructing a cultural image of a giver and a receiver of help. The results are discussed in light of Arlie Russel Hochschild's concept of the emotion management and feeling rules and Candance Clark's concept of sympathy margin.

Key words: beggars, undernourishment, attitudes, emotions, social media, discourse, Poland

INTRODUCTION

In all times and societies there have always been very different and ambivalent attitudes towards the poor (Geremek 1989, 1994, Bauman 1998, Lepianka 2000, Stanaszek 2007, Tarkowska 2013, Shildrick, Rucell J. 2015). The poor have been both admired and condemned. A prominent Polish historian and politician Bronisław Geremek (1989, first published in 1978) wrote in his book *Mercy and the Gallows: Europe and the poor from the Middle Ages to the present day* about the complexity of the feelings of mercy, noticing that along with humanitarian motives of charity, there is also a motive of affirmation of the giver's wealth and seeking public recognition of his or her prestige. Nowadays, the view of beggars on the street also provokes different emotions and reactions on the part of passers-by. The emotions of those who give help can also be ambivalent. The question is how emotions shape and are shaped by cultural norms with regards to helping the poor?

This paper has the following structure. To begin with, I shortly present a broader context for Poland regarding undernourishment and institutional help. Then, I demonstrate the attitudes of Poles towards beggars and their willingness to help. After that, I explain the subject of my research and draw a theoretical and methodological framework. Finally, the results of the analysis and discussion are presented.

1. POVERTY AND UNDERNOURISHMENT IN POLAND AND INSTITUTIONAL FOOD ASSISTANT PROGRAMS

In 1989-1991, at the beginning of the systemic transition in Poland, subsidies for food were abolished and food prices increased six times (Gulbicka 2007: 28). The rise in unemployment and the drop of the real incomes of Poles worsened the situation of the poorest, also in meeting their nutrition needs. Jacek Kuron, who was Minister of Labour and Social Policy and an opposition activist in the communist period, took the first social initiative by giving out pea soup to the unemployed and the poor in Warsaw. In 1993, a small state food program for children at schools was started. In the following years, the food program had been gradually expanded. According to the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy (2014), in 2013 about 2 million people were users of a state program for the nutrition of children and adults, including 320 thousand children up to the age of 7, almost 700 thousand pupils of upper-secondary schools; and more than 870 million zlotys were spent. However, according to the data of the research, the state support is not very efficient (Malec, Smyk, Tyrowicz 2015), not all needy pupils receive a valuable dish once a day. Today in Poland, there are several NGOs which operate with food and nutrition assistance programs for the needy: Caritas Polska ("The Peace of Bread" program), The Polish Humanitarian Action ("The Wooden Puppet" program), the Federation of Polish Food Banks. Since 2004, Poland has been participating in the food European Program of Aid to the Poorest (PAED).

Despite institutional help for those who need food assistance, there are people who ask passers-by for money or food. According to the Code of Offences (*Kodeks wykroczeń*), begging in public places is not allowed for those who have means of livelihood or is able to work. It is assumed that a single return for support in an emergency is not begging. If someone is begging in an importunate way and is cheating, he or she can be punished by being arrested or by being given a fine a reprimand. It is difficult to assess the scale of begging in the streets of Poland. According to police estimations (*Żebraczy biznes*), there are 200 thousand beggars, of which a half are a kind of professional beggars. Beggars in Poland are mainly Poles, though there are also other groups: Roma and people from the former Soviet republics. There are many types of

beggars, as there are different reasons of begging (e.g. Król 2008). The majority of beggars asks people for money, while some of them ask for food or money for food. Begging for food is an indicator that a person is hungry, and in certain situations it can also be an indicator that a person is poor and worth of compassion and help.

Ordinary people in Poland engage in helping the poor in various ways. The motivations of such behavior can be humanitarian or religious. Religion has an important role in life of many Poles, so the religious motivation in helping those in the greatest need is worth mentioning. The Bible teaches Christians to take responsibility for the poor. It is believed that a person sharing his or her food with the poor will be blessed. Food has a special value as a charity gift at Christmas time (especially at Christmas Eve), and during the Lent. Then people more eagerly share with food while doing daily shopping and donating food to charity organizations. In many Polish cities charity meals (e.g. Christmas Eve suppers, Easter breakfasts) for homeless and other poor people are organized by the church, authorities and other organizations. This happens in accordance to the Christian tradition of fasting, which is connected to prayer, fasting and giving alms to the poor. Almsgiving is a sign of faith, love for God and fellow creature.

