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Akademia Pedagogiki Specjalnej im. Marii Grzegorzewskiej

ul. Szczęśliwicka 40

02-353 Warszawa

sgege@aps.edu.pl

www.sgege.aps.edu.pl

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Słowo od redaktora/ A word from the Editor

Szanowni Państwo,

otwierając pierwszy numer „Studiów z Etyki i Edukacji Globalnej” pragnę zasygnalizować kilka podstawowych kwestii składających się na program pisma, które na swoich łamach chce podejmować tematy aktualne, wyrażnie i dotkliwie obecne w naszym życiu.

Żyjemy w świecie zglobalizowanym i wciąż globalizującym się. Proces globalizacji okazuje się czymś coraz bardziej niszczycielskim, groźnym i bolesnym, a my stajemy się jego ofiarami. Wrogość wobec różnych aspektów globalizacji narasta, czego wyrazem jest fala krytyki, która uderzyła ostatnio w Unię Europejską. Sukces partii nieprzychylnych integracji europejskiej, chociaż koncentrujących się przede wszystkim na zagadnieniach lokalnych, jest wyraźnym ruchem antyglobalistycznym. W wielu wymiarach podejmuje on problemy globalne, których nie udało rozwiązać się w wymiarze lokalnym, między innymi: napływ emigrantów z ubogiego Południa, konflikty międzykulturowe, światowy kryzys gospodarczy. Obserwowany ostatnio wzrost znaczenia ruchów nacjonalistycznych i skrajnie prawicowych również wyrasta z buntu przeciwko opresjom globalizacji. Jednak, nawet jeżeli zamknijemy się w narodowych gettach i przełamujemy neoliberalny dyktat pustoszący naszą planetę, nie oznacza to, że problemy globalne znikną, a my, dzięki uszczelnieniu granic, osiągniemy komfort – głusi i ślepi na cierpienia innych.

Już na przełomie XVI i XVII wieku John Donne napisał, jakże aktualne i dzisiaj słowa: "Żaden człowiek nie jest samoistną wyspą; każdy stanowi ułomek kontynentu, część ładu. Jeżeli morze zmyje choćby grudkę ziemi, Europa będzie pomniejszona, tak samo jak gdyby pochłonęło przylądek, włość twoich przyjaciół czy twoją własną. Śmierć każdego człowieka

Dear Readers,

in this first opening number of "Studies in Global Ethics and Global Education" I would like to signalize a few fundamental issues composing the programme of this new journal - a journal that intends to raise topics, which are current, as well as clearly and acutely present in our lives.

We live in a globalized and progressively globalizing world. The process of globalization turns out to be increasingly destructive, threatening and painful with us as its victims. The hostility towards various aspects of globalization is growing what is manifested by the barrage of criticism that has lately hit the European Union. The success of the parties inimical to European integration, although focusing above all on local issues is a clear anti-globalist movement. In many dimensions it undertakes global problems, which have not been resolved on the local level, like the influx of immigrants from the poor South, intercultural conflicts, global economic crisis. The recently observed increased importance of the nationalist and radical right-wing movements also stems from the rebellion against the oppressions of globalization. Even if we close ourselves in national ghettos and breach the neoliberal diktat devastating our planet, it does not mean that global problems will disappear and we, due to tighter borders, will find comfort - deaf and blind to the suffering of others.

Already at the turn of the 16th and 17th century John Donne wrote the words that still remain valid today: "No man is an island entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main; if a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as well as any manner of thy

umniejsza mnie, albowiem jestem zespólny z ludzkością. Przeto nigdy nie pytaj, komu bije dzwon; bije on tobie" (*Wiersze wybrane*, 1984, s. 54).

Problemy globalne nie są jedynie technologicznym wyzwaniem, są sprawdzianem naszego człowieczeństwa i wymagają podjęcia jako problemy moralne. Tylko na płaszczyźnie moralnej mogą zostać one właściwie sformułowane, a na gruncie etyki profesjonalnie uporządkowane.

Jednak treści moralne same nie przekuwają się w działanie. Drogą wcielenia ich w życie jest edukacja. Zapomniany dzisiaj polski pedagog Bogdan Suchodolski w 1947 roku w książce *Wychowanie dla przyszłości* stwierdził: „Wytworzenie nowego sumienia, które czuje odpowiedzialność za więcej niż dostrzega naocznie w bliskim promieniu, jest sprawą zasadniczego znaczenia dla naszej epoki. Na tym właśnie polega jedna z jej cech głównych – a zarazem specyficznych trudności – iż proces techniczno-gospodarczego powiązania różnorodnych rejonów kuli ziemskiej zaczął się i dokonuje się znacznie prędzej, niż proces kształtowania się nowej postawy, dzięki której mogłoby się zawiązywać poczucie światowej jedności ludzkiej, technicznie już możliwe a ekonomicznie bardzo potrzebne. Ta nowa postawa nie zrodzi się sama przez się jako kontynuacja dawnych. Jak poczucie przynależności do narodu było czymś zasadniczo innym niż poczucie przynależności do rodu, tak i poczucie przynależności do ludzkiej rodziny współzamieszkującej ziemię będzie czymś zupełnie nowym. Uczucia tej przynależności i wymagany przez nie normatywizm muszą być kształtowane od podstaw” (s. 25-26).

Trudno nie zgodzić się z wyżej przytoczonymi słowami. Współcześnie kluczowe staje się jednak poszukiwanie odpowiedzi na pytanie, co oznaczają one dzisiaj i na jakie wyzwania się przekładają. Czasopismo „*Studia z Etyki i Edukacji Globalnej*” wychodzi naprzeciw tym zagadnieniom.

Profil tematyczny czasopisma jest efektem licznych debat ze specjalistami z rozmaitych dyscyplin nauki oraz ośrodków badawczych z Polski i zagranicy, jak również kontynuacją idei przyświecającej organizowanym od 2007 roku przez Zakład Filozofii Moralności i Etyki

friends or of thine own were; any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind. And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee." (*The Works of John Donne*, 1839, vol. 3, p. 575).

Global problems are not merely a technological challenge; they constitute a test for our humanity and need to be addressed as moral problems. They can be properly formulated only on the moral plain; only ethics can professionally arrange them.

However, moral contents do not translate themselves into actions. They can be put into practice by means of education. A forgotten Polish pedagogue Bogdan Suchodolski in his 1947 book *Education for the Future* claimed: "Creating a new consciousness that feels responsibility for more than what is directly and closely perceived is an issue of a fundamental significance for our epoch. This is exactly what one of its main features and specific difficulties consist of - the process of technological and economic colligation of different regions of the globe began and has been taking place faster than the process of shaping a new attitude on account of which the sense of global human unity could have evolved, the sense that is already technologically viable and economically so necessitous. This new attitude will not be born by itself as a continuation of the old ones. As the sense of belonging to a nation was principally different from the sense of belonging to a tribe, the sense of belonging to the human family cohabitating the earth will be something entirely new. The feelings of this belonging and the normativity required by them must be moulded from scratch" (pp. 25-6; own transl.)

It would be difficult not to agree with the aforesaid words. Nowadays however seeking the answer to the question what do they mean today and what challenges they translate into seems crucial. The journal "Studies on Global Ethics and Global Education" comes forward to meet these challenges.

The thematic profile of the journal is a result of numerous debates with specialists of various scientific disciplines and research institutes based in Poland and abroad; it continues the idea behind academic conferences under a

Globalnej Akademii Pedagogiki Specjalnej im. Marii Grzegorzewskiej w Warszawie wspólnie z kierowanym przez Prof. dra hab. Włodzimierza Tyburskiego Zakładem Filozofii Moralnej i Bioetyki Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu konferencjom naukowym z cyklu „Człowiek i świat – wymiary odpowiedzialności”.

Czasopismo „Studia z Etyki i Edukacji Globalnej” podejmuje zagadnienia globalnych problemów i zagrożeń współczesności, a w szczególności:

- zagadnienia związane z ekologią i etyką środowiskową, w tym zagrożenia dla biosfery spowodowane przez człowieka;
- analizę ekonomicznych, społecznych, politycznych i technologicznych problemów oraz zagrożeń o charakterze globalnym, czyli tych wszystkich aspektów cywilizacji współczesnej, których ekspansja czyni rozwój ludzkości dynamicznym i nieograniczonym, a jednocześnie nieprzewidywalnym i groźnym;
- refleksję ujmującą globalizację jako zjawisko rozgrywające się w *theatrum* kultury masowej, poruszającą kwestię relacji międzykulturowych i multikulturalizmu, jak również krytykę i dyskusję tej perspektywy w imię definiowania humanistycznych, uniwersalnych wartości mających integrować ludzkość wokół nowych wyzwań;
- analizę napięć pojawiających się na styku lokalności i globalności, z uwzględnieniem konkretnych, praktycznych rozwiązań adoptujących problematykę zrównoważonego rozwoju do warunków lokalnych.

Ów złożony i obszerny tematycznie zakres zainteresowań pragniemy podporządkować wyraźnej linii programowej czasopisma, której zasadnicze rysy wyznaczają dwa zawarte w tytule hasła, mianowicie - etyka globalnej odpowiedzialności oraz edukacja globalna. Wyróżnione kierunki odgrywać będą rolę biegunów orientujących dyskusję podejmowaną na łamach „Studiów z Etyki i Edukacji Globalnej”.

Na pierwszy plan wysuwa się etyczny wymiar poruszanej problematyki, refleksja nad warunkami, możliwościami i moralnymi następstwami szeroko rozumianej globalizacji, uwzględniająca dalekosiężną perspektywę etyczną. Edukacja natomiast jest działalnością nadającą dyskusji, do jakiej wzywamy, elementarny sens

general theme "Human Being and the World - the Dimensions of Responsibility" organized since 2007 by the Institute of Philosophy of Morality and Global Ethics at the Maria Grzegorzewska Academy of Special Education and the Institute of Moral Philosophy and Bioethics run by Prof. Włodzimierz Tyburski at the Nicolaus Copernicus University.

The journal "Studies in Global Ethics and Global Education" addresses problems that belong to the area of broadly conceived globalization studies, in particular:

- issues related to ecology and environmental ethics, including anthropogenic dangers for the biosphere;
- analysis of the economic, social, political, and technological problems and dangers of global nature, i.e., all those aspects of contemporary civilization, which expansion makes the development of humanity dynamic and unlimited, and simultaneously, unpredictable and dangerous;
- reflection grasping globalization as a phenomenon taking place in the *theatrum* of mass culture, raising the question of multicultural relations and multiculturalism, as well as the discussion and critique of that perspective in the name of defining humanistic and universal values, which are to integrate humanity around new challenges;
- analysis of tensions appearing at the interface between locality and globality, i.e., the problems focused around the term "glocalization," including particular, practical solutions adopting the ideas of sustainable development for local conditions.

We wish to subject this complex and thematically broad scope of interests to a clear programme policy of the journal, which principal characteristic is defined by the two headwords present in the title, namely, ethics of global responsibility and global education. The indicated directions will play the role of the poles orientating the discussion undertaken in "Studies in Global Ethics and Global Education."

What comes to the fore is the ethical dimension of the addressed problems, reflection on the conditions, possibilities, and moral consequences of broadly understood globalisation, including a far-reaching ethical

i praktyczny wymiar. Rozważania nad przyszłością i niesionymi przez nią zagrożeniami mają bowiem sens o tyle, o ile dają się przełożyć na praktykę edukacyjną. Mówiąc o praktyce edukacyjnej mamy na myśli zarówno formalną, jak i nieformalną aktywność sprzyjającą kształtowaniu umiejętności i postaw na rzecz zrównoważonego rozwoju, w szczególności szereg działań akcentujących lokalny wymiar globalnej odpowiedzialności. W tym sensie „Studia z Etyki i Edukacji Globalnej” są czasopismem mającym, poprzez żywą i dynamiczną dyskusję, poszerzać ramy wyobraźni moralnej oraz proponować konkretne treści działania, jakim staje się współcześnie edukacja globalna.

perspective. Education, on the other hand, is an activity that gives the discussion we call for an elementary sense and a practical dimension. Considerations about the future and the dangers associated with it make sense in so far as they are applicable into educational practice. By educational practice we understand both, formal and informal activities, which foster forming skills and attitudes for sustainable development, especially a number of actions emphasizing a local dimension of global responsibility. In this sense, "Studies in Global Ethics and Global Education" are a journal which with its vivid and dynamic discussion should broaden the frames of moral imagination and propose concrete contents for the activities that global education turns out to be today.

Helena Ciążęła

Lokalny i globalny wymiar ochrony środowiska w perspektywie odpowiedzialności

The Local and the Global Dimension of Environmental Protection from a Perspective of Responsibility

WŁODZIMIERZ TYBURSKI

*Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika,
Instytut Filozofii, Zakład Filozofii Moralnej i Bioetyki,
ul. Fosa Staromiejska 1a, 87-100 Toruń,
E-mail: tyburski@main.uni.torun.pl*

Abstract

The basic idea of this article is the ecological perspective of the notion of responsibility. Especially nowadays, in the times of ecological crisis this concept is endowed with essential importance. The paper analyzes the basic meanings of responsibility in the context of environmental concerns. It focuses on the requirements for responsibility, the resources and areas of responsibility, on the responsibility for the state of affairs, and above all on the local and global (planetary) responsibility. The notion and the value of responsibility have been grasped in a close connection with the notion of the value of solidarity and the category of ecological exclusion.

Key words: responsibility, solidarity–collectivity, ecological crisis, ecological humanism, sustainable development, ecological exclusion

Streszczenie

Podstawowym pojęciem niniejszego artykułu jest odpowiedzialność ujmowana w perspektywie ekologicznej. W obliczu narastającego kryzysu ekologicznego kategoria odpowiedzialności nabiera fundamentalnego znaczenia. Artykuł analizuje podstawowe rozumienia odpowiedzialności w kontekście problematyki ochroniarskiej. Przedmiotem refleksji uczyniono zagadnienie warunków odpowiedzialności, zasobów odpowiedzialności, obszarów odpowiedzialności, odpowiedzialności za stan rzeczy, a przede wszystkim odpowiedzialności lokalnej i globalnej (planetarnej). Pojęcie i wartość odpowiedzialności ujęte zostały w ścisłym związku z pojęciem wartości solidarności oraz kategorią wykluczenia ekologicznego.

Słowa kluczowe: odpowiedzialność, solidarność–wspólnotowość, kryzys ekologiczny, humanizm ekologiczny, zrównoważony rozwój, wykluczenie ekologiczne

Budząca głęboki niepokój w wymiarze globalnym oraz często dramatyczna w skali lokalnej i regionalnej sytuacja ekologiczna świata – jak również potwierdzająca to zgromadzona wiedza – pozwala wnioskować, że cywilizacja zachodnia jest raczej mało przyjazna dla przyrody. Z reguły traktowała ją jako niewyczerpany zasób dóbr służących jej autonomicznemu rozwojowi. Nie jest więc przesadą stwierdzenie, że do świata przyrody odnosiła się najczęściej z perspektywy instrumentalno-uitylitarnej. U podstaw takiego nastawienia znajdowały się określone przesłanki natury filozoficznej, aksjologicznej, społecznej, gospodarczej – uzasadniające eksploatorski stosunek człowieka wobec swego naturalnego otoczenia. Jednak negatywne doświadczenia ostatniego stulecia, zwłaszcza zaś widmo nadciągającego globalnego kryzysu ekologicznego, zmuszają do rewizji tego myślenia, które wyznaczało dotychczasowy kierunek rozwoju cywilizacji. Ufundowane ono było na paradygmacie pozytywistyczno-technokratycznym, zaś oparty na jego przesłaniach postęp naukowo-technologiczny ujawnił z czasem swe Janusowe oblicze. Cywilizacyjno-techniczne sukcesy człowieka okazywały się bardzo często klęską przyrody. W miarę budowania obecnego kształtu cywilizacji, tworzenia dóbr materialnych i technicznych oraz wzrostu konsumpcji dokonywała się postępująca degradacja i niszczenie środowiska przyrodniczego, które jest – co należy zawsze przypominać – również środowiskiem człowieka.

Współczesna myśl ekologiczna proponuje budowanie odmiennego od dotychczasowego paradygmatu postulującego nowe podejście metodologiczne i koncepcyjne, oparte na wiedzy i wartościach ekologicznych. Opowiada się także za wypracowaniem nowej filozofii rozwoju, uwzględniającej wnioski wynikające z negatywnych doświadczeń naszych czasów. W kreowaniu nowego paradygmatu rozwoju szczególnie istotną rolę mają do spełniania dyscypliny humanistyczne. Wypracowują one filozofię określającą na nowych zasadach stosunek człowieka do świata przyrody. Przede wszystkim wskazują na potrzebę myślenia i działania zgodnego z wartościami humanizmu. Bowiem – jak powiedział założyciel Klubu Rzymskiego Aurelio Peccei – „nasza epoka wymaga humanizmu, który by zastąpił i zmienił zasady oraz normy, uważane przez nas dotąd za nienaruszalne, lecz obecnie są nie do zastosowania bądź powodują skutki sprzeczne z naszymi celami; humanizm ten musi sprzyjać powstawaniu zarówno nowego systemu wartości, który by nam przywrócił równowagę wewnętrzną, jak i nowych motywacji: intelektualnych, etycznych, filozoficznych, społecznych, politycznych, estetycznych, artystycznych”¹.

¹ A. Peccei, *One Hundred Pages for the Future*, Pergamon Press, Nowy Jork 1981; cyt. za: D.L. Meadows, J. Randers, *Przekraczanie granic, czy bezpieczna przyszłość?*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 1995, s. 205-206.

Szczególną doniosłość wymiaru humanistycznego w działaniach na rzecz ochrony środowiska akcentuje wyraźnie również Henryk Skolimowski, gdy dowodzi, że „stan środowiska jest odbiciem stanu ducha ludzkiego, odbiciem naszego sposobu myślenia, naszych wartości”². Świadomość tego faktu jest najbardziej wyrazistą cechą przedstawianych powyżej dyscyplin humanistycznych. Zaproponowały one nowe myślenie, odmienne od tego, które znajdowało się u podstaw tradycyjnego stosunku człowieka do świata przyrody. Owe różnice uwydatnia cytowany autor, zestawiając zasadnicze tezy filozofii ekologicznej i filozofii tradycyjnej. Jego zdaniem filozofia tradycyjna charakteryzuje się tym, że jest „kawalkująca, szukająca informacji, pomijająca problemy ekologiczne, niezainteresowana problemami społecznymi, obojętna wobec kwestii odpowiedzialności indywidualnej, zorientowana na język, duchowo martwa. W przeciwieństwie do niej ekofilozofia jest filozofią całościową, szukającą mądrości, świadomą problemów ekologicznych, zainteresowaną sprawami społecznymi, dostrzegającą odpowiedzialność jednostki, zorientowaną na życie, duchowo żywą”³. Słusznie też zwracano uwagę na to, że pojawienie się refleksji humanistycznej nakierowanej na problematykę ekologiczną „związane jest z pytaniem o głębsze przyczyny kryzysu ekologicznego oraz z problemem naszej zdolności do jego przezwyciężenia za pomocą środków dostępnych w ramach obowiązującego paradygmatu kulturowego”⁴. Chodzi o to, aby rozeznaczyć w stopniu możliwie najpełniejszym te filozoficzne i światopoglądowe elementy kultury, które okazały się kryzysogenne, i dokonać przewartościowania dotychczasowego paradygmatu kulturowego w duchu „nowego myślenia”, kreującego pożądany model relacji człowieka ze środowiskiem przyrodniczym oraz wypracowania skutecznych metod wcielania owego modelu w praktykę życia i działania. Niewątpliwie jedną z istotnych przyczyn zjawisk kryzysowych jest brak lub niedostatek kulturowych wzorów przyjaznych zachowań wobec środowiska przyrodniczego. Stąd pojawiające się przekonanie, że kryzys ekologiczny jest w istocie kryzysem kultury⁵. Coraz częściej formułowany jest pogląd (i znajduje on dobre uzasadnienie), że „rozwiązanie problemów ekologicznych współczesnej doby wymaga przede wszystkim przemiany w kulturze. Polega ona na wypracowaniu nowego wzoru kulturowego (wzoru postępowania), który nie pozwalałby człowiekowi na dewastowanie i krzywdzenie innych istot”⁶. Zgodnie też podkreśla się, że

² H. Skolimowski, *Technika a przeznaczenie człowieka*, Wydawnictwo ETHOS, Warszawa 1995, s. 143.

³ H. Skolimowski, J.K. Górecki, *Geniusz światła, a świętość życia*, Oficyna Wydawnicza Vega, Warszawa 2007, s. 211.

⁴ M. Bonenberg, *Człowiek i ziemia*, Wydawnictwa Oddziału Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Seria Nauka dla Wszystkich, Kraków 1999, s. 13.

⁵ H. Skolimowski, J.K. Górecki, *Zielone oko kosmosu. Wokół ekofilozofii w rozmowach i esejach*, Wydawnictwo ATLA, Wrocław 2003, s. 196.

⁶ *Ochrona środowiska przyrodniczego*, red. G. Dobrzański, B.M. Dobrzańska, S. Kielczewski, Wydawnictwo Ekonomia i Środowisko, Białystok 1997, s. 338.

dyscypliny humanistyczne – jak żadne inne – predestynowane są do podjęcia wysiłku efektywnego zmierzania się z tak sformułowanymi wyzwaniem.

Uznać można, że takiego też zadania podjęły się dyscypliny humanistyczne, wydatnie angażując się na rzecz ekologii: ekofilozofia, etyka środowiskowa, ekoestetyka, psychologia ekologiczna, ekoteologia czy ekopedagogika. Fakt tak okazałego udziału dyscyplin humanistycznych w rozwiązywaniu rozległego katalogu problemów lokujących się w obszarze relacji środowisko przyrodnicze–człowiek sprawił, że działalność na tym rozległym polu zwykło się określać jako humanistyczny kierunek ochrony środowiska. Zmierzając on do odpowiedzi na istotne pytanie, jak powinien zachować się człowiek wobec środowiska naturalnego, oraz uzasadnienia, dlaczego tak a nie inaczej powinien postępować. Stąd też wynika potrzeba, aby „na nowo przemyśleć i zweryfikować zasadnicze przesłanki i wartości naszej kultury, odrzucić zdezaktualizowane modele pojęciowe, także zastanowić się nad przywróceniem niektórych wartości, które odrzuciliśmy w dawnych okresach dziejowych naszej kultury”⁷, oraz – dodajmy – pokusić się o wypracowanie takiej całościowej aksjologii, która tworzyłaby fundament tego, co można nazwać światopoglądem ekologicznym naszych czasów.

Zadania przemyślenia na nowo miejsca człowieka w uniwersum podjęły się ekofilozofia i etyka środowiska. Ta ostatnia w katalogu proponowanych wartości na miejscu szczególnym stawia odpowiedzialność – wartość tradycyjną, ale wzbogaconą o nowe, nieznane jej wcześniej treści. Skala rozwoju cywilizacyjnego, wzrost złożoności potencjalnie niszczycielskich mocy, także wielu zagrożeń, czyni obecnie problematykę odpowiedzialności niezwykle aktualną. To zaś w sposób naturalny i oczywisty skłania do formułowania pytań: co to znaczy działać odpowiedzialnie dziś, w obliczu już istniejących i w perspektywie możliwych zagrożeń; na kim spoczywa odpowiedzialność za pojawianie się i trwanie sytuacji kryzysowych i zagrożeń, w których przychodzi nam żyć; kogo należy pociągnąć do odpowiedzialności za takie czy inne negatywne skutki; kto jest odpowiedzialny za efekty żywiołowego rozwoju w różnych obszarach życia społecznego i cywilizacyjnego; i przede wszystkim jak nadać praktyczny wymiar poczuciu odpowiedzialności niezbędnemu do przezwyciężenia różnych przeszkód oraz trudności, których – z taką niekiedy ostrością i wyrazistością – doświadczamy. Ten zestaw pytań ma szczególne znaczenie dla refleksji filozoficzno-etycznej i społecznej, które podejmując te jakże trudne i skomplikowane problemy, powinny wyjść poza obszar teorii i odnieść się, w praktycznym wymiarze, do zjawisk kryzysowych, które są udziałem współczesnego świata – zjawisk jakże realnych i dotykających.

⁷ F. Capra, *Punkt zwrotny. Nauka, społeczeństwo, nowa kultura*, PIW, Warszawa 1987, s. 59.

W świetle negatywnych doświadczeń współczesnej epoki wiemy, że nasza odpowiedzialność za przyszłe pokolenia i stan naszej planety polega na tym, że dziś musimy działać tak, aby kolejne generacje nie musiały stosować drakońskich metod, koniecznych do przetrwania na tej planecie. W obliczu trudnych problemów ekologicznych konieczna wydaje się zmiana naszego myślenia o przyszłości. Dziś dominuje w polityce społeczno-ekonomicznej działanie krótkookresowe. Postrzegamy przyszłość w skali miesięcy, co najwyżej kilku lat. Dłuższa perspektywa mało już nas interesuje. Tymczasem z punkt widzenia przyrody i bytujących w niej społeczności taki długookresowy punkt widzenia jest konieczny, bo dopiero wówczas zagadnienie odpowiedzialności nabiera szczególnego znaczenia i sensu. Problem komplikuje jednak to, że w myśleniu, a tym bardziej działaniu, nakierowanym na dość odległą przyszłość kategoria odpowiedzialności zatracą swe wyraźne kontury, niejako rozplywa się i staje się pojęciem mglistym, tracącym siłę mobilizowania oraz oddziaływania. To, co w swych skutkach nas bezpośrednio nie dotyka i nie ingeruje w nasze codzienne bytowanie, staje się mało realne, wręcz abstrakcyjne. Skrajnym przykładem takiego myślenia jest znane, dyktowane egoizmem hasło „Po nas choćby potop”. Często jest bowiem tak, że w miejsce poczucia odpowiedzialności pojawia się obojętność. Wydaje się, że takim krótkofalowym formom myślenia i działania należy się zdecydowanie przeciwstawić i poszukiwać sposobów awansu długomyślnie rozumianego modelu odpowiedzialności w świadomości indywidualnej i społecznej. To ważne zadanie dla edukacji ekologicznej. Zwraca na to uwagę Dieter Birnbacher – autor głośnej książki *Odpowiedzialność za przyszłe pokolenia*. Uznał on, że w kształtowaniu tak pożądanego modelu odpowiedzialności niezbędne są mądre poczynania edukacyjne w zakresie zmiany świadomości, głównie zaś kształcenie motywacji dla etyki przyszłości. Etyka ta powinna się odwoływać w najogólniejszym sensie do teorii wspólnotowych wypracowanych przez filozofie społeczne. „Ważnym jest – przekonuje Birnbacher – wykształcić świadomość własnej pozycji temporalnej w łańcuchu pokoleń, jak również ponadpokoleniowe poczucie wspólnoty, jeśli nie z całą ludzkością, to chociaż z niewielkimi grupami kulturowymi, narodowymi czy regionalnymi. Celem winno być rozwinięcie wdzięczności wobec pokoleń przeszłych i równocześnie przyjęcie zobowiązań wobec przyszłych pokoleń”⁸. Dodajmy, że w stosunku do przeszłych pokoleń chodzi nie tylko o rozwinięcie wdzięczności, ale także krytyczną ocenę skutków ich działań. W naszej świadomości powinno zaistnieć przekonanie, że przyszłe pokolenia będą nas surowo sądziły za stan spuścizny, którą im pozostawiliśmy, i – dodajmy – będą miały do tego prawo. Wydaje się, że podobnie ujmuję ten problem Zygmunt Bauman, gdy opowiada się za potrzebą przezwyciężania obojętności w drodze budzenia poczucia odpowiedzialności za Innego, to jest

⁸ D. Birnbacher, *Odpowiedzialność za przyszłe pokolenia – zakres i granice*, „Studia Ecologiae et Bioethicae” 2009, t. 7, s. 104.

drugiego człowieka, życia jako takiego, to jest także życia i kondycji przyrody, myślenia nie tylko tu i teraz, ale również w planie przyszłościowym. Z kolei autor *Odpowiedzialności za przyszłe pokolenia* mocno akcentuje, że działaniom na rzecz zmian świadomościowych towarzyszyć powinny podejmowane w duchu etyki przyszłości określone decyzje polityczno-gospodarcze. W tym wymiarze istotne znaczenie miałyby „przedstawianie (prawdopodobnych) potrzeb i interesów przyszłych pokoleń w obecnych decyzjach, np. poprzez mianowanych rzeczników przyszłych pokoleń na szczeblu lokalnym, regionalnym, państwowym i międzynarodowym”⁹. Innym liczącym się posunięciem mogłoby być rozszerzenie o sprawy przyszłych pokoleń uprawnień istniejącej prawnej instytucji, jaką jest organizacja pożytku publicznego. To także sposób nadzorowania, kontrolowania i sankcjonowania polityki państwowej i działań rządu, również po to, „by móc upubliczniać i denuncjować naruszanie interesów przyszłych pokoleń, jak np. wycinanie lasów deszczowych, pustoszczenie i emisję gazów cieplarnianych”¹⁰. Słusznie akcentuje się więc przekonanie, że „etyka otwartego globalnego społeczeństwa oparta musi być na godności i odnosić się do przyszłości. W przyszłości będą kolejne pokolenia ludzi, którzy podobnie jak my będą chcieli godnie żyć. Jednakże to my tu i teraz poprzez nasze działania możemy zadecydować o ich życiu i rozwoju. Zmusza to nas do wyprzedzającego w czasie pojmowania godnego życia przyszłych pokoleń”¹¹.

W kontekście dyskusji wokół etyki otwartego globalnego społeczeństwa po raz pierwszy w dziejach ludzkości pojawia się problem odpowiedzialności za planetę. Orędownikiem tej idei jest Carl Amery. Mówi on o potrzebie budowania takiej etyki, która wykracza poza stosunki międzyludzkie i czyni „wspólną odpowiedzialność nie tylko za własną grupę i własny gatunek, ale za planetę jako całość”. I dodaje: „tego rodzaju odpowiedzialność powinna być pierwszym i realnym obowiązkiem ludzkości”. Etyka odpowiedzialności globalnej jest wyrazem narastającej – pod wpływem dramatycznych wydarzeń – potrzeby kreowania odpowiedzialności przed światem i za świat. To zaś znaczy, że niebawem zmienią się, w kierunku niekiedy maksymalnego poszerzenia, zakresy odpowiedzialności. Przez całą niemal świadomą historię człowieka był on odpowiedzialny za siebie, własną postawę i czyny, krąg najbliższych osób, następnie za miejsce zakorzenienia, zbiorowość, w której egzystował. Dopiero z czasem (w dobie nowożytnej) pojawia się odpowiedzialność za państwo, ojczyznę, dziś zaś także za świat przyrody, planetę Ziemia. Wkraczamy zatem w erę odpowiedzialności globalnej – jej zakres jest najszerszy z dotychczas

⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁰ Ibidem, s. 105.

¹¹ R. Janikowski, *Zrównoważony rozwój jako przedmiot kształcenia ogólnego*, [w:] *Edukacja dla zrównoważonego rozwoju*, red. T. Borys, Wydawnictwo Ekonomia i Środowisko, Białystok 2006, s. 36.

nam znanych. Wynika on z jej przedmiotu i obejmuje przestrzeń pomiędzy wymiarem lokalnym a globalnym.

Jednak nie tylko zakres odpowiedzialności uległ poszerzeniu, można i należy mówić także o nowych obszarach, które dotąd nie były przedmiotem odpowiedzialności, obecnie zaś ich znaczenie jest doniosłe. I tak np. dziś, gdy wiedza stała się wielką siłą sprawczą, powinnością moralną uczonego i całych zespołów badawczych, jest bycie odpowiedzialnym za skutki swoich działań w sferze poznania naukowego, jego wyników i zastosowań. Tradycyjnie mocno akcentujemy indywidualną odpowiedzialność naukowców na rzecz pozyskiwania wiedzy o rzeczywistości. Jednakże współczesna nauka – co jest rzeczą dziś już oczywistą – rozwija się głównie w ramach instytucji i organizacji naukowych. Pojawia się zatem problem odpowiedzialności instytucjonalnej nauki, która nie sprowadza się do sumy odpowiedzialności indywidualnej członków danej instytucji czy organizacji. Jest to sprawa bardzo złożona i skomplikowana, ponieważ proces instytucjonalizacji nauki może implikować zjawisko rozmywania się odpowiedzialności.

Mówiąc o nowych obszarach odpowiedzialności, mam na myśli także odpowiedzialność w kontekście rozwoju techniki, odpowiedzialność w perspektywie społeczeństwa informacyjnego i – najbardziej nas tu interesującą – odpowiedzialność za świat przyrody oraz korzystanie z jej zasobów, w tym odpowiedzialność za przyszłe pokolenia. Istnieje także pilna potrzeba budowania i wzmacniania postaw indywidualnie pojętej odpowiedzialności – odpowiedzialności za każde działanie, które podejmujemy we własnym gospodarstwie domowym, zakładzie pracy, osiedlu, regionie, odpowiedzialność za dobrą kondycję naszych „małych ojczyzn”. W takim ujęciu odpowiedzialność lokalna znajduje się w ścisłym związku z odpowiedzialnością globalną. Z kolei wychowanie w duchu odpowiedzialności za sprawy lokalne i odpowiedzialności globalnej to ważne zadania dla edukacji ekologicznej.

Wydaje się, że sensowny dyskurs wokół tak rozumianej odpowiedzialności nie jest możliwy bez jej niezbędnego dopełnienia, jakim jest myślenie oraz działanie w kategoriach wspólnotowych i solidarnościowych.

Wiemy, że poczucie solidarności i stowarzyszonej z nią wspólnotowości powinno znajdować się u podstaw demokracji, jak również u podstaw gospodarowania w gospodarce wolnorynkowej. Słusznie zatem zwraca się uwagę na to, że zaspokajanie własnych, często egoistycznych, potrzeb kosztem innych społeczeństw jest niewątpliwie zaprzeczeniem tej solidarności, a zarazem zaprzeczeniem ekologicznego myślenia. Jeśli natomiast będzie to „solidarność z jutrzejszymi pokoleniami, tzn. głęboka świadomość tego, że my możemy zużyć możliwości życia następnych pokoleń, albo jeśli to będzie solidarność z innymi żywymi istotami

i samą przyrodą, to (...) nawet wzrost gospodarczy, jeśli u jego podstaw będzie leżało poczucie solidarności, będzie mógł przyczynić się do poprawy ochrony środowiska naturalnego”¹². Opierając się na wartości solidarności, mamy szansę godzenia ekonomii i ekologii, gdyż rozwój gospodarczy może przyczyniać się do poprawy stanu środowiska tylko wówczas, gdy będzie uwzględniał wartość wspólnoty ze światem przyrody. Należy przy tym pamiętać, że idea solidarności jawi się tu nie tylko jako wartość stanowiąca podstawę demokracji i wolnego rynku¹³, ale również jako fundamentalna składowa odpowiedzialności.