2. ATTITUDES OF POLES TOWARDS THE POOR AND BEGGARS

The attitudes towards the poor and charity have been changed across time and societies (Geremek 1994). In the Middle Ages in Europe, beggars were an integral part of society. They played their role according to Christian doctrine. Poverty had a spiritual meaning, and according to the Old Testament, the poor should be shown compassion. Churches and monasteries supported those in need by dispensing food, clothing, shelter and money.

Increasing poverty in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries due to food crisis, and demographic and economic expansion changed the attitudes to the poor by the public and authorities. Begging started to be stigmatized and punished. In industrial societies ability to work became crucial in separating the "deserving" (incapable to work) poor from the "undeserving" (who did not want to work).

Later on, images linking poverty with social pathology (e.g. alcoholism, criminal behaviour) appeared. The poor were seen by society as redundant (Czarnowski 1956). They also were seen as "insubordinate", because they dared to "consider that the dinners given out to them are due to them and they expressed dissatisfaction with the poor quality of the distributed groceries" (Czarnowski 2006 [1956]: 96, in translation of Mendel 2011: 163). Such negative images of the poor influenced charitable attitudes of people as being more disciplinary. In modern consumer society, it is consumption, not production that became a source of new social

division, so the poor became unwanted (Bauman 1998). In contemporary affluent societies, being poor became even a more shameful experience than in early traditional societies.

In modern times, almsgiving was replaced by social welfare policies. According to Richard Titmuss (1974), there are different models of social policy: residual welfare, industrial performance and institutional redistribution. Residual welfare is based on the premises that the private market and the family are the main channels of meeting the individual's needs. Social welfare institutions have a limited role in helping those most in need. The industrial achievement-performance model is based on work performance and productivity. It assumes that people should work to meet their own needs. The institutional redistributive model "sees social welfare as a major integrated institution in society, providing universalist services outside the market on the principle of need. It is in part based on theories about the multiple effects of social change and the economic system, and in part on the principle of social equality. It is basically a model incorporating systems of redistribution in command-over-resources-through-time" (Titmuss 1974: 146). Thus, it can be assumed that people believe in various models of social policy, which influence their attitudes to the poor.

Public opinion in Poland did not know too much about poverty during the communist period, because poverty was a taboo as a research topic and as a theme to be discussed in public discourse. From the beginning of the transition in 1990's, the awareness of the problem of poverty became noticed and recognized; and, as a result, various research and public discussions appeared. Nowadays Polish public opinion overestimates the scale of poverty, and explains the reasons of poverty in rather individualistic than structural terms (CBOS 2012). In general, more than half of the respondents consider the poor as intelligent, kind and honest. However, the higher a person's status, the more negative attitude towards the poor (Marchlewska 2014).

Attitudes towards beggars are even more unfavorable. However, it should be said that the attitudes of Poles changed during the time of transition (Krajewski 2008: 11). While in 1990's there was a deep economic crisis and there were many unemployed people, the attitudes of Poles to beggars were more sympathetic. However, later, when dishonest and more aggressive beggars appeared on the streets, the attitudes of people became more unfavorable. The pioneering qualitative sociological research of beggars in Poland (Bukowski, Marmuszewski 1995) revealed that passers-by mostly show uncharitable attitudes towards the beggars ("passing", "bypassing", "curiosity", "disapproval"), they seldom engage in some kind of help for beggars. Another study into the attitude of 100 passers-by towards beggars conducted in 2001 in Poznan (Król 2008) demonstrated that 92% of the respondents had an indifferent attitude towards beggars in a situation when beggars did not disturb them and were not aggressive and not bothersome. Only

8% of the respondents declared that they would give alms to a beggar. According to a public opinion poll (CBOS 2000), 9% of Poles give alms very often, 36% give alms seldom, 31% never gives money to beggars, 24% give alms very rarely and only in unusual situations. Some people can believe in the institutional redistribution model of social welfare (Titmuss 1974), and hence not giving charity on the street.

People have various motivations in helping the poor. Some of them refer to Christian motives, others to humanitarian ones. Some of them occasionally give alms and sometimes support institutional charity programs, while others work as volunteers in charitable organizations or support those organizations in the longer run. There are also people who do not want to take responsibility for strangers, so they ignore beggars on the street, and even can feel fear. All in all, it can be assumed that knowledge on poverty and social welfare models influence people's charitable attitudes.

The presented data on attitudes to beggars can be perceived in a more critical way, while people's answers to interview questions may not be completely truthful. Elżbieta Tarkowska (2013: 53) wrote that in Poland there are a lot of statistical research on poverty and there are not so many qualitative ones, especially in the sphere of social and relational aspects of poverty, interactions with the poor, attitudes and emotions. Therefore, qualitative analysis of helping relation between a giver and a receiver of help can have important value in revealing people's attitudes toward the beggars.

3. THEORY AND METHODS

The theoretical framework of the study is built on the sociology of emotions, namely Arlie Russel Hochschild's concept of the emotion management and feeling rules, and Candance Clark's concept of the sympathy margin. In regard to internet discussion, it is useful to take on some parts of Hochschild's theory. First, sharing difficult emotions online can be analyzed in terms of cognitive emotional work. According to Hochschild, there are various types of cognitive emotional work, based on the recodification of a situation. The author states that:

> As in an initial, more automatic codification of a situation, deliberate recodification means asking oneself (a) What category in my classification schema of situations fits this new situation? (the schema may include blame-in situations, blame-out situations, credit-in situations, credit-out situations, etc.), and (b) What category in my classification schema of emotions fits the emotion I'm feeling right now? (i.e., is it anger, general anxiety, disappointment?)" (Hochschild 1979, 562).

Meeting a beggar in a city who asks us to help violates our anonymous status in public place due to appraisals of our reaction by other passers-by (Marmuszewski, Światłowski 1995). In this interaction both a beggar and a passer-by play a difficult game using various tools to protect

their identity, to achieve goals, to maintain the social status and emotional well-being. People can feel discomfort with regards to themselves. Both giving a hand to a beggar and refusing to help him or her refer to emotional work, including a cognitive one. This emotional work is carried out in accordance to the socio-cultural and emotional rules and ideologies. Beggars cannot be helped by all people and in every situation.

Candance Clark (1987) states that sympathy is an emotion guided by complicated social norms, by cultural "feeling rules" and by the structure of relationships between sympathizer and the one offering sympathy. Sympathy is not experienced by all those in finding themselves in trouble/difficult situations. Those who receive it can face different ways of expressing sympathy. It can be sincere sympathy or it can be feigned sympathy. As she put it:

> a potential sympathizer considers the moral worth of the other, the sympathy worthiness of the other's plight, the other's complicity in the plight, and one's own situation relative to the other's. The outcome may or may not be sympathy (Clark 1987, 297).

Clark claims that showing sympathy can mean caring or be a manifestation of human connection, but also it can be a sign of the superiority or moral worth of the donor. The author states that people have different sympathy margins and so they react to meeting beggars in different ways. Some beggars can receive more sympathy than others. It depends on various factors:

> sympathy margins are affected by one's sympathy biography – previous adherence to the protocols or etiquette for owing, giving, claiming, and accepting sympathy per se (ibidem, 303).

It is expected that the gift of sympathy should be reciprocated. Clark writes:

> Rules for repaying sympathy with sympathy, like those for paying gratitude, are contingent on power relations. For example, repaying a superior with sympathy (an equal return) may be considered an insult; gratitude is often preferred (ibidem, 313).

The methodological inspiration for my research comes from the works of Michele Foucault. The crucial topics of Foucault's discourse theory were relations of power and knowledge in a historical perspective. He wrote: "each discourse contains the power to say something other than what is actually says, and thus to embrace a plurality of meanings…" (Foucault 1972, 118). For Foucault "to analyze discourse is to hide and reveal contradictions" (Foucault 1972, 151). According to him, discourse analysis has been seen as multifunctional related to "constituting social identities and social relations." Another inspiration was methodology of qualitative research case. "Qualitative researchers have strong expectations that the reality perceived by people inside and outside the case will be social, cultural, situational, and

contextual – and they want the interactivity of functions and contexts as well described as possible" (Stake 2005, 452).

My case study discourse is a way of constructing knowledge about emotions and attitudes towards beggars and the poor, about charity, and also about defining oneself and coping with difficult emotions. It is obvious, that a charitable act generates power relations between a giver and a receiver of help. I am interested in revealing the complexity of that experience in the analyzed example. I also agree that "the utility of case research to practitioners and policy makers is in its extension of experience. The methods of qualitative case study are largely the methods of disciplining personal and particularized experience" (Stake 2005, 460).

4. A CASE STUDY OF AN INTERNET DISCUSSION

Although the emotional experience at the beginning has as an individual and private character, it can later on be shared with other people (Rimé 2009). It is estimated that people independent of age and gender share emotions with others in more than 80% of all emotional situations (Rimé 2009). Although both positive and negative emotions can be socially shared, these are negative emotions, which fuel cognitive work. Modern Western culture allows people to share with their emotions in social media. As Zygmunt Bauman (2012) expressed it:

> We live in a confessional society, promoting public self-exposure to the rank of the prime and easiest available, as well as arguably the most potent and the sole truth proficient, proof of social existent. Millions of Facebook users vie with each other to disclose and put on public record the most intimate and otherwise inaccessible aspects of their identity, social connections, thoughts, feelings and activities.