Odpowiedzialność i solidarność–wspólnotowość stają się priorytetowymi wartościami w obliczu niebezpiecznego w skali globalnej zagrożenia, jakim są narastające w szybkim tempie zmiany klimatyczne. Potrzebujemy „globalnej solidarności klimatycznej i globalnych rozwiązań – piszą Zbigniew M. Karaczun i Andrzej Kassenberg, autorzy artykułu pod znamienym tytułem *Solidarność klimatyczna – gdzie ona?* – bez nich nie pozostawimy bezpiecznej Ziemi naszym dzieciom i wnukom. Już teraz można w naszym kraju dostrzec negatywne skutki zmian klimatu. Zwiększa się liczba huraganów i katastrof budowlanych nimi spowodowanych (...), pojawiają się szkodniki i choroby występujące wcześniej tylko w krajach o cieplejszym klimacie, zwiększa się częstotliwość susz. Raporty naukowe nie pozostawiają wątpliwości: adaptacja do zmieniających się warunków klimatycznych będzie pięć–dziesięć razy droższa niż działania na rzecz ochrony klimatu. To powinien być podstawowy rachunek, bez którego międzynarodowej i krajowej polityki klimatycznej nie można prowadzić w sposób rozsądny i zrównoważony”¹⁴. Klimat, przekonują autorzy cytowanej wypowiedzi, można ochronić skutecznie tylko w warunkach międzynarodowej solidarności i współpracy krajów rozwiniętych i rozwijających się, ale tylko wtedy, gdy będą potrafiły wznieść się ponad własny wąski interes i zaczną myśleć oraz działać w kategoriach solidarności klimatycznej. Jest to też głos skierowany do polskich polityków, którzy powinni zrezygnować ze źle pojmowanej polityki izolacjonizmu i zastąpić ją polityką dyktowaną potrzebą działania w imię globalnej solidarności klimatycznej¹⁵.

Trzeba podkreślić, że idea odpowiedzialności oraz wspólnoty i solidarności ze światem przyrody posiada wymiar nie tylko normatywno-perswazyjny, nakierowany na zmianę naszego odnoszenia się do przyrodniczego otoczenia. Chodzi tu również o określoną koncepcję rozwoju cywilizacji, a mianowicie taką, która uwzględniałaby interesy także świata pozaludzkiego, traktując je jako interesy wspólnotowe. W świetle trudnych doświadczeń ostatnich dziesięcioleci nie budzi chyba wątpliwości teza, że każda sensowna koncepcja rozwoju cywilizacyjnego musi uwzględniać

¹² J. Okrześnik (głos w dyskusji), [w:] *Ekologia, demokracja, wolny rynek*. Międzynarodowa konferencja w Krakowie, listopad 1995, s. 59–60.

¹³ Ibidem.

¹⁴ Z.M. Karaczun, A. Kassenberg, *Solidarność klimatyczna – gdzie ona?*, „Gazeta Wyborcza”, 2 listopada 2009, s. 16–17.

¹⁵ Ibidem.

aksjomat o wspólnocie losów człowieka i przyrody. Jej zdecydowanym zwolennikiem jest Hans-Georg Gadamer, który przekonuje, że „na przyrodę nie można już więcej patrzeć jak na przedmiot wykorzystania, musi ona we wszystkich formach jej jawienia być doświadczana jako partner”¹⁶.

Z tych też powodów etyka środowiskowa obok odpowiedzialności wysoko lokuje solidarność w katalogu gloszonych i preferowanych wartości i nadaje jej wieloaspektowy wymiar. Treść tej idei nie wyczerpuje się jednak w często przywoływanym przez ekologów postulatcie wspólnotowego pojmowania interesów ludzkości i świata przyrodniczego. Równie istotne jest tu wyraziste i zdecydowane akcentowanie potrzeby odwoływania się do solidarności w rozwiązywaniu wspólnych problemów ekologicznych. Przy czym mamy tu na myśli dwojakie pojmowanie tej wartości. Jedno z nich wyraża się w postulatcie solidarności między narodami, zgodnie z przekonaniem, że jedynie wspólnotowym, solidarnym wysiłkiem można powstrzymać grożące lub zaistniałe już niebezpieczeństwa (np. niekorzystne zmiany klimatyczne). Tej zasadzie wyraźnie sprzeciwiają się kraje, które chroniąc własne zasoby naturalne (np. lasy), jednocześnie wykorzystują bez ograniczeń zasoby innych krajów, zwykle tych zapóźnionych w rozwoju (np. trzebią lasy, nie zważając na to, że w zatrważającym tempie giną masywy leśne na Filipinach, Wybrzeżu Kości Słoniowej, w Amazonii, Indonezji i wielu innych miejscach naszego globu). W innym kontekście rozumiemy tę wartość, gdy wskazujemy na konieczność myślenia i działania również w kategorii solidarności międzypokoleniowej. Problem i zarazem nielata do przezwyciężenia trudność polegają na tym, że nasze pokolenie powinno tak gospodarować wszelkimi dobrami i zasobami świata przyrody, aby zabezpieczone zostały także interesy przyszłych pokoleń, aby nie ograniczyć ich możliwości przetrwania i rozwoju. Można więc uznać, że solidarność człowieka z światem przyrody, solidarność między narodami w rozwiązywaniu problemów ekologicznych oraz solidarność międzypokoleniowa, pozostające w sojuszu z poczuciem odpowiedzialności, składają się na to, co coraz częściej określa się jako solidarność i odpowiedzialność globalną. Tak wspólnotowo pojęty sojusz owych wartości traktować należy jako jeden z najbardziej konstytutywnych składników nowego myślenia i działania. Zwróćmy również uwagę na to, że obie idee: solidarności i odpowiedzialności przebiegają w poprzek podziałów politycznych, zawodowych, kulturowych czy pokoleniowych. Są tymi ideami, które wbrew różnego rodzaju podziałom i zróżnicowaniu duchowo spajają ludzi oraz społeczeństwa, rzec można – mogą i powinny być łączącym ich, wspólnotowym rdzeniem. Z tych to właśnie powodów ich miejsce w aksjologii zrównoważonego rozwoju jest tak wysoko ulokowane, zaś popularyzacja oraz zaszczepianie idei odpowiedzialności i solidarności to fundamentalne zadania

¹⁶ H.G. Gadamer, *Dziedzictwo Europy*, Fundacja Aletheia, Warszawa 1992, s. 20.

edukacji na rzecz zrównoważonego rozwoju. Idea solidarności, kierując się poczuciem wspólnotowości, wzmacnia wszelkie działania na rzecz zrównoważonego rozwoju, ale – na co również należy zważyć – istnieje tu sprzężenie zwrotne, ponieważ każde racjonalne działanie w imię idei zrównoważonego rozwoju przyczynia się do umacniania postaw solidarnych i wspólnotowych, zaś odpowiedzialność za pomyślność świata człowieka i przyrody zachęca do opowiedzenia się za ideą zrównoważonego rozwoju. Zgodzić się zatem należy z poglądem, że „edukacja dla zrównoważonego rozwoju jest jednym z istotnych mechanizmów zmierzających do przywrócenia tkwiących w naturze ludzkiej skłonności do samoorganizacji i do solidarnego działania na rzecz dobra wspólnego”¹⁷. Odpowiedzialność i solidarność jako wartości oraz koncepcja zrównoważonego rozwoju to dwie wzajemnie wzmacniające i uzupełniające się jakości. Idee odpowiedzialności i solidarności oraz wywodzące się z ich ducha postawy i działania są niewątpliwie silnym sprzymierzeńcem wszelkich poczynań na rzecz rozwoju zrównoważonego, pobudzają i wzmacniają naturalną ludzką skłonność do poczynań wspólnotowych, samoorganizujących. Dlatego też – podkreślmy to raz jeszcze – każda mądra edukacja nakierowana na rzecz zrównoważonego rozwoju nie może pozostać obojętna wobec powyżej wskazanej zależności.

Doniosłość i ranga przedstawianych tu wartości stają się jeszcze bardziej oczywiste w sytuacji procesów degradujących środowisko przyrodnicze, które powodują, że coraz liczniejsze grupy i zbiorowości ludzkie żyją w warunkach o bardzo obniżonych standardach ekologicznych – takich, które nie odpowiadają elementarnym wymogom zdrowotnym, co w wydatnym stopniu wpływa na pogarszanie zdrowia fizycznego i samopoczucia psychicznego. Jest oczywiste, że dobra kondycja fizyczna i psychiczna jest niezbywalnym i najbardziej istotnym elementem jakości życia każdego człowieka. Uznać więc należy, że – najogólniej mówiąc – procesy deregulujące i dewastujące świat przyrody godzą w najbardziej egzystencjalne podstawy bytu ludzkiego. Zdegradowane obszary przyrodnicze i walory krajobrazowe, brak dostępu do zdrowej wody i czystego powietrza, a także konsumowanie produktów pochodzących z zanieczyszczonej chemicznymi substancjami gleby – wszystko to w niezwykle poważnym stopniu ogranicza ludziom dostęp do wartości przyrodniczych, zdrowotnych, rekreacyjnych, czy estetycznych. Tym samym zdecydowanie obniża poziom i jakość ich życia, stawiając ich w pozycji nieporównanie gorszej od tych, którzy mają szczęście zamieszkiwać na obszarach zdrowych ekologicznie. Nie ulega bowiem wątpliwości, że korzystna lub niekorzystna sytuacja ekologiczna poszczególnych obszarów, regionów, niekiedy całych krajów, w znacznym stopniu wyznacza

¹⁷ Z. Piątek, *Przyrodnicze i społeczno-historyczne warunki równoważenia ładów ludzkiego świata*, „Problemy Ekorozwoju” 2007, vol. 2, nr 2, s. 14.

poziom zaspokojenia wielu potrzeb oraz określa jakość życia, i – co istotne – jest też nowym, niewystępującym dotąd, znaczącym powodem dyferencjacji społecznych.

W kontekście powyższych rozważań pragnę zwrócić uwagę na dość istotny fakt, że po raz pierwszy w tak gwałtownej postaci mamy do czynienia z sytuacją, w której przyczyną podziałów jest nierówny dostęp do zdrowego środowiska przyrodniczego – obecnie powszechnie cenionego dobra. Należy sądzić, iż w miarę narastania zjawisk kryzysowych skala anonsowanych problemów będzie się poszerzać i pogłębiać. Można zatem w tej sytuacji mówić o znacznym uszczupleniu, a nawet dolegliwym wykluczeniu wielu grup i zbiorowości z dostępu do tych cennych dóbr, którymi dysponuje zdrowe środowisko przyrodnicze. Ich deficyt może doprowadzać w różnych regionach poszczególnych krajów, bądź już doprowadza, do nowych konfliktów, sporów, a nawet walk i wojen (np. o zdrową wodę, urodzajną glebę itp.). Mowa jest zatem o nowych, niespotykanych dotąd w takim nasileniu i o takim zasięgu, ograniczeniach, warunkujących dobrostan człowieka, grup i całych zbiorowości. Ich zasięg terytorialny i głębokość są oczywiście różne, za to przedmiot ten sam – mniej lub bardziej obniżona jakość życia w wielu istotnych jej wymiarach. Do obiektywnych – wymienionych wyżej – komponentów dochodzą jej elementy subiektywne, np. poczucie dyskryminacji połączone ze stanami o charakterze deprivacyjnym.

Dlatego konieczne są działania mające na celu ochronę kapitału przyrodniczego środowiska nie tylko ze względu na jego samoistną wartość, ale również w celu zapewnienia różnym grupom, a często i całym zbiorowościom, w miarę równych szans w dostępie do tych wartości, którymi świat przyrody dysponuje, zgodnie z przekonaniem, iż każdy z nas ma prawo do korzystania z czystego powietrza, zdrowej wody, nieskażonej gleby, piękna krajobrazu. Zatem refleksja nad zjawiskiem marginalizacji braku dostępu do cenionych dóbr i wykluczenia wpisuje się w szerszy kontekst myślowy i koncepcyjny i powinna być integralną częścią idei ekorozwoju oraz jej bardziej rozwiniętej postaci – koncepcji zrównoważonego rozwoju. Znajdująca się u podstaw tych koncepcji filozofia opowiada się za takim kierunkiem rozwoju, który uwzględnia potrzeby zarówno człowieka, jak i świata przyrody.

W kontekście refleksji nad problemem ekologicznego wykluczenia jako zjawiska jednoznacznie negatywnie ocenianego z wyżej przedstawionych powodów warto również zwrócić uwagę na takie rozumienie pojęcia wykluczenia, które w kontekście ekologicznym zyskuje jednoznacznie pozytywną konotację. Pojawia się ono jako sztandarowe hasło w wypowiedziach zwolenników bioregionalizmu, którzy przekonują, że społeczeństwo, wraz z jego polityką i gospodarką, powinno być oparte na naturalnych ekosystemach. „W każdym bioregionie – powiada D. Foreman, zwolennik tej idei – powinny istnieć obszary wykluczone (to pozytywne znaczenie tego pojęcia – WT) z użytkowania przez człowieka, pozostawione same sobie, aby

mogły realizować swoją doniosłą rolę ewolucyjną”¹⁸. Cechą charakterystyczną bioregionów jest zatem to, że każdy z nich powinien mieć rezerwat dzikiej przyrody, „gdzie występują wszystkie istoty żywe, a naturalne procesy przebiegają bez zakłóceń”¹⁹. Foreman uważa, że w bioregionie powinno się zakładać rezerваты duże i małe, „łączące się ze sobą naturalnymi korytarzami umożliwiającymi swobodny przepływ materiału genetycznego między tymi rezerwatami, a także między bioregionami”²⁰. Byłyby to „miejsca święte”, czyli obszary wykluczone z jakiegokolwiek działalności produkcyjnej, gospodarczej. Podstawowymi zadaniami bioregionalistów – do czego gorąco zachęca cytowany entuzjasta ekologii – byłoby opracowanie propozycji takich obszarów chronionych oraz praca nad ich utworzeniem. To jeden z wielu przykładów lokalnych działań godnych popularyzacji i naśladowania. To także praktyczny wyraz głoszonego przez ruchy ekologiczne hasła „Działać lokalnie, myśleć globalnie”. Dodajmy, że wpisujący się w powyższe hasło katalog propozycji form bezpośredniego działania w skali jednostkowej i lokalnej, które mogą podejmować poszczególne osoby i zbiorowości, przedstawił Tyler Miller w rozprawie *Living in the Environment*²¹.

Wydaje się, że dla idei ekorozwoju zagadnienie wykluczenia w dwóch przedstawionych powyżej znaczeniach: negatywnym, gdy mówimy o wykluczeniu ekologicznym grup i zbiorowości, oraz pozytywnym, gdy mówimy o wykluczaniu z obszarów dominacji przemysłu i gospodarki terenów z rezerwatami dzikiej przyrody wraz z łączącymi je korytarzami, powinno być przedmiotem aktywnego zainteresowania. Sądzę, że tematyka ta winna stać się powodem wnikliwszych analiz także w ramach programów zrównoważonego rozwoju, które są o wiele szersze i zakresowo, i problemowo od programów ekorozwoju, gdyż kwestię rozwoju gospodarczego, społecznego, kulturowego oraz problematykę ochrony środowiska przyrodniczego traktują integralnie jako ściśle ze sobą powiązaną, współzależną i współwarunkującą się całość. Dlatego też w myśleniu o zrównoważonym rozwoju poczesne miejsce znaleźć powinno zagadnienie wykluczenia w dwóch przedstawionych powyżej

¹⁸ D. Foreman, *Wyznania wojownika Ziemi*, Stowarzyszenie Obywatel, Łódź 2004, s. 75.

¹⁹ Ibidem.

²⁰ Ibidem, s. 76.

²¹ 1) Możesz uwrząliwić się na swoje środowisko; 2) Możesz posiadać wszechstronną wiedzę ekologiczną; 3) Możesz wybrać prosty sposób życia, ograniczając znacznie zużycie energii oraz ilość odpadów i zanieczyszczeń [...]; 4) Pamiętaj, że środowisko i ekologia zaczynają się w gospodarstwie domowym; 5) Możesz unikać myślenia, że ktoś coś za ciebie robi, będącego usprawiedliwieniem braku jakiegokolwiek działania; 6) Możesz zaangażować się w politykę na szczeblu lokalnym, regionalnym lub krajowym, działając w najsilniejszych grupach reformatorskich bądź w partiach ekologicznych; 7) Możesz robić małe rzeczy: nie zostawiaj po sobie śmieci, pamiętaj, jaki kolor ma niebo; 8) Możesz mieć wpływ na tych, którzy zanieczyszczają środowisko, i przyczyniać się do rozwiązywania innych ważnych problemów, angażując się w działania polityczne i akcje propagandowe oraz zdobywając wiedzę o środowisku; 9) Nie obarczaj ludzi winą. Jest wiele do zrobienia, a nikt sam nie może zrobić wszystkiego”. Cyt. za: B. Devall, G. Sessions, *Ekologia Głęboka. Życie w przekonaniu, że natura coś znaczy*, tłum. E. Margielewicz, Wydawnictwo Pusty Obłok, Warszawa 1994, s. 65.

znaczeniach. Zaś odpowiedzialność i solidarność to – jak sądzę – dwie fundamentalne wartości lokujące się u podstaw myślenia i działania w duchu zrównoważonego rozwoju.

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Gefahrenzivilisation und Schöpfung: Verantwortung neu denken – Menschenwürde neu beachten¹

Hazardous Civilisation and Creation: Rethinking Responsibility – Respecting Human Dignity

DIETRICH BÖHLER
BERNADETTE HERRMANN

*Hans Jonas Zentrum Berlin,
Freie Universität Berlin,
Malteserstr. 74-100, Haus S, 12249 Berlin,
E-mail: hans-jonas-zentrum@fu-berlin.de*

Abstract

This article contains analyses of the concept of responsibility in the state of danger caused by damaging consequences of technological development. The inquiry – inspired by conceptions of Hans Jonas and Karl-Otto Apel but arguing in the “actual dialogic-reflexive” approach of transcendental discourse pragmatics – is concentrated on finding borders of our responsibility, for which parts of our action should we feel accountable. For this purpose seven obligations of a discourse partner are reconstructed by means of reflection on the presuppositions of arguing. These obligations have a transcendental-pragmatic status of implicit dialogic promises: They can be disregarded only at the price of a performative self-contradiction. Another problem which is stated in this paper is a question about justification for our moral obligations, including our obligations for the future generations and the problem of motivation to fulfil it. The last part of the article describes reflexive transcendental arguments for including embryos in our concept of responsibility. Explaining some doubts about the status of embryos is also helping to understand better the way in which we should perceive the concept of responsibility itself. It should be taken into consideration that we live in times in which our knowledge about the world is not always standing up to our abilities to influence it. The authors emphasise that the article is actually a lecture, that invites to reading a transcendental pragmatic book: Böhler 2013/2014.

Key words: responsibility, ethics of technology, moral obligations, dialogue, discourse pragmatic, Hans Jonas, Karl-Otto Apel, human dignity

¹ Dem Text liegt ein kleiner Vortrag zugrunde, den die Verfasser in Anlehnung an den ersten Essay des Bandes von D. Böhler, *Zukunftsverantwortung in globaler Perspektive*, Bad Homburg 2009, gehalten haben, und zwar 2013 in der Klosterkirche in Neuruppin, Brandenburg.

EINFÜHRUNG UND FRAGESTELLUNGEN

Als zeitsensibler und naturzugewandter Denker rekonstruierte Hans Jonas in *Organismus und Freiheit*, Göttingen 1973, sowohl die Selbstbejahung und innere Werthaftigkeit des organischen Lebens als auch dessen zelluläre Steuerungsdynamik. Auf die unabgegoltene philosophische und biologische Aktualität dieser evolutionären Ontologie² kann hier leider nicht eingegangen werden. Seit 1968 (New Yorker Vortrag *The Practical Uses of Theory*) erspürte er mit „Furcht und Zittern“ die umweltzerstörerischen Folgelasten nicht nur der Hochtechnologie, sondern der etablierten technisierten Lebensform einer fortschrittsgejagten „Wachstums“-Gesellschaft.

Gegen die zugrundeliegende Verdrängung der Idee einer praktischen, moralisch verbindlichen Vernunft durch eine Kalkül-Rationalität im Dienste des Machenkönnens brachten zwei Prinzipiendenker gegen den Mainstream, Karl-Otto Apel mit der *Transformation der Philosophie* (1973) sowie mit *Diskurs und Verantwortung* (1988) und Hans Jonas mit dem Werk *Das Prinzip Verantwortung* (1979), unterschiedliche, aber kooperationsfähige Entwürfe einer Prinzipienethik zur Begründung der Zukunftsverantwortung ins Spiel. Ihr Zweck ist die Orientierung sowohl von Wissenschaft und Technik als auch von Lebenspraxis und Politik. Sie packen die Menschen als Denkende bzw. mögliche Diskursteilnehmer, die zugleich Akteure und Mitverursacher sind, bei einer Mitverantwortung, die sie nicht glaubwürdig bezweifeln können.

Im Gespräch mit diesen beiden Jahrhundertdenkern, dem metaphysischen Quasi-Aristoteliker Hans Jonas und dem kommunikationsreflexiven Postkantianer Karl-Otto Apel, nimmt der Artikel eine *reflexiv transzendente* Perspektive ein, die von der sprachpragmatischen Transformation der Philosophie der Philosophie Kants á la Apel nahegelegt wird. Dieser Perspektive entspricht die zugrundegelegte sokratisch sinnkritische Methode einer aktuellen Dialogreflexion: Man fragt auf sich selbst *als* Dialogteilnehmer und seinen (realen oder möglichen) Dialogpartner zurück – und nimmt diesen wie auch sich selbst ernst *als* einen solchen, der ausschließlich sinnvolle, prüfbare Argumente sucht und gelten läßt. In einem kurzen Vortrag kann die Methode keinesfalls zureichend expliziert, sondern nur exemplarisch, im Blick auf zwei

² Zur philosophischen und neurophysiologischen Aktualität dieses Werkes, das mit seinem Kontext als Band I/1 der Kritischen Gesamtausgabe (zit.: KGA) 2010 in Freiburg i. Br. erschienen ist: Jens Peter Brune, „Können wir Leben verstehen?“, in: Dietrich Böhler, Horst Gronke und Bernadette Herrmann (Hg.), *Mensch – Gott – Welt. Philosophie des Lebens, Religionsphilosophie und Metaphysik im Werk von Hans Jonas*, Freiburg i. Br. 2008, S. 89-111. Zeitgleich begründeten Karl-Otto Apel (*Transformation Philosophie*, II, 1973, S. 358 ff.) und Dietrich Böhler die Diskurs-Verantwortungsethik: *Funkkolleg Praktische Philosophie/Ethik*, Reader 1, Frankfurt/Main 1980; ferner unter demselben Obertitel: *Dialoge 1 und 2*, Frankfurt/Main 1984 und *Studentexte 1, 2 und 3*, Weinheim und Basel 1984.

Böhlersche Grundbegriffe, (impliziter) *Begleitdiskurs* und (implizite) *Dialogversprechen a priori*, eingeführt werden. Für die Begründung der Methode und ebenso für ihre Durchführung (etwa am Beispiel der Embryonenproblematik) verweisen wir auf das Buch von Böhler 2013/2014.

Vor diesem Hintergrund stellen wir hier folgende Fragen:

- Für welche Auswirkungsbereiche dürfte in der hochtechnischen Zivilisation Mitverantwortung bestehen? (1)
- Wozu sind wir bei unzulänglichem Wissen schädlicher bzw. verwerflicher Handlungsfolgen einsehbar verpflichtet? (1.1)
- Warum eigentlich moralisch (und also zukunftsverantwortlich) sein (2)?
- Und dann: Wie kann ein Freund von Fortschritt und Technologie – und das sind wir aufgrund unserer Lebenspraxis alle irgendwie – mit guten Gründen zu der verzichtreichen Praxis einer Vorsicht im Sinne des Verantwortungsprinzips bewegt werden? (3)
- Schließlich steht noch die Frage der Reichweite des Verantwortungsprinzips an: Wem gegenüber sind wir einsehbar zur Verantwortung verpflichtet? Oder: Wen schließt die Verantwortungspflicht ein, auch Embryonen? (4)

Längst ist die Selbstgefährdung des Menschen eine Sache unserer ‚normalen‘ Lebenspraxis geworden. Dies wirft grundsätzliche Fragen auf. Wie ist Verantwortung angesichts der lebensgefährdenden Folgelasten der hochtechnologischen Zivilisation zu denken? Ist eine Verpflichtung zur solidarischen Zukunftsverantwortung, ein Prinzip der kollektiven Mitverantwortung, intersubjektiv begründbar? Solche Fragen gehören ins Zentrum der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Sie zu erkennen und begrifflich zu präzisieren, macht die Aktualität einer Philosophie aus, die in der Lage ist, ihre Zeit in Gedanken zu fassen. Insofern ihr das gelingt, ist sie nicht bloß „aktuell“ sondern wahr: Wahr als Beitrag zum Diskurs über die moralische Situation des Menschen und die geistige Situation der Zeit.

Solche Aktualität wird Hans Jonas, einem der frühesten Warner vor der – verharmlosend so genannten – „ökologischen Krise“, vor einer drohenden Klimakatastrophe *und* einer bio- und medizintechnischen Zersetzung der Menschenwürde, in weiten Teilen der Welt zugesprochen. Sein 1979 veröffentlichtes Werk *Das Prinzip Verantwortung* ist ein Longseller, der mittlerweile in mehr als zwanzig Sprachen vorliegt (Jonas, 1979).³

³ Hans Jonas, *Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation*, Frankfurt/Main 1979. Gleiches gilt für einen Teil seiner anderen Schriften. Bereits zwölf Jahre nach seinem Tode 1993 wurde mit ersten Vorbereitungen zu einer Kritischen Gesamtausgabe seines Werkes begonnen. Band I/1 erschien 2010 im Rombach-Verlag Freiburg und in der Wissenschaftlichen Buchgesellschaft Darmstadt.

Daß nicht allein Politiker, Wirtschaftler und Finanzleute, sondern wir alle für das Schicksal der Menschheit in der hochtechnologischen Gefahrenzivilisation *mitverantwortlich* sind, weil wir „in den Nahinteressen“ befangen sind, hat Jonas seit den frühen 1970er Jahren unermüdlich hervorgehoben. Wir alle, schon als Konsumenten und Autofahrer, seien aufgrund unserer – längst hochtechnologisch vermittelten und daher äußerst folgenreichsten – Lebensgewohnheiten in die Verursachung mitverstrickt.

[Eine] Zeitbombe tickt, während wir einfach so leben, wie wir es tun als Mitglieder der westlichen technischen Zivilisation, und woran jeder von uns mitwirkt. Indem wir in unser Auto steigen und durch die Gegend fahren und indem wir an dem großen Güterreichtum des modernen Lebens teilnehmen und indem wir all diese Dinge benutzen, für die Wälder abgeholzt werden, für deren Herstellung ganze Gegenden chemisch vergiftet werden, die Verschmutzung der Atmosphäre, der Gewässer, des Bodens, die Ausraubung der Biosphäre, der ganzen Lebenswelt durch Überbeanspruchung, durch Ausrottung von Arten oder auch nur durch solche Änderungen der Umwelt, daß gewisse Arten nicht mehr lebensfähig sind. Was tun wir da? Kurz und gut, (wir wirken mit an der) Ausplünderung und eventuellen Vernichtung unserer natürlichen Umwelt und der biologischen Gefährdung des Menschen (eingeschlossen auch das, was der Mensch) mit seinen eigenen Lebensumständen macht, einschließlich ganz willkürlicher genetischer Manipulation (Jonas, 2004, S. 450 f.).

1. Wissen und Verantwortungsdimensionen in der technologischen Gefahrenzivilisation oder: Für welche Auswirkungsbereiche des Handelns besteht heute Mitverantwortung?

Gleichsam unter der Spitze des Eisbergs, anders gesagt: hinter der dramatischen *äußeren* Herausforderung durch die Lebensgefährdungen der Menschheit von der Atombombe bis zur drohenden Klimakatastrophe liegt die *geistige* Herausforderung durch das vorherrschende formale und technische Verständnis von Wissenschaft, und zwar als Zusammenhang von Theorie und Empirie, der sich darin erschöpft, Phänomene zu objektivieren und kausal zu analysieren, zusammenzustellen und zu berechnen. Diese Analysen und Berechnungen haben eine praktische, handlungsorientierende Bedeutung allenfalls insofern, als sie zur Konkretisierung von bereits gewählten Zielen nützlich sind. Sie besagen aber nichts darüber, welche *Ziele* wir eigentlich wählen und welche *Prioritäten* wir unter den Zielen setzen sollten. Diese Fragen der Rechtfertigung, des moralischen *Sollens* – wir nennen sie seit alters Probleme der praktischen Vernunft – bleiben unbeantwortet. Den Platz der praktischen Vernunft läßt die Wissenschaft verwaist zurück; sie bietet bloß einen formellen Verstand, arbeitet mit purer „Zweckrationalität“

(Max Weber) oder „instrumenteller Vernunft“ (Max Horkheimer). Gleichwohl unterstellt das Selbstverständnis der verwissenschaftlichten Zivilisation, diese moralfreien Kompetenzen, empirisch-theoretische Wissenschaft und formelle Ratio, seien die höchsten Güter der modernen Menschheit.

Als 1972 die Industriegesellschaften vom *Club of Rome* die erste drastische Warnung vor den ökologischen Langzeitgefahren des quantitativen ökonomischen Wachstums und vor den kumulativen Folgeschäden der (damals teils kapitalistischen, teils staatssozialistischen) technologischen Zivilisation erhielten, fand sich die Philosophie auf die neue Verantwortungsproblematik und die damit verbundenen Begründungsprobleme schlecht vorbereitet. An der *New School for Social Research* in New York und der Universität Kiel, dann an der Universität des Saarlandes und schließlich an der Universität Frankfurt/Main waren jedoch zwei sehr unterschiedliche Denker schon seit einer Reihe von Jahren dabei, eine Ethik der Menschheitsverantwortung als Zukunftsverantwortung zu entwerfen: Karl-Otto Apel und Hans Jonas, ein rationaler Postkantianer und ein metaphysischer Postaristoteliker (mit biblisch jüdischer, z. T. auch kantischer Moralmotivation).

Bemerkenswerterweise kommt Jonas' Situationsanalyse des *technological man* (1980) mit derjenigen Apels im wesentlichen überein. Die Beobachtung, daß „die ganz unbeabsichtigten, aber unausweichlichen Nebenwirkungen“ der technologischen industriellen Zivilisation unermesslich sind, führte Jonas wie auch Apel zu der Erkenntnis, daß die Wirkungsmacht des Menschen „nach Maßstäben unserer irdischen Umwelt (...) enorm gestiegen (...) und ein Zustand erreicht worden ist, in dem beinahe alles möglich scheint (Jonas, 2004, S. 453).

Daraus erwächst die Einsicht, daß proportional zu dieser Wirkungsmacht auch die Verantwortung des Menschen größer geworden ist – dermaßen, daß es nunmehr eine permanente Verantwortung für die organische Welt, für die Zukunft der Menschheit und für die Menschenwürde gebe. Diese moralphilosophische Einsicht hatte Karl-Otto Apel schon 1973 dazu geführt, drei Verantwortungsbereiche der Menschen zu unterscheiden. In diesem Sinne eröffnete ich 1980 das „Funkkolleg Praktische Philosophie/Ethik“.

Ethische Probleme treten gegenwärtig in drei verschiedenen Auswirkungsbereichen menschlicher Handlungen auf: in einem Nah- oder *Mikrobereich* der unmittelbaren Interaktion zwischen Menschen im sog. *Privatleben*, in einem Mittel- oder *Mesobereich* der Interaktion *politischer Handlungssubjekte*, welche Gruppen- oder Nationalinteressen vertreten, und schließlich in einem Groß- oder *Makrobereich* solidarischer Verantwortung der Menschheit für das Lebensinteresse der *menschlichen Gattung*, bezogen auf die Gegenwart und auf die kommenden Generationen.

Darüber hinaus zeigt sich weltgeschichtlich erstmals, daß ethisch bedeutsame Entscheidungs- und Regelungsprobleme des Mikro- und Mesobereichs heutzutage die Tendenz haben, zu solchen des Makrobereichs zu werden: Z. B. wird das scheinbar private *Intimsphären*-Problem der Geburtenregelung zu einer Streitfrage internationaler Konferenzen über die Gefahren einer *Überbevölkerung* der Erde.

Und die klassischen Probleme der politischen *Staatsräson* – so etwa die der Diplomatie und ihrer militärischen Fortsetzung – haben im Atomzeitalter auf den Abrüstungskonferenzen der Weltmächte eine neue Dimension angenommen, die schon deshalb nicht nur machtstrategisch, sondern auch moralisch relevant ist, weil das *Überleben* der Menschheit davon abhängen kann. In den dreißig Jahren, die seit jener Analyse vergangen sind, haben sich die Probleme zum Teil erheblich zugespitzt. So hat sich das *Atomproblem* von der Mesoebene her dramatisiert. Vielleicht noch dramatischer als die gebremste, aber fortgeführte atomare Rüstung ist das Makroproblem der Atomenergie zur Stromerzeugung. Hier bestehen die, nach allem, was wir wissen, nie verantwortlich lösbaren Probleme sowohl einer ungefährlichen, kontrollierbaren Endlagerung des hoch radioaktiven Abfalls als auch eines sicheren Betriebs der Atomkraftwerke. Selbst in einem hochtechnologisch perfekt ausgerüsteten Land bringt ein Kernkraftwerk die tödliche Gefahr der Kernschmelze mit sich. Seit 2011 hat sie einen japanischen Namen: Fukushima.

Zudem leidet die Zukunftsverantwortung unter einem globalen Turbo-Finanzkapitalismus: Unkontrollierte finanzkapitalistische Investment-, Bank- und Börsenspekulationen, welche in Sekundenschnelle Milliardenbeträge virtuellen Geldes um den Globus jagen, gefährden die Bedingungen für nachhaltige Entwicklung, für Zukunfts- bzw. Umweltinvestitionen. Hinzukommt eine gigantische Schuldenpolitik nicht allein Deutschlands, sondern führender Weltmächte wie der USA und der Europäischen Union. So dürfte der Haushalt des deutschen Staates mit mehr als einer Billion Euro Schulden belastet sein. Diese Unsummen gehen zu Lasten der Nachkommen, von denen sie abgetragen werden müssen. In Europa kommen die kaum vorstellbaren Belastungen riskanter „Rettungsschirme“ für den Euro hinzu, die das umweltpolitisch so dringlich benötigte Kapital festlegen, und zwar im Sinne der umweltzerstörerischen „Wachstums“-Perspektive.

All das verschlechtert die Realisierungsbedingungen der Zukunftsverantwortung aufs Erheblichste.

Schließlich ist ein vierter Verantwortungsbereich zu berücksichtigen, den Hans Jonas seit den siebziger Jahren aufgedeckt hat. Es ist gewissermaßen die *Tiefendimension der Zukunftsverantwortung* für Gehalt und Verbindlichkeit der Moral und letztlich des Moralprinzips.

Diese Tiefendimension ergibt sich aus der gesellschaftlichen und zeitgeistigen Tendenz zur Unterordnung sowohl des moralischen Orientierungsbegriffs ‚Menschenwürde‘ als auch naturethischer Intuitionen wie ‚Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben‘ unter persönliche Interessen des Mikrobereichs oder partikulare Interessen des Mesobereichs.