In light of this statement, it is possible and inspiring to look at the expressed opinions and communication emotions of Facebook users. The present case study examines the attitudes of people towards helping beggars who ask passers-by on the street for food or money to buy food. It is based on 500 of 5058 selected Facebook comments (200 first and 300 last comments) to Tomasz Motylinski's post (who is an IT worker, rather unknown for the public, a representative of the middle class). The selection of comments was made based on the following procedures: reading comments many times, concentrating on early, as more spontaneous reactions, and late, as partly being influenced with reactions of other people. This is an interesting case, because it attracted a lot of people (including the media) in a short period of time opening a big discussion on the moral condition of Polish society. When Tomasz Motylinski published a private Facebook post about his experience of buying food for a poor man on July 2014, 170 thousand Facebook users liked his post, and 1.5 million people visited his Facebook page. He also gave several interviews in the mass media, including television.

This case was selected after searching the Internet for other examples to conclude that it is a unique discourse on poverty not typical for the Polish media. The selected Facebook post was presented by a man, not a woman, which contradicts to the assumptions of Arlie R. Hochschild's concept about gender ideologies and emotional work. She states that emotional work has more importance for women than men. However, in the case of helping relation with the poor, this man also manages his difficult emotions. In its turn, Candance Clark argues that compassion of men has higher value for the general public in Western societies than the compassion of women. Maybe this partly explains the great interest of people and their social reactions to this case. However, there is a need to add some more reasons of public interest to the case. The first reason was attaching a receipt for food Motylinski bought for the needy man. Some people assessed this behavior as bragging about a good deed. The second reason was the author's declaration that he helped the poor man despite the fact that he is an atheist. Therefore, there were many various reactions, including the attitudes to the author of the post and his help, the attitudes towards the needy man and to other beggars on the streets, the attitudes to help and its effectiveness. Robert E. Stake advises the researcher to choose the case from which we can learn the most. "That may mean taking the one most accessible or the one we can spend the most time with. Potential for learning is a different and sometimes superior criterion to representativeness. Sometimes it is better to learn a lot from an atypical case than a little from a seemingly typical case" (Stake 2005: 451). It seems to me that the chosen case meets these criteria.

It is obvious that such an analysis of internet opinions is not representative of Poles in general. Yet it has an important value in the cultural perspective. It can reveal different practices of discourse of the part of Polish society, which actively presents its ideas and expresses emotions publicly about help the poor. The research topic is a specific one and it seems that in this case, people's opinions are rather sincere (especially the first spontaneous reactions and reactions using people's own similar or different experiences in their contacts with beggars on the streets), though there is no possibility to check the authenticity of the analyzed material (posts of the internet users). The analysis has unobtrusive character and this is the important strength of the adopted methodology.

The following research questions have been formulated: What are the ways of giving help and compassion? How do they refer to emotion work? Who is given sympathy and compassion, and in which circumstances? What emotions arise when coming into contact with a beggar on the street and how they are managed? The aim of the research is to reveal the dynamics of the

construction of self (giver) and other (receiver). That is why such emotions as pride and shame are given a special interest.

5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

5.1. SYMPATHY MARGINS

The element of deservingness already appeared in Motylinski's initial story. As the author wrote in his post about an old working poor man asking him for 10 groszes to buy bread: "He looked neat, there was no smell of alcohol, so he got 2 zlotes". Here we can see verification of a beggar and process of taking a decision in which the appearance is a crucial criterion. The author of the post recognized the poor as someone who needs help and who can be given sympathy. He recodifies the situation as blame-out, credit-in. Other commentators of the post were mentioning that aid should be given to old people, to the sick and to the people with disabilities. Young beggars were stigmatized, recognized as those who cannot deserve help. There was an opinion that aid is for "our people," and not for foreigners.

The Facebook users commenting on the post shared their own experiences. There were two different situations discussed: 1) when someone bought food for a beggar and was met with a grateful reaction from the receiver, and 2) when reaction was ungrateful. In the first case, expressing exaggerated gratitude was stressed. It was linked to those beggars who wanted food. In the second case, there were the reactions of the beggars wanted only money, not food, and they were very unpleasant and disappointing cases for the commentators. The ungrateful reactions were different: one beggar threw the shopping food in the trash, another one tried to resell the food, someone called a person names, declaring willingness to buy food instead of giving money. The first type of experience happened to the author of the post. The important motive for sympathy and emotional reaction was the grateful reaction of the recipient. It is probably that in the future, those who experienced the first situation will help those who beg for food. On the contrary, those people who faced with the second situation will probably refuse to help. Their sympathy credit was not being paid.

People who help the poor admitted that sometimes they were in difficult situations themselves. Such an explanation corresponds with statements made by social psychologists that people more willingly help to others who are similar to them (Aronson et al. 2007).

5.2. MANAGING DIFFICULT EMOTIONS

Let us come back to the Motylinski's post which describes the behavior of the receiver of help. A beggar chose the cheapest food products, asking if he can take something for sure. When shopping was finished, Motylinski was deeply moved and felt very bad. As he described in his post, several minutes passed while he could not cope with his emotions in this situation. He admitted that he was crying in his car. Similar emotional reactions including crying were presented by the other post's commentators (both men and women). In this case crying can be interpreted as a way of relieving the emotional tension, as well as an expression of helplessness.

Following the idea of a confessional society, the first reaction to Motylinski's Facebook post were his words: "This post was only **my expression of emotions which I wanted to throw away** because yesterday I couldn't manage them." It is also in line with Hochschild's cognitive emotion work in a situation of an interaction with a beggar.

Paradoxically, even the commitment to help the needy leads to discomfort and does not brings full satisfaction. This is in line with the concept of existential gilt (Montada, Schmitt, Dalbert 1986). People experiencing the first situation (with a grateful reaction of the receiver) declared their sadness and disappointment. As one of the commentators (Daniel Sxoxk), who bought a begging woman with a child some groceries, wrote: "in fact, it doesn't improve my mood." Although the woman "terribly thanked" to him, he was aware of the fact that his help was accidental, and he didn't know how to help her in the longer perspective.

5.3. MANAGING THE ROLE OF A GIVER

A beggar asking us for food in public places enforces our reaction, which influences our self-image, including the looking-glass self, defined by Charles Horton Cooley (1902) as how we think others perceive us. In the situations discussed by the Facebook commentators of Motylinski's post there were mainly negative reactions of the public mentioned: a feeling of alienation, a lack of understanding in the other's eyes. The following expressions of the online comments illustrate it:

"People looked at me as if I was a leper", wrote Iwona Anowi, who gave 5 zlotys to a poor man and talked to him for an half an hour. It was in front of the discount store Biedronka. She also mentioned that the situation happened "before Christmas." It shows us an additional Christian motive to help the poor.

"People standing in line looked at me as if I was an alien at least." In this way Mariusz Pawlak describes his experience, when a homeless asked him whether he can eat the rest of the food left on his plate; he bought a new dish for him.

The abovementioned situations can tell us about a social norm of refusing to help a beggar. So, those who break the norm are punished by such an exclusive perception. One of the commentators mentioned that not only in Poland do people look strangely at those who help beggars in public places. A similar situation was also observed in London. Therefore, it is a question whether the norm for refusing to help beggars in the street by ordinary people is universal in modern Western culture?

When managing their role of a giver, people refer to humanitarian or religious motivations. Motives for helping the needy and faith have been discussed very emotionally. Motylinski ended his post with the words that he helped the poor despite the fact that he is an atheist. The majority of comments supported the opinion that atheists understand more quickly the need to help, and that the representatives of the Catholic Church are very often not helpful. There were contrary opinions that there are believers who help the poor. Actually, for Poland, according the public opinions poll (CBOS 2016), these are believers who are more often involved in charitable activity. This piece of discussion shows us that one of the emotional dimensions of charity in the case of Polish society refers to religious values.

Another dimension refers to patriotic values. Both Motylinski and some disputants mentioned their shame, because politicians and the state have not solved the problem of people suffering from difficult situations and undernourishment. Such a way of thinking corresponds to the wider public opinion in Poland that considers helping the poor as mostly an obligation of local authorities and government (CBOS 2008).

CONCLUSION

This paper aimed to provide a discourse analysis of helping relation between a food beggar and a potential food giver in terms of emotions and attitudes being expressed and communicated online. It was revealed that sympathy was not equally shown to all beggars, what is in line with Candance Clark's theory. There were several reasons influencing opinions, feelings and behavior towards food beggars. First, the criterion of the deservingness of the needy was crucial for the internet discussants. As a large amount of research on poverty shows the same criterion is also discussed in public discourse in regard to other people living in poverty. Second, the previous experience was taken into account, in which a beggar's grateful reaction was important.

Asking someone to buy something to eat creates an interaction order with various emotions and unequal power relations. On the one hand, people providing aid feel proud, because of their sympathy (becoming a sympathy donor towards a poor person), on the other

hand, they feel sorrow (sadness and disappointment) that their help is just momentary and they are not improving the status of a needy person.

Summing up, the Samaritan way of conduct towards a hungry poor person gives rise to two basic emotions in the observers: some feel compassion and few of them help the beggar, others are hostile and they stigmatize both a poor person and his or her virtue. Further research is needed to explore attitudes towards of helping the needy in different cultural contexts aiming to reveal the universal and culturally determined emotional reactions in interaction between a beggar and a giver.