Im Mikrobereich werden vom medizintechnischen Fortschritt Heilungswünsche lebensbedrohender Krankheiten wie Morbus Parkinson, Multiple Sklerose und Diabetes mellitus angesprochen oder auch der Wunsch kinderloser Ehepaare nach eigenen Kindern (In-vitro-Fertilisation). Die angebotenen Techniken können mit der moralischen Prinzipienorientierung, vor allem dem Menschenwürdegrundsatz, kollidieren. Eine solche Kollisionsmöglichkeit besteht im Falle der „verbrauchenden“ Forschung an menschlichen embryonalen Stammzellen und im Falle der Reproduktionstechnik „PID“.

Im Falle der Stammzellforschung ergibt sich eine derartige Kollision auch im Mesobereich, der Medizinindustrie. Ein deutsches Beispiel ist Oliver Brüstle als Forscher an Humanstammzellen, der zugleich Unternehmer in dieser Sache ist.

Das Ineinander dieser vier Auswirkungsdimensionen des Handelns in der technologischen Zivilisation stellt neuartige Wissensanforderungen. Das provoziert die Ethik dazu, eine Ethik der Diskurse bzw. eine Ethik des Wissenserwerbs und des Umgangs mit Wissen zu werden. Hier begegnen sich wiederum die nicht metaphysische Diskurs- Verantwortungsethik und die metaphysische Wert-Verantwortungsethik von Jonas. Metaphysisch ist Jonas’ Ethik, weil sie spekulativ auf das Ganze des Seins schaut und dabei eine gläubige Ehrfurchtsperspektive einnimmt. So legt sich Jonas bereits im Vorwort seines ethischen Hauptwerks darauf fest, daß die Ethik „über die Klugheit hinaus eine solche der Ehrfurcht sein“ (Jonas, 1979, S. 8) müsse.

Freilich will auch Jonas – und das erlaubt den gleichberechtigten Dialog mit der strikt rationalen Diskursethik – „unsere Pflicht gegen die Nachwelt und die Erde unabhängig von unserem Glauben begründen“.

1.1. Dialektik des Wissens/Nichtwissens und (ökologische) Vorsichtspflicht oder: Wozu sind wir bei >Nichtwissen< verpflichtet?

Nach einer Kritik daran, daß die traditionelle Ethik einschließlich ihrer Imperative und Maximen auf den Nahhorizont einer Nächstenmoral, Familien und Nachbarschaftsmoral beschränkt gewesen sei, stellt Jonas die mit der Diskursethik übereinkommende Forderung auf: „Beschafft Euch Wissen!“

Allerdings gelangt Jonas sogleich zu einem ernüchternden Resultat.⁴ Denn das Wissen über die Folgen des Handelns in nichtgeschlossenen Systemen, ein Folgenwissen für die geschichtliche Welt und für die Biosphäre der Erde, kann nie das der exakten Prognose sein. Daher bleibt es stets unzulänglich. Aus der Nichtprognostizierbarkeit der ökosozialen Technologiefolgen ergibt sich ein scheinbar paradoxes Ausgangsproblem der Verantwortungsethik *als* einer Wissens- oder Diskursethik, das Jonas so pointiert:

Daß das vorhersagende Wissen hinter dem technischen Wissen, das unserem Handeln die Macht gibt, zurückbleibt, nimmt selbst ethische Bedeutung an. Die Kluft zwischen Kraft des Vorherwissens und Macht des Tuns erzeugt ein neues ethisches Problem. Anerkennung der Unwissenheit wird dann die Kehrseite der Pflicht des Wissens und damit ein Teil der Ethik (Jonas, 1979, S. 28).

Wenn gilt, daß das Folgenwissen in der offenen geschichtlichen Welt *und* in der lebensdynamischen Bio- und Ökosphäre nie zureicht und sehr fehleranfällig bleibt, geschweige, daß sich aus ihm exakte bedingte Prognosen ableiten ließen, die man in verlässliche Wenn-dann-Handlungsregeln gießen könnte, *dann* folgt für die Diskurspartner der Imperativ: „Laßt euch nur auf solche Maßnahmen, Techniken etc. ein, deren Folgen sich kompensieren lassen. So nämlich, daß sie mit der Rücksicht gegenüber den möglichen Betroffenen – auch den *zukünftigen* Betroffenen – vereinbar sind, was insbesondere die ökologische Nachhaltigkeit einschließt“.

Der Grund der Verbindlichkeit dafür ist: Mit eurer (nicht sinnvoll bezweifelbaren) Vernunftrolle als glaubwürdige Diskurspartner habt ihr den Geltungsanspruch der argumentativen Konsenswürdigkeit erhoben, der die Berücksichtigung aller guten Gründe einschließt, die für mögliche Betroffene ins Feld geführt werden können.

„Langsam, langsam“ – oder: „wie das?“ fragt der Skeptiker. „Damit unterstellst du, daß eine universal einsichtige Pflicht besteht, zukunftsverantwortlich zu sein und also moralisch. Dagegen stelle ich dir die Grundfrage: Warum eigentlich moralisch sein?“

2. Zweierlei Grundfragen: Warum eigentlich moralisch (mithin zukunftsverantwortlich) sein? Was bringen wir a priori ins Spiel, wenn wir etwas sagen, z. B. eine Frage stellen?

Würde man eine Straßenumfrage durchführen und Passanten mit der Frage „Warum moralisch sein?“ konfrontieren, erhielte man womöglich die unterschiedlichsten Reaktionen und Antwortversuche. Von einem überrumpelten „Keine Ahnung, hab ich mir noch keine Gedanken

⁴ Der wissenschaftstheoretische Gehalt dieser Einsicht kommt mit Karl R. Poppers fallibilistischem Denken überein: Karl R. Popper, „Naturgesetz und theoretische Systeme“, in: Hans Albert (Hg.), *Theorie und Realität*, Tübingen 1964.

gemacht“, über ein (voluntaristisches) „weil ich ein moralischer Mensch sein will, der sich selbst im Spiegel anschauen kann“, bis hin zu (utilitaristischen) Antworten wie: „weil eine Gesellschaft mit moralischen Spielregeln besser funktioniert, was im Interesse aller ist“, wird vieles zu hören sein. Vielleicht auch ein Hinweis auf die sogenannte „Goldene Regel“ oder gar auf den kategorischen Imperativ Kants. Oder auch auf die Gebote Gottes, die Zehn Gebote der hebräischen Bibel. Ihnen fallen sicher noch weitere landläufige Antworten auf die Frage ein, warum man moralisch sein solle. Die Fülle der Antworten deutet darauf hin, daß das Vorverständnis dessen, worauf die Frage überhaupt zielt, nicht bei allen Adressaten übereinstimmt.

Zunächst scheint unklar, was wir eigentlich mit „moralisch“ meinen. Fürs erste ist es philosophisch wichtig, eine begriffliche Abgrenzung vorzunehmen gegenüber den Sitten, Gepflogenheiten und Konventionen, die in einer bestimmten Kultur oder Gesellschaft üblicherweise anerkannt sind. Denn diese sind selbst noch auf ihre Moralverträglichkeit hin zu überprüfen, zu „hinterfragen“. Aus den faktischen Verhältnissen oder auch aus soziologisch- bzw. psychologisch-empirischen Daten allein können wir jedenfalls kein Moralkriterium gewinnen, denn dann würden wir einem sogenannten naturalistischen Fehlschluß aufsitzen – wir würden versuchen, aus zufälligen Tatsachen eine moralische Pflicht, ein unbedingtes Sollen herzuleiten.

Ein weiteres Verständnisproblem diese Hauptfrage betreffend fällt bei unserem Straßeninterview-Beispiel auf: Viele Antworten werden der „Warum“-Frage, der Frage nach dem Geltungsgrund, nämlich gar nicht gerecht. Beispielsweise handelt es sich nicht um Antworten auf die geltungslogische Frage „warum“, sondern vielmehr auf die Frage „wozu moralisch sein?“ Sie geben Auskunft darüber, welches äußere, als erstrebenswert unterstellte, Ziel Menschen dazu motivieren könnte, sich moralisch zu verhalten. Ich erinnere an die Antwort „weil es letztlich meiner Gemeinschaft und mir Nutzen bringt“. Abgesehen davon, daß in verschiedenen Gemeinschaften, Gesellschaften, Kulturen etc. unterschiedliche Verhaltensweisen als moralisch angesehen werden, geht die Antwort am Kern der Frage vorbei.

Die Frage nach dem „Warum“ des Moralischseins verlangt nämlich eine Antwort, in der allgemein einsehbare Gründe dafür angegeben werden, also Gründe, die jedes vernunftfähige Wesen potentiell nachvollziehen können muß. Es ist die Frage nach dem universal einsehbaren „Grund einer Verbindlichkeit“, wie Immanuel Kant in seiner *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* formulierte.

Eine Einschränkung des Geltungsbereichs der Moral auf eine bestimmte Gruppe, auf je meine bzw. unsere Werte und Normen würde diesem Kriterium also widersprechen und auf einen Wertsubjektivismus oder ethischen Partikularismus hinauslaufen.

Also auch das Berufen des gläubigen Christen auf Gottes Gebot als *Geltungsgrund* der Moral kann einen Philosophen als *Philosophen*, der nach metaphysikfreien Gründen sucht, die für *jedermann* einsehbar und daher geltungsfähig sein sollen, nicht überzeugen – wenn er möglicherweise auch den Inhalt einiger Gebote Gottes als vernünftig einsehbar und daher moralisch verpflichtend erweisen kann. Und wenn er auch womöglich sogar selbst den Glauben als Motivation für sein eigenes Moralischsein in Anspruch nehmen mag.

Jedenfalls: Erst wenn ein solcher allgemein einsehbarer Grund der Verbindlichkeit fürs Moralischsein angegeben werden kann, besteht eine unbestreitbare Pflicht zum Moralischsein. Wie aber läßt sich etwas herleiten, das imstande ist, die Frage, *was* „moralisch sein“ bedeutet, sowie die weitere Frage, *warum* man moralisch sein *solle*, derart zu beantworten, daß in der Antwort solche allgemein einsehbaren Gründe vorgebracht werden, die nicht mehr mit sinnvollen Argumenten in Zweifel gezogen werden können?

Nun, blicken wir doch auf uns selbst. Fragen wir uns: Was *tun* wir immer schon und notwendigerweise, wenn wir sprechen oder denken? Wann immer wir reden oder denken, adressieren wir zunächst die faktisch Anwesenden oder uns selbst, als unser alter ego. Wir begeben uns mit uns selbst oder mit den anderen in einen Diskurs.

Und weiter: Was bringen wir stillschweigend ins Spiel, wenn wir eine Frage stellen? Eine Frage ist eine Sprachhandlung die *Geltungsansprüche* einschließt. Zunächst den Anspruch auf *Verständlichkeit/Sinn Gültigkeit*: Sie gehen davon aus, daß eine Frage, die Sie mir stellen, für mich verständlich ist, zumindest soweit, daß sich ihr genauerer Sinn durch Nachfragen präzisieren läßt und daß sie sich als Beitrag zur Klärung der Sache herausstellt. Weiterhin erheben Sie den Anspruch auf *Wahrhaftigkeit*. Sie meinen Ihre Frage ernst und erwarten schließlich auch von mir eine ernsthafte Antwort.

Darüber hinaus enthält Ihre Frage aber auch einige implizite *Behauptungen* (und dies ist für unsere Anknüpfung an Ihre Frage als Ausgangspunkt für unsere Beantwortung der Frage von eminenter Bedeutung). Mir fallen zumindest drei implizite Behauptungen ein, die in Ihrer Frage enthalten sind, nämlich:

- 1) „Es gibt so etwas wie „moralisch“, denn das ist der Gegenstand unseres Gesprächs.“
- 2) „‘Warum moralisch sein?’ ist eine sinnvolle Frage.“
- 3) „Es ist richtig bzw. legitim, sich mit der Frage ‚warum moralisch sein‘ zu beschäftigen.“

Nehmen wir nun zu diesen Behauptungen den Gedanken hinzu, daß wir auch beim Sprechen etwas *tun*, daß es sich um Sprech*akte* bzw. Sprach*handlungen* handelt, z.B. um den Akt des Fragens, des Behauptens, des Versprechens etc. Je nach Situation versteht sich meist von selbst, um welchen Akt es sich handelt, so daß er meist nicht benannt werden muß. Die jeweilige Sprachhandlung läßt sich jedoch auch explizieren. Ich will Ihnen dies beispielhaft anhand einer Frage und den darin impliziten Behauptungen verdeutlichen. So würde Ihre Frage nach dem Moralischsein, vollständig formuliert, folgendermaßen lauten:

- 1) „Hiermit fragen wir Sie, Frau Herrmann: ‚Warum moralisch sein?‘“
- 2) Die impliziten Behauptungen, die in dieser Ihrer Frage enthalten sind, würden vollständig lauten:
- 3) „Hiermit behaupte ich euch und allen gegenüber als wahr, daß es so etwas wie ‚moralisch‘ gibt.“
- 4) „Hiermit behaupte ich euch und allen anderen gegenüber als wahr, daß ‚Warum moralisch sein?‘ eine sinnvolle Frage ist.“
- 5) „Hiermit behaupte ich euch und allen gegenüber, daß es richtig bzw. legitim ist, sich mit dieser Frage zu beschäftigen.“

Neben den beiden schon genannten Geltungsansprüchen auf Verständlichkeit und Wahrhaftigkeit erheben wir mit einer Frage also implizit auch Gültigkeitsansprüche im engeren Sinne: nämlich den Geltungsanspruch auf *Wahrheit* und den Geltungsanspruch auf Legitimität bzw. *Richtigkeit*. Es läßt sich kein vernünftiger Gedanke und keine sinnvolle Rede vorstellen, ohne daß damit zumindest implizit alle vier Geltungsansprüche verbunden wären – wenn auch meist nicht explizit geäußert. Sie finden sich nämlich meist nicht in der geäußerten Aussage oder Fragestellung bzw. in dem gedachten Gedanken selbst, sondern sie begleiten diese – als performativer Akt.

Karl-Otto Apels seinerzeitiger Frankfurter Kollege Jürgen Habermas sprach deswegen von der Doppelstruktur einer einfachen, logisch verständlichen Äußerung. Sie bestehe aus dem propositionalen Gehalt (der Aussage) *und* der eigentlichen Sprach*handlung*, dem performativen Akt, in dem die Handlungs*weise* steckt (stelle ich eine Frage oder will ich etwas behaupten etc.?), dann die Voraussetzung daß andere oder ich selbst als alter ego adressiert werden – und schließlich finden sich hier auch die Geltungsansprüche.

Die Schlußfolgerung daraus zieht das nächste Kapitel.

2.1. Wir sind (unausdrücklich) immer schon in einem Begleitdiskurs. Unsere implizite Diskurspartner-Rolle hat starke moralische Verbindlichkeiten

Ein Schüler Karl-Otto Apels, der norwegische Philosoph Audun Øfsti, hat die Analyse von Habermas ergänzt, indem er geltend macht, daß man zu jeder formal vollständigen Äußerung noch einmal mit einer solchen Stellung beziehen können muß, wenn man seine eigene Äußerung einholen will. Daher spricht er von einer doppelten Doppelstruktur.⁵ Bei der stellungnehmenden Äußerung handelt es sich gewissermaßen um einen *Begleitdiskurs* zu der ersten Äußerung. Für unsere Beispielbehauptung würde das folgendermaßen aussehen (nehmen wir an, ich hätte Sie nicht deutlich verstanden und würde nachfragen, ob Sie das wirklich behaupten): Sie könnten dann formulieren: „Ja, wir behaupten es als wahr, Ihnen und allen gegenüber, daß wir gerade eben wirklich als wahr behauptet haben, daß ‚warum moralisch sein‘ eine sinnvolle Frage ist.“

Diese doppelte Doppelstruktur der Sprache oder auch doppelte Dialogstruktur bietet aufgrund der durch ihre Beachtung aufgedeckten Geltungsansprüche, die wir implizit oder explizit erheben, und aufgrund des möglichen Stellungnehmens dazu, eigentlich alles Handwerkszeug, das wir benötigen, um Ihre Frage zu beantworten, warum wir moralisch sein sollen und was Moralischsein bedeutet. Denn wir sind immer schon im Diskurs, er ist als letzte Geltungsinstanz, als Metainstitution unhintergebar, wann immer wir denken, sprechen oder bewußt handeln.

Auch beim Handeln? Inwiefern das?

Nun, wir können unser Handeln (sofern nicht bloß ein quasi-automatisiertes Verhalten vorliegt) als Antwort auf Situationen verstehen. Tendenziell sind wir – das will das Buch *Verbindlichkeit aus dem Diskurs* (2013/2014) zeigen – immer schon in einem *inneren Begleitdiskurs* zu unserem Handeln. Diesen können wir erläutern und ausdrücklich entfalten, wenn wir nach den Gründen unseres Handelns gefragt werden, wenn wir zur Rechenschaft gezogen werden und uns ver-antworten, also Rede und Antwort stehen sollen.

Alle unsere Rollen, die wir im täglichen Leben spielen, werden getragen von unserer Begleit-Rolle als Diskurspartner. Wann immer wir eine besondere Rolle bewußt einnehmen, uns für sie aus Gründen entscheiden, handeln wir als Diskurspartner. Diese Begleitrolle garantiert sozusagen, daß in all unseren Handlungen unser Ich-Zentrum samt Freiheit und Moralität zum Tragen kommt und wir nicht einfach nur gedankenlos funktionieren.

Die vier Geltungsansprüche, die wir rekonstruiert haben und die sich allesamt schon in der hier gestellten Frage finden, wohnen also auch unserem (bewußten) *Handeln* inne.

⁵ Audun Øfsti, *Abwandlungen. Essays zur Sprachphilosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie*, Würzburg 1994.

Wie nun bringen uns diese Geltungsansprüche in unserer Fragestellung nach dem verbindlichen Grund des Moralischseins weiter?

Zu dem Handlungswissen, das jeder Kommunizierende und Denkende von seinem kommunikativen Handeln schon mitbringt (jedenfalls implizit und potentiell explizierbar), gehört (neben dem Wissen um die doppelte Dialogstruktur und die Geltungsansprüche) auch das Wissen darum, daß mit dem Erheben von Geltungsansprüchen *Dialogverpflichtungen* eingegangen werden. So lassen sich implizite Dialogversprechen aufweisen, die unablässig an dem Erheben der Geltungsansprüche haften. Auch sie sind konstitutiv für den Dialog, nämlich unhintergebar als Sinnbedingungen des Diskurses. Bisher wurden sieben solcher Dialogversprechen rekonstruiert, die wir im folgenden aufzählen und kurz erläutern:

1. Wir haben, wann immer wir Geltungsansprüche erheben, stillschweigend versprochen, daß wir uns den Anderen mit prüfbaren Diskursbeiträgen als *autonomer Diskurspartner* zur Verfügung stellen, uns also um *widerspruchsfreie* und sachlich *wahrheitsfähige Dialogbeiträge* bemühen. (Dieses Versprechen, selbstverantwortlich für die eigenen Dialogbeiträge zu sein, läßt sich aus den Geltungsansprüchen der Verständlichkeit und der Wahrhaftigkeit herleiten. Es enthält in sich auch schon die Verpflichtung zu realen Diskursen überhaupt, also zur Bereitschaft, meine Argumente und Handlungsgründe dem Diskurs auszusetzen und sie dort prüfen zu lassen.)

2. Außerdem haben wir implizit versprochen, die *nicht begrenzbare Gemeinschaft aller möglichen Anspruchssubjekte*, mithin das Universum der sinnvollen Argumente bzw. der sinnvoll argumentierbaren Lebensansprüche als letzte Sinn- und Gültigkeitsinstanz, (selbst- und ergebniskritisch) zu berücksichtigen, also auch nach möglichen besseren Argumenten zu suchen. (Ohne dieses Versprechen ließen sich keine Gültigkeitsansprüche im engeren Sinne erheben. Wann immer es mir als ernsthaft Denkendem bzw. als glaubwürdigem Diskurspartner um die Wahrheitsfindung oder um das richtige Verhalten in einer bestimmten Situation geht, muß ich jedes Argument zur Sache hören und berücksichtigen wollen. Ich darf also die Gruppe derjenigen, mit denen ich argumentiere, nicht eingrenzen, sondern bin auf eine unbegrenzte Argumentationsgemeinschaft als letzte Gültigkeitsinstanz angewiesen, die letztlich auch die Argumente schon Verstorbener sowie die Ansprüche künftiger Generationen mitberücksichtigen muß, so daß diese die Chance bekommen, im Diskurs der Argumente berücksichtigt zu werden.)

3. Auch haben wir implizit versprochen, *allen Anderen gleiche Rechte* als möglicher *Dialogpartner* zuzuerkennen und ihre Würde zu achten: Diskursgerechtigkeit (mit Fairneß) und Menschenwürde. (Siehe die Erläuterung zu 2: Würden wir den anderen die Möglichkeit zum Äußern ihrer Ansprüche und Argumente verbieten, könnten wir nicht mehr ernsthaft unsere

eigenen Gültigkeitsansprüche vertreten, zu deren Einlösung es ja darauf ankommt, *alle* Argumente zur Sache gleichermaßen zu berücksichtigen.)

4. Ebenso haben wir implizit versprochen, *mitverantwortlich* zu sein *für den Diskurs* (als Möglichkeit der Verantwortung, jetzt und in Zukunft, also auch *für die* (in konkreten, falliblen Diskursen zu ermittelnden) menschen-rechtlichen, ökologischen, sozialen und kulturellen *Realisierungsbedingungen* öffentlicher Diskurse. (Wiederum: ohne Diskurs keine Einlösungsmöglichkeit unserer Gültigkeitsansprüche; insofern besteht eine Verpflichtung zur Erhaltung und Verbesserung der Diskursbedingungen.)

5. Nicht zuletzt haben wir stillschweigend versprochen, die *Fallibilität*, die Fehlbarkeit von Situationsanalysen und situationsbezogenen Diskursen zu berücksichtigen, also deren Ergebnisse revisionsfähig zu halten und keine irreversiblen Handlungsweisen zu empfehlen, deren Folgen mit unseren anderen Dialogversprechen unverträglich sein können,

6. Schließlich haben wir a priori versprochen, auch in diesem Sinne *mitverantwortlich* zu sein *für die tendenzielle Umsetzung der Diskursergebnisse* in die alltagsweltlichen und gesellschaftlichen Praxisfelder. Dieses sechste Versprechen haftet an unserem Wahrhaftigkeitsanspruch.

Inwiefern?

Würden wir nämlich in einem praktischen Diskurs zwar nach den besten Lösungsmöglichkeiten in einer Situation suchen, uns dann aber nicht um die praktische Realisierung dieser Lösungen scheren, so könnten wir nicht mehr als wahrhaftig gelten, wir hätten einen *l'art pour l'art*-Plauderpartner abgegeben, aber nicht als ernstzunehmender Argumentationspartner an einem praktischen Diskurs teilgenommen.

Das Versprechen der Mitverantwortlichkeit für die *Realisierung* der Diskursergebnisse in der gesellschaftlichen Welt schließt freilich eine Handlungsbereitschaft ein, die auf prekäre Weise über die Bereitschaft zum Diskurs hinausgeht. Denn als praktisch Handelnde wissen wir, daß die gesellschaftliche und schon die alltägliche zwischenmenschliche Praxis durchaus nicht allein von argumentativen Dialogen bestimmt wird und häufig auch nicht in deren Sinne abläuft, sondern von nondialogischen, ja antidialogischen Verhaltensweisen *und* ebensolchen Verhältnissen dominiert sein kann – von List, Lüge, Betrug und Gewalt. Was dann?

7. Angesichts antidialogischer und somit moralwidriger Situationen oder auch Strukturen weiß der ernsthafte Diskurspartner, daß sein Versprechen, sich um eine praktische Realisierung der Diskursergebnisse zu bemühen, einen *strategischen* Sinn haben kann. Es ist dies der prekäre Sinn, mitverantwortlich für die Überwindung der vorgefundenen Diskurs- und Moralwidrigkeiten zu sein und diese zu neutralisieren oder gar aufzulösen. Und immer dann, wenn sich deutlich zeigt, daß ein argumentativer Dialog *mit* Diskursverweigerern oder *angesichts* diskurszerstörerischer

Machtstrukturen, wo Macht in Gewalt umgeschlagen ist, erfolglos sein dürfte – immer dann muß der ernsthafte Diskurspartner nach *moralischen Strategien* suchen. Genauer: nach solchen Strategien, die sowohl erfolgsfähig als auch so vernunft- und moralaffin sind, daß sie die begründete Zustimmung *aller* ernsthaften Diskurspartner fänden, welche die gegebene nondialogische, moralwidrige Handlungssituation analysieren würden. (Im Extremfall, daß ein Moral- und Diskursfreund ganz allein gegen eine diskurs- und moralfeindliche Umwelt stünde, wäre er auf sein Gewissen angewiesen, auf einen einsamen Gewissensdiskurs, der einen argumentativen Konsens der Moral- und Vernunftfreunde *antizipiert*.)

Kurzum: Als Diskurspartner *in der realen Welt* mit Diskurs- und Moralbarrieren oder auch Diskurs- und Moralerstörungen wissen wir implizit, daß wir im Sinne des sechsten Dialogversprechens zu einem weiteren verpflichtet sind, nämlich *mitverantwortlich* zu sein für die Entwicklung, sodann für die strikt argumentative Prüfung und schließlich für die, möglichst wenig Schaden anrichtende, Durchsetzung einer *Konterstrategie*. Das ist das siebte implizite Versprechen eines glaubwürdigen Diskurspartners. Er weiß, daß er, bei aller diskursiven Sorgfalt und selbstkritischen Gewissenhaftigkeit, bereit sein muß, sich die Hände schmutzig zu machen (vgl. Böhler, 2014, S. 350-363, 401-405, 413-417 und 298, 299).

Nun haben wir verpflichtende Sinnbedingungen des Diskurses und damit wesentliche Elemente des Moralischen aus unserem Handlungswissen als Kommunizierende und Denkende rekonstruiert: Achtung der Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte, Pflicht zur Bewahrung und Verbesserung sozialen und ökologischen Lebensbedingungen etc., schließlich die Pflicht zur Durchsetzung der zu diesem Zweck geführten Diskurse bzw. ihrer Ergebnisse.

Mit dieser Besinnung auf den Dialog, besser: auf uns *als* Partner im Dialog der Argumente läßt sich offenbar als verbindlich erweisen, wozu Hans Jonas nur motiviert: die Pflicht der Mitverantwortung für die Welt und ein menschenwürdiges Leben; theologisch gesprochen: für die bedrohte Schöpfung und den Menschen als Gottes Ebenbild.

In der Tat spricht der Philosoph Jonas von „Schöpfung“, was ja einen Schöpfer voraussetzt. Vielleicht sogar einen „Allmächtigen“? So jedenfalls bekennen die Juden, dann die Christen und schließlich die Muslime traditionell Gott. Es stellt sich aber die heikle Frage, ob „Allmacht“ in bezug auf die Welt ein sinnvoller Begriff ist. Das kann er nicht sein, sagt Jonas, weil sich Macht immer auf Andere und auf möglichen Widerstand bezieht, so daß wir von „Allmacht“ (jedenfalls in bezug auf Welt und Raum und Zeit nicht sinnvoll reden können.⁶ Wären wir denn glaubwürdige Diskurspartner, wenn wir diesen Begriff auf Gott beziehen? Wir, die wir die politische Erfahrung des Völkermords an dem Bundesvolk Gottes gemacht haben und die

⁶ Vgl. H. Jonas, Der Gottesbegriff nach Auschwitz. Eine jüdische Stimme, in: Ders., *Philosophische Untersuchungen und metaphysische Vermutungen*, Frankfurt a. M. und Leipzig 1992, bes. S. 201 f.

wir jetzt die Erfahrung machen, daß wir die Schöpfung sowohl mit Atomwaffen zerstören können als auch durch unseren sogenannten friedlichen technischen Fortschritt, nicht allein durch den Einsatz von Kernenergie.

3. Jonas' rationale Motivation zur Zukunftsverantwortung. Gibt es für den Fortschrittsfreund gute Gründe zur ökologischen Praxis des Verzichts und der Risikobegrenzung?

Hans Jonas ist kein Technikfeind; denn er weiß: Ohne modernste Technologien könnte die explosiv angewachsene Menschheit auf der begrenzten Erde gar nicht ernährt werden. Er weiß auch: Ohne Bereitschaft zur Übernahme von Risiken, also zum Umgang mit Projekten, die Folgelasten nach sich ziehen, lassen sich kaum neue Technologien entwickeln. Deshalb fragt er, welcherlei Risiken verantwortbar sind. Zur Beantwortung entwirft er ein Gedankenexperiment. Es ist das „Denkexperiment“ über das „Element der Wette im Handeln“. Hierin prüft er, ob die lebensweltlich ethische Intuition, man dürfe das nicht verwetten bzw. aufs Spiel setzen, was anderen gehört, als allgemeine Handlungsmaxime gültig und verbindlich sein könne (Jonas, 1979, S. 76-83, vgl. S. 218, f.). Dieses Denkexperiment hat die Form eines moralischen Selbstgesprächs, eines argumentativen Diskurses, den ein Gewissenhafter mit sich selber führt. Dieser weiß bereits, daß Handlungsweisen in der hochtechnologischen Zivilisation eine kaum begrenzbare Auswirkungsdimension haben können. Zudem weiß er, daß eine Prognose ihrer Auswirkungen immer unsicher bleibt (Jonas, 1979, S. 66, 67).

Jonas' gedankenexperimentelle Kriteriensuche führt zu folgendem Ergebnis: Ein Risiko, welches „das *Ganze* der Interessen der betroffenen Anderen“, vor allem ihr Leben, umfaßt, darf niemand eingehen (Jonas, 1979, S. 78).

Es komme hinzu, daß die großen Wagnisse der Technologie lediglich für einen Fortschritt, eine gewisse Verbesserung, unternommen würden und daher nur einen „melioristischen“ Status hätten (Jonas, 1979, S. 79; 1985, S. 127); Sie stünden, wie auch die medizinische Forschung – das zeigt er in der Studie „Über Versuche an menschlichen Subjekten“ (Jonas, 1985, S. 109-145) – im Dienste gesellschaftsvertraglichen Nutzens und Gemeinwohls (Jonas, 1985, S. 117-127), keineswegs aber dienten sie direkt einem höchsten Wert wie der Würde des Menschen (Jonas, 1979, S. 94, 97, 392 f.) und der Permanenz der moralfähigen Gattung, der Menschheit.

Aus diesem Grunde gilt es, wie im Sinne der diskurspragmatischen Ethikbegründung hinzuzufügen ist, ihre möglichen Folgelasten am Diskurs-Moralprinzip zu prüfen: ‚Wären sie mit den konsenswürdigen der Argumenten vereinbar, wie sie (auch) die Betroffenen vorbringen können? Könnten auch die Betroffenen die Folgelasten *als* Argumentationspartner noch

akzeptieren?‘ Daß wir ein solches Einverständnis annehmen können, macht Jonas zum Kriterium. Denn „erst die Einbeziehung der Anderen in meine ‚Wette‘ macht Leichtsinn unannehmbar“ (Jonas, 1979, S. 78). Wenn wir aber die Anderen, die Zukünftigen in den politischen Diskurs einbeziehen, so sei eines evident: „Kein Einverständnis zu ihrem Nichtsein oder Entmenschtsein ist von der Menschheit der Zukunft erhältlich noch auch supponierbar“ (Jonas, 1979, S. 80).

Auf diese Weise erhärtet Jonas die in seinem Gedankenexperiment vorausgesetzte Motivation zur Zukunftsverantwortlichkeit. Unter der Voraussetzung, daß man überhaupt zur Moralität und damit zur überinstitutionellen Verantwortungsbereitschaft verpflichtet ist, holt er damit seinen Imperativ der Zukunftsverantwortung ein, der „*unsere* Grundpflicht gegenüber der Zukunft der Menschheit“ (Jonas, 1979, S. 89) zum Ausdruck bringt:

Handle so, daß die Wirkungen deiner Handlung verträglich sind mit der Permanenz echten menschlichen Lebens auf Erden (Jonas, 1979, S. 36).

Unter „echtem menschlichen Leben“ versteht Jonas eine Existenzweise, die imstande ist, der Verantwortlichkeit gegenüber „der Idee des Menschen“ gerecht zu werden. Diese Idee ist – erstens – „ontologisch“, auf das Sein bezogen, fordert sie doch das Dasein von Menschen in der Welt (Jonas, 1979, S. 90 f.), und sie ist – zweitens – normativ gehaltvoll, weil sie eine doppelt adressierte Verpflichtung einschließt: Einmal verpflichtet sie *uns* dazu, den künftigen Menschen die Möglichkeit ihrer Menschenwürde sicherzustellen; zudem verpflichtet sie die Späteren, ihrer eigenen Menschenwürde als Ebenbilder Gottes, sprich als Mitverantwortlicher für die Schöpfung, gerecht zu werden, indem sie ihre „Pflicht gegen das Sosein der Nachkommen“ *als* zur Zukunftsverantwortung Berufener erfüllen (Jonas, 1979, S. 89 f., 94, 186).

Was aber bei Jonas offenbleibt, ist die Frage: Wer oder was gehört zum echten menschlichen Leben? Genauer: Wem schulden wir die Achtung menschlicher Würde? Das sei an dem konfliktbeladenen Problem veranschaulicht, ob es mit der Idee des Menschen bzw. dem Menschenwürdegebot vereinbar ist, embryonale menschliche Stammzellen zu Forschungszwecken zu töten, zu „verbrauchen“. (Das heißt aber zu einem Zweck, der jedenfalls den *Anspruch* bei sich führt, ein *allgemeines Menschengut* zu sein, das sich als solches nicht auf Partikularinteressen zurückführen lasse.)

4. Wieweit reichen Verantwortungspflicht und Menschenwürde? Im Zweifel für Menschenwürde – auch der Embryonen

Wenn wir das Gedankenexperiment der Wette und damit Jonas' neuen Imperativ im Rahmen der Diskussion um die Legitimität der Präimplantationsdiagnostik (PID) und der „verbrauchenden“ Forschung an embryonalen menschlichen Stammzellen bringen, so drängt sich dagegen der Einwand auf, daß die umstandslose Anwendung des Gedankenexperiments zum Zweck der Überprüfung von PID und „verbrauchender Embryonenforschung“ das eigentliche Problem überspringe: Ob nämlich das Ganze der künftigen Interessen von Embryonen und auch von Embryonen *in vitro* moralisch zu berücksichtigen ist, ob also Embryonen ein moralischer Status mit Anspruch auf Menschenwürdeschutz zukomme, ist ja eine offene Frage. Jedenfalls herrscht bereits über die Frage nach dem Anfang menschlichen Lebens im öffentlichen Diskurs faktisch Dissens.