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Immigrants, Precarious Workforce as a Structural Necessity of Modern Global Capitalism

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Abstract

This article focuses on the socio-economic aspects of migration and migrants – economic refugees. The author presents the migrants as a precarious workforce, which is an indispensable part of modern global capitalism. In this article, the author points out that among the many factors influencing migration, the economic ones play the most crucial role. Forces released by the neo-liberal paradigm led to the global economic and social tensions. This is due to the fact that the market has become the only regulator of economic and social relations. This article is not another critique of neo-liberal doctrine, advocating for replacing capitalism by "something else." The author believes, similarly to John Gray, that what we need is a consensus between the states on different models of capitalism, as there are different cultures.

Key words: migrants, migration, precariat, precarization of work, globalisation, neoliberalism, civilization changes

INTRODUCTION

Regardless of the reasons why people leave their homeland, whether it is war, natural disasters, political persecution, or famine, it is always about improving the human condition. The latter is inextricably linked with work. Work is one of the main topics addressed by social sciences. In ancient times, it was perceived negatively and performed mainly by slaves. It was not a privilege, but a duty. At least since the industrial revolution work is desirable, and its absence excludes from

full participation in society. Unemployment has become one of the basic social, economic and political problems.

Migration is not something specific only for our times. Migration is as old as our civilization. Periods of intense migratory movement of great historical significance have occurred both in the history of our civilization, as well as in other parts of the world at different times. The problem, which we are currently experiencing, is the influx of people from the Middle and Far East and North Africa to Western Europe and from Latin America to the United States,[1] people ready to work for a significantly lower salary than the labor market is able to offer, is the culmination of long-term processes. Zygmunt Bauman in a recent essay "Strangers at Our Door," wrote that such a huge increase in the number of refugees is a side effect of misguided and disastrous expeditions to Afghanistan and Iraq. These interventions, according to Bauman, resulted in:

> conversion of dictatorial regimes in the continuous spectacle of tyranny and madness of violence - encouraged and goaded by unchained arms trade, gaining momentum through profit-hungry defense industry, which is done with the tacit (...) the consent of the governments focused on the GDP growth (Bauman 2016, 12).

The problem of the economic migrations is a consequence of the neo-liberal economic policy, focusing on increasing the exploitation of workers and the reversal of redistribution (Wielgosz 2016, 3). This has become possible thanks to processes such as liberalization, commercialization and deregulation. In addition, broadening the field of action of the private sector, with a simultaneous withdrawal of the state, which itself is exempt from responsibility for the functioning of the sphere of social services also plays a role. "Recovered" in this way, deficit spending can be used to further increase the global competitiveness of private producers (Polak, Polak 2013, 11-20).

The neo-liberal paradigm brought about global economic and social tensions. This is due to the fact that the market has now become a major factor in regulating the economic and social relations, and from among the many factors contributing to migration, it is economic factors that exert the strongest impact.

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[1] The problem of migration, of course, does not apply only to the above mentioned directions. Migrations from poor countries to rich ones are roughly one-third of total global migration rate. The rest are the directions from rich countries to other rich countries and from the poor countries to other poor ones. Western countries are not the only rich countries, which attract immigrants, and where refugees become members of the precariat. Foreigners are working in Qatar in tragic conditions. Most of this two million group are construction workers and as every foreigner in Qatar they are subjected to the kafala system. Under the guise of a system to monitor migrants, which is the kafala system, lies half-slave system that deprives workers of all rights, even such as a change of employer before the expiry of two years or the possibility of returning to their homeland. For that, they need the original version of their residency papers, which are often held by the employer. Not to mention the starvation wages and inhuman working and living conditions (Garcia 2016, 14), (The Economist, 2013).

Migrants play a key role in capitalism as both a "reserve army of labor," and a means to increase profit.[2] Migrants thus provide global job security and are one of the most important reasons for its enlargement. Guy Standing, when describing new social phenomena, recently revived the concept of "precariat," which defines migrants as "infantry of the whole process of precariousness" (2014, 190) of work. Precarious work is, according to some, a structural necessity of modern global capitalism (Žižek 2016, 126-131).

1. WHAT IS PRECARIAT?

Precariat is a typical condition of the post Fordian model of production, which does not hold traditional class divisions and is a symptom of global neo-liberalism. Many commentators of late capitalism such as Loïc Wacquant, see in precarious work a common condition linking the fate not only of numerous representatives of different, classically understood, social classes, but also the workers / employees of the global North and South. Although the number of publications on the precariat is quite large,[3] according to Jaroslaw Urbański, this term does not yet have a clear definition. Antonio Negri is a co-author of one of them. It says, that precariat is:

> an another step, after proletarianization, i.e. the subordination to the regime of wage labor as such, of the development of capitalist relations of production, and at the same time, a regression of the social achievements of working class from the second half of the 20th century (Ratajczak, Sowa 2012, 517-518; own transl.).

Standing, like Negri, links the precariat with the end of the welfare state, which follows the "glorious 30 years" after the war. According to Standing, precarious workers are primarily people deprived of the seven types of work-related securities, which were gained by the Social Democrats after the WW2. Precarious workers suffer from a lack of:

- Security on the job market

- Security of employment

- Workplace safety

- Work security

- Security of skills reproduction

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[2] Already in 1845 Federick Engels wrote: "English manufacture must have, at all times save the brief periods of highest prosperity, an unemployed reserve army of labor, in order to produce the masses of goods required by the market in the liveliest months" (Engels 1962).

[3] It is characteristic that the subject of precarious work is elaborated mostly by the activists of social movements and academics from post-industrial societies of Europe, USA and Japan, where Fordism was strongly developed. Kathleen Millar, an anthropologist from Brazil points it out in the article: *The Precarious Present: Wageless Labor and Disrupted Life in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil*, as does Anne Allison. Therefore, in addition to the allegation of ambiguity of the definition of "precarious work", which Urbanski set forth, we can point out the narrow perspective of research limited only to Western countries. However, precarious work, as proved by the mentioned authors, but also by Wacquant and Jean and John L. Comaroff, Ned Rossiter or Brett Neilson is present everywhere (Millar 2014, 32-53).

- Income security

- Representation security (Standing 2014, 49).

Apart from the withdrawal of the welfare state, the emergence of precariat was greatly influenced by a change in management, namely the transition from Taylorism to Toyotism, which took place in the 1980's. The organizational changes started at that time were implemented to make the worker less "alienated" thanks to shifting a part of his/her responsibility. However, autonomy and responsibility did not improve worker's conditions, but as it was pointed by Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello in *The New Spirit of Capitalism* workers became objects of a new form of exploitation. Autonomy and responsibility:

> were obtained at the price of a reduction in the protections enjoyed by wage-earners at the start of the period, which derived not only from economic conditions but also from a balance of power that was temporarily favourable to them. (…) autonomy was exchanged against security, to the point where it is often a forced, involuntary autonomy, difficult to equate with freedom (Boltanski, Chiapello 2007, 430).

According to Boltanski and Chiapello (2007, 430) a decrease in security is "the most striking of the forms of opression," which indirectly is a result of new form of employment (fix term contracts, etc.). Meanwhile, the situation of workers who have not yet been precarized became paradoxical. The autonomy granted in exchange for accepting more responsibility and modification of working methods has made employees more autonomous, but at the same time more incapacitated (Boltanski, Chiapello 2007, 430). This is due to changes in the modes of control in the management process:

> Given that enhanced autonomy is accompanied by a growth in self-control and team work, with a corresponding reinforcement of peer-group control, it is even possible that workers are more highly controlled than they were previously (Boltanski, Chiapello 2007, 431).

There was a shift from a "surveillance society" in the sense of Foucault to "audit society,"[4] the evolution of techniques of control of "direct supervision" into the "control of control" (Boltanski, Chiapello 2007, 432).

2. MIGRATORY COMPETITION

Returning to economic refugees enlarging the ranks of precarious workers, they are the price, notes Slavoj Žižek (2016, 126-131), we pay for a globalized economy, in which goods - not people – are allowed to freely migrate. An extreme, but relevant example, which shows these pathologies are sweatshops. These are manufacturing plants, which are very difficult or dangerous working

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[4] This term (*audit society*) was introduced by Michael Power, professor of London School of Economics and Political Science, who was quoted by Boltanski and Chiapello in the above mentioned work.

conditions, where workers are deprived from protection rights and are not covered by formal labor relations. In reality, sweatshops are places, where people, mostly women, are forced into slave labor. Wages are extremely low or workers do not receive a payment. This calls to mind the images of factories from the turn of the 20th century from the UK or USA, when workers' rights were almost non-existent. Although sweatshops are characteristic to the Third World, such places can be also found nowadays in developed countries. A lot has been written recently in the Polish press about construction workers from North Korea who build a housing estate in Warsaw.[5] Their hourly rate is much lower than the average in this sector in Poland, and also their earnings are mostly confiscated (indirectly) by the Korean regime. The question is whether in the case of the Korean builders we have to deal with migrants or whether they are simply a product offered by the North Korean government?