An diesem Dissenspunkt ist offenkundig ein Verbindlichkeitserweis erforderlich, der auch den argumentationsbereiten Skeptiker oder den Andersmeinenden einbezieht und das skeptische Argument entkräftet. Für die Begründungsarbeit würde das bedeuten: Erforderlich ist ein *nicht-metaphysischer* und *nicht-intuitionistischer* Weg, weil eine metaphysische und ebenso eine intuitionistische Theorie vom Skeptiker mit Recht bezweifelt werden kann. Daher stellt sie, wie Jonas selbst eingeräumt hat, bloß „eine Option [...] zur Wahl“ (Jonas, 1992, S. 140). Zudem darf der Argumentationsweg *nicht deduktiv* sein, weil sich alle solche Ableitungen einer moralischen Sollensvorschrift in der Ausweglosigkeit eines Begründungsstrilemmas verlieren (Albert, 1968, S. 11-15; Kuhlmann, 1984, S. 572-605).

Aber was für eine Begründung bleibt dann noch?

Was bleibt, ist der sokratische Weg der aktuellen Reflexion *in* dem gerade geführten Diskurs *auf* die Sinnbedingungen eines argumentativen Dialogs.⁷ Besinnung darauf, daß man auch als Skeptiker mit seinem Etwas-Bezweifeln bereits in einem argumentativen Dialog mit Anderen ist und daß man im Dialog der Argumente die eigene Zweifelsthese müßte verantworten können.

Wer etwas behauptet und sich damit Anderen gegenüber rechtfertigen will, ist nämlich einsehbar und unbestreitbar dazu verpflichtet, die Möglichkeit der Rechtfertigung, der dialogförmigen Verantwortung, zu erhalten. Das aber heißt, er ist zunächst gehalten, „das Ganze der Interessen“ von (möglichen) Anspruchssubjekten nicht aufs Spiel zu setzen, sondern deren Rechte im Diskurs zu berücksichtigen. Und letztlich ist er verpflichtet, die Idee des Menschen,

⁷ Vgl. Karl-Otto Apel, *Auseinandersetzungen*. Frankfurt a. M. 1998, S. 178 ff.

welche nicht allein die Bewahrung der Gattungsexistenz, sondern auch die Hütung der Menschenwürde und Moralfähigkeit einschließt, in seinen Entscheidungen zur Geltung zu bringen. Negativ ausgedrückt besagt das: Solange nicht mit Sicherheit ausgeschlossen werden kann, daß gravierende Einwände gegen eine Handlungsweise möglich sind – etwa aus der Perspektive von Embryonen –, solange besteht die grundsätzliche Verpflichtung, den Rechtfertigungsdialog und das Irrenkönnen *in concreto* ernst zu nehmen, statt in eine folgenirreversible Handlungsweise, die nicht irren dürfte, überzugehen.

Demnach würde als verbindlich gelten: *Im Zweifel für die Verantwortung* (als Sich-im-Dialog-Verantworten-Können) und damit für das Leben und die Menschenwürde. Diese Pflicht zur Vorsicht beim Sich-im-Dialog-Verantworten erstreckt sich auch auf den moralischen Status menschlicher Embryonen.

In der Tat ergibt sich mit Blick auf Jonas' Gedankenexperiment über die Wette im technologischen Handeln als Antwort auf die Warum-unbedingt-Frage – „sind wir denn unbedingt zur Mitverantwortung für die Lebensrechte von Embryonen verpflichtet?“ – mithin dieser Verbindlichkeitserweis:

- Eine Technologie, deren Einsatz mit dem Risiko verbunden ist, das Ganze der möglichen Interessen moralisch anspruchsberechtigter Wesen aufs Spiel zu setzen, ohne dadurch zur Rettung der Menschheit beizutragen, ist moralisch nicht zu verantworten, weil du einen solchen Einsatz, solche Wesen definitiv aus dem Diskurs ausschließen würde, nicht mit deinen Pflichten als Diskurspartner (Geltungsansprüche und implizite Dialogversprechen) vereinbaren könntest.
- Präimplantationsdiagnostik und verbrauchende Embryonenforschung setzen das Leben von Menschen-Embryonen aufs Spiel, ohne zur Rettung der Menschheit beizutragen.
- Ob Embryonen moralisch anspruchsberechtigte Wesen sind, ist zwar noch nicht eindeutig geklärt und faktisch umstritten (faktischer Dissens, faktisches Unwissen).
- Solange aber nicht mit Sicherheit ausgeschlossen werden kann, dass gravierende Einwände gegen eine Handlungsweise möglich sind, bleibt für dich als Argumentationspartner wie auch für alle möglichen Argumentationspartner die grundsätzliche Pflicht bestehen, den argumentativen Dialog und die Irrtumsfähigkeit in konkreten Fragen ernst zu nehmen, statt eine folgenirreversible, menschliches Leben auslöschende, daher nicht irrendürfende Handlungsweise zu wählen.

Es gilt also: *Im Zweifel für das Leben und die Nichtverfügbarkeit von Embryonen.*

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L'idée de la république universelle pendant la Révolution Française

The Idea of a Universal Republic during the French Revolution

MARIAN SKRZYPEK

*Institute of Philosophy and Sociology
of the Polish Academy of Sciences,
Nony Świat 72, 00-330 Warsaw, Poland*

Abstract

The idea of a universal republic as a global democratic state was deeply rooted in the enlightenment cosmopolitanism. Its conservative, anarchic and libertine version is represented by L. Ch. Foucheret de Montbron, the author of *Le Cosmopolite ou citoyen du monde* (1750). The person who is considered to be the father of the idea of the European community is I. Castel de Saint-Pierre, the author of *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe* (1713-1717). In this work he proposed a federation of European states with different political systems, which would conclude a treaty of perpetual peace. The continuator of Saint-Pierre's ideas was J.J. Rousseau, who undertook the publication of his manuscripts left behind after his death in 1743. Rousseau adopted the ideas of his predecessor, but in his own essays *Sur le système de paix perpétuelle* (1741), *Projet d'une paix perpétuelle et générale entre les puissances de l'Europe* (1747), *Extrait du Projet de paix perpétuelle de M. l'abbé de Saint-Pierre* he gave them a new meaning. Rousseau saw the world community as a federation of small republics or patriarchal communities. Another important philosopher, who during the French Revolution took up the idea of universal republic was P.S. Maréchal, who saw a future republic as a federation of egalitarian patriarchal communities. Maréchal was a proponent of Polish national liberation and Poland's rebirth as a democratic state.

Key words: idea of a universal republic, enlightenment cosmopolitanism, idea of European community, federation of European states, treaty of eternal peace, cult of the human race

Le projet d'un organisme politique européen et mondial, qui garantirait la coopération pacifique à l'échelle internationale, hantait les philosophes depuis l'antiquité grecque et latine. Notre sujet n'exige pas, cependant, de remonter à cette époque si lointaine. Il nous suffit de mentionner que le cosmopolitisme des Lumières renouait avec celui des stoïciens (surtout d'Épictète et de Sénèque) qui songent à une situation où chaque homme n'est qu'un citoyen du monde. Il vit parmi ses frères et ses égaux, bien qu'il soit un homme libre ou un esclave, un Grec, un Romain ou un barbare. Sénèque dans les *Lettres à Lucilius* fut maître spirituel de d'Holbach, de Diderot, et de Rousseau. C'est Jean Jacques qui a trouvé la notion fondamentale du déchirement de la personne humaine constituant un ensemble dialectique de *proprio* et d'*alienum*, de la nature et de la civilisation, du domaine d'être (naturellement) et de paraître à l'intention de la société.

Or, Rousseau qui fondait son républicanisme et ses idées démocratiques sur la volonté générale, fut maître de tous les républicains révolutionnaires «gauchistes» qui ont parlé de la république universelle. C'est seulement que dans leur réception des idées politiques et sociales de Rousseau, leurs propres pensées formées sous l'influence d'autres philosophes des Lumières (physiocrates aussi bien que mercantilistes) et surtout sous l'influence de la situation révolutionnaire concrète, ils citent le plus souvent à côté de Rousseau, Saint-Pierre et Raynal.

En ce qui concerne Rousseau, il faut signaler que ces propos concernant une société universelle divergent dans les textes qu'il lui a consacré. Dans un texte joint au *Contrat social*, intitulé *De la société universelle de genre humain* il reprend son idée maîtresse du déchirement entre la nature et la civilisation. Il juge que plus nous avons des besoins, plus le nombre d'hommes qui peuvent les satisfaire augmente, plus nous devenons dépendants d'eux. Quand, enfin – dit-il – les désirs de l'homme embrassent toute la nature, il lui suffit à peine la coopération de tout le genre humain¹. Mais alors cela augmente notre esclavage. La satisfaction de nos besoins dépendant de tout le genre humain nous rend son esclave. Or le sentiment de la dépendance des autres provoque notre ressentiment envers eux, mais plus nous devenons ennemis des autres, plus nous ne sommes pas capables de se passer d'eux. Notre gratitude envers eux nous oblige à exprimer cette reconnaissance mais nous voudrions éviter de leur payer la même monnaie. Les relations parmi les hommes fondées sur l'intérêt causent donc en même temps leur union et concorde mais aussi l'envie et les rivalités. L'homme dans la société ressemble donc à un acteur sur la scène du théâtre. A chaque moment il n'est pas le "même homme". Il joue son rôle selon les circonstances

¹ J. J. Rousseau, *De la société universelle de genre humain*. Nous consultons ce texte rare, repris des *Political Writings of J.J. Rousseau*, Cambridge 1915 (édition de C.E. Vaughan, pour nous inaccessible) par Bronisław Baczko et ajouté à l'édition polonaise du *Contrat social: Umowa społeczna*, Warszawa 1966, p. 167 -177.

changeant sans cesse. C'est pourquoi il est difficile de se fier à l'ordre permanent du monde et à la vertu constante des hommes. Il n'est pas possible de distinguer l'homme honnête du scélérat et le bien du mal.

En fin de compte, Rousseau constate que la société universelle, telle que nos besoins mutuels la constituent, ne fournit pas à l'homme devenu une créature malheureuse aucune aide efficace, et en tout cas elle ne donne pas de nouvelles forces qu'à ceux qui en ont le plus. L'homme faible l'égaré, étouffé, écrasé par la pluralité des autres ne trouve aucun refuge, aucun appui à la faiblesse et enfin il devient victime de l'union illusoire de laquelle il attendait son bonheur.

Cependant, Rousseau ne veut pas renoncer d'une telle société, car l'indépendance naturelle de l'âge d'or n'est pas pour lui "un état désiré". La paix et l'innocence ont disparu pour nous pour toujours. Par ailleurs cette paix et cette indépendance seraient un état de la stupidité, car la raison humaine ne se développe que dans les contacts avec les autres hommes et par son activité sociale.

La société du genre humain constitue pour Rousseau un idéal philosophique difficile à préciser d'une manière concrète. Il s' imagine qu'elle ne serait qu'un "être moral" qualitativement différent de la somme des sociétés particulières, de même que dans la chimie la composition d'éléments produit un élément totalement différent de ses parties initialement séparées. Fidèle à son principe de la démocratie directe, où la volonté générale ne peut se réaliser que dans les petites républiques, Rousseau précise son attitude envers une société universelle. Nous concevons – dit-il – la société universelle selon nos sociétés particulières et la formation des petites républiques nous invite à rêver une grande république – c'est en devenant citoyens que nous commençons d'être hommes. Il en résulte ce qu'il faut penser de ces prétendus cosmopolites, qui fondent leur amour de la patrie sur l'amour du genre humain et s'enorgueillissent d'aimer le genre humain pour avoir le droit de n'aimer personne.

Rousseau accepta le "déisme de Saint-Pierre, son esprit de tolérance, son humanitarisme, son réformisme et ses vues sur l'éducation². Mais au fond, la manière d'aborder les problèmes par l'abbé "s'opposait à la sienne et rendait illusoire toute conciliation de leurs points de vue"³.

Il nous faut donc relever les idées essentielles de Saint-Pierre qui nous intéressent ici. Or, celui-ci compte sur la raison des chefs ou des corps dirigeants les États chrétiens de l'Europe et sur la compréhension de la nécessité de créer une union permanente qui garantirait la paix durable. Il pense aussi à la liquidation des conflits entre les États et à l'établissement de la

² S. Stelling-Michaud, Introduction aux *Écrits sur l'abbé de Saint-Pierre*, dans: J.-J. Rousseau, *Œuvres complètes*, Paris, 1964, t. 3, p. CXXIX.

³*Ibid.*

coopération pacifique entre eux. Cette société européenne, et ensuite mondiale, empêcherait aussi les "guerres civiles", les "révoltes" et les "conspirations des sujets"⁴. Elle rendrait possible le progrès des sciences, des arts et métiers. En supprimant le budget de guerre, et en vivifiant le commerce international, elle contribuerait à l'augmentation du niveau de vie de tous les Européens et à la suppression du fléau de famine.

Le progrès constitue l'une des catégories centrales de l'œuvre de l'abbé de Saint-Pierre. Cette catégorie s'apparente à une autre, et notamment à celle de l'activité ou du travail, qui produit la richesse des nations. L'abbé méprise donc "ces honnêtes fainéants qu'on appelle nobles en Europe"⁵. Il devient apologiste de ceux qui jouissent de la considération grâce aux occupations utiles et aux emplois publics. Bien que Saint-Pierre renoue principalement avec la tradition mercantiliste, il prêche aussi des idées populationnistes si familières aux physiocrates dans la seconde moitié du XVIIIe siècle. La guerre – constate-t-il – détruit la population. „Or plus il y a de sujets, plus les manufactures produisent, mieux les terres sont cultivées, plus elles rapportent; d'ailleurs plus il y a de gens occupés au commerce, plus le pays s'enrichit"⁶.

La théorie du progrès dans la *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe* se fonde sur prémisses anthropologiques. L'abbé de Saint-Pierre veut bâtir sur les hommes tels qu'ils sont, plutôt que sur des hommes tels qu'ils devraient être". Or, selon lui, les hommes sont des êtres qui ont des besoins et désirent de les satisfaire. C'est pourquoi ils sont intéressés à s'unir pour augmenter la production et les échanges des biens pour en profiter. Il faut seulement que la raison leur serve de guide dans leur tendance naturelle à l'union pacifique.

Selon l'abbé de Saint-Pierre la paix favorise le progrès, la guerre y fait obstacle, car elle détruit les acquisitions scientifiques, techniques et culturelles qui passent, en tant que « monuments » d'une génération à l'autre. Grâce à ces monuments l'homme s'immortalise dans ses œuvres et contribue au progrès de l'humanité. Après Horace, Ovide et avant Diderot et Comte, l'abbé de Saint-Pierre parle de l'extériorisation de l'homme qui, grâce aux effets de son activité, se perpétue dans les acquis de l'humanité.

C'est ainsi que les générations, l'une après l'autre, se transmettent le sceptre du progrès. Celui-ci subit une accélération toujours croissante en conséquence des perfectionnements continuels de l'esprit humain. Pendant que le corps de l'homme subit une vicissitude biologique naturelle, car il croît jusqu'à un certain temps et ensuite il se détériore, l'esprit profite des lumières du passé, il les multiplie et les passe aux générations futures. "Les hommes – dit l'abbé de Saint-Pierre – s'imitent facilement les uns les autres; ce qu'un vieillard a appris dans un métier

⁴ Ch. I. Castel de Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe*, Utrecht, 1713, t. 1, p.72 .

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 270.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.241.

en quarante ans d'expérience, un jeune homme peut l'apprendre en peu de temps, et ce que celui-ci aura appris en quarante autres années de pratique continuelle, son fils à vingt ans pourra l'apprendre en peu de mois; c'est ainsi qu'un fils peut hériter des connaissances utiles de son père et laisser à son fils une succession encore plus riche de connaissances de même espèce⁷.

Le progrès est considéré par l'abbé de Saint-Pierre en tant que processus diachronique et en même temps synchronique. Il représente pour lui un mouvement d'ascendance et de diffusion. Le premier s'accomplit principalement par de nouvelles inventions et découvertes, le second a lieu grâce à leur communication. C'est un échange continu des biens et des idées. En effet, l'"esprit des savants et du peuple même va toujours en croissant"⁸.

Il n'est pas difficile de remarquer que Rousseau, dont l'attitude envers les progrès de la civilisation fut toujours ambivalente, se posait une tâche ingrate en essayant de donner un raccourci du *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe* de l'abbé de Saint-Pierre. Précisons que les deux philosophes envisagent le processus historique de manières différentes. Pour l'abbé, l'histoire s'identifie à une ligne toujours ascendante du progrès. Pour Rousseau, elle représente un cercle, où le mouvement ascendant et descendant se suit. Cette compréhension de l'histoire influe considérablement sur son évaluation des possibilités de conserver une paix durable. Rousseau aperçoit une importante « semence de guerre » précisément dans ce fait que chaque gouvernement tend toujours à s'altérer, « sans qu'il soit possible d'empêcher ce progrès »⁹. Autrement dit, tout gouvernement doit subir une dégénération avant d'être régénéré sous une forme nouvelle. Par contre, l'abbé de Saint-Pierre considère le développement progressif de l'humanité comme un mouvement harmonieux et conforme à l'ordre rationnel des choses. Ce qui ne veut pas dire que l'abbé vise à « figer l'histoire »¹⁰. Or, il ne vise qu'à maintenir le "*statu quo* territorial"¹¹ et politique en Europe. En même temps il pense que ce *statu quo* paisible doit contribuer aux progrès de l'humanité dans tous les domaines de la vie sociale. L'optimisme historique s'accompagne donc, chez l'abbé de Saint-Pierre, de l'optimisme irénique.

Chez Rousseau le pessimisme historique va de pair avec le pessimisme anthropologique. L'auteur de l'*Extrait* considère que la nature humaine n'est pas rationnelle. L'homme, selon lui, ne suit que ses passions. Par conséquent, il serait inutile de faire un appel aux monarques, dont l'intérêt personnel s'exprime dans la folie des conquêtes, pour qu'ils établissent l'union

⁷ *Projet de Traité pour rendre la paix perpétuelle entre les souverain chrétiens*, Utrecht, 1717, p.25.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 451.

⁹ J.-J. Rousseau, *Extrait du projet de paix perpétuelle de Monsieur l'abbé de Saint-Pierre*, dans les *Oeuvres complètes*, éd. Citée, t. 3, p. 569.

¹⁰ J. Lecercle, *L'abbé de Saint-Pierre et Rousseau, Dix-huitième siècle*, 1993, t.25, p.26.

¹¹ S. Stelling-Michaud, *Ecrits sur l'abbé de Saint-Pierre*, dans: J.-J. Rousseau, *Oeuvres complètes*, éd. citée, t. 3, p. CXL.

européenne réalisant l'idée de la paix perpétuelle. L'*Extrait* de Rousseau finit par ces mots significatifs se rapportant au *Projet* de l'abbé:

„On doit bien remarquer que nous n'avons point supposé les hommes tels qu'ils devraient être, bons, généreux, désintéressés, et aimant le bien public par l'humanité; mais tels qu'ils sont, injustes, avides, et préférant leur intérêt à tout. La seule chose qu'on leur suppose, c'est assez de raison pour savoir ce qui leur est utile, et assez de courage pour faire leur propre bonheur. Si, malgré tout cela, ce *Projet* demeure sans exécution, ce n'est donc pas qu'il soit chimérique; c'est que les hommes sont insensés, et que c'est une sorte de folie d'être sage au milieu des fous”¹².

Cette opposition entre les passions et l' ”âpre et repoussante raison » nous la rencontrons dans plusieurs pages de l'*Extrait* et des deux autres écrits de Rousseau consacrés à l'abbé de Saint-Pierre. C'est le cas des *Fragments et notes* qui lui sont consacrés, où il dit que « l'abbé de Saint-Pierre bienfaisant et sans passions semblait un Dieu parmi les hommes mais en voulant leur faire goûter sa raison désintéressée il se rendait plus enfant qu'eux”¹³.

Mais il nous reste à discuter la thèse qui concerne Rousseau opposant à l'abbé „sa vision pessimiste des hommes en laquelle la rédemption politique n'est pas possible”¹⁴. Bien que l'auteur de l'*Extrait* accepte formellement l'alliance des monarques de l'Europe, proposée par l'abbé de Saint-Pierre en tant que moyen de cette régénération politique, il songe en même temps à l'alliance des peuples auxquels il attribue la véritable souveraineté. La société pacifique de l'avenir, c'est une „république européenne”¹⁵. Contrairement à l'abbé de Saint-Pierre, il se rend compte du fait que le passage de l'état de guerre à l'état pacifique en Europe ne peut s'accomplir par un simple procédé juridique, mais qu'il exige une „force collective” qui forcerait tous les membres de la communauté internationale à se soumettre aux engagements réciproques. Qui plus est, ce passage exige l'abolition du régime monarchique et l'établissement de la démocratie universelle. A vrai dire, il n'exprime pas cette idée nettement et il hésite à la prononcer, mais on a le droit d'interpréter ainsi ses mots contenus dans le *Jugement sur le projet de paix perpétuelle*, où il dit que cette paix ”ne peut se faire que par des moyens violents et redoutables à l'humanité”¹⁶.

Évidemment, Rousseau prend une position ambivalente par rapport à une république européenne formée par des mesures violentes. Il n'est pas sûr si une telle ligue ”est à désirer ou à craindre » et si elle ne ferait « plus de mal tout d'un coup qu'elle n'en préviendrait pour des

¹³ J.-J. Rousseau, *Fragments et notes sur l'abbé de Saint-Pierre*, dans: *Oeuvres complètes*, éd. citée, t. 3, p. 659.

¹⁴ S. Goyard-Fabre, *Présentation du projet de paix perpétuelle*, dans: Abbé de Saint-Pierre, *Projet de rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe*, Paris, 1981, p. 93.

¹⁵ J.-J. Rousseau, *Extrait...*, éd. citée, p. 565, 567, 576.

¹⁶ J.-J. Rousseau, *Jugement sur le projet de paix perpétuelle*, dans: *Oeuvres complètes*, éd. citée, t. 3, p. 660.

siècles”¹⁷. Les conséquences radicales, sans aucune ambivalence, seront tirées de la pensée de Rousseau, à l’époque de la Révolution Française, par ses disciples, les chefs du Cercle Social (Claude Fauchet et Nicolas Bonneville), les hébertistes (surtout Anacharsis Cloots) et les babouvistes (Sylvain Maréchal, François Noël Babeuf, Philippe Buonarroti) qui songèrent à la formation de la république universelle, garantissant la paix perpétuelle entre toutes les nations par l’abolition révolutionnaire des monarchies de l’Europe et l’institution du régime démocratique. L’idée d’un organisme politique mondial des peuples qui ont secoué le joug du despotisme fut diffusée par Constantin François Volney dans ses *Ruines* (1791) qui jouissaient d’une grande popularité à l’époque. Leur traduction polonaise parut en 1794 pendant l’Insurrection de Kościuszko¹⁸.

Cependant certains auteurs pensent que le „républicanisme de Rousseau perce aussi bien dans l’*Extrait* que dans le *Jugement* et s’affirme déjà comme la condition de cet universalisme institutionnel qui, par le canal des constitutions démocratiques, agira si puissamment sur les mœurs et l’esprit des peuples”¹⁹. Mais on n’oublie pas que les idées nouvelles de Rousseau n’apparaissent que dans le contexte traditionnel de la pensée de l’abbé de Saint-Pierre. Par conséquent, sa notion de l’unité des peuples prend parfois une signification bien divergente. Convaincu de leur union dans l’avenir, quand ils seront régénérés, Rousseau dénonce „cette fraternité prétendue des peuples de l’Europe” à l’état actuel des choses.

La naissance de l’idée de la république universelle pendant la Révolution Française se laisse d’abord expliquer par ce fait essentiel que la France républicaine fut menacée par la coalition des monarques. Elle vit donc ses alliés potentiels dans les peuples souffrant l’oppression féodale et nationale. En même temps, les penseurs radicaux de la Révolution Française imbus d’idées humanitaires et cosmopolites des Lumières voulurent républicaniser l’Europe, y introduire un système politique et social plus rationnel et plus juste, imitant celui des Français. Ils assignèrent donc à la Révolution de 1789 une mission historique universelle de la libération des peuples.

L’idée de cette mission apparaît en 1790 dans la doctrine du Cercle social qui fut une véritable pépinière de la pensée républicaine, démocratique et égalitaire à l’époque de la

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Nous avons traité ces problèmes plus largement dans les textes suivants : *Quelques personnalités rationalistes du passé* : Vallée, Meslier, Dupont, Lequinio, Cloots, Cahiers rationalistes 1969, n° 264, p. 107-136 ; *Sylvain Maréchal et son utopie sociale*, Tijdschrift voor de Studie van de Verlichting 1973, nr 3-4, p. 342-373. *La philosophie et l’utopie sociale du jacobin Anacharsis Cloots*, Annalen der internationalen Gesellschaft für dialektische Philosophie. Societas Hegeliana 1990, Bd. II ; p. 145-149 ; *Lequinio, Cloots und die Volksphilosophie*, Dialektik 17 : *Der Philosoph und das Volk*, Köln 1989, p. 40-48; *La Révolution et les origines du socialisme chrétien en France*, dans M. Vovelle (dir.) : *L’Image de la Révolution Française*, Paris 1989, t. 2, p.1521-1525 ; *Volney dans les Lumières polonaises*, dans J. Roussel (dir.), *Volney et les idéologues*, Angers 1988, p. 357-368.

¹⁹S. Stelling-Michaud, *Ecrits sur l’abbé de Saint-Pierre*, op.cit., p. CXLI.

Révolution. Selon C. Fauchet et N. Bonneville, fondateurs du Cercle, celui-ci devait se transformer en une organisation mondiale dont le but serait le „pacte de la fédération du genre humain”²⁰. C’est en inaugurant cette Confédération Universelle des Amis de la Vérité que C. Fauchet encouragea les peuples à suivre l’exemple français: „L’Amérique avait donné l’exemple à l’Europe, la France le donne à l’univers. Nous sommes libres, nous le sommes sans retour; le genre humain va l’être, car le génie français, élevé à la hauteur de la liberté, ne peut plus être contenu, il va bientôt la montrer dans tous ses charmes, et la faire adorer des deux mondes”²¹.

En assignant à la France la mission de la régénération de l’ordre social en Europe et dans le monde entier, C. Fauchet veut y voir un „foyer d’amour et de l’humanité”²². Il ne prêche pas l’exportation de la révolution. Il compte sur l’action solidaire mais pacifique des peuples dont le mot d’ordre serait: „Unissez vous, et les tyrans na seront plus”²³. Cependant, il désigne un rôle particulier, dans cette voie vers l’unité, aux hommes éclairés, sociétaires de la Confédération Universelle des Amis de la Vérité. Il s’adresse aux savants, aux voyageurs, aux commerçants pour qu’ils servent à former des „comités de correspondance avec l’Angleterre, l’Espagne, l’Italie, la Hollande, les Cercles /sociaux – M.S./ d’Allemagne, la Suède, la Russie, la Danemark, la Pologne, les villes commerciales du Levant; et par suite, à mesure que la Confédération s’agrandira, avec toutes les parties du monde”²⁴. La chose intéressante est ce que Fauchet veut propager l’idée de la république universelle, et même la réaliser, par l’intermédiaire des loges maçonniques, ce qui constitue un précédent par rapport aux pratiques de la Charbonnerie démocratique universelle préparant en 1832 l’insurrection européenne contre les monarques.

Malgré son pragmatisme notoire, le Cercle social cherche une justification théorique de l’idée du „pacte associatif de l’univers”. Il la trouve dans la notion rousseauiste de souveraineté du peuple et de volonté générale en tant que source du pouvoir. La volonté générale – selon Fauchet – ne peut être vraiment générale que lorsqu’elle s’étend à tous les hommes de la terre. Le rousseauisme de Fauchet est cependant imprégné d’un christianisme un peu mystique. L’union mondiale est pour le chef du Cercle social, la réalisation parfaite du principe chrétien de l’amour. Vers la fin de 1790 Fauchet annonce la prompte réalisation d’une belle prédication: „fiat unum ovile et unus pastor”²⁵. Il ne précise, cependant, pas qui serait ce „pasteur”, et qui réaliserait la volonté générale; serait-ce un corps politique ou un monarque? Le contexte de ses énoncés sur

²⁰ *Déclaration patriotique du Cercle social pour la Confédération universelle des Amis de la Vérité*, La Bouche de Fer, octobre 1790, n° 1, p. 14. .

²¹ *Premier Discours*, prononcé par M. l’abbé Fauchet, pour l’inauguration de la Confédération universelle des Amis de la Vérité, „La Bouche de Fer”, octobre 1790, n° 3, p. 24.

²² Ibid., p. 159.

²³ *Claude Fauchet à M. Cloots*, „La Bouche de Fer”, octobre 1790, n° 10, p. 159.

²⁴ „La Bouche de Fer”, octobre 1790, n° 11, p.166.

²⁵ C. Fauchet, *Neuvième discours*, „Bouche de Fer”, décembre 1790, n° 31, p. 484.

l'avenir de l'Europe nous laisse deviner qu'il voulait y fonder une république. Les mots de la „république universelle” furent cependant prononcés par un autre membre du Cercle social qui s'imaginait cette république comme „une seule cité”, dont les citoyens seraient égaux et n'obéiraient qu'à eux mêmes²⁶.

En 1791 paraît l'œuvre de C.F. Volney, *Les Ruines*, qui renferme un nouveau projet de la société du genre humain. La justification théorique de ce projet diffère radicalement de celle des Amis de la Vérité. Sans mentionner l'abbé de Saint-Pierre, Volney renoue à son *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe* (1713) et fait reposer les bases de la prochaine société des nations sur la loi naturelle. Après avoir dénoncé une „ligue générale des tyrans civils et sacrés des peuples” contre la „nation libre”, et après avoir imaginé une „assemblée générale des peuples” à Paris, il fait lancer cet appel aux délégués venus du monde entier par le représentant de la nation libre: „O nations! Bannissons toute tyrannie et toute discorde: ne formons plus qu'une même société, qu'une grande famille; et puisque le genre humain n'a qu'une même constitution (physique - M.S.), qu'il n'existe plus pour lui qu'une loi, celle de la nature; qu'un même code, celui de la raison; qu'un même trône, celui de la justice; qu'un même autel, celui de l'union”²⁷.

Il ne résulte pas de ces développements de Volney que la nouvelle organisation du monde devrait être nécessairement républicaine, car la nation ”libre” vivait en ce 1791 dans une monarchie constitutionnelle.

Le vrai fondateur de l'utopie de la république universelle fut Jean-Baptiste (Anacharsis) Cloots qui réussit à joindre deux traditions dans la recherche d'un état européen ou mondial: celle de l'abbé de Saint-Pierre et celle de Rousseau, dans l'interprétation de sa doctrine inaugurée par le Cercle social. On peut même dire que le rousseauisme subit chez Cloots une seconde radicalisation, car il y devient matérialiste et révolutionnaire. Cloots délaisse aussi le fédéralisme de Rousseau et de Fauchet. Il songe à une république universelle qui ne constituerait qu'un corps homogène. En 1791 il formule, dans *L'Orateur du genre humain* ses principes universalistes, dont l'application au monde entier mettrait fin à tous les particularismes, à toutes les contradictions entre les peuples et entre les hommes. Il songe à une „patrie universelle” qui n'aurait qu'un seul régime démocratique et égalitaire. Cette patrie universelle serait l'aboutissement de l'histoire humaine. „Une constitution inébranlable par sa base – dit Cloots – et qui ne connaît ni sujets ni alliés, ni provinces ni colonies, ni blancs ni noirs, ni blonds ni bruns, ni bourgeois, ni catholiques ni non catholiques, ni ennemis ni étrangers, doit durer éternellement”²⁸.

²⁶ „La Bouche de Fer”, décembre 1790, n° 34, p. 534.

²⁷ C. F. Volney, *Les Ruines ou Méditation sur les révolutions des empires*, Paris 1791, p. 113.

²⁸ J. B. Cloots, *L'Orateur du genre humain*, Paris 1791, p. 142.

Les textes de Cloots écrits en 1792 témoignent de la prise de conscience révolutionnaire quant à la méthode de la réalisation de son projet de la république universelle. Il ne s'adresse pas, comme N. Bonneville et C. Fauchet aux francs-maçons et aux "illuminés", mais aux révolutionnaires. Selon lui, la France doit favoriser les insurrections populaires dans les pays despotiques. „Il ne faut – dit-il le 1-er janvier 1792 – qu'un Spartacus, un Ziska, un Münzer, un Horia, un Pougatchev, pour libérer à jamais l'Italie, la Bohême, l'Allemagne, la Hongrie, la Moscovie. Les despotes sont retranchés dans les magasins à poudre; ils craignent plus une étincelle que le peuple ne craint un tremblement de terre. La jacquerie des laboureurs européens ne saurait recommencer désormais, sans la chute universelle des nobles et des pontifs, des trônes et des sénats”²⁹.

Cloots ne prêche pas la fraternité de la France avec les peuples ou les nations, car il tend à éliminer les nations et les États particuliers. Il dit dans sa *République universelle*, publiée en 1792, que les „Corps provinciaux et les Corps nationaux sont les plus grands fléaux du genre humain”, car ils font naître des rivalités et des guerres. Par conséquent le „genre humain vivra en paix, lorsqu'il ne formera qu'un seul corps, la Nation unique”³⁰. N'acceptant pas l'idée de la fédération des organismes nationaux, Cloots ne suit pas, non plus, le cosmopolitisme traditionnel des Lumières. Il ne croit pas que tous hommes soient frères. Puisque l'humanité se divise en oppresseurs et en opprimés, la fraternité entre ces deux groupes sociaux est impossible. Elle n'est possible que parmi les hommes ayant les mêmes intérêts. La conscience de ce fait devient particulièrement lucide chez Cloots à l'époque de son activité dans le mouvement hébertiste vers la fin de 1793. Il écrit alors dans les *Bases constitutionnelles de la République du genre humain*: „Un vieux proverbe dit: qui se ressemble s'assemble; or, rien ne ressemble plus à un sans-culotte du Nord qu'un sans-culotte du Midi; rien ne ressemble plus à un aristocrate de l'Orient qu'un aristocrate de l'Occident”³¹. Cloots reprend aussi cette maxime connue depuis 1792: „Guerre aux châteaux, paix aux cabanes”, et propose de l'appliquer par les armées françaises à l'étranger, là, où „le genre humain se trouve l'héritier du despotisme abattu”³². Cette attitude relève d'une sorte d'internationalisme plébéien et non pas du cosmopolitisme traditionnel.

En admettant le projet hébertiste de la guerre pour la libération des peuples de l'Europe, Cloots associe cette „révolution politique” à la révolution sociale qui réaliserait son utopie égalitaire. Cette utopie intègre certains éléments de la doctrine politique de Rousseau et de Saint-Pierre en dépassant toutes les deux. Comme Rousseau il prêche l'égalitarisme et la démocratie

²⁹ Société des Amis de la Constitution, séante aux Jacobins, à Paris . *Discours d'Anacharsis Cloots* prononcé à la Société, dans la séance du 1-er janvier, Paris 1792, p. 3.

³⁰ J. B. Cloots, *La République universelle*, Paris 1792, p. 7.

³¹ J. B. Cloots, *Bases constitutionnelles de la République du genre humain*, Paris 1793, p. 40.

³² *Réimpression de l'ancien « Moniteur »*, Paris 1840, t. 14, p. 261.

directe qui tendrait à supprimer l'État. Comme l'abbé de Saint-Pierre il croit aux progrès de la civilisation qui apportera le bonheur à l'humanité. Il admet aussi que l'organisation mondiale du genre humain amènera la paix perpétuelle qui permettra d'utiliser de grandes ressources à l'augmentation du niveau de la vie et à la suppression de la pauvreté. Loin de partager l'avis de Raynal³³ et de Saint-Pierre que le commerce harmonise les rapports internationaux. Cloots démontre que les États ont toujours été l'instrument de la rivalité économique, ce qui entraînait la guerre. L'harmonie politique et économique ne peut donc avoir lieu que dans un régime de démocratie mondiale. Dans son désir de conformer le libéralisme économique à l'égalitarisme social, Cloots ne veut pas supprimer la propriété privée. Il espère que l'égalité sociale mènera spontanément à l'équilibre entre la production et la consommation, entre le travail et le travailleur. De même, il se prononce pour le libéralisme économique et contre l'économie dirigée. Il veut une organisation internationale du travail. Son utopie annonce donc celle de Saint-Simon.

L'un des problèmes les plus importants pour les utopistes du 18^e et 19^e siècle fut la religion. Cloots résout ce problème en faisant fusionner d'une manière originale la tradition matérialiste et rousseauiste. Convaincu que les religions divisent les hommes et les États, il propose la réalisation pratique du paradoxe de Bayle en lui donnant une empreinte républicaine. „On a écrit - dit- il - des volumes pour savoir si une république d'athées pourrait exister. Je soutiens, moi, que toute autre république est une chimère”³⁴. Cloots songea à réaliser cette république en devenant, en l'an II, l'un des chefs du mouvement de la déchristianisation révolutionnaire en France. C'est à l'époque de ce mouvement antireligieux qu'il proposa le 27 brumaire, l'an II (le 17 novembre 1793) à la Convention Nationale d'ériger au Temple de la Raison (ci-devant cathédrale de Notre-Dame à Paris) une statue à Jean Meslier, ce fameux curé athée et révolutionnaire avant la Révolution et le ”premier ecclésiastique abjuteur”³⁵.

A cette action destructive s'associe chez Cloots un programme positif. Il veut remplacer le christianisme par le culte laïc du genre humain. La conception de ce culte renoue avec la notion rousseauiste de la souveraineté du peuple et de la religion civique. Or, Rousseau propose dans le *Contrat social* une telle religion imposée par la loi et obligatoire à tout le monde, ce qui restera conforme avec l'esprit des révolutionnaires à l'époque de la terreur jacobine : ”Il y a donc une

³³ Raynal croyait dans son *Histoire des deux Indes* que le commerce est l'instrument de la paix mondiale, mais les jacobins étaient d'avis que le commerce renforce les égoïsmes nationaux et sociaux. « Les marchands n'ont pas de patrie » disait J. R. Hébert. Nous traitons ces problèmes dans *Le commerce instrument de la paix mondiale*, dans G. Bancarel, G. Goggi (dir.), *Raynal, de la polémique à l'histoire*, Oxford 2000, p. 243-254.

³⁴ Nous citons d'après J. Guillaume, *Procès-verbaux du Comité d'Instruction Publique de la Convention Nationale*, Paris 1897, t. 3, p. 78.

³⁵ Anacharsis Cloots, *Discours prononcé à la tribune de la Convention Nationale le 27 brumaire, l'an II*. Nous citons d'après la réimpression de ce texte dans les *Œuvres de Jean Meslier*, Paris 1972, t. 3, p. 503.

profession de foi purement civile dont il appartient au souverain de fixer les articles, non pas précisément comme dogmes de religion, mais comme sentiments de sociabilité sans lesquels il est impossible d'être bon citoyen ni sujet fidèle. Sans pouvoir obliger personne à les croire, il peut bannir de l'État quiconque ne les croit pas ; il peut le bannir non comme impie, mais comme insociable, comme incapable d'aimer sincèrement les lois, la justice, et d'immoler au besoin sa vie à son devoir. Que si quelqu'un, après avoir reconnu publiquement ces mêmes dogmes, se conduit comme ne les croyant pas, qu'il soit puni de mort ; il a commis les plus grands des crimes, il a menti devant les lois"³⁶. Cependant, malgré de telles tirades, Rousseau ne fut pas révolutionnaire. Ce qui intéressait Cloots dans le *Contrat social*, ce fut la souveraineté du peuple dont il tira des conséquences théoriques en proposant un culte civique du "genre humain".

Selon Cloots, la puissance de l'homme et du peuple entier est bornée. Par contre, celle du genre humain est parfaitement souveraine, car l'humanité porte les qualités de l'homme au rang absolu. Cependant cette souveraineté fut attribuée à un être chimérique, un Dieu abstrait. Dans le culte du genre humain les attributs de l'humanité lui sont rendus. La divinité conçue comme genre humain perd son caractère transcendant et métaphysique. Elle devient une entité politique. „La république universelle – dit Cloots – remplacera l'église catholique, et l'assemblée nationale fera oublier les conciles œcuméniques. L'unité de l'État vaudra mieux que l'unité de l'Église. La présence réelle des représentants ne sera pas un article de foi comme la communion des saints. Le symbole des conventionnels sera démontré plus clairement que le symbole des apôtres. L'unité théologique a produit tous les maux; l'unité politique produira tous les biens. Les décrétales du chef-lieu de la chrétienté ont semé la zizanie; les décrets du chef-lieu de l'humanité produiront la concorde et l'abondance. La théocratie universelle persécute la raison; la monarchie universelle persécute la liberté; la république universelle rend à chacun ce qui lui est dû"³⁷.

Un autre type de l'utopie, dans laquelle est inscrite l'idée de la république universelle, représente Sylvain Maréchal. Pénétré, lui aussi, du rousseauisme, il accentue d'autres aspects de la philosophie de Jean-Jacques. Comme lui, S. Maréchal ne voit pas le bonheur dans l'avenir de l'humanité, mais dans son passé et plus précisément dans l'état patriarcal de la société. Comme lui, il est apologiste de l'état de la nature et va plus loin encore en prêchant le retour à l'âge d'or de l'humanité, ce que Jean-Jacques croyait impossible. Mais comme lui il démontre les côtés néfastes de la civilisation pour la morale. Il s' imagine la nouvelle société comme une simple jonction des familles autonomes, dont chacune ne compterait que cent personnes environ. Cependant il pense, lui aussi, à l'unité du genre humain. Il désire voir les hommes du monde

³⁶J. J. Rousseau, *Contrat social ou Principes du droit politique*, Paris, b.d.w., Librairie Garnier Frères, s. 335.

³⁷J. B. Cloots, *Bases constitutionnelles*, p. 21.

entier assis devant la „table commune de la nature”. A l’aube de la Révolution il écrit: « Que chacun rentre dans sa famille et qu’il serve ses parents; qu’il y commande à ses enfants; et que tous les hommes d’un bout du monde à l’autre se donnent la main, ne forment plus qu’une chaîne composée d’anneaux tous semblables »³⁸. Maréchal ne songe pas à un gouvernement, qui est un mal nécessaire et passager également dans l’utopie de Cloots, et c’est ainsi qu’il fait disparaître la notion de patrie. Cette autarcie sociale, il la prêche encore à l’étape babouviste de sa pensée. On sait que son *Manifeste des Égaux* contient cette phrase qui – d’après Buonarroti – en a rendu le texte inadmissible aux babouvistes: „Disparaissez enfin, révoltantes distinctions de riches et de pauvres, de grands et de petits, de maîtres et de valets, de gouvernants et de gouvernés”³⁹.

Dans les textes de Maréchal qui se suivent entre 1779 et 1793 la patrie est un terme qui relève plutôt de la psychologie sociale que de la politique. Cependant, il réussit à préciser des liens intimes entre le sentiment patriotique et „internationaliste” quand il déclare que l’amour de la patrie n’exclura point l’humanité. Ces deux mots expriment la même vertu, considérée sous deux points de vue différents. La terre regardée comme la mère de tous les hommes, ne verra dans ses enfants que des frères amis”⁴⁰. L’unité du genre humain repose donc, dans la pensée de Maréchal, sur l’identité de la nature humaine. Les faits sociaux n’y comptent rien.

La perspective change en 1793. Maréchal, lié à cette époque avec P. G. Chaumette et la Commune hébertiste, commence à voir dans la Révolution Française le début de la guerre des pauvres contre les grands et les riches. C’est alors qu’il fait sienne l’idée de la république universelle tout en bornant ses limites à l’Europe seule. Il la présente sous forme de « prophétie » dans un genre de comédie-bouffe, *Le jugement dernier des rois* où les peuples de l’Europe, après avoir observé les événements révolutionnaires en France décidèrent de « fraterniser » avec leurs aînés en liberté. „En conséquence, chaque nation de l’Europe envoya à Paris de braves sans-culottes chargés de la représenter. Là, dans cette diète de tous les peuples, on est convenu qu’à certain jour, toute l’Europe se lèverait en masse, et s’émanciperait (...). En effet, une insurrection générale et simultanée a éclaté chez toutes les nations de l’Europe”⁴¹.

En 1794, Maréchal fut enclin à voir dans l’insurrection polonaise de Kościuszko le début de cette révolution européenne et même mondiale. Si la Pologne réussit à s’affranchir – constata

³⁸ S. Maréchal, *Premières leçons du fils aîné d’un roi*, Bruxelles 1789, s. 35.

³⁹ S. Maréchal, *Manifeste des Égaux*, dans Buonarroti, *Conspiration pour l’Égalité dite de Babeuf*, Paris 1957, t. 2., p. 96. Première édition, Bruxelles 1828.

⁴⁰ S. Maréchal, *Le livre de tous les âges ou le Pibrac moderne*, dans *De la vertu*, Paris 1807, p. 345.

⁴¹ S. Maréchal, *Le jugement dernier des rois*, Paris 1793, p.11.

– t – il – alors la liberté „invitera l'Asie et l'Afrique à fraterniser avec l'Europe indépendante ”et c'est ainsi que la Révolution Française « fera le tour du globe”⁴².

En 1796, l'idée de la république universelle fut admise par les autres babouvistes. C'est F. Buonarroti, compagnon de lutte de Babeuf et de Maréchal, qui nous en renseigne dans l'histoire de ce mouvement faite en 1828 à l'intention de la nouvelle génération des démocrates. Selon Buonarroti les Égaux « désiraient que le peuple français, se considérant comme un membre de la grande société humaine, contribuât par sa sagesse et par son exemple, à assurer la paix universelle, et à faire respecter en tout lieu les droits que la nature a accordés à tous les hommes »⁴³. Les babouvistes furent unanimes dans la critique de la « passion des conquêtes ». Ils s'opposèrent tous à la politique extérieure du Directoire et du général Bonaparte.

C'est à ce problème que S. Maréchal consacra son *Correctif à la gloire de Bonaparte* paru en 1797, quelques mois après le drame des babouvistes. En analysant la campagne d'Italie (1796-1797) Maréchal démontre que le brave général, dont il apprécie les talents, réalise ses aspirations d'un dictateur au lieu de libérer et républicaniser des peuples tels que les Italiens et les Polonais. Il voudrait aussi voir dans Bonaparte précisément cet homme qui réaliserait le rêve de la république universelle. Après avoir évoqué, dans les dernières lignes du *Correctif*, le projet d'Henri IV « de ne faire de tout l'Europe qu'une seule monarchie », il lance au général cet appel: "Bonaparte! Élève-toi bien au dessus de cette conception: transporte à Paris le Congrès de Rastadt, et sois y le fondateur d'une république universelle et fédérative, dont la France serait le chef-lieu et le principal boulevard. Sois l'Amphictyon de notre siècle. Et c'est ainsi qu'il conviendrait de fermer la grande Révolution”⁴⁴.

Après avoir esquissé ce bref panorama de l'idée de la république universelle pendant la Révolution Française, le moment est venu de se poser la question sur la diffusion de cette idée en dehors de la France. Sans aspirer à la présentation exhaustive de ce problème nous nous bornerons à quelques faits qui parurent importants pour cette étude. Or, la lecture de la "Bouche de Fer" publiée par le Cercle social nous a révélé les contacts particulièrement intenses avec les Allemands. Les noms de Wieland, Klopstock et Nicolai y sont les plus souvent cités. Une étude récente sur la *République démocratique européenne. Rêve des révolutionnaires allemands*⁴⁵ montre bien que des ouvrages consacrés à la république universelle parurent en Allemagne depuis 1786. A l'époque de la Révolution Française, les penseurs Allemands montrèrent beaucoup de réalisme en

⁴² S. Maréchal, *Les crimes des empereurs turcs*, Paris an III, p. 601. – *Tableaux historiques des révolutionnaires* Paris an III, p. 143.

⁴³ Buonarroti, *Conspiration pour l'Égalité dite de Babeuf*, t. 1, p. 182-183.

⁴⁴ S. Maréchal, *Correctif à la gloire de Bonaparte ou Lettre à ce général*, Paris an VI. Nous citons d'après la réimpression dans la „Revue historique de la Révolution française, 1912, n° 10, p. 312.

⁴⁵ M. Gilli, *La république démocratique européenne. Rêve des révolutionnaires allemands*, „Dix-huitième Siècle”, 1993, n° 25, p. 41-53.

bornant le projet d'un État universel à l'Europe, où à l'Alliance franco-prussienne. Parmi ceux qui proposèrent la fusion des Allemands libres et des Francs libres on trouve G. Forster et F. Cotta. Cependant N. Vogt s'imaginait l'Europe fédérée autour des États allemands. Plus „internationalistes” furent des penseurs qui lièrent l'idée de la république universelle avec celle de la paix perpétuelle, et le cas de Kant avec son *Zum ewigen Frieden* est suffisamment représentatif pour cette attitude. Pendant que Kant se prononçait contre l'ingérence d'un État dans les affaires d'un autre, et de même rejetait une guerre de propagande républicaine, des penseurs comme J. J. Görres et F. G. Pepe furent convaincus que la paix perpétuelle ne peut être que la conséquence d'un effort visant à républicaniser le continent par les Français.

Une preuve de l'intérêt des jacobins autrichiens pour un État républicain du genre humain est la traduction manuscrite de la *République universelle* de J. B. Cloots que nous avons trouvée dans leurs papiers conservés aux Archives Nationales de Vienne⁴⁶. Il faut chercher le traducteur anonyme de l'ouvrage de Cloots parmi les jacobins autrichiens exécutés à la charnière de 1794-1795, tels que I. J. Martinovics, A. Riedel et F. Hebenstreit (c'est S. Staszic qui observait son exécution à Vienne lors de son passage à travers cette ville).

En Pologne, les échos de la propagande républicaine française se font sentir dans les brochures politiques anonymes publiées à l'époque de l'insurrection de 1794. On trouve un fragment de Cloots inséré dans la traduction de J. P. Rabaut Saint Etienne⁴⁷. Les plus intéressantes sont les *Réflexions d'un ami de l'humanité* publiées en français et en polonais. Leur auteur reconnaît que les principes français ont « un très grand nombre de partisans dans tous les pays », mais il est convaincu de la nécessité qu'ont les peuples de „se donner des constitutions « d'après le vœu public », c'est-à-dire le vœu national. La république européenne que proposent les *Réflexions d'un ami de l'humanité* réunirait „toutes les nations diversement constituées”. Le but principal de cette association européenne serait de „prévenir les horreurs des guerres”, et, autrement dit, de ne pas laisser écraser l'insurrection par les monarques copartageant la Pologne. Un élément nouveau par rapport à d'autres projets de la formation d'un État universel qui apparaît dans les *Réflexions d'un ami de l'humanité*, c'est l'appel aux sentiments de la fraternité des soldats. L'auteur des *Réflexions* invoque: „Soldats de tous les pays, dites à ceux qui vous mènent, que vous ne voulez pas être les instruments du despotisme; que vous êtes les amis de l'humanité et que vous ne voulez combattre que pour la défense. Dites à ceux qui vous mènent que les Français, que les Polonais sont vos frères, et que vous ne voulez pas les égorger”⁴⁸.

⁴⁶ Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Wien, VA 17, fol. 1005-1028.

⁴⁷ *Unagi polityczne* (1794) publiées par le jacobin J. Mejer.

⁴⁸ *Réflexions d'un ami de l'humanité*, /Varsovie 1794/, p. 6.

Après la chute de l'insurrection de Kościuszko, on observe en Pologne l'influence de la littérature républicaine et parfois babouviste. C'est le cas d'une brochure anonyme dont l'auteur est Sylvain Maréchal: *Correctif à la gloire de Bonaparte* (1797) qui y est très populaire à cause de la critique de Napoléon, car celui-ci au lieu de libérer les peuples dominés par les despotes européens et songer à la république universelle, reste impassible aux aspirations des légions polonaises et mène des pourparlers avec les monarques. En somme, Maréchal accuse Napoléon d'avoir trahi la cause des Polonais, des Irlandais et des Italiens qui aspirent à la libération nationale. Cette brochure fit une carrière immense bien que clandestine en Pologne. On en trouve des copies manuscrites et une traduction imprimée clandestinement, à la charnière de 1799 et 1800, sous ce titre significatif: *Promemoria* (sic) *Bounaparcie* (sic)⁴⁹. L'un des quatre exemplaires enregistrés dans le catalogue central de la Bibliothèque Nationale à Varsovie appartenait à un écrivain et réformateur politique éclairé K. Kwiatkowski. Cet exemplaire est conservé à la Bibliothèque de l'Université de Varsovie. Une note manuscrite de Kwiatkowski porte la date « 1800 ». Les nouvelles informations que nous avons réussi de recueillir sur le républicanisme polonais au déclin du XVIII^e siècle, après notre dernier texte consacré à la fortune polonaise de l'opuscule de Sylvain Maréchal⁵⁰, nous montrent clairement qu'il se situe parmi les publications de la Société des Républicains Polonais (1798-1804). Cette société formée par la fusion de la Députation parisienne des insurgés émigrés après la défaite de 1795 et de la Centralisation de Lvov, maintenait des contacts avec les républicains français et continuait l'édition des brochures clandestines traduites du français depuis l'insurrection de Kościuszko. On trouve parmi ces brochures quelques variantes de *L'Abrégé du code de la nature*, tiré du *Système de la nature* de d'Holbach. Ce texte a eu une renommée internationale. Nous connaissons ses traductions hongroises attribuées aux jacobins G. Bessenyei et M. Cskonai et une traduction russe de I. Pnine⁵¹. L'une des variantes polonaises de cet opuscule diffusé en 1794 et en 1798 est due à F.K. Dmochowski dont le nom marque une continuité de la tradition républicaine polonaise dans le dernier quart du XVIII^e siècle. C'est lui qui a conçu l'idée d'une morale laïque et ensuite républicaine. Or, Dmochowski a publié en 1787 l'adaptation de l'*Ethocratie* de d'Holbach intitulée *O cnotach towarzyskich i występkach im przeciwnych*. Les variantes successives de *L'Abrégé du code de la nature* holbachien paraissent toujours sous les auspices de Dmochowski (dans la littérature clandestine jacobine en 1794, dans la revue *Pamiętnik Naukowy*, qui exploite en 1819 ses manuscrits posthumes, et surtout dans *Les lois présociaux* (*Ustawa przedspołeczna*) rédigées en 1798

⁴⁹ *Pro memoria Bounaparcie dla sprostowania słany jego, czyli list do tegoż generała*, s.l.n.d.

⁵⁰ Voir *Promemoria Bounaparcie, czyli ambivalencje bonapartyzmu w polskiej anonimowej broszurze z końca XVIII wieku*, Napis 2007, Seria XIII, p. 9-26,

⁵¹ Nous avons traité ce problème plus largement dans *La diffusion clandestine du matérialisme français dans les Lumières polonaises*, dans O. Bloch (dir.), *Le matérialisme du XVIII^e siècle et la littérature clandestine*, Paris 1982, p.263-272.

par la Société des Républicains Polonais. Ce texte publié par M. Handelsman contient un *Recueil de maximes morales*⁵² qui n'est qu'une version de *L'Abrégé du code de la nature*. Or, Dmochowski fut avec M. A. Horodyski et J. K. Szaniawski, l'un des organisateurs de la Société des Républicains Polonais.

Nous nous sommes arrêtés sur la personne de Dmochowski, car il représente une attitude originale du républicanisme polonais dans le contexte de la république européenne. Il pense à cette république pendant l'insurrection de 1794 et il suggère dans la « Gazette gouvernementale » (« Gazeta Rządowa ») du 21 octobre que la « révolution universelle » suivra celle accomplie en France et changera la face de l'Europe. En tant que lecteur de *l'Ethocratie ou le gouvernement fondé sur la morale* et de *La morale universelle* du baron d'Holbach, il veut fonder sur les mœurs la communauté politique et par conséquent il propose l'émancipation sociale du peuple polonais. Il compte sur la République Française dans sa forme établie conformément avec la Constitution de l'an III (septembre 1795), et le 22 novembre il fait son apologie dans le *Discours prononcé à la barre de la Convention Nationale par les réfugiés polonais au nom de leur nation*.

Dans le *Lois présociales*, c'est-à-dire provisoires, qui devaient précéder la constitution d'un "gouvernement républicain et démocratique" élu par les représentants du peuple, la Société des Républicains Polonais se propose la proclamation "des droits de l'homme et du citoyen puisés dans la constitution française de l'an III de la République". Elle prévoit l'invitation des membres potentiels de la Société à la « lecture assidue de la constitution française, des droits de l'homme, du *Contrat social* de Rousseau et des *Droits et des devoirs du citoyen* de Mably⁵³. C'est seulement que la notion rousseauiste de la volonté générale est remplacée dans les statuts de la Société par celle de la nation en tant que souverain : "La nation se forme par la loi seule de la nature : le gouvernement est une émanation de la volonté de la nation. La nation est avant tout, et elle est le commencement du tout. Sa volonté fait toujours la loi. Avant la nation et au dessus d'elle, il n'y a que la loi de la nature. C'est pourquoi la nation est tout ce qu'elle puisse être"⁵⁴. Cependant, l'idée de la nation reste assez vague dans les statuts de la Société. On ne précise pas son contenu social. La lecture des statuts n'est pas trop instructif là-dessus. On en peut seulement juger que les républicains polonais se méfiaient du peuple. Ils furent convaincus que les paysans sont ignorants et superstitieux. Il faut donc les instruire sur les principes républicains avant de les admettre dans la Société.

⁵² M. Handelsman, *Rozwój narodowości nowoczesnej. Ideologia polityczna Towarzystwa Republikańców Polskich*, Warszawa 1924, p. 213-217.

⁵³ *Ustawa przędspoleczna z dn. 1 października 1798*. Ibid., p. 212. Cette œuvre posthume de Mably parut en 1789 et en 1793.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 217.

En ce qui concerne la politique extérieure, la Société ne propose plus une république universelle, mais la solidarité entre les pays républicains. Elle déclare qu'elle « est amie de toutes les nations libres », qu'elle aura de bons contacts avec les pays républicains et avec les autres sociétés secrètes dans les monarchies despotiques, afin de rendre à tous leurs habitants les droits de l'homme. Au lieu d'une république universelle, la Société se borne à une entente avec la France révolutionnaire. Cette union spirituelle exigera l'appui militaire : »La Société considère la guerre menée contre la République Française comme dirigée contre tous. Elle se sert de tous les moyens disponibles pour nuire à l'ennemi de la République»⁵⁵. Les auteurs des statuts de la Société Républicaine Polonaise considèrent les légions polonaises combattant en Italie contre l'Autriche en tant que forces militaires de la république polonaise prochaine.

Les sociétaires républicains polonais ne furent pas unanimes en ce qui concerne les voies de la libération nationale de la Pologne qui n'existait pas depuis 1795 comme un État indépendant. K. Szaniawski, ce jacobin radical pendant l'insurrection de 1794⁵⁶ passa une crise morale après sa défaite; il a perdu l'espoir de la libération du pays par la voie révolutionnaire. Cette crise s'est approfondie, lors de son séjour à Paris en 1799 ou, la Révolution de l'époque du Directoire, prenait de plus en plus le caractère conservateur. En l'observant Szaniawski »perd son culte pour cette révolution et la confiance en France»⁵⁷. Il cesse de croire à la solidarité sentimentale entre les peuples, car « aucune nation ne se soucie du sort d'une autre nation gratuitement; une amitié pure n'arrive que parmi les particuliers, mais les nations ne se conduisent que par leurs intérêts»⁵⁸.

Kościuszko qui fut aussi membre de la Société comptait dès le début de sa carrière politique sur les forces nationales à l'exemple des Américains. Cependant, au printemps 1793 il soumit un mémoire au ministre girondin des affaires étrangères Lebrun. Il y spécifia les raisons et les moyens de faire éclater une révolution en Pologne grâce à l'appui de la France. Il y suggérait que la révolution prochaine polonaise transporterait les principes républicains de la liberté et de l'égalité à la Russie où l'on planterait un arbre de la liberté parmi les glaces du Nord et l'on l'ornerait de fleurs. Nous savons que les pourparlers de Kościuszko avec Lebrun furent infructueux, car le gouvernement girondin alors au pouvoir ne partageait pas l'idée de la république universelle et de la guerre de propagande lancée par les jacobins radicaux nommés hébertistes (Cloots, Hébert, Chaumette). C'est un fait presque symbolique que ces jacobins groupés autour de la Commune de Paris ont été jugé par le Tribunal révolutionnaire et exécuté le

⁵⁵ Ibid., p : 227.

⁵⁶ Voir sur son activité pendant les émeutes à Varsovie B. Leśnodorski, *Polscy jacobini*, Warszawa 1960, p. 395.

⁵⁷ M. Mateufflowa, J.K. *Szaniawski. Ideologia i działalność. 1815-1830*, Warszawa 1936, p. 26.1

⁵⁸ M. Handelsman, *Rozwój narodowości nowoczesnej. Ideologia polityczna Towarzystwa Republikanów Polskich*, Warszawa 1924, p. 239.

24 mars 1794, car le même jour Kościuszko a proclamé à Cracovie l'acte de l'insurrection nationale. La crise du républicanisme français (Le Directoire, le Consulat, l' Empire) pesait lourdement sur le républicanisme polonais. Ils ont cessé de voir en Paris la capitale de la république européenne et même mondiale qui universelle, parce que cette ville devint le centre de la dictature de Napoléon. C'est intéressant que le traducteur polonais du *Correctif à la gloire de Bonaparte* passe sous silence le fragment, où il y a question de Paris en tant que „chef-lieu et le principal boulevard” de la république universelle.

Le Correctif à la gloire de Bonaparte contenant la critique du général, mais aussi l'espoir de le rendre utile à la cause de la libération des nations opprimées par les despotes (Sylvain Maréchal lui reproche de ne pas vouloir mettre Kościuszko en tête des légions polonaises et le conduire à Varsovie) fit une carrière internationale. Nous connaissons sa traduction italienne: *Corettivo alla gloria di Buonaparte ovvero lettera a quel generale* dont l'unique exemplaire nous a été signalé par la Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale à Florence⁵⁹. Cependant elle fut publiée clandestinement à Paris chez le même éditeur et la même année que l'original français. Il est fort probable que cette traduction italienne fut accomplie par F. Buonarroti, ami intime et compagnon de lutte de Bqbeuf et Maréchal. On sait que déjà en 1795 Buonarroti avait fondé ses espérances de la libération de l'Italie sur l'action des armées républicaines françaises. Il „avait même fait paraître une brochure *La Paix perpétuelle avec les monarques* dans laquelle se trouve déjà esquissé un plan assez voisin du plan de Maréchal”⁶⁰. Il y proposa l'anéantissement de la „ligue tyrannique” et la dissolution de la papauté comme condition de la paix perpétuelle.

C'est grâce à Buonarroti que s'accomplit la continuité entre la tradition jacobine et babouviste, qui fut fusionner le cosmopolitisme des Lumières avec l'idée révolutionnaire de la fraternité des couches populaires, et les mouvements démocratiques de la première moitié du 19^e siècle songeant à une fédération européenne des républiques.

Mais il y a aussi une césure entre l'idéologie démocratique de ces deux époques. Elle s'annonce surtout dans la doctrine de G. Mazzini et de la Jeune Europe. Cette doctrine s'oppose à l'universalisme gallocentrique de la charbonnerie démocratique. Elle assigne aux nations particulières, et non pas à une nation unique, une mission dans la formation de la nouvelle Europe républicaine. C'est dans ses lettres adressées au démocrate polonais J. Lelewel que Mazzini formule une idée de l'Europe polycentrique, bien que groupant toutes les nations libres et autonomes. Les écrivains romantiques feront de la nation un sujet actif, un créateur de l'histoire.

⁵⁹ *Corettivo alla gloria di Buonaparte, ovvero lettera a quel generale*. Traduzione dal francese. Venezia et si trova a Parigi presso Lenfant. Cote: Colloc. Palat. Misc. 3.D.8.4.

⁶⁰ M. Dommanget, *Sylvain Maréchal. L'égalitaire l'Homme sans Dieu*, Paris 1950, p. 346.

Le cas de Mazzini nous laisse mieux saisir le problème essentiel de la nation, posé d'une manière totalement différente chez les révolutionnaires français, héritiers du rationalisme des Lumières, et chez les penseurs romantiques. L'universalisme éclairé des Français tend souvent à exclure tout particularisme au nom de l'universalisme de la nature et de la raison. Leur république universelle ne peut s'établir que par la suppression des États et des nations. Elle constitue un assemblage décidément amorphe d'individus homogènes. L'absence de toutes les tensions possibles entre l'universel et le particulier, tel qu'une nation, un État, un groupe social, politique, religieux, linguistique ou autre, voilà ce qui fait tourner l'idée de la république européenne en utopie. Il nous serait difficile de s'imaginer les paysans polonais et encore davantage les représentants des peuplades archaïques en tant que braves sans-culottes venant à Paris pour un congrès des nations et parlant français. Même si dans le discours concernant la république universelle on parle des nations, on les identifie avec les peuples, et les peuples sont souvent considérés comme des groupes ethniques ou linguistiques. A la charnière du XVIII^e et du XIX^e siècle on songe à la formation des organismes politiques groupant les pays slaves autour de la Pologne ou autour de la Russie. Le panslavisme trouve son correspondant dans le gallocentrisme français qui trouve son expression dans l'Académie Celtique protégée par Napoléon. L'ethnologie sert alors la politique et celle-ci sert l'ethnologie. Cette jonction présente en Pologne chez S. Staszic se fait dans un organisme politique international qui n'est plus républicain. En 1807, il précise dans *La statistique de la Pologne* destinée à Napoléon préparant l'organisation du Duché de Varsovie que la Pologne peut devenir le centre de la prochaine union des nations slaves ayant presque les mêmes mœurs et presque une même langue. Après la défaite de Napoléon Staszic rédige *Les pensées sur l'équilibre politique en Europe* où il accepte les solutions du Congrès de Vienne (1815) et projette la formation d'un seul État slave ayant le souverain commun pour la Russie et la Pologne. On a souvent tort de voir dans le panslavisme de Staszic une attitude conservatrice et russophile. Cependant Il ne voyait dans une « nation slave » qu'un état passager vers la fédération universelle des nations. L'idée de cette fédération, il l'avait bien conçue bien avant la période napoléonienne. Il l'a trouvée d'abord chez l'abbé de Saint Pierre et chez Raynal. Mais restant en contacts avec les anciens républicains polonais et surtout avec Szaniawski qui étudia Herder, il se familiarisa avec la philosophie de l'histoire contenue dans *Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit* (1784-1791). Staszic de même que Herder furent buffoniens. Une catégorie centrale de leur pensée c'est la force créatrice inhérente à la nature et prenant dans l'homme une forme consciente. Cette force se réalise dans les progrès que font les hommes réunis dans les sociétés constituant le genre humain. Cependant la force créatrice de la nature agit toujours d'une manière objective et la subjectivité humaine est sujette à l'erreur. Par conséquent l'histoire

objective idéale et l'histoire subjective concrète ne sont pas identiques. L'homme en perfectionnant sa nature réalise toujours sa force créatrice, mais il ne fait des progrès qu'en corrigeant ses erreurs. Selon Buffon les "grands talents dans l'art de faire du mal ont été les premiers qui aient frappé l'esprit de l'homme; ensuite ceux qui l'ont amusé ont occupé son cœur; et ce n'est qu'après un très long usage de ces deux moyens de faux honneur et de plaisir stérile qu'enfin il a reconnu que sa vraie gloire est la science, et la paix son vrai bonheur"⁶¹. Nous avons cité les dernières lignes de l'ouvrage de Buffon: *Des époques de la nature* (1778).

Staszic qui l'avait traduit en 1786 et réédité en 1803 et 1816, l'avait sous les yeux pendant plus d'une trentaine d'années. La connaissance de l'œuvre de Herder qui est devenue populaire parmi les membres de la Société des Amis des Sciences, dont Staszic fut le membre depuis 1800 et le ensuite (depuis 1808) président, laissa enrichir l'idée de la confédération des nations et de la paix perpétuelle chez l'auteur du *Genre humain*. Nous avons parlé ailleurs⁶² comment l'œuvre de Herder, parlant avec une sympathie des paisibles et laborieux Slaves, influa sur les recherches consacrées à leur histoire et comment cette histoire souvent mythique laissait exprimer les sentiments patriotiques. Herder comme Staszic fut pacifiste et sa philosophie optimiste de l'histoire prévoyait la réalisation de l'humanité (*Menscheit*), c'est-à-dire des meilleures qualités humaines et entre autres du pacifisme slave. Les deux philosophes reconnaissaient l'histoire en tant que processus objectif réalisée par la force créatrice de la nature. Staszic identifiait parfois cette force avec le *fatum* des anciens auquel même les dieux étaient soumis. Cependant la Providence chez Herder semble renouer avec celle de Vico et parfois on l'interprète de la même manière. Cependant Staszic ne fut pas seulement un philosophe de l'histoire, mais un homme politique qui essayait toujours conformer ses vues théoriques avec les exigences de la situation politique concrète.

En tant que philosophe il fut convaincu de l'union prochaine des nations et de la paix perpétuelle. En tant qu'homme politique il compta en 1807 sur Napoléon et lui suggérait une version polono centrique de son panslavisme.

⁶¹ Buffon, *Les époques de la nature*, Paris 1971, p. 221.

⁶² Voir *Pacyfizm Staszica na tle idei wiecznego pokoju w oświeceniu europejskim*, Zeszyty Staszicowskie, 2004, 4, p. 7-23.

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Prejudices: An Investigation Into Barriers of Humanity*

CHEIKH MBACKÉ GUEYE

International Academy of Philosophy,

Im Schwibboga 7,

FL-9487 Bendern,

The Principality of Liechtenstein

E-mail: cgueye@iap.li

Abstract

By bringing people closer together, the phenomenon of globalisation not only accentuates differences but also it reinforces the sense of identity and belonging. This paradoxical and dynamic picture puts us straight before the challenge as to how to accommodate differences in order to live peacefully together. The gulf between “us” and “them” become more and more visible. The perception we can have of “others” remains deeply shaped by the values and precepts we learn in our respective cultural and educational circles. Yet, because men are not mere cultural products, individual responsibility and rational deliberation play an important role in the ways we approach “others.” In this article, we investigate prejudices as a phenomenon that is in the heart of above-mentioned issues. After a brief investigation into the nature of a prejudice, the paper outlines two main philosophical positions that either rehabilitate prejudices (Hans-Georg Gadamer) or calls for their abandonment (Descartes). The author argues that, despite the good arguments to be found in both positions, the nature of prejudices—as “something not yet knowledge”—puts upon us a kind of “moral and epistemological obligation” to overcome them, in order to do justice to ourselves and to our fellowmen, and construct sustainable and peaceful societies.

Key words: prejudice, judgement, knowledge, understanding, dialogue, self-knowledge, peace, sustainability, humanity, difference

* Some ideas in this article have been expressed in a previous article of mine. (Gueye 2005, pp. 83-103).

“Oh! I know these people!” someone may say of another nation.

“They are superficial.” If you ask why, he will answer:

“I once knew a man from this nation and he was very superficial.”

Men who tend toward this type of reasoning allow certain facts, which they know from

naïve cognition, to fall right into their

theoretical attitude, and they proceed to employ these facts

merely as examples for their uncritical induction.”

Dietrich von Hildebrand (1991, p. 54)

INTRODUCTION

The relevance of the issue of prejudices takes on a greater value nowadays, in the twenty-first century, because of the inescapable routine of living side by side with people from different backgrounds. The cohabitation and juxtaposition of “differences” reveal two dynamic movements that are intrinsically intertwined: facing the “other” and facing “ourselves.” The contact with the “other” becomes a mirror which brings us back to our own self, our own identity. By learning to know the “other” we put into the test our preconceptions, prejudgments, and prejudices.

However, prejudices can have a double-edged “function”: they can help with or distort the encounter with the “other.” Where to place the cursor? When can we rely on prejudices while being sure that they don’t fail us and make us adopt unjustified attitudes? How to move between the mazes and pitfalls of prejudices with a realistic conception of the human being, i.e., a human being with an individual and a social identity expressed in various areas and dimensions: society, culture, religion, politics, etc.?

In order to give answers to these questions, it is useful to take recourse to philosophy in general, and philosophical anthropology, epistemology, and ethics in particular. Hence in what follows, I will try, after I) some general remarks on the ontology of prejudices, to provide a II) sketch of the two movements of pro- and anti-prejudices in philosophy; after that, I will propose to look into III) some practical ways as to how to overcome prejudices.

I. WHAT IS A PREJUDICE?

To investigate the nature of prejudices requires a clear attention to the elements and kinds of prejudices and the necessary states of affairs rooted in their nature. It is also necessary to distinguish between the intrinsic value or disvalue of a prejudice and its different kinds,

differences that derive from the various levels on which prejudices exist and from the different groups of persons subject to prejudices. Thus, since prejudices can be classified in relation to certain social, intellectual, and ethico-religious aspects, one can then speak of racial, philosophical, and ethico-religious prejudices, etc. (See Allport: 1954).

Furthermore, one can distinguish between: a) internal prejudices in the sense of inner acts of prejudices, i.e., the personal acts of premature or prior judging, b) the objective judgements (propositions) held true in these acts of judging, c) and the external manifestations of prejudices, i.e., linguistic utterances and certain modes of behaviour, through which these inner prejudices are clearly expressed. Therefore, it is crucial to be aware of these different forms and moments of prejudices and of the differences between inner prejudices and their external manifestations. Consequently, reducing prejudices to mere behaviours would be tantamount to overlooking the inner acts of prejudices and the assumptions and propositions espoused by them, which seem, to a great extent, to be the most important moment and the chief factor responsible for their external manifestation. For, our language and conduct are often spontaneous expressions of our inner judgments, dispositions and convictions.

Let us note here that the word “judgment” can be understood in different manners. (1) It can simply refer to the act of the intellect which holds a certain state of affairs to exist and judges it to obtain; this meaning is the primitive and primary meaning of judgment. (2) More restrictedly, it can refer only to those acts of judging that allot a certain value to an object, a person, or an event. (3) It can also refer to a certain objective logical entity which is composed of concepts and to which we can ascribe truth or falsity. This third meaning of judgment is even more complicated and calls for a clear attention. (See Pfänder, Crespo 2000, pp. 31-126). Within judgments of all these kinds there is a huge difference between those that are well-founded in knowledge and those which are rash, blind, ill-founded, or erroneous. The concept of prejudice can be related to all of these meanings of the word “judgment.”

In this attempt to overcome the difficulties pertaining to understanding and defining prejudices, linguistic analysis can be helpful. In fact, one of those difficulties comes from the ways of understanding the anteriority implied in a “*pre-judice*.” As a matter of fact, from the Latin *praejudicium*, prejudices can refer to a *judgment* or to *something which is not yet a judgment*. These two interpretations are valid because of the two meanings which could rightly be attached to the Latin preposition *prae* which could be translated as “anterior” or “before,” as an adjective or an adverb. Prejudices could then be an anterior (or precedent) judgment, as well as something (not yet a judgment) which could be held before any kind of judgment. In this second meaning, prejudices can refer to some inclinations, the nature of which has still to be investigated and its

difference with a judgment be established. Nevertheless, it seems that at least a triple understanding of anteriority could be established here: A *logical* anteriority, a *psychological* anteriority, and a *chronological* one.

The “anteriority question” reveals in general the issue of the nature of prejudgment and judgment, and their relations; it reveals especially three problems that I would term as the “limit,” “continuity,” and the “subordination” problems.

a) “The limit problem” refers to the question as to which extent a judgment is *totally* different from a prejudgment. If there is a rupture, what could be the terms of that rupture between a judgment and a prejudgment? In other words, where do prejudgments end, and where do judgments start?

b) “The continuity problem” refers to the question as to what extent a judgment can simply constitute the continuity or continuation of a prejudgment. In other words, the question is whether there are essential elements in a prejudgment that have necessarily to be maintained in a judgment.

c) “The subordination problem” would refer to the question as to what extent prejudgment can be subordinated, if ever, to a judgment.

We could, then, rightly infer that a prejudice is not yet knowledge. And even the protagonists of positive prejudice would have serious difficulties in determining in which sense prejudices can be positive. The main problem that they are confronted with has to do with what I would call “the situational state” of a prejudice, namely, how it is related—within the process of thinking, formulating ideas and reflections, and coming to knowledge—to judgments. While knowledge is something acquired, secured and justified, resulting from deliberation and reason’s ratification, something of certainty, prejudices can only be the anterior judgements that might help in the possession of knowledge. Hence a notion of “positive prejudice,” in my opinion, has nothing to do with truth and true knowledge. Therefore, a tentative definition of a prejudice could be *a rash, cognitively unfounded, judgment of a certain kind*. It can be identified with *an act of judging rashly, or with the cognitively ill-founded objective logical proposition, especially the ill-founded value judgment*. But it can also refer to the *propositions asserted in such rash judgments and to their falsity or to true judgments which are cognitively ill-founded*.

In our relations within a social environment, we come to form certain ideas about peoples, situations, things, and so on. We come to form prejudgments that do not always match the true reality or being of things. These prejudgments, although it is hard to get rid of them, can constitute serious obstacles when we try to enter into contact or cohabitate with others. This cohabitation is in danger mostly when people form prejudices, i.e., prejudgments which, not only

do not match the reality and true being of things, or states of affairs, but also, more often than not, come into conflict with the truth of things.

II. PHILOSOPHERS ON PREJUDICE

Philosophers have always been struggling with notions of truth and knowledge. They have tried, through the proposition of various philosophical systems, to provide answers to questions such as how to acquire true knowledge, and how to conceive of the truth. Since an important element of the philosophical inquiry is to tend towards impartiality and find solid and objective foundations for knowledge, the issue as to how we should stand by our traditions and experience has occupied an important place. The experience we gather throughout our lives is full of instances that are deeply engraved on our minds and they consequently influence our conducts.

We might be philosophers aspiring to knowledge and wisdom, but we are first and foremost human beings, i.e., social and political beings who lead actual lives with other fellow human beings. This fact of our being “on board,” i.e., born in actual communities, makes us somewhat vulnerable to many influences that could colour our judgments. Our experiences in society make us form prejudices, consciously or unconsciously.

The issue of prejudice has been broadly explored in philosophy. In fact, there are two main trends which hold either a positive nature of prejudices, or a negative one. On the one hand, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975) thinks, for example, that prejudices have a positive character because they can help us understand and enter into dialogue with our environment. Mills and Polanowski (1997), follow in the footsteps of Hans-Georg Gadamer to criticize the ‘negative’ connotation and twist that are attached to prejudices and define prejudice as a preferential self-expression of valuation, the necessary precondition for the self and civilization to emerge. On the other hand, Descartes (1971) as well as Bachelard (1938) consider prejudices as epistemological obstacles which hinder us from gaining true and unshakable knowledge.

1. The Positive Nature of Prejudices

Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975, p. 240) tried to rehabilitate prejudices by claiming that they have a positive nature in so far as they “are conditions for understanding.” For Gadamer, the negative connotations of prejudices stem from the Enlightenment. In fact, prejudices and fore-meanings in the mind of the interpreter make understanding (*verstehen*) possible, are not at the free disposal of the interpreter, but linked to a “horizon” and an “effective history.” In *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, he states:

It is not so much our judgments as our prejudices that constitute our being....Prejudices are not necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so that they inevitably distort truth. In fact, the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. They are simply conditions whereby we experience something. (Gadamer 1977, p. 9)

Understanding Gadamer's stance about prejudices requires going back to his theory of historicity or historicity of understanding which is closely connected to Heidegger's call for taking seriously into account the fore-structure of understanding. Actually for Heidegger, in order to grasp the objective ways of understanding one should consider understanding as meaning the projection of possibilities. And in order to get to be able to make those projections, one should rely on fore-structures. The interpretation we make of something we encounter in the world arises out of the way we understand the world. Heidegger goes on to spell out the three stages of the fore-structure. For Heidegger (1962, p. 191), "in every case this interpretation is grounded in *something we have in advance*—in a *fore-having*. (...) in *something we see in advance*—in a *fore-sight*. (...) in *something we grasp in advance*—in a *fore-conception*."

Gadamer takes on Heidegger's circle in order to develop the role of the fore-meanings in our effort to understand and interpret. But, as Heidegger who warns us against the tendency of relying on "fancies" and "popular conceptions" introduces the fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception, Gadamer (1975, pp. 236-7) also emphasizes that as interpreters, we should not "rely solely on the fore-meaning at once available to us, but rather examine explicitly the legitimacy, i.e., the origin and validity, of the fore-meanings present within ourselves." Moreover, Gadamer acknowledges that prejudices (as fore-meanings) can sometimes distort; the point is that they do not *always* do so.

Nevertheless, Gadamer has come under hard criticisms, all mostly deriving from his conception of historicity as a condition of understanding. What is the criterion for determining the validity of an interpretation? If understanding is always historical, how do we account for any criticism of a current interpretation? How does Gadamer understand at all the historicity of understanding? These are questions that critics of Gadamer have raised to point at some tensions in Gadamer's hermeneutical theory. My aim here is not to provide answers to those criticisms but to raise them in order to show some of the crucial problems that the project of rehabilitating prejudices has been confronted with. At any rate Bilen (2000) does address those sorts of criticisms by arguing that Gadamer's theory is in no way promoting relativism. Quite to the contrary, philosophical hermeneutics, he says, as developed by Gadamer, rests on the ontological

structure of the relation between understanding, language, and Being; and he argues that Gadamer maintains the universality of reason and language.

Furthermore, there is still another problem, namely, how prejudices can lead to knowledge. If for Gadamer mutual agreement or understanding amounts to knowledge, then a society or, persons—to paraphrase Dermot Moran (2000, p. 286)—through their use of prejudgments or prejudices, might well be convinced that the earth is flat, and they might agree on this. However, although there is agreement, society, or those persons, cannot claim to possess knowledge. Hence, the setting up of criteria proves relevant and even more necessary, for agreement in truth is much better than an agreement in falsity or much rather, agreement on false claims is even a greater evil than the discord between true knowledge and error.

Let us stress that in Gadamer, one can find three basic understandings of “understanding.” Here I focus only on one of them, i.e., understanding as mutual agreement that I think, is somewhat flawed. The other two kinds of understandings are an intellectual grasp, and understanding as a practical know-how (Grondin 2002, pp. 37-51).

I shall retain from Gadamer at least three levels of the historicity of understanding: the historicity of experience, the historicity of objects of the human sciences, and the historicity of the understanding subject him or herself (Bilen *ibid*, p. 3). The context in which the dialogue between the subject and the object takes place is of an outmost importance. Crucial is also the way in which the subject is “colored” by tradition, beliefs, and “truths” of his time. The description of human beings’ “embeddedness” should not necessarily lead to holding on to relativistic conceptions of morality and truth. Gadamer, by emphasizing the role of historicity in human understanding and approach to things, reveals the important tripartite relationship constituted by subject-object-environment. The role of the subject who aspires to gaining true knowledge is to take a measured consideration to the context while pursuing with perseverance the truth of the things in themselves.

The positivization of prejudices can also be seen in the light of legal procedure, precisely in the so-called “presumption of innocence.” An accused person is presumed innocent until the contrary is proven, i.e., a positive prejudice is *granted* to him unless proofs are laid out that show and confirm his culpability. The presumption of innocence is also closely linked to the right to the benefit of doubt. What the presumption of innocence aims at is the preservation of the dignity of the accused; but more important, it rests on the idea that people are basically honest and respectful of the laws. Hence, any theory of prejudices remains closely linked to a certain conception of man. The inherent fallibility of man has led some philosophers to adopt a cautious attitude towards—if not a complete rejection—of prejudices.

2. The Negative Nature of Prejudices

René Descartes holds that prejudices have a negative character; hence people must get rid of them in order to gain true knowledge. Prejudices are *epistemological obstacles*, an idea that is also espoused by Gaston Bachelard (1999), for whom, man, in the course of understanding, should be led to wipe out his prejudices, all those “primitive modes of thinking” which are naïve and credulous. “There are no first truths,” he says, “only first errors.” Hence the search for truth consists in a permanent rectification of errors. Once we start asking ourselves questions related to the why and how of things and beliefs, we start moving slowly away from prejudices. Prejudices conflict with a questioning of received ideas. As long as I ask myself questions, I doubt, and by doubting, I start to put into question beliefs. Descartes (1971, p. 20) was aware of this task as he alluded to it in his first method:

The first was never to accept anything for true which I had not evident knowledge of its being so; that is, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and to embrace in my judgment only what presented itself to my mind so clearly and distinctly that I had no occasion to doubt it.

The philosophical inquiry has to start from somewhere. Alone the fact of choosing which method and methodology to adopt can be interpreted as a prejudiced approach. But beyond that, the question that needs to be posed here is how to account for the possibility of philosophizing without prejudices. Descartes has been criticized in this respect for his idealistic conception of man, i.e., as a being who must be entering (and who can enter!) into philosophical reflection with no prejudices. Descartes, in fact, calls for a pure *presuppositionless* beginning in philosophy in general, and in epistemology in particular. This stance seems to overlook the fact that men are “on board,” i.e., carrying with them some features of their cultures, beliefs, and so on, all of which are very hard to get rid of. Furthermore, besides the temporal problem as to when we are able to confirm our possession of true knowledge, there is the risk of being a “perpetual beginner” for whom “no thesis could ever be sufficiently well established that it could not be called up for re-examination at any point of the investigation.” (Salomon 2001, p. 145)

Interestingly, Descartes seems to be having recourse to prejudices (prejudgments) while calling for an abandonment of prejudices through his doubt which results in a provisory judgment (*jugement provisoire*). On what should the provisory judgment be based? Furthermore, the provisory doubt which is the exposition of some rules of action given by Descartes in the third part of the *Discourse on Method*, as valid in the sphere of action, *awaiting to find certitude and knowledge*

of moral principles, cannot be worked out *ex nihilo*. More importantly, this provisory doubt finds itself in three maxims: 1) to follow the customs of one's country (rule of conformism), 2) to take the certain as probable, and 3) to change one's desires rather than the order of the world. It seems that, to avoid falling into contradiction, Descartes needs some foundations, a kind of springboard for his provisory doubt to take place and work correctly. Now the nature of these foundations seems to be either unknown, or at least, not clear enough, mostly when it comes to differentiating them from prejudices. At any rate, it seems that any act of judging, whatever its object might be, is somehow unthinkable without prejudgments.

The question, in my opinion, is less about whether we have prejudices—I think we all do—than how to go about our prejudices. I think we should move from an idealistic conception of man to a realistic description of man that, nevertheless, does not allow giving a blank check to our prejudices. The call to overcome prejudices—as *rash, cognitively unfounded judgments*—has a special role to play in our efforts to work out a solid platform for addressing the (social, political, psychological, religious, political, etc.) obstacles or barriers of humanity.

In social relations, prejudices play a decisive role in that they influence our way of behaving towards each other. It goes without saying that when these prejudices have a negative character (nature), the social relations are more jeopardized. The examples of the consequences of negative prejudices are not totally unknown in our century where suspicions of all kinds are most of the time expressions of prejudices. Furthermore, if we call for an effort to overcome prejudices, it is surely because their nature poses problem.

Because prejudices lack verification and evidence, and their defenders often are not even interested in the question of truth, but are guided by other considerations irrelevant for the question of truth, they are prime targets for a systematic and critical analysis into their nature and origin. Such an analysis forms the groundwork for any objective and impartial approach to our social and political environment and would thus contribute much to the dissolution of prejudices, and prevent us from engaging in stereotyping, bigotry, scapegoating, and other elements and roots of prejudices.

III. WAYS TO OVERCOME PREJUDICES

By the call to overcome prejudices and the plea for a careful analysis of the latter, we make ourselves aware of the danger we all run into when we have recourse to prejudices while interfacing with others. Overcoming prejudices can, at times, require monumental efforts, since man is inclined towards and immersed in prejudice. Though the efforts to overcome prejudices have different aspects, not all of which are reducible to the intellectual sphere, I will chiefly

indicate here four practical ways: 1) self-knowledge, 2) critical thinking and attitude, and 3) solidarity, sympathy and compassion.

1. Self-Knowledge

The Socratic expression “know yourself” is a celebrated injunction which began its career in the realm of philosophy. However, it also extends to other spheres of human existence inasmuch as it emphasizes the place that self-knowledge has in relations with others. By knowing oneself, one can avoid becoming a victim of external manipulations and, at the same time, avoid falling prey to some misunderstanding and misjudgement. This knowledge of oneself indeed goes hand in hand with a profound and constant *prise de conscience* of oneself, not only of one’s place and role in the world, but also of that of the others. It is through this *prise de conscience* that one comes to realize the infinitesimal and yet very important place that one occupies in the general administration of the world. Along with this *prise de conscience* come certain virtues such as humility. Furthermore, this *prise de conscience*, rather than occasioning a closed-mindedness, is what helps us broaden our perspective and views about the world. For, as Bertrand Russell (1961, p. 438) puts it:

So far knowledge is concerned, a man should be aware of the minuteness of himself and his immediate environment in relation to the world, all with an equal right to live and think and feel. He should see his own age in relation to the past and the future, and be aware that its own controversies will seem as strange to future ages as those of the past seem to us now. Taking an even wider view, he should be conscious of the vastness of geological epochs and astronomical abysses; but he should be aware of all this, not as a weight to crush the individual human spirit, but as a vast panorama which enlarges the mind that contemplates it.

Prejudices can profoundly dwell in man’s mind; they can be so hidden that it becomes a Herculean—if not simply an impossible—task, to get rid of them. Hence people need to look into themselves, to scrutinize themselves, their behaviours as well as their beliefs and ideas, in order to learn more accurately in what their judgments and prejudices consist, and more importantly, if they coincide with truth and reality. For, although brought about from the outside world, prejudices are—consciously or unconsciously—entertained and developed within our minds.

Although the *philosophical* task of an analysis of the essence of prejudices (dealing with the general essence and roots of prejudices) is entirely different from the type of self-scrutiny considered here, the two things are closely connected. We should examine the nature and roots

of our own prejudices and seek to free ourselves from them *in the light of understanding their general nature, elements, and roots*.

And it can only be the quest for truth, not a relativistic philosophy and attitude, that can lead to overcoming prejudices and even to understanding their nature. Without the notion of an objective truth the whole notions of error and of prejudices make no sense. It should be a daily occupation of each and every man to aspire to, and to espouse, truth that alone has the power to lead us to freeing ourselves from prejudices. If there is no truth, there are no errors and prejudices nor can we free ourselves from them. Moreover, relativism, as history, in which the worst forms of oppression of human dignity were built on relativistic ideologies (see Buttiglione 1991; von Hildebrand 1994), has taught us, is only the origin of an unstable and precious world, where wars and conflicts of all kinds abound and where not only *de facto* but also *de jure* no rational notion of prejudices is possible. Fighting against relativism, however, in no way means a promotion of exacerbated and uncritical universalism that would make us blind towards the many factual negative and positive differences of cultures, civilizations, and convictions of people, and towards the need to respect all authentic cultures and values. Furthermore, this investigation into the truth of things remains closely related to a critical attitude which one also ought to have towards inherited ideas and traditions.

2. Critical Thinking and Attitude

Prejudices often abide where laziness prevails. The relation between the nature of man and his tendency to form prejudices has also been characterized by Kant (1968, pp. 136-7), in his definition of a prejudice as “the tendency to passivity [passive reason], and therefore to heteronomy of reason.” As Trojan horses—to borrow an expression from informatics—prejudices can be present in one’s minds, unnoticed, hidden, while colouring one’s decisions and behaviours, ‘undermining’ the very autonomy of oneself as a person. There is a need for a critical attitude towards the received ideas which are taken for granted and never questioned. The routine in which the lazy man moves favours that he never questions anything. In order not to leave the ground to prejudices, one has to eliminate them from their very roots, i.e., from the very beginning of their formation. Here the criticism towards oneself, including one’s ideas inherited from tradition and culture, can be a tremendously important tool in the fight against prejudices. Indeed, from a “learned” culture, people should move towards a rationally “judged” culture. From an enculturative conditioning people should tend to harbour a critical attitude towards the established and “taken for granted” cultural practices.

In this respect, one could also point at the need to take distance vis-à-vis some religious teachings that promote and encourage indoctrination and fanaticism, etc. If it is true that there are truths on which every religion rests, it should be emphasized that some of what we are taught in religious surroundings needs to be objectively analysed. There are, indeed, religious prejudices that are different from prejudices about a religion. Religious prejudices would be endogenous or “inherent” to the very teachings of a religion; they would be part of the religion. Whereas prejudices about a religion would be false ideas *projected*, from without, to a religion, thus misjudging it. This differentiation is important, mostly in the context of our epoch, where terrorism, and all evil acts performed in the name of religion, are so common. Finally, I could stress that the call for a critical thinking towards our environment and culture in general, and towards religion in particular, has nothing to do with any kind of heretical attitude. Rather, it denotes an awareness of and an attachment to truth and objectivity that have to motivate and support our judgments and ways of life.

It is not just a philosophical task to put into question some received ideas, as Descartes seemed to imply. It is even a moral vocation for every man to challenge and question the “smooth continuity of obviousnesses” in order to cultivate objectivity and a sense of independence. However, it is important to stress here that this call for distancing oneself from one’s environment and inherited ideas has nothing to do with condescendence. Rather, it has everything to do with learning to respect another’s beliefs and culture. Hence it is not so much to deny the existence of prejudices, than it is to dominate and control them, or to apply to them what Socrates suggested Meno doing with true opinions: to fasten them, as the statues of Daedalus:

To possess one of his works which is let loose does not count for much in value; it will not stay with you any more than a runaway slave: but when fastened up it is worth a great deal, for his productions are very fine things. And to what am I referring in all this? To true opinions. For these, so long as they stay with us, are a fine possession, and effect all that is good; but they do not care to stay for long, and run away out of the human soul, and thus are of no great value until one makes them fast with causal reasoning. And this process, friend Meno, is recollection, as in our previous talk we have agreed. But when once they are fastened, in the first place they turn into knowledge, and in the second, are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more prized than right opinion: the one transcends the other by its trammels. (Plato, *Meno*, 97e- 98a)

Hence, there is a need to develop a critical thinking. Children who are not so much capable of taking distance vis-à-vis their environment need to be schooled and initiated into a critical thinking. Adopting a critical thinking and attitude requires an analysis of our daily experiences by using some criteria such as the representativeness, the relevance, and the quality (validity) of the experiences. Apart from these rather intellectual efforts, the overcoming of prejudices can also be practiced through more or less spiritual and affective efforts.

3. Solidarity, Sympathy, and Compassion

Another way to overcome prejudices is to try to put ourselves in the place of the other and here I speak not solely of an intellectual effort but also of a free attitude and an affective response to others. A certain outburst of solidarity is needed, which consists in our will to encounter the other, to be informed about what he feels and endures, about his pains and joys, in his days and his crepuscles, his smiles and cries. This will to encounter the other expresses a human need which consists in re-affirming what unites all men, i.e., their humanity. But it is always recommendable that this solidarity be worked out in reference to truth, love and mutual respect. For it needs, indeed, unshakable and powerful foundations in order to last.

Because prejudices are formed on an incomplete set of data, or simply on “bad consciousness,” it is an important task to cultivate the will to “join” the other and ourselves in his orbit. For, there are also hidden characters or hidden elements that cannot simply be approached or known through a cold and distant contact. It is this deep feeling together, this sympathy which can help us in comprehending the other, living with him in peace, and sharing with him as much as we could, all this on the mutual respect between each other, without taking into account those contingencies that divide more than they unite human beings. This sympathy has also been recognized by the Dalai Lama (1998, pp. 42-5) as one of the main conditions to implementing peace in the world.

Along with sympathy, compassion, as a positive emotion, can help us “get into the shoes of the other.” If we are able to be compassionate, it is solely because we are human. But compassion does not go hand in hand with egoism or closed-mindedness: it requires a sort of *transcendence* which, far from referring to any condescension or certain contempt for earthly things, is the view that all human beings are members of the great community of mankind, and as such, they deserve respect and concern. This kind of *transcendence* avoids, however, any subjectivism that can be inimical to the life in community. Transcendence and the overcoming of our own subjective feelings and prejudices about the other would then allow us to start the difficult process of imagining the others not as a mere transient intellectual exercise, but as an attitude that

stems deeply from our will to live up to our humanity. (Scarry 1998, pp. 40-62) Bertrand Russell tells us here one of the various ways to imagine the other, an exercise that each of us may already start practicing, when opening and reading *foreign* newspapers:

When reading a foreign newspaper each day, we ought to routinely substitute the names of alternative countries to *test whether our response to the event arises from a moral assessment of the action or instead from a set of prejudices about the country.* (Nussbaum 2002, p. 106)

Russell's proposal, although mainly directed to a certain commitment to drawing the divide between the objective and the subjective and to showing how the status of morality and moral actions can be different from our respective social conditioning and determinism, can also be taken as a good and practical advice to experiencing the emotion of compassion. Indeed, Russell's proposal can be interpreted as a third way between the thoughts of those who hold for compassion to the kins, and those who advocate compassion for those at distance. Given the dynamism involved in man's existential display, I think neither of those two could address satisfactorily the issue of compassion. As a matter of fact, compassion should be given to all mankind, regardless of the ties that bind us.

Through the methodological tool consisting in rotating names, we can come to not only test our prejudices, but also our reactions when what seemed so foreign to us is all the sudden brought to our doorsteps. Furthermore, the virtues of effectively practising solidarity, sympathy and compassion rest on the possibility of breaking the divide between "us" and "them" and focusing on commonalities rather than on differences. They enable the process of integration which should take place first in the minds and hearts of human persons, and assisted by an adequate platform to be worked out by society at large and politics in particular. The responses we give to the events we come to know about throughout our lifetimes are often coloured by our previous experiences. But our attitude towards and usage of those previous experiences need also to be carefully analysed if we are to do justice to the other persons.

CONCLUSION

Although all of us harbour various kinds of prejudices that we happen to gather from our respective educational surroundings and individual experiences, we are called upon to exercise a permanent self-prospection and a criticism of our environment in order to gain true knowledge that would constitute the basis for our acts and choices. But we should not be oblivious of the

fact that prejudices are not always negative. They can, as initial thoughts, help us start our cognitive journey towards truth.

Nevertheless, whether they are negative or positive, they need to be overcome and replaced by a valid and true knowledge that takes into account of and is informed by reality. This call takes on today an important dimension when we witness the rapidity in which our globalised world enables encounters and shapes relationships. Facing this reality it is useful to abandon any comfortable attitude that would make us mere victims of prejudices; our efforts should rather tend to the adoption of a responsible approach that consists in transcending and overcoming prejudices.

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White Storks Killings in Lebanon and the Effort to Stop It: The Role of Social Media in Spreading and Counteracting the Phenomenon

CYPRIAN ALEKSANDER KOZERA

*National Defense University, National Security Faculty,
al. gen. Antoniego Chruściela "Montera" 103,
00-910 Warszawa, Poland
E-mail: c.kozera@aon.edu.pl*

Abstract

Massive White Storks killings in Lebanon and the response to the phenomenon reflect an example of globalized ties that connect and unite European and Middle Eastern societies. Numerous migrant birds, protected in Europe, are being killed solely for entertainment when they cross over the Lebanese sky in flocks of hundreds and thousands, among them the White Stork. The national law concerning hunting has not been enforced properly for many years in Lebanon. In result there are thousands of untrained hunters who shoot everything alive visible on the sky and afterwards proudly publish photos with the pray in the social media. This deteriorating phenomenon forced local environmentalists to seek the attention and help abroad. Hence, the network of Lebanese and Polish NGOs has been established to, via diplomatic channels, put a pressure on the Lebanese government to act more consistently. It seems that such unprecedented cooperation between Lebanon and Poland has brought forth desired results and migrating birds are becoming safer – thanks to the globalization and the Internet as well.

Key words: hunting, Lebanon, migratory birds, social media, White Stork

“Stork, stork, long-legged stork,
Off to your wife you'd better fly.
She's waiting for you in the nest,
Rocking four young ones to rest.
The first he will be hanged,
The second will be stabbed,
The third he will be burned,
And the fourth will be slapped!”

Hans Christian Andersen (*The Storks*, 1838)

INTRODUCTION

Nothing better reflects the complexity of nations' ecological ties in the globalized world as the phenomenon of birds' migration. Born in one place in the north, they annually migrate thousands of kilometres through many countries to winter in a warm region of the south. Some of them, like the White Stork (*Ciconia ciconia*), got so deeply enrooted in the culture of European nations that they are being considered as national heritage or even an iconic symbol, as it is in the case of Poland. Even though migrant birds spend half of the year “abroad,” they are considered “ours,” since they are born in Europe and therefore acquire the affiliation by the right of the soil. Yet, crossing numerous human drawn borders they enter other lands where it becomes a big challenge for them to survive due to hunting and poaching, as it happens in some countries of Africa and more commonly in the Middle East. Millions of soaring birds die every year on their way through the Levant, among them – thousands of White Storks, and it should not be considered solely an issue of the states whose airspace that concerns. Migrating birds, as all animals on the planet, belong to the global ecosystem, yet as well to multiple sub-ecosystems and thus their preservation is the concern for all humans, but especially for nations that host them. Therefore, it should not be considered an infringement of sovereignty, nor an act of imperialism, nor an oriental resentment if a nation expresses its concern about the fate of migratory birds mercilessly shot over a territory of another state just to prove the poachers' manhood. Furthermore, it should be welcomed with optimism when such a harmful phenomenon pushes the Lebanese non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to whistle-blow and spread the news to their European colleagues because it fosters further research and exchange through the media and the Internet. In consequence, due to the commitment of the Polish NGOs the diplomatic channels have been activated and the pressure put on the Lebanese government to act.

Last years NGOs' reports, press releases and the Internet social media invoked the problem of migrant birds mass killings in Lebanon¹, where they were hunted down and killed in millions without any legitimate reason – not because of hunger or environmental balance – but for the very entertainment of this activity. That sparked an outrage among environmentalists in Lebanon and the common public in Poland, where one of the migratory soaring birds, the White Stork, is commonly recognized as an informal national symbol (the White Eagle being the official one) and is widely considered as “our” bird since it breeds on the Polish land and its biggest population lives there.

Obviously, and unfortunately, the White Stork is not the only migratory species to be killed² and Lebanon is not the only country whose population is poaching them – it happens as well in Egypt, Sudan, Syria and even Cyprus, France, Malta or Spain (Birdwatch 2011a, Harper 2014, Kronenberg et al. 2013, p. 182), i.e. every country birds are migrating through. Yet, it is the scale of killings (partially due to the geographic localization of the migration routes that meet in the Levant) and the long-lasting lack of response that are so disturbing in the case of Lebanon.

This article starts with a brief explanation of the bird's cultural and pragmatic role, as well as the concept of its “Polish-hood”. Then, it briefly describes the migratory routes and tries to answer the question “How many White Storks cross the Lebanese sky?” Furthermore, it elucidates the phenomenon of illegal hunting in Lebanon, puts it in the legal framework, and finally aims at reconsidering the already taken countermeasures to prevent further killings of soaring birds in Lebanon, focusing especially on the Polish NGOs and diplomatic contribution.

Methodologically, the text is based on articles published in scientific journals, European and Lebanese NGOs' reports, recent press, radio and video releases regarding the phenomenon (2011-2014); social media research (encompassing examination of the Facebook profiles of the Polish and Lebanese NGOs, Lebanese hunters and their associations); as well as on the consultations with a Lebanese environmentalist and a lawyer.

The background and the symbolic meaning of the White Stork is described upon a work edited by Jakub Kronenberg (*et alia*, 2013), the migration routes and populations, that passes through, are discussed upon the articles of Yossi Leshem and Yoram Yom-Tov (1998), W. van den Bossche (2002), and the reports prepared by the Israel Ornithological Center by J. Meyrav (2009), M. Atallah-Augé, S. Dakdouk, J. El Khoury & N. Nasser (eds., 2005) for the Society for

¹ *Vide*: Nader 2013, Committee Against Bird Slaughter (CABS) & Lebanon Eco Movement (LEM) 2013 and: Birdwatch 2011b, Čápi východních Čech 2011, Green Prophet 2012, LosyZiemi.pl 2013, Raptor Politics 2013, RMF24 2013, Tarka 2014, TVN Meteo 2013, Wild Life Extra 2012, wPolityce.pl 2013; also: the main Facebook profiles that inform on the poaching activity are: “STOP Hunting Crimes in Lebanon”, “STOP Shooting Birds!! in Lebanon” and the “Lebanon Eco Movement.”

² In fact there are 142 species (among them many endangered) identified as poachers' pray in Lebanon (CABS & LEM 2013).

the Protection of Nature in Lebanon, and a joint report of the Committee Against Bird Slaughter and the Lebanon Eco Movement (2013). The hunting phenomenon is presented upon the aforementioned material, press news, a radio analysis (Tarka 2014), a report of B. Abi Nader of the Lebanon Eco Movement (2013), the social media research, including a content analysis of the Facebook profiles of "Lebanon Eco Movement," "Lebanese Hunting Club," "Lebanon Hunting News," "STOP Hunting Crimes in Lebanon," "STOP Shooting Birds!! in Lebanon," "T.E.R.R.E. Liban," some private profiles; and a conversation with Mr. Marc Roger, a member of the "STOP Hunting Crimes in Lebanon." The legal framework is discussed with the reference to the "Hunting System in Lebanon" law (no. 580 dated 25.02.2004), three reports published recently by the Birdlife on bird hunting legislation, policy and practices in the Mediterranean and Lebanon (Atallah-Augé et al. 2005, Birdlife 2006a, Birdlife 2006b) and e-mail consultations with a Lebanese lawyer Mr. Charbel Fadel. The response to the phenomenon and the Polish diplomatic and non-governmental efforts are described in the above mentioned documents and on the websites of *Grupa Ekologiczna*, the Polish Embassy in Beirut and the Facebook profiles of the Lebanese environmental NGOs.

"OUR STORKS"

The White Stork is commonly associated in European folk tales as a child-bringer, what was cemented, particularly as an explanation given for children, with a famous Hans Christian Andersen's story *The Storks*³. The presence of the bird in the household is also believed to be a good omen and especially a sign of fertility (Columbia 2013). According to the well documented Polish popular believes, it also protects the buildings, which host its nest, from fire, hail and thunder (Gloger 1903, Janota 1876, Lewandowski & Radkiewicz 1991, Rzączyński 1721 & 1745, Wodzicki 1877, Wójcicki 1842 – all as cited in Kronenberg et al. 2013, p. 188). Some even say that the storks are capable of carrying water to extinguish the fire on the house, but it is most probably related to an observation that storks are pouring water from their beaks onto their offspring in the nest to cool down their temperature when there is a nearby fire (Sokołowski 1932 as cited in Kronenberg et al. 2013, p. 188). However, the most reasonable explanation for such unique human acceptance towards such great birds in people's neighbourhood is a fact that they eat frogs, lizards, vipers and rodents, i.e. the animals that are considered abominable or pest (Kronenberg et al. 2013 p. 183-184, Tarka 2014). In African regions, vulnerable to the locust

³ "Yes," their [storks'] mother agreed. "What I have thought of will be just the right thing to do. I know the pond where all the little human babies lie until the storks come to take them to their parents. The pretty little babies lie in that pond, dreaming more sweetly than they ever dream afterwards. All parents want a little baby, and every child wants a little sister or brother. Now, we'll go to that pond and bring a little baby sister or brother for each of the children who didn't sing that wicked song or make fun of us. (Andersen, 1838).

plague, storks are also known to have some impact on regulation of insect population (La Baume 1910, Vesey-Fitzgerald 1959, Milstein 1966, Anderson 1995 – all as cited in Kronenberg et al. 2013, p. 183).

In Poland, which hosts the biggest population of storks amounting to over 50.000 couples (i.e. circa 250.000 birds, including the offspring, out of the total 1 million birds) (Kronenberg et al. 2013, Tarka 2014)⁴, that majestic soaring bird has gained a reputation of a national icon and, as such, it is distinctively recognizable by all Poles – both young and old; in daily life and during national festivals. The stork – less official in its symbolism and less aggressive than the Eagle – has become also an “export symbol” of Poland – a country famous of well-preserved natural environment and hospitable people. Polish souvenir shops are full of the three storks T-shirts, mugs, fridge-magnets, pens and other stuff with the inscription “*Made in Poland*” (vide fig. 1); the stork mascot has already represented Poland for many years at the EXPO World Fairs; and the greatest and most representative Boeing 787 Dreamliner, recently bought by the Polish Airlines LOT, has been nick-named “Stork” in a popular radio contest (Kronenberg et al. 2013 p. 186, RMF24 2012). The authors of the quoted article (Kronenberg et al. 2013) point out that the employment of the stork motif in such an important and prestigious event as the EXPO means that in the judgement of the PR specialists, the stork is as much useful for the country branding and as much recognizable as amber or Chopin’s Mazurkas (p.186)!



Fig. 1. (To the left): The logo of “Made in Poland,” a promotion campaign of Poland among foreign visitors, that appeared on T-Shirts, mugs, fridge-magnets, pens and other souvenirs.

⁴ In 2004/2005 season, several international censuses estimated the total population at about 230.000 pairs (Yavuz, Yavuz, Tavares, Bar 2012); more on the international census can be read in G.C. Boere, C.A. Galbraith, D.A. Stroud (eds.), *Waterbirds around the world. A global overview of the conservation, management and research of the world's waterbird flyways*, The Stationery Office, Edinburgh 2006, p. 493-495 (available at www.jncc.gov.uk/worldwaterbirds - 2014.04.17).

(source of the image <http://orfinansklep.pl/en/product,17640794,magnet,bociany,made,in,poland.html> – 2014.04.21)

Fig. 2. (To the right): An example of a mobile phone case designed for the Polish Diaspora in England available in a French on-line store – not only it reflects the popularity of the stork motif and its Polish affiliation, but also the pan-European folk explanation for the ancient question “where do the babies come from?” (source of the image:

http://www.cafepress.fr/+stork_baby_poland_england_iphone_4_slider_case,508475771 - 2014.04.21)

Thus, the White Stork represents Poland not without a reason – it has gained its “citizenship” by *ius soli* it “wears” the Polish national colours (red and white) and in its slow and soaring flight the bird is majestic enough to arouse respect and admiration, as the national symbol should. Yet, also this elevation has a pragmatic foundation – storks have always been useful (and not only demographically) for households and the environment: they regulate the populations of smaller animals, provide shelter for many other species in their nests and reflect the cleanness of the environment (“*the White Stork is a good biodiversity indicator*” – Tabółka, Sparks & Tryjanowski 2012 as cited in Yavuz et al. 2012) – (Kronenberg et al. 2013, p. 183-186). Presently, they also increase our *joie de vivre* of communing with nature – artificial platforms for the nest are being created (what attracts birds to breed and increase the population as studies in Italy, Croatia and Israel showed – Santopaolo, Godino, Golia, Mancuso et al. 2013), the electric wire infrastructure is being improved and the wounded storks are rehabilitated in a special health centre for protected animals (TVN Meteo 2012a), cameras are mounted in nests to broadcast births of young storks (since 2006 a stork’s nest in Przygodzice has been seen on-line by 2 up to 5 million people from approximately 200 countries – TVNMeteo 2012b) and visitors come to show the birds to their children... Now, everybody knows that storks not only bring children, but whole families! A small Żywkowo village that lies on the Warmia-Mazury stork route is visited annually by more than eight thousand people and thus “the stork agro tourism flourishes: there are new recreation and hiking trails created (for pedestrians and cyclists)” all over the Northeastern Poland and even „a White Stork Museum has been established by the initiative of League of Nature Protection” (PAIiZ 2007). Obviously, the villages that attract storks, attract tourists.

In Poland, where a White Stork’s nest is “a traditional landscape component” (PAIiZ 2007), the birds themselves are a part of the natural heritage, a national symbol, and... an economic variable. That is why unfounded killings of those animals spark outrage among Poles who consider them “our storks.”

MIGRATING ROUTES AND THE LEBANESE BOTTLENECK

Geographically a part of the Levant, Lebanon is a tiny country of just over 10.000 square kilometres (1/30 of Poland's area), populated by fewer than 6 million inhabitants (5.88 million est. in 2014 – CIA 2014) and situated just below the Eastern migratory bird route. Its territory is divided into four main longitudinal regions: the coastal plain, the Lebanon, the Anti-Lebanon mountains with the narrow Beqaa Valley, that lies in between, and a prolongation of the Jordan Valley (an important route for migratory birds).

Each spring and autumn few million of migrant birds pass through the Levant on their way to Africa and back. Among them White Storks, whose European population divides almost equally for the birds that travel through the Western route (via Gibraltar) and the Eastern, the Levantine route. There is also a stork population that lives in Asia, but they take further East routes, especially in the autumn, when almost all of them travel via the Arabian Peninsula (*vide* fig. 3).




Fig. 3. Schematic view of the migration routes of soaring birds in the Middle East: spring (to the left) and autumn (to the right), (Yom-Tov & Tchernov 1988 as cited in: Leshem & Yom-Tov 1998, p. 50)

Although the above maps are only schematic, they show the importance of the Eastern route, which is taken annually by the Central and Eastern European storks. Therefore, all the soaring birds meet over the skies of Lebanon and Syria, what makes these lands crucially

important for the preservation of the birds. In reality, the Eastern route consists of several corridors, what is illustrated further in the text.

Due to the lack of studies in Lebanon, it is hard to estimate the numbers of White Storks that cross the Lebanese sky and their exact routes, yet the Israeli research can shed some light on that issue. According to Yossi Leshem and Yoram Yom-Tov (1998), soaring birds flying over Israel tend to take various routes depending on a season: “in the autumn, White Storks pass over only along the Jordan Valley axis, whereas in the spring, about half the migrating storks also pass over the western edge of the central mountain range” (p. 41). The research carried out during the four consecutive years of late 1980s showed that in the autumn 88% of White Storks tend to fly over a narrow front of 52-70 km east of the Mediterranean coast (via Jordan Valley route) and only 12% of storks passed on the western side of the central mountains (i.e. via the coastal channel) – (Leshem & Yom-Tov 1998, p. 43). On the other hand, during the spring season “White Stork migration was the most conspicuous” – according to the authors of the study – since it contradicted the former hypothesis that the Jordan Valley route was the main migration route for those birds. The research showed that “at least half of the migrating White Storks moved along the western slopes of Israel's mountains (239.100 +/- 61.400 birds)” (Leshem & Yom-Tov 1998, p. 44). Other surveys done in Israel during autumns of 1988-96 resulted in 73.153 to 313.108 White Storks passing through the Bet She'an Valley (the Eastern Israeli corridor used by the majority of White Storks migrating in autumn) with the exceptionally high number of 538.000 birds calculated in 1997 (Van den Bossche et al., 2002, p. 69). In a more recent survey carried out by the Israel Ornithological Centre (IOC) in the autumn 2009 315.000 White Storks were counted in Israel in the Dead Sea region (Meyrav 2009, p. 2). The results of the presented surveys show important differences in yearly counts and regardless of the numerous surveys it is hard not only to give the number of storks entering Lebanon, but even of those that just cross the Israeli sky.

The Eastern Israeli corridor, as depicted on the figure 4., according to observations, continues to the Lebanese Beqaa Valley (Leshem & Yom-Tov 1998, p. 44), but it can turn out that the birds steer further east to Syria and thus omit Lebanon. In the opinion of van den Bossche (et al. 2002, p. 64) “most White Storks on autumn migration enter Israel not from the north, but from the northeast and east. The majority enters Israel between the southern part of the Golan Heights and the southern edge of the Dead Sea,” therefore skipping Lebanese airspace.




Fig. 4. Migration routes of soaring birds in Israel. Flocks using the western route were White Storks, the eastern route were White Storks and Lesser Spotted Eagles (the easternmost line) and the Elat [the southern] region were Honey Buzzards (Yossi Leshem, Yoram Yom-Tov; “Routes of...”, *op. cit.*, p. 44).

Leshem and Yom-Tov (1998) add that migrating storks are “probably divided almost equally” between the Israel and Jordan routes during both seasons (p. 51). On the other hand, the quoted survey of the IOC estimates the number of the birds crossing over Jordan for “anywhere from 20.000 to 150.000 storks” – therefore far fewer (Meyrav 2009, p. 2).⁵

Thus, it seems obvious that the birds that fly through Jordan continue via Syria but for those that pass over Israel it is not that clear. Generally, those of the Western Israeli corridor (during spring even up to 180.000-300.000) have to enter Lebanon, yet probably some of the storks travelling over eastern Israel (during autumn 70.000-310.000, exceptionally 580.000) come from or enter the Syrian airspace instead of flying via the Beqaa Valley. Hence, it can be estimated that 150.000-300.000 White Storks enter Lebanon, some of them twice a year. It can constitute a similar amount of the birds nesting in Poland, a country of about 37 million

⁵ The Israel Ornithological Centre complains on lack of surveys on the Jordanian side.

inhabitants, therefore, for fewer than 6 million Lebanese, such a number of birds (and it is only one of approximately 400 species crossing the Lebanese sky) can falsely appear as infinite. That probably lies at the foundations of irrational massacres done on migratory birds just for entertainment.

Only during two migrant seasons, two million European migrating birds pass over Lebanon to winter in Africa and to breed in Europe (Atallah-Augé, Dakdouk, El Khoury & Nasser 2005, p. 9/15). The already quoted report prepared by the Lebanon Eco Movement in collaboration with the German Committee Against Bird Slaughter (CABS & LEM 2013) points at two main corridors for migrant birds: the coastal pathway – considered the most important, and the above mentioned Beqaa Valley. “The plateau is in places only a few kilometres wide. And precisely at this bottleneck, where the migration flocks are funnelled into a narrow corridor, bird hunting has a long tradition” (p. 2). On the other hand, *The National Report on Hunting. Country: Lebanon* prepared by the Society for the Protection of Nature in Lebanon (SPNL) describes three corridors in the country, naming the Beqaa Valley the most important, especially for the soaring birds. The third corridor lies within “the Anti-Lebanon mountain range and is mainly used by soaring birds during the spring migration” (Atallah-Augé et al. 2005, p. 8/15), (*vide* figure 5. for the schematic maps of the routes). The report (Atallah-Augé et al. 2005) points out also several other “micro-flyways” with the Beirut valley, which is considered as a main hunting spot (due to its proximity to the capital) and a very popular *Bhamdown Markwas* (“shooting range”), a place that is covered all over with empty cartridges (p. 8/15). And not less significantly, just next to the town of Chtaura, which is one of the closest cities to Beirut in the Beqaa Valley, the authors of the report counted 20 large hunting shops in the distance shorter than 50 metres (Atallah-Augé et al. 2005, p. 9/15).




Fig. 5. Main migrant routes in Lebanon (solid lines – known, dashed – possible) during autumn and spring according to the Lebanese environmentalists (Fig. by A. Rocha in: Nader 2013, p. 3).

THE HUNTING

Hunting White Storks is neither a new phenomenon, nor it happens only in Lebanon. For instance, in Wad Medani, in eastern Sudan, where much of the Polish Stork colony winters, farmers and shepherds were catching resting storks with bare hands or with boomerangs called *safaroque* in order to diversify their daily menu, causing about 3.000 deaths annually in the late 1980s (Schulz 1988 as cited in Kronenberg et al. 2013, p. 182). Yet, these birds were, and probably still are, killed in primitive (i.e. also limited) way in order to be eaten. On the contrary to the hunters in the Mediterranean (including not only Lebanon and Syria but also France and Spain) who kill White Storks with sophisticated weaponry for the so called sport or trophy. In the late 1990s the estimated number of White Storks killed annually by all hunters and poachers on the three continents amounted to 15.000, i.e. 2-3% of the total population that takes the Eastern route (Berthold 2000 as cited in Kronenberg et al. 2013, p. 182). Presently, the environmentalists of Lebanon inform of 5.000 to even 10.000 White Storks being killed in Lebanon itself (Roger 2014),⁶ and according to Marwan Owaygen from the UNDP Regional Centre in Cairo, “records of 70-100 birds per day per person are not surprising figures during spring migration” (“Egypt Bird Group” 2008). Only “this spring [of 2014] in two different situations, 200 White Storks were killed in roosting area” (Roger 2014). The overall number is alarming since it seems that the amount of the killed birds is raising due to an uncontrolled poaching activity, what can have an impact on the entire stork population and thwarts European efforts to increase the bird's European population and to reintroduce them in places where they are already extinct.

The modern way of hunting in Lebanon has a tradition of only about six decades – it was in the 1950s when the president of the newly created Lebanese Republic introduced the British style of hunting with rifles and dogs as a sport. The president was a charismatic person, and thus his *entourage* quickly adopted the lifestyle, unsurprisingly the fashion was further spread among entire Lebanese population due to the low cost of hunting equipment, huge amount of migrating birds and lack of other activities in rural areas. Presently, hunting remains popular because of these very reasons, yet it is as well “practiced as a source of income given that [small] birds are considered a delicacy in the country; other reasons include a way to relieve pressure; a hobby, sport and way to be in nature; and male-bonding activity allowing to escape women [sic!]” (Atallah-Augé et al. 2005, p. 5, 8/15).

⁶ Data acquired from Marc Roger, a member of „STOP Hunting Crimes in Lebanon” in conversation on 21st April 2014 via the social media. As well „if one compares the proportion of Facebook profiles checked by us to the total numbers of active hunters in the Lebanon, the numbers of birds shot every year must amount to several thousand individuals of each species [the White Stork and the Honey Buzzard].” (CABS & LEM 2013, p. 10).

Nowadays, another phenomenon accompanies and fuels hunting – it is the social media. The poachers are very fond of their pray to the extent that they expose it proudly in the Internet, especially on the Facebook portal, where they enjoy acclaim of their friends. The photos, sometimes abominable in their brutality or wicked sense of humour, are made public and signed with names, and commented without any sense of wrongdoing or fear of being prosecuted (hunting on migratory birds is forbidden in Lebanon – more on that further in the text). The LEM and the CABS collected those pictures and recognized most of the pray (see the quoted report): more than 13.000 birds were killed (among them not only White Storks but at least 143 other species, also protected and endangered throughout Europe, as e.g. the Lesser Spotted Eagle⁷), and “this figure represents only a miniscule fraction” of the hunters’ activity – the environmentalists say (CABS & LEM 2013, p. 3). Just a few examples of the photos are presented below to illustrate the disturbing phenomenon of the marriage of poaching and the social media (*vide* fig. 6).



Fig. 6. Photos found on the social media (Facebook): above from the left: Lesser Spotted Eagles (*Aquila pomarina*); a child holding a Black Stork (*Ciconia nigra*) – hunting with and by children is not an exception; White Storks killed during the spring migration of 2014; below to the left: White Storks hung “to dry” (all

⁷ Regarding the Lesser Spotted Eagle: „Apart from modification of habitat, the on-going hunting on the migratory flyways (it is apparently the favourite raptor hunted in Lebanon, where local information suggests killing of 100s and even 1,000s every autumn) has been one of the causes attributed to the decline.” (Meyburg et al., 1997, p. 8).

reposted by “STOP Hunting Crimes Lebanon”); below to the right: a photo posted on April 12, 2014, with the user’s name and surname on the Facebook profile of the “Lebanon Hunting News” with a description “27” (number of killed Storks), received almost as many “likes.”

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A quarter of century of an internationalized civil war (1975-1990), followed by the Israeli and Syrian occupation, another conflict with Israel (2006), present unrest of Syrian conflict with massive refugee influx, and Hezbollah increased military activity are permanently accompanying the daily Lebanese life, and thus consistently receding the environmental issues into the background.

However, Lebanon is a part of several multi-lateral international agreements that have direct or indirect relevance for protection of migratory birds. Although the country did not sign the 1979 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS, the so called Bonn Convention), it ratified an agreement within the CMS framework: the African-Eurasian Waterbird Agreement that “includes recommendations regarding the use of lead shots, hunting of waterbirds, conservation of key sites for their protection and species-specific action plans.” The Levantine state is also a party of the Convention on Biological Diversity of 1992, the Ramsar Convention (i. e. the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, especially as Waterfowl Habitat) of 1971 and the Barcelona Convention (the Convention for Protection against Pollution in the Mediterranean Sea) of 1976 with the protocol concerning the Specially Protected Areas of Mediterranean Importance – all those acts obligate Lebanon to protect migratory birds or their habitats (Birdlife 2006a, p. 10).

And so, reviving from the ashes of the civil war at the beginning of the 1990s, the Lebanese government wanted to manage hunting in the country. Since there had been no monitoring, nor studies on wildlife population for last decades, the government initially banned all hunting activities in order to buy some time for studies and to prepare a proper legislation. The ban was introduced for 5 years in 1995.⁸ However, it was renewed four times due to the lack of consensus among the interested parties: the government, the environmentalists and the hunting lobby. It fuelled frustration among hunters, and with weak enforcement of the law, the prohibition has been widely ignored (Atallah-Augé et al. 2005, p. 5/15 and Birdlife 2006a, p. 3). In 1994 when the ban was voted, there was 14.000 registered hunters; presently, the estimations vary from 60.000 (maximum – according to hunter organizations) to 600.000 (according to environmental NGOs), with a possible amount of 300.000-400.000 judged upon the extent of

⁸ The date sometimes varies depending on the sources.

hunting activities (Atallah-Augé et al. 2005, p. 5 & 12/15). To compare, the Polish Hunting Association counts 116.000 members (*Polski Związek Łowiecki* 2014).

Finally, in 2004 a new act on the hunting system in Lebanon was voted in the parliament ("Hunting System in Lebanon" – law no. 580 dated 25.02.2004)⁹. The idea of the legislation was to regain the control over hunting by allowing to hunt certain species during strictly defined seasons and enforcing protection over endangered species. Therefore, the article XXII abrogates all the previous law inconsistent with the new legislative, and already in the article 4.(a), the law explicitly prohibits hunting migratory birds all over the year without any exception.¹⁰ Moreover, the article XI bans the export of the prey without a permission issued by the Ministry of the Environment (such activity has been highlighted by environmentalists as well). The article XIV and XV define possible punishment: imprisonment up to one month, a fine of 500.000 Lebanese Pounds (ca. 330 USD), cancellation of the hunting license, and in certain cases: confiscation of the weaponry and any illegal hunting equipment.

The implementation of the law has been delayed due to the assassination of the prime minister Rafiq Hariri the following year, the subsequent political turmoil and, reportedly, until the Law 580 is fully implemented, the hunting ban of 1994 is still in force – with its fines that were much lower for killing migratory species than the "national" ones (Birdlife 2006a, p. 3). However, the fines are never levied on poachers, since the level of corruption reported by the SPNL was significant, with bribes sometimes equalling to a weekly salary of the law enforcement officers (200-500 USD) – (Atallah-Augé et al. 2005, p. 7/15). According to the Lebanon Eco Movement, the full implementation of the Law 580 was still pending acceptance of the remaining application decrees in 2013 (CABS & LEM, 2013, p.2). Yet, a Lebanese lawyer, Charbel Fadel (Fadel, 2014), consulted for the purpose of this article, stated that "the hunting law was published and several executive regulations were issued after its publication" and since "a law becomes enforceable '*et entre en vigueur*' once it's published in the official gazette." Therefore, legally the Hunting Law number 580 is valid and binding (even if not enforced by the appropriate institutions in daily life).

Discussing the law, it is worth mentioning the religious law, since for devoted people it is not less important, than the state law. And Lebanon "has the most religiously diverse society in the Middle East, comprising 17 recognized religious sects" with slightly more than 1/3 of them being Christian and the majority of them being Islamic (Dukata 2007, p. 85). As for the

⁹ Available at the website of the Lebanese Ministry of the Environment (<http://www.moe.gov.lb> – 2014.04.23): „*qanun raqm / 580, nizam alsyd albry fy lbnan*”(transliterated from Arabic).

¹⁰ Transliterated as follows: „*almadh alrab'eh : a*

ybdd nzyr alnasyb , b'ed astsharb almjls , altra'ed almsnsh ktra'ed syd walmsmmb sydaa fy awqat m'eyn nybdd tlk alawqat . fyda kbha altra'ed alty thdd nfqaan lljqrh alsabq , t'etbr jmy'e altyr walhywanat albryh almqymh walmhajrh mbmyh 'ela mdar alsnb nybzr sydba,” *ibidem*.

Christians (and the Jewish) the Book Leviticus of the Bible (and the Torah) see the stork as an unclean animal that should not be eaten: “These are the birds you are to regard as unclean and not eat because they are unclean: the eagle, the vulture (...) the stork...” (Leviticus 11: 13-19) – it can have some impact on Christian dislike towards the consumption of those birds’ meat (Kronenberg et al. 2013, p. 182). For Muslims it is even more obvious. The hadiths – the stories narrating the Prophet Mahomet’s life – clearly reveal his inclination towards wellbeing of animals. According to one of the stories, narrated by Abdallah bin Ja'far, “the Prophet passed by some children who were shooting arrows at a ram. He told them off, saying: ‘Do not maim the poor beast’” (bin Ja’far 7:238 as cited by CHAI). In other narration it is stated that: “the Prophet forbade an animal being made a target;” (Anas, no. 1606 as cited by CHAI) furthermore “the Prophet condemned those people who take up anything alive as a mere sport;”(bin ‘Omar, np. 1958 as cited by CHAI) and finally: “the Prophet forbade blood sports” (ibn Abbas 8:15, no. 2603 as cited by CHAI). Even during the war, a Muslim should not kill an animal he is not going to eat – according to the instruction given to his army by the first caliph Abu Bakr after the Prophet’s death (CHAI). Therefore, for Islam believers, it is clearly prohibited to shot the animals without a reason, and an entertainment is certainly not one of them.

Even though the hunting ban of 1994/1995 was intended to serve the environment and migrant birds, its prolongation has been deeply harmful. Not only it weakened the respect for the law, but also committed to the emergence of thousands of untrained poachers who received no education on hunting ethics, good practices or bird identification, and therefore shoot indiscriminately to everything that crosses the sky. “The impact of the ban on hunting has been tremendous on bird population” – the report of the SPNL points out (Atallah-Augé et al. 2005, p. 6/15).

Furthermore, the report published by the Birdlife on hunting practices in the region („Birdlife” 2006b) adds: “Lebanese hunters shoot migrants in preference to residents because they believe migratory birds have higher reproduction rates/ large populations; they provide no ecological benefit; the hunters feel no connection with them; they believe impacts of migrant hunting in Lebanon are insignificant compared with those in Turkey” (p. 6). Such an approach “has nothing to do with hunting, since it does not regulate the population, it is a robbery on the environment done for entertainment, for primitive exercise” – Andrzej Kurszewicz, the director of the Warsaw Zoological Garden, comments on the phenomenon. Further, he adds: “for the ecosystem it is a loss, especially when the phenomenon is massive... It can have an impact on the Polish population” (Tarka 2014).

Political instability and, in consequence, inability to cope with legislation and law enforcement in the country that lies on an important migratory route have resulted in a situation that is undoing the European efforts to protect populations of numerous migrant, sometimes endangered, species. The Lebanese environmentalists, grouped in the Lebanon Eco Movement, being aware that their own voice fails to be heard among the Lebanese policymakers, decided to draw European attention to the phenomenon. Yet, it is a Polish diplomatic effort that seems to give a sign of change in the Country of Cedars.

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS

The phenomenon has been known for many years, but most probably due to the social media the problem has become visible for the broader public. It is therefore possible that the very same instrument that fuels poachers' eagerness to hunt (i.e. the social media), could help counteract the phenomenon.

The Facebook profile "STOP Hunting Crimes in Lebanon" (over 15.000 followers) was registered on November 27, 2013, to share the poachers' photos with their prey and spread the news about the on-going carnage – the staff has collected more than 20.000 such pictures published on the Facebook. These photos were analyzed by the Committee Against Bird Slaughter and the Lebanon Eco Movement and the results were published in a form of two quoted reports in March and June 2013 (CABS & LEM 2013, Nader 2013). Yet, earlier it was the "STOP Shooting Birds!! in Lebanon" Facebook profile that denounced poachers' activity (since May 7, 2011). Upon those data and signals made by the members of the LEM, a lot of press releases have been published¹¹ and the Polish environmental activists shocked by the information they had read in the article "Birds massacred in Lebanon – Unfettered hunting a disgrace" (*Wildlife Extra* 2012) decided to act. Most probably this article was crucial in fighting the phenomenon – the very text was cited by *Grupa Ekologiczna* (the Polish Ecological Group) as a reason to intervene (Grupa Ekologiczna 2014), and furthermore, it reveals the Lebanese source of the news, what is very important for the good name of the country. In consequence, on January 14, 2013, a group of ten Polish NGOs wrote a letter to the embassy of the Lebanese Republic in Poland (with a copy to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs) demanding the necessary actions to be undertaken by Beirut (Grupa Ekologiczna 2013).

Simultaneously, in March 2014 *Grupa Ekologiczna* in collaboration with the Association T.E.R.R.E Liban prepared and distributed, with a help of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland

¹¹ *Vide* the footnote 2 and particularly *Wild Life Extra* 2012.

in Beirut, leaflets and posters (fig. 7)¹² about the White Stork in schools; and *Polska Agencja Prasowa* (the Polish Press Agency) prepared a short video for educational purposes that describes the importance of the animal¹³. Activities such as “A day with the birds” that aims at raising awareness about birds’ protection are conducted for families with children in a common effort by the Polish Embassy and T.E.R.R.E. Liban.¹⁴

It is important to teach potential future hunters about the necessity to preserve wild animals, yet it will be much harder to shape the awareness of the already self-made hunters. On Facebook there are hunting groups that support the environmental protection (like “Pro Lebanese Hunters,” ca. 6.800 members) but there are also much bigger groups whose message can be seen as ambivalent, if not cynical. One of them is the Lebanese Hunting Club (over 16.000 followers) that alternately publishes (or allows its members to publish) photos discouraging to shoot protected species (fig. 8) and photos with hunters’ mass-shot prey or video that glorifies massive and excessive hunting like that one whose snapshots can be seen below (fig. 9).



Fig. 7 & 8. A leaflet of Grupa Ekologiczna and T.E.R.R.E. Liban (to the left) and a picture posted by the Lebanese Hunting Club on Mother's Day (to the right).

¹² Those can be seen on the official website of the Embassy of the RP in Beirut: http://beirut.msz.gov.pl/en/news/let_s_protect_storks (2014.04.30).

¹³ The film with the English subtitles can be seen on the YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xre0veatDN4> (2014.04.22).

¹⁴ For more details see the Facebook profile of “T.E.R.R.E. Liban association.”




Fig. 9. A compilation of snapshots of a video published by the Lebanese Hunting Club on its Facebook profile on April 9, 2014 with description: “Enjoy Hunters !!!” (and 187 “likes”). The last frame shows the prey of dozens shot birds and the hunters’ post among with artificial birds (the video can be seen on: <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?v=696137433781883&set=vb.298608453534785&type=2&theater> – 2014.04.30).

Finally, on April 11, 2014, the Polish ambassador met with the Lebanese Minister of the Environment, Mohammad Machnouk, to discuss the issue of “mass killings of migrating birds.” The minister declared his support for the Polish educational campaign and announced that on April 7, a decree was issued that introduced the Environment Protection Service, which aim is to counteract poaching. “The new law will allow to establish an organization specialized in controlling and enforcement of a hunting law (implemented by the parliament in 2004). Additionally, a countrywide registry of hunting law violations will be created to record all people involved in illegal killings (Stork killings included)” – as the Polish embassy in Beirut informs (Embassy of RP in Beirut 2014). It would be possible that a person that appears in the register would not be granted a visa to the Schengen area – the chairman of *Grupa Ekologiczna* specifies (Grupa Ekologiczna 2014). Hopefully, it is not just a political statement and the freshly appointed

executive will have the ability to enforce the law and significantly curb illegal hunting in Lebanon. We cannot be sure whether the Polish diplomatic efforts directly influenced the recent decree, yet, it seems that the Lebanese government understood that killing migrant birds on its territory is harmful to the image of the country, particularly in the EU,¹⁵ which is one of the biggest donors of the Official Development Aid to Lebanon.

CONCLUSIONS

„Do kraju tego, gdzie winą jest duża
Popsować gniazdo na gruszy bocianie,
Bo wszystkim służą...
Tęskno mi, Panie...”

(“For the land where it's a great travesty
To harm a stork's nest in a pear tree,
For storks serve us all...
I am homesick, Lord!...”)¹⁶

Cyprian Kamil Norwid, *Moja piosnka* (*My Song*)

The phenomenon of migratory birds killing in Lebanon, although not the biggest threat to the migrant birds (deprivation of habitat being the major), illustrates the broader problem of excessive hunting of animals and reveals the ties that connect, seemingly not related, nations in the globalized world. It also portrays how the modern communication technology, as the Internet and the social media can help to act in favour of the environment and exercise a leverage, via diplomatic channels, on the government of the state that was reluctant to protect the common natural heritage before; and most optimistically – that there are people around the globe for whom the fate of endangered animals is important and they are eager to act together despite the distance.

One cannot be sure about the outcome, especially given the unrest in the Middle East and rising political instability in Lebanon itself. Yet, since the network among the Polish and Lebanese NGOs has been established, the educational campaign began, the diplomatic machine

¹⁵ On the European level, Ireneusz Kaluga of Grupa Ekologiczna met the EU parliament member, Jolanta Hibner from the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) striving for support of the European institutions. The parliament member expressed her interest in pursuing the matter. (Ireneusz Kaluga on the Facebook profile of „Grupa Ekologiczna” on March 31, 2014).

¹⁶ Translated by Walter Whipple; <http://www.mission.net/poland/warsaw/literature/poems/mysong.htm> (2014.05.10).

has been started and the proper authorities are being brought into existence, it seems that Lebanon has entered the right way to decrease the annual wildlife damage done by illegal hunting. Even though it will take many more years to limit the poaching, it seems that the issue has finally reached the agenda.

To conclude, though the problem requires deeper studies regarding the numbers of White Storks entering Lebanon, those being shot, their routes, stopovers, the habitat deprivation and even food contamination, etc., the issue that is the most urgent now is the continuous, consistent and real institutional protection of wildlife in the ancient and beautiful Country of Cedars.

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The Discourse on Identity in a Global Consumption–Based Society. Between Myth and Reality

VIORICA PALAMARCIUC

*The University of the Academy of Sciences of Moldova, Faculty of Humanities,
Department of Philosophy, History and Methodology of Research,
3/2, Academiei Street, MD-2028, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova*

Abstract

The continuously transforming contemporary world has altered the process of identity creation. Consequently, the contemporaneous discourse on identity is subject to fundamental metamorphoses. The power of consumption, in its broadest sense, represents one of the major factors that affects the way people conceive and perceive their and others' identities. Ultimately, the social relations are also functioning differently. The basic purpose of this paper is to understand whether people are losing their identities or whether they are creating new ones. It is an attempt to identify the positive and/or negative aspects of consumption in the process of identity creation. The paradoxical connection between the contemporaneous discourse on identity and the process of consumption is expressed in Baudrillard's concept of consumption as a system of signs. Baudrillard considers consumers to be “mutually implicated, in a general system of exchange and in the production of coded values.”

Key words: power of consumption, contemporary society, discourse on identity, myth of consumption, symbol, sign

Nowadays, we live in a global society of consumers or in a “society of desire” as it is defined by Gilles Lipovetsky (2006, p. 9). All aspects of our ordinary life, as well as our beliefs and values are altered by the patterns of consumer behaviour.

Continuous transformation of the contemporary world has built a complicated stage for acting out the concept of identity. The permanent clashes between researchers regarding the question of identity are accompanied now by a fluctuant and ambiguous medium, considering the globalization process and the phenomenon of consumption, which contribute to the widening of

the identity trap. In recent times, there has been a major preoccupation and a desperate need for a new consciousness, for new cosmopolitan identities, in the broadest and most literal sense of the term. The old geocentric and anthropocentric theories might not be suited for the destructive power of our technocratic era, underlines Steven Best in his article *Human Identity Politics: Homo Indeterminus* (2010, p. 12).

In the most apocalyptic of postmodern pronouncements, consumption has become the chief reason for existence; signs of the commodity have become more important than the commodity itself and people have begun to lose their identities in the melee of consumption. The point here is to understand whether people are losing their identities or creating new ones; to demonstrate how a consumer comes to his new identity, his new relations to the world, to others, to society, to oneself.

Consumption has been integrated among the most influential institutions of our times. "A sociological institution can be defined as a historically constructed power-laden typification of habitualized thoughts and actions. As with all institutions, consumption, as a shared way of thinking and acting, generally is experienced as an objective reality. This perception is largely a result of the fact that the consumption, as it is experienced and thought about in any particular place and time, largely predates individual memory. All institutions constitute, in effect and paradoxically, a 'humanly produced, constructed objectivity'." (Comor, 2008, pp. 24-25) Therefore, consumption is conceptualized (as well as other institutions) in ways largely determined by others, particularly those from the past. Since we are born into an apparently universal and timeless complex of institutions, norms – such as those associated with consumption – generally are 'internalized,' often appearing to be inevitable – the fruit of human nature or, from a common sense perspective, just 'the way it is,' argues the same author.

This being said, one of the reasons consumption is criticized nowadays, is how the institution of consumption is understood. Even if it was constructed by our predecessors, it is changing our way of perceiving, understanding and acting. This way, what seems to be imminent to us becomes transcendent. Capitalist consumption represents an institution, which mediates relationships and structures conceptualizations and consciousness.

A thorough observation shows us that consumption is something that everyone does. We all consume in order to survive. In our contemporary world, some people do not work, some do not produce, some do not even reproduce, but everyone consumes. Again, consumption should be understood here not only as using products, things for our biological needs. It also refers to the way we are addicted to different types of services, information, and ideas. As E. Comor truly specifies, consumption constructs patterns of behaviour easily detectable through price and

market research systems but also, less observable (because they affect the level of our subconscious) myths and socialized norms.

Another explanation of this phenomenon is offered by Jean Baudrillard. The author argues that consumerism has gained such an influential role because it spreads across all areas of human acting and thinking. It should be stressed one more time that consumerism is not only about things but primarily (at least in today's modern world) about ideas, knowledge, and truths. Taking into account the new power of consumption, the universal agreement on the meaning of 'identity discourse' is also affected. Furthermore, the discourse itself is a rather elastic concept. It is useful to study discourses and language in general, since language not only "mirrors the world but constructs social reality" as well. Thus, it is a question of "representing reality" or creating a "social imaginary." (Johansson, 2007, p. 13) Consequently, we have access to the external reality through the mediation of language. Michel Foucault's preoccupation was also oriented to define how social reality, as human being perceives it, was constituted in discourse. "My problem is essentially the definition of the implicit system in which we find ourselves prisoners; what I would like to grasp is the system of limits and exclusion which we practice without knowing it; I would like to make the cultural unconscious apparent." (Vighi, Feldner, 2007, p. 99) He conceptualized discourse formations as autonomous, self-sufficient systems, the functioning of which could be explained without reference to some external system. In this context, the subject was conceived as an effect of discourse and would amount to little more than a mirror image of the subject positions produced within a given discursive regime. Affirming that the contemporaneous discursive regime represents consumption, the social reality, and the human being itself, might be a production of consumerism regime. In an era, in which traditions, politics, religion help less to create an identity, the power of consumption is in charge of a new feature, the identity process. In our days, "Homo consumericus" (Lipovetsky, 2006, p. 41) is the one who can answer the question "who am I?"

The sociological criticism of 1960-70 (Lipovetsky, 2006, p. 35) interpreted consumption as a logic of social differentiation. There is no object desired for what it really is, so there is no attraction to the things themselves, but there are always needs of prestige, social recognition, status, and social integration. Purchased goods function as symbols of status. They make us more independent, free and mobile; they also promise us longevity, beauty, youth, that is the life quality.

The burgeoning literature (Bamberg, De Fina, Schiffrin, 2011) analyzes discursive perspective on identity construction in three analytic domains:

- a. The intermingled and interdependent relation between the individual and the world. Individuals construct the reality through their actions and discourses and at the same time they are constructed by the external world.
- b. The harmonization between the similar and different aspects of a human being in relation to others.
- c. The harmonization of similar and different aspects of a human being across time and space.

Let us see how consumption has acquired and fulfilled all these domains of discursive identity:

- a. The intermingled and interdependent relation between the individual and the world. Individuals construct the reality through their actions and discourses and at the same time they are constructed by the external world.

The splendid association of Jean Baudrillard makes sense in this chapter: “as the wolf-child becomes wolf by living among them, so are we becoming functional. We are living the period of the objects: that is, we live by their rhythm, according to their incessant cycles.” (2001, p. 29) Nowadays, the human being is the one to observe the birth, fulfilment and death of an object; whereas in the past, it was the object, instrument and perennial monument that survived the generations of men. However, the parallelism with previous civilizations is susceptible. The human being is like a new savage who tries to understand the organization and function of technological jungle.

However, even largely imbedded with consumption practices, social identity is still dependent on work. Work time cannot be excluded from the institutions which contribute to the identity construction as long as it is the source of money needed to spend during the consumption processes. To this extent, the identity-inputs of work and consumption are interdependent and by extension, the relation between the individual and his external environment are also interdependent in the process of identity construction.

Another reason why consumption provides important inputs to identity is that it supplies people with new opportunities to experiment with and consume the meaning of identity. The objects and activities of consumption are heavily loaded with sign-value. “Within the field of their objective function objects are not interchangeable, but outside the field of its denotation, an object becomes substitutable in a more or less unlimited fashion. In this field of connotations, the object takes on the value of a sign. In this way a washing machine serves as equipment and plays as an element of comfort, or of prestige, etc. It is the field of play that is specifically the field of consumption.” (Baudrillard, 2001, p. 44) The author introduces his theory of

consumption as a system of signs. If an object with its usual functions (for example a washing machine is used to wash clothes) is transferred to a different field of connotations, it becomes a symbol of comfort, prestige, etc. We can use this transfer of significations/connotations for different equipment, continues Baudrillard. This process of changing/adding new functions to different objects contributes to the production of a general system of exchange, based on new coded values of each object implicated in the process. In this sense, the author makes a parallel with Levi-Strauss's system: rules of marriage represent the multiple ways of assuring the circulation of women within the social group. The kinship system serves as a system of meaning, as a kind of language. It replaces the biological system of relation (marriage and kinship) of a specific community with a social system of alliance, which ensures the communication between the individual and groups. "The same is true for consumption: a sociological system of signs (the level characteristic of consumption) is substituted for a bio-functional and bio-economic system of commodities and products (the biological level of needs and subsistence). And the essential function of the regulated circulation of objects and commodities is the same as that of women and words. It is designed to assure a certain type of communication." (Baudrillard, 2001, p. 47)

This way, consumption has the function of creating a new world for human beings, the world of object/signs, which ensures also the need of communication through acquisitions and consumption. This new world influences people, giving them new opportunities for self-identity.

(b) The harmonization between the similar and different aspects of a human being in relation to others.

Considering Paul Ransom's definition of the contemporary process of identity construction, consumption is contributing to the process of self differentiation from others by offering the possibility to choose what to consume, in its basic manifestations, like: what to wear, what to listen to, what to watch, what to read etc. These daily activities are crucial in the process of self-identification because they are followed by the feedback one gets from others. The perspective one receives from the others when he or she dresses a specific way or reads a specific book, enhances his own perception of how he wants to be seen.

"Variations in the levels of pleasure associated with different forms of self-presentation reinforce and consolidate one's preference for consuming one mode of cloths rather than another." (Ransom, 2005, p. 144)

Conrad Lodziak in his criticism of consumerism gives an example, which should have denied the importance of style in identity creation: "a woman, through choice of clothing, appearance, demeanour and speech, may 'put on' or construct a style that she thinks will create a good impression at a job interview. After getting the job she may modify her style, and she is

most likely to discard it altogether in the confines of her home, and then put on another style for going out. She is likely to feel more at ease with herself when she adopts a style that is consistent with her self-identity, or dispenses altogether with any kind of style. Styles that are readily discarded tend to be those that are not part of her self-identity.” (2002, p. 58) It might be as the author emphasizes, though it is known that identity is a personal process. It is also known that it cannot be reached in the absence of the other. The social environment people spend their time in tends to influence and change their way of perceiving, thinking and acting. Human beings are social, communicative entity; they permanently exchange information and experiences. It would be wrong to affirm that the woman from Lodziak’s example does not internalize her work style. On the contrary, after internalizing the work style she might start to identify herself with it.

Lodziak continues his theory on the creation of social image through the mediation of clothing/style by analyzing its relevance to youth. In this field, the author is more positive, as adolescence is a period during which identity experimentation occurs. It is an intense period of self-discovery, in which the individuals desire to exercise autonomy.

What is important to add here is that the choices of objects/signs we make are not made randomly. Choices, remarks J. Baudrillard, are determined by the system of values of the society we are living in. As it was specified several time, nowadays people consume meanings in the first place. The products they choose should have a meaning within their system of values. One could say that the value system depends somehow on the social category people are coming from. This leads to a perspective on consumption in terms of integration.

Marketing, purchasing, sales, the acquisition of various commodities and object/signs — all of these presently may constitute a human being’s language, the language of individuals of a consumption-based society, a code with which the entire society communicates and speaks of and to itself, a language, through which, people form their social identity. Taking consumption as a kind of universal system of signs is a new opportunity for individual affirmation.

(c) The harmonization of similar and different aspects of a human being across time and space.

Whatever modernity may signify, its arrival coincides with the changing relationship between space and time. “Modernity starts when space and time are separated from living practice and from each other and so become ready to be theorized as distinct and mutually independent categories of strategy and action, when they cease to be, as they used to be in long premodern centuries, the intertwined and so barely distinguishable aspects of living experience,

locked in a stable and apparently vulnerable one-to-one correspondence.” (Bauman, 2000, pp. 8-9)

The acceleration of time and the compression of space are through the most influential factors of identity shifts. The general and natural desire of society members to be more similar to one another rather than different, in order to maintain their safety and wellbeing, is achievable now through the mediation of new communication technologies. With only one click on the Internet we have access to cultures and civilizations we have never met; within several hours we can visit another continent. These opportunities transform the unknown and the totally different into something common, they affect and transform us.

This example can be easily related to a consumption-based society, the actual object of research. It can be concluded that this intention of uniformization, the desire to be like your neighbour, facilitated and encouraged the process of mass consumption and transformation into a global society of consumption.

The paradox of consumption is that through smoothing everything and everyone, it opens new opportunities for an individual to express himself or herself in the way he or she wants, and in this way to differentiate him or her from others. It is a process with two ends.

In our days, there is a constant pressure to become someone else. The “liquid modernity” of Zygmunt Bauman is one of the most detailed research into this subject. He is analyzing every change in self perception once the consumption-based society affirms more and more. The world we inhabit is perceived as a huge container of spare parts. This conception affects most of all human relationships: self identification and the perception of the others. Changing identity, discarding the past, and seeking new beginnings – these are the main preoccupations of an individual in a consumption society.

The expression of “synchronic humans” (a concept developed by Elżbieta Tarkowska, a prominent chronosociologist, cited in Zygmunt Bauman, 2007, pp.105-106) may be more convenient in defining the contemporaneous consumer; the consumer who lives solely in the present and who pays no attention to experience or future consequences of his or her actions. It is a “presentist culture,” which emphasizes speed and effectiveness.

Using Zygmunt Bauman’s attributes for contemporaneity - uncertainty, unsafety, and insecurity – it may be affirmed that identity constantly needs the assurance and confirmation in this world. According to Bauman (2007, p. 110), in the contemporary consumption society, identities are not given at birth, identity is something to work on, a project and not something that is received, as it was in previous civilizations.

The author presents two types of contemporary identities. The first one is called “cloakroom communities,” which represents the perfect metaphor for how the social identity is constructed in present times. Social ties are fragile and superficial, based on quotidian needs. Bauman describes them as ghost communities, phantom communities, etc. This cloakroom communities might be a comfortable means of identity construction, says Bauman, as the “pointillist time rules” (2007, p. 110) and creates the required facilities of living in a community or leaving it, at will.

For the second type, Bauman reserves the way people in the today’s society are addicted to brands, fashionable things, which are called “totems” by the author. These totems require, firstly, shopping skills. Like in an ancient society, each tribe had its totems, and each member had his or her distinctive object. In our society of consumers, a rebirth of such elements of social identification can be observed. In the society where human bonds are mediated by the markets for consumer goods, remarks Bauman, the sentiment of belonging and the process of self-identification is pursued, and its results are displayed, with the help of visible “marks of belonging,” obtainable as a rule in the shops. “In the ‘postmodern tribes’ (as Maffesoli prefers to call the ‘style packs’ of consumer society), ‘emblematic figures’ and their visible marks (clues suggestive of dress and/or conduct codes) replace the ‘totems’ of the original tribes.” (Bauman, 2007, pp. 82-83) In other words, our society is as similar to the ancient model of living as we couldn’t have imagined at the very beginning. Everywhere we can find gold remains of our predecessors.

The discourse on identity in our global society of consumers can be defined in terms of flexibility and volatility which are based on the ability to “‘shop around’ in the supermarket of identities.” Having that ability, it seems that one is free to create and destroy identities at will. This is another paradox of consumption society, which Bauman explains in terms of interdependency. “In a consumer society, sharing in consumer dependency – in the universal dependency on shopping – is the condition sine qua non of all individual freedom; above all, of the freedom to be different, to ‘have identity’.” (2000, pp. 83-84)

The new feature that the myth gets these days is its flexibility. The most characteristic feature of identity becomes its finesse. It can be easily changed the new market offers. Through this, the new consumption identity appears artificial and unstable, in a continuous flow, citing Bauman’s thoughts – a liquid identity.

One of the first conclusions might be that the notion of identity is more liberal in a consumption-based society. It is impossible to exhaust all the different versions of identity/individuality which are available. As Paul Ransome (2005, p. 144) remarks, there are as

many versions of identity as there are people, and even more, taking into account that one person might experience more than one version of their personal identity. However, the degree of freedom has become a challenge in an identity construction process. All the things that are bought involve decisions and exercise of people's own judgment, but: "Obviously we do not control what is available for us to choose from in the first place. All the same, in consumer culture choosing and freedom are two names of the same condition; and treating them as synonymous is correct at least in the sense that you can abstain from choosing only by at the same time surrendering your freedom." (Bauman, 2007, p. 85) The same idea is supported by Lodziak (2002, p. 67), who emphasizes that one can be anything he or she wants, but he cannot ignore the consequences of his or her acts, thus his or her freedom is limited. (Alternatively, as Nikolas Rose remarks, modern individuals are not merely "free to choose," but obliged to be free, to perceive and live their lives in terms of choice.)

Lodziak's thoughts on this issue are quite indispensable for the actual research. People buy things and goods but how couldn't they buy them? "The freedom of the consumer is not located in the freedom to buy, but in how the consumer interacts with what is bought and/or with the images of consumer culture." (Lodziak, 2002, pp. 76-77) Another simple fact concerns the dependence of the freedom of money. Money, as remarks the author, is not freely and equally available to everyone, meaning one is more free than others... Again, we usually receive money for doing a job. In this sense, consumer's freedom is dependent on work. Or being dependent on something is the opposite of freedom.

As a result, the freedom perceived today is connected with the plurality of choices: in the process of consumption on the one hand and, on the other, in the process of self-identity creation. This plurality of choice denotes a freedom that did not exist in earlier times.

Not to fall prey to the worship of consumption, some critics of consumerism will bring fresh and useful conclusions. In *The Myth of Consumerism*, Conrad Lodziak engages himself in a criticism of powerfulness of consumption. He takes a sceptical position of a culturalist theory, which emphasizes that people actually consume images, meanings, symbolic values, dreams, fantasies and so on. "Consumer culture is, if you like, in substantial part, the product of imaginative, creative and playful consumers. Portrayed as such, consumer culture is wholly positive. It is 'meaningful' and our participation in it promises to enrich our lives. It is so meaningful that it has become the site in which we become who we are and choose who we want to be. I consume, therefore I am." (Lodziak, 2002, pp. VII-VIII)

The fiction or myth of consumption, continues the author, besides the fact that it distorts the reality, also "provides politicians with numerous ideas that can be used either to ignore, or to

put a positive spin on, deprivation and social inequalities, to justify their promotion of big business, entrepreneurship, and forms of social and environmental impoverishment in the name of wealth creation.” (Lodziak, 2002, p. IX)

Taking into account the ironical and critical accents on consumerism it can be deduced that the author uses the word “myth” close in meaning to the word “fiction”. However, the myth has another meaning, a more inherent in its nature. It is the sense of a true and sacred story, in believe and take it as a foundation of their lives. This might be the biggest challenge for contemporary discourse of identity. Is consumption a fiction, or a formula of life? What is reality if the myth is a fiction? The current research tends to identify mostly with Cassirer’s affirmation, that myth represents an indispensable bridge between a human being and reality, because an individual is a deeply symbolic animal.

Lodziak has a different explanation, which also has its logical meaning. The statement that consumerism is first of all related to signs and symbols is demonstrated by the fact that in our era many cultural products are presented as texts for instance in magazines, television programmes, internet web pages and social networks. Considering the idea that the text is open to different interpretations and may be interpreted in different ways, cultural studies have been gradually extending the interpretation to other consumption’s goods. “It is on this basis that theory unproblematically transforms all objects of consumption into texts. As we shall see, this sets up the description of consumption as an activity in which we consume signs in order to create or play with meaning”. (Lodziak, 2002, p. 14)

The author’s hypothesis that the textualization is the key element in considering consumption as meaningful could be true. However, it does not neglect the fact that people consume because they have needs that should be satisfied. A human being has not only carnal needs, but symbolic as well. Along with the development process and the raising of the standard of living (for a part of the global population), symbolic needs become more important than the carnal needs, just as Maslow has demonstrated.

The theory of symbols, signs and images as prime elements of consumerism is developed in a strong connection with mythological kind of human thinking. What is to demonstrate here is that human beings have not changed so much. The mythological type of thinking and acting are as real as they were in ancient times. Only forms are changing. It seems that consumerism became a magical and symbolic power. Through it, everything is possible; even a new identity.

Even the critical Lodziak remarks: “There is no need to deny that everything that is produced and consumed carries meanings. There is no need, either, to deny the fact that these meanings are culturally-based and arbitrary, that is they can vary according to the values of

particular cultures. Obviously cultural values and meanings play a significant role in both the production and consumption of goods. The important question is: how significant?" (2002, p. 35) The latest ideology of consumerism inclines towards the view that things or objects are open to an infinite range of meanings. This ideology, argues the author, excludes from consideration those meanings that derive from the practical value of the product.

However, there are facts that cannot be denied. The individual is forced to redefine continuously his or her identity, at the personal level as well as the societal and racial ones. "In a synthetic world, where the tendency to resist generalized conformity is essentially just another version of conformity, where each individuality tries to assert its uniqueness by mimicking other, already-unique individualities, identity is being used as currency in the interpersonal social games that ultimately dictate each one's part in the play imitating what used to be reality." (Athes, 2010, pp. 3-8) H. Athes underlines the paradox of contemporary identity construction process, which on the one hand is defined by the vital necessity of the individual to create a unique identity and on the other hand conforms to the pre-designed societal norms and values.

Consumption being a widespread phenomenon, influences identity construction of a human being. The discourse on consumption in the contemporary world has assumed new forms and meanings.

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Peer Re-Production and an Extended Culture Industry. The Case of TV Content and Redistribution in Europeanizing and Globalizing Poland

MIROSŁAW FILICIAK

*Szkoła Wyższa Psychologii Społecznej, Wydział Nauk Humanistycznych i Społecznych,
Instytut Kulturoznawstwa, Katedra Estetyki i Kultury Artystycznej,
ul. Chodakowska 19/31, 03-815 Warszawa,
E-mail: mfiliciak@snps.edu.pl*

PIOTR TOCZYSKI

*Akademia Pedagogiki Specjalnej im. Marii Grzegorzewskiej,
Wydział Stosowanych Nauk Społecznych, Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii,
Katedra Socjologii Ogólnej i Badań Interdyscyplinarnych,
ul. Szczęśliwicka 40, 02-353 Warszawa,
E-mail: ptoczywski@aps.edu.pl*

Abstract

Television content – mostly American productions – circulates among Polish Internet users. The article analyzes the increase in the scale of re-production of audiovisual content among large groups of the Polish network society. The growth in “peer re-production” constitutes an “extended culture industry.” The case of Poland is studied with quantitative audience research and survey research. The growth in the use of streaming websites providing free access to audiovisual content is explained in terms of the Polish local history of “piracy,” ongoing global processes and the generation gap.

Key words: extended culture industry, globalizing Poland Internet, media redistribution, media piracy, TV content

INTRODUCTION

In this article, we focus on the global phenomenon usually called “piracy,” although we try to avoid this term, replacing it with more neutral ones. The phenomenon we analyze is the informal circulation of audiovisual content in contemporary Poland. American television series are the object of “peer re-production” that constitutes an “extended culture industry.” We illustrate both these categories with the most appropriate data available from several sources, including computer-assisted web interviews we conducted. Although we refer the above to quite general

issues such as “piracy” and “content,” we redefine them before presenting research results as parts of the two key categories of the article, namely “peer re-production” and an “extended culture industry.”

The problem of free access to professionally produced content circulating around the globe is not unique to globalizing and Europeanizing Poland. In the already existing literature, we find other examples of such flow from central to semi-peripheral and peripheral countries. Intending to present the flow and circulation of content as both global and local processes, we provide relevant references in the first part of the article. Firstly, in low-income countries, media goods, which we see as “pieces of content,” are highly desired and highly priced, but freely available through “pirate” channels. Secondly, the cultural content exchange is integrated into everyday social and befriending practices, but into professional networks as well. “Pirate” networks intersect all dimensions of contemporary culture, including the academic community, and thus represent a generation gap only to a certain extent. This leads us to see who the actors of “piracy” are, both in terms of global settings, the historical trajectory and age groups. Following the issue of who is involved in “piracy,” we focus on time and space of this phenomenon. The questions arise: In what ways is it global and what is its timeline in Poland? We respond to these questions with the historical method and then with data illustrating the growing number of “real users” of video streaming websites as well as other data, including survey research among Polish Internet users.

MEDIA GOODS: PIECES OF CONTENT AVAILABLE IN THE NETWORKS

The authors of the “Media Piracy in Emerging Economies” report, edited by Joe Karaganis (2011a), decided to use an unusual strategy, i.e. to release it under the terms of a Consumer's Dilemma license. It is based on diversifying access granted to persons from different parts of the world. People in countries classified as low-income countries pay nothing, but those who download the report in the U.S. and Western Europe need to pay \$8 or €8 for it. For commercial use, one has to pay \$2,000.

Or maybe they do not have to? “If you are residing in one of the listed high-income countries, want to read the report, but think that \$8 is an unreasonable price, you can acquire it for free through other means. In fact, we have made it exceedingly easy to do so. If you fall under the terms of the commercial reader license but think that \$2000 is unreasonable, you have the same options (plus the \$8 option). In both cases, the reader is faced with a dilemma: pay the legal price (roughly mapping ability to pay to a determination about whether the price is fair), acquire it through pirate channels, or don't bother with it. In most of the countries we've studied in this

report, the results of this calculation with respect to DVDs, music, and software are strikingly consistent. Media goods are highly desired, exorbitantly priced with respect to local incomes, and freely available through pirate channels” – Karaganis (2011b) wrote in the blog accompanying the report.

As it can be seen, the report not only provides knowledge on developing countries, but it also allows residents of affluent countries experience dilemmas similar to people who are the subject of the report. This whole situation touches on yet another problem. It shows that “piracy” is not only a culture emerging around music and movies. Some researchers downloaded the report as “pirates” would do.

As the residents of Poland, we had the chance to download it legally and for free, but while working on this article, we often found ourselves in a situation where interesting and potentially useful texts across which we came were available in online databases for the access to which we had to pay (perhaps in contrast to our foreign colleagues, often benefiting from subscriptions purchased by their universities). However, the same articles could be “googled” in other places and read without paying. We mention this to show that “piracy” is not only the networks created by professional copy-traders or teens wanting to listen to their favorite band’s album for free. This is not just a web equivalent to old youth subcultures, although accessing media content and sharing it is very important among youth and sometimes leads them to ethical dilemmas (Filiciak et al. 2013: 132, 176). It is more than that. Pirate networks intersect all dimensions of contemporary culture – also the academic community. Moreover, they are not limited to the conflict between Internet users and business, because the “pirate” activity that boosts the number of viewers remains “unnoticed” by many websites, as evidenced by the controversy surrounding sites such as YouTube, where audiovisual materials are often posted without the rightholders’ consent. Thus researchers as well as big companies might be “pirates,” which shows how fluid and ambiguous are the borders imagined for legal and illegal activities associated with copying and exchanging content.

Our knowledge of the mechanisms of “piracy” is still limited. One of these mechanisms is “engagement” that is becoming a new aim of ad-supported online businesses. Companies in the sector of culture often treat their customers as free workers nowadays (Terranova 2000). Cultural products are to be “spreadable,” are to circulate in social networks and reach out to niches through redistribution carried out by enthusiasts, heavy and active users of online content. Yet the Internet was not designed as a tool for media distribution, but as possibly the most effective communication tool. The other side of this intended “spreadability” (Jenkins et al. 2010) is therefore the distribution of content beyond the control of producers and broadcasters

(Filiciak et al. 2012, Toczyski 2012). As we will show, this is ubiquitous in Poland but popular in other parts of the world as well (Roettgers 2011).

The most significant change has thus taken place in an area which is researched to an incomparably lesser extent than content creation. This area is not production but the reproduction of content – especially the content that is produced by professionals, and then circulates on the Internet. The scale of its use is much higher than the increase in creativity caused by the popularity of the Internet. The consequences are great, too – both in terms of facilitating access to cultural content (mainly music, movies, television series and books), but also at the level of integration of the cultural content exchange with everyday social and friendly practices (cultural content in the form of a file becomes an element of exchange in social networks), and finally at the economic level, undermining the existing models of media industries.

The proper perspective to understand this reality seems to be the perspective of a “piece of content,” a single content item. Content – a text, an image or an audiovisual recording – flows through the nodes of the network, subject to conversion to cultural and intellectual capital, social capital (understood as the strengthening of relations), and usually also economic capital – by saving money of those who decide to consume a “piece of content” for free. Content circulation is an important, non-judgmental concept. Regardless of the “medium,” what remains essential is “content” (appreciated with such statements as “content is king”, widely used in business). Thus the subject of “piracy” in terms of a “piece of content” is that the “medium” is skipped and that the circulation of “content” starts out of the loop provided by the publisher.

By adopting the perspective outlined above, we consider research on the informal economy of the media as an important and still poorly examined aspect of the sociocultural change. This change has taken place through the dissemination of digital and networked media, allowing almost any entity with access to the Internet to copy and distribute cultural content at almost no cost. At the same time, the entity is perhaps more the beneficiary than the driving force behind this change – because even though the Internet file-sharing networks of Internet users’ individual computers play the role of major hubs, file-sharing often happens without any clear intention and often without the users being aware of it. Sometimes redistribution happens to be the “side effect” of the Internet’s architecture, and more exactly the peer-to-peer networks’ architecture, and default software settings for sharing (not downloading or uploading) files.

THE TIME, SPACE AND ACTORS OF “PIRACY”: AN EXTENDED CULTURE INDUSTRY?

We refer here to “pirate” activities of Internet users rather than organized criminal trafficking. For ordinary citizens, “piracy” is an opportunity to facilitate contact with the content of culture,

which not only happens at no cost, but is often the easiest in terms of convenience and user experience (Toczyski 2012). In this article, we will not pass judgments, because we are interested in the observed social practices and their technology and business conditions. The legal dimension of the phenomena being analyzed is interesting so far as breaking the law can be regarded as an illustration of the weak influence of arbitrary rules for controlling the flow of content in the social space. So instead of trying to explain or denounce “pirate” actions, valuating will mainly concern us so far as these actions are an example of tensions at the level of discourse. Even the term “piracy,” which is sometimes used in respect of file-sharing networks, is ambiguous – as John Logie (2006) convinces, the meaning of this word was shaped in an era when copying and redistribution of original content was primarily an organized profit-oriented practice. Today, files are usually downloaded through “user-generated content” – though the word “generated” sounds ironically here – i.e. without the participation of brokers and money (unless one counts sites like once-famous PirateBay or even more famous Megavideo and the advertisements published by them).

In the context of these considerations, the question of the “ad-supported” model in combination with “piracy” comes up. Is avoiding advertisements, for example with ad-block, an act of piracy? Is not this action (bypassing advertisements) the core of the concept of movies and TV series “piracy?” “Piracy” certainly does not refer solely to the issue of copy-selling focused on micropayments (other ways of charging for content are used on a marginal scale). In the search for a business model that constructively resolves the “conflict of interests” between the content publisher and the consumer, one cannot ignore the development of the advertising market, advertising tools and attitudes to online advertising. These issues are merely indicated here, but they are worth extending on another occasion.

Discussions on the creative industries focus on large cities and industrialized countries, and yet new models are often developed elsewhere. In his analysis dedicated to the phenomenon of Nollywood, the Nigerian film industry, Ramon Lobato says: “Various efficient and economically sustainable industry models already exist in second and third world media (...). While creative industries policy seeks to formalize these economies, incorporating them into established networks of international trade, this is not the only possible response. It may well be that policymakers in the West can learn as much from developing nations about creative industries as 'they' can from 'us'” (Lobato 2010). Of course, it is not just about reversing the direction of influence. Perhaps what Nollywood producers dream about is to function as a Hollywood movie studio. But in the world where the Internet shook the traditional centralized model of media production and distribution, it is also likely that U.S. companies will have to

borrow solutions from their counterparts operating in Nigeria, where the law is helpless against piracy. A glance at the statistics on the level of piracy in industrialized countries indicates that despite the intense efforts ongoing for over a decade, aimed at reducing the scale of file sharing on the Internet, the effects of these activities are as minimal as in Nigeria.

Moreover, the example of the third world shows that the boundaries between “pirate cultures” and the legitimate media market are blurred in many places around the world – the divisions imposed by the law often do not designate the boundaries of real circulation. Brian Larkin, who deals with piracy in Nigeria, notes that: “Nearly all of those who might be described as pirates were at the same time involved in the duplication and sale of legitimate media” (2004: 295). The situation was the same in Poland during the sociopolitical system transformation after the Polish People’s Republic, when some companies entered the official distribution market, growing from small pirate initiatives and going through a transition period where the offer consisted of two available products: originals and copies.

Our article is devoted to the Polish case not only because we live here and are most aware of the situation here. Poland was the center of the unprecedented and successful youth citizen protests against the unconsulted anti-piracy law ACTA in 2012, which were in part motivated economically (Kuczyński 2014: 54). Although in other countries, “in real-life choices, youngsters may appear to be less ethical and law abiding, but the driving force behind this is mainly economical” (Weijters et al. 2013) just like in Poland, it was the Polish youth that stood against the new unwanted law, becoming an avant-garde for other European youngsters.

This shows that free access to media goods turned out to be important to an extent that was not foreseen before. Our case study is thus also motivated by the fact that Poland is situated – not only geographically but also politically – between the East and the West as an area subject to the Europeanization of the state and law and the Americanization of culture (the latter being, moreover, in our view, only a medium based largely on European content – sometimes mythical content and of distant origin – cf. Toczyski 2013). The perspective of Europeanization becomes especially valuable when we realize that since 2004, Poland has been the European Union member state. Intending to respond to the demands placed on the EU candidates, from the fall of the socialist People’s Republic in 1989 to EU accession, Poland introduced changes to its legislation, which made the Polish system coherent with the copyright policy of its Western neighbors.

At the same time, however, at the level of everyday practice, informal exchange of cultural content is widely accepted in Poland. In principle, there has been no generation in Poland – at least since the 1970s – for which informal access would not be the primary form of

access. “Pirate” media economics were legitimized by the practices of citizens seeking access to content which could not be obtained in a legal way. Since the 1980s these practices have been increasingly allowed and even stimulated by the flagging state and after the fall of the socialist People’s Republic – by the Internet, in which, as Lawrence Lessig wrote, “it is code, rather than law, that rules” (2004: 148). The historical aspect seems to be important here – which does not mean that history is treated as the main explanation of the development of “piracy” in Poland. It rather adds a time dimension to the spatial dimension in the changing center-periphery relations, about which George Yudica, analyzing the example of Latin America, wrote that “the flows of influence no longer travel from center to periphery but circulate in multidirectional way among global cities through the world, much like the transactions of transnational corporations” (2003: 239). These flows also fluctuate over time – sometimes suddenly re-legitimizing what was stigmatized as obsolete or even barbaric until recently.

The element of time superimposed on the spatial heterogeneity has yet another dimension as it refers to generational conflicts of interest. Businesses located in Far East – as partly showed the example of the already closed Megavideo website, which operated, inter alia, (or perhaps mainly) from China, using a Chinese address – have no interest in respecting the “intellectual property rights” as possibly no sufficient volume of such competitive property exists in that region. Intellectual capital still belongs rather to the West. Even in the West, however, violations of intellectual property rights are sometimes a manifestation of social conflict that is a “generation gap” in this case as was suggested by Ivan Krastev in an interview conducted by Jacek Żakowski (2011). Krastev’s interesting long-term perspective suggests that the West will depend on the protection of these rights because we are entering a “dictatorship” of older people, whose economic prosperity in the macro-scale depends on the implementation of intellectual property rights to a larger extent than the economic prosperity of young people. That would situate our subject in the category of the conflict of generations, a generation gap: as young people do not have the resources to get access to culture, because they are poor compared to the older generation, they want to access cultural content for free. The elders do not want to give them this access for free, hoping for royalties to secure themselves prosperous lives. And yet, thinking long term, access to culture is part of equal opportunities in life. Therefore, it would also be in the wider interest of the elderly to provide young people with the widest possible access to the content they search (ergo: those royalties should be somehow indirectly funded to authors or authors could even accept the loss of their royalties).

All the above seems coherent with the proposed title of our article, first created by Mirko Tobias Schaefer, who in the text *Participation Inside? User Activities Between Design and Appropriation*

points out that it is difficult to change the media landscape seen only in the context of the increasing autonomy of audiences and the flowering of grass-roots creativity. This is because – as already mentioned – the persons intentionally creating culture texts constitute the margin of digital media users. What is archived on websites is often the “side effect” of communication processes.

In addition to creativity, Schaefer sees the creating and processing of content as an important area of the contemporary cultural landscape, as well as archiving, which is of interest to us here and which “refers to the organization, maintenance and distribution of the digital artifacts” (2009: 149). This area includes both legal resources and pirate activities. “Instead of replacing them, these new modes complement older modes of production, distribution, and consumption, and can therefore be described as establishing an *extended culture industry*. The extended culture industries are characterized by the dynamic interaction of all participating parties. Production processes are not only extended into the domain of users – where the (old) culture industry’s media texts and products are appropriated – but also happen completely independent of established production and distribution channels. In conclusion, we can state that this present culture is constituted by new design and appropriation of existing content, unfolding along the lines of accumulation, construction, and archiving from the culture industries to its fringes and beyond” (Schaefer 2009: 150).

This way of conceptualization allows us to blur the artificial divisions between senders and recipients, whether professionals or amateurs