Sweatshops, which are probably the most precarized workplaces, have their defenders. They claim, that people choose to work in sweatshops, because they offer way better working conditions in comparison with primitive farming. They also claim, that sweatshops are the first step in the technological development of poor countries and that this is their chance for economic development. This can be of course claimed, if we assume that there is no other way.

Capital, as can be seen eagerly greets migration. It provides it with a cheap labor force. As noted by Dominic Casciani, quoted by Z. Bauman in the aforementioned essay, British employers have learned to acquire cheap labor, using special employment agency whose sole job is to locate and recruit undemanding and often desperate foreign workers (Bauman, 10). Governments take also advantage of immigrants. The latter are interested in the economic refugees who left their countries to look for employment. There is something called migratory competition. As mentioned, at the beginning, the current migratory crisis is connected with the influx of people from the Middle East and North Africa to Western Europe. However, this problem has also its inner European dimension.

Hungarian philosopher Gáspár Miklós Tamás claims that for countries such as Hungary it is important to actually stop refugees, so they do not compete with them for wealth from the West (2016, 6-7). Although they call it a bad joke, when we have a closer look at the numbers, this joke becomes quite real. For example, a few years ago the population of Romania was twenty three million people, today it is eighteen million. Over the past two years 600 000 Hungarians have left the country for the UK and Germany, and the majority of them were young, qualified people with university diplomas. If in the West the new refugees replaced them, it would mean an

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[5] This is not the first case when slaves from North Korea were on the Polish labor market. Earlier they filled the gap left by welders who left the Gdansk shipyard in Poland (Tomański 2016), (Chrzan, Kowalski 2006).

economic catastrophe for Eastern Europe. This would be because the aging population, among others, in Poland, would lose their source of income, that is family members, who work in the western countries (Tamás 2016, 6-7). Only in 2015, Poles working abroad sent over sixteen billion Polish zloty to Poland,[6] which boosted consumption in the county, and of course it decreased the unemployment rate (Maciejewicz 2016). This is why governments, especially in the Visegrad Group, use anti-migratory social moods that point to refugees as an economic problem and a threat to national identity and security.

I would like to note at this point how dangerous the outflow of social energy in the form of economic refugees, not only from Eastern Europe, can be. A historical example is Spain in times of colonizing South America, when it coped with unemployment among the nobility. However, weakened by the social potential outflow, Spain collapsed (Moczulski 2016). In this place it is worth mentioning data from the report *Economic Migrations of Poles*, conducted by Work Service in 2015. This report shows, that over 12 months, every fifth active participant in the job market in Poland considers economic emigration. This means, that 1.25 million Poles are ready to leave the county and 63% of them are under the age of 35 years old (Work Service 2015).

SUMMARY

In closing, let me reiterate that economic migration and refugees, which constitutes the backbone of precariat, are an integral part of global capitalism. They are, as many commentators of contemporary capitalism claim, its structural necessity. Although the neo-liberal doctrine, which distorted the values of liberalism, is not close to me, and I do not think that capitalism should be replaced by "something else." I think, similarly to John Gray (2015, 69), that a change of capitalism would not be enough – what is needed is a consensus between countries, a realization that there are different models of capitalism and different cultures. What is certain is that various states and regions are becoming increasingly linked, just as it is certain that they will never accept a single economic system. Economies reflect family life, religious beliefs or geopolitical conditions. It is important that the processes of globalization, which is the source of Western capitalism, take these factors into account. This is possible only when the global management[7] accepts the diversity of political and economic systems. The processes of globalization, which cause mainly unification, must also bring the freedom, but not that, which is proposed by neo-

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[6] According to the National Polish Bank, between 2004-2013, 41.6 billion EUR were placed sent to Poland from Poles working abroad. To compare, European Funds from this period are 108 billion EUR (Chmielewska 2015).

[7] Behind the concept of "global leadership" is the American empire, which, according to J. Gray is the only preferred and available form of global governance. However, it may not be as durable as Pax Britannica.

liberal capitalism. Freedom in the neo-liberal context has been limited to the entrepreneurship, which guarantees, as put by Karl Polanyi:

> the fullness of freedom for those whose income, leisure, and security need no enhancing, and a mere pittance of liberty for the people, who may in vain attempt to make use of their democratic rights to gain shelter from the power of the owners of property (Polanyi 2001, 265).

We need globalization, which source is not imperialistic ambitions, nationalism, hatred of immigrants, religious fundamentalism and modern slavery (Wallerstein, Collins, Mann, Derluguian, Calhoun 2015, 218). Perhaps the solution suggested by Alexander Kojève (2015, 5-16), that Western capitalism should be less "taking" and more "giving" – less exploitation and wiser investments.

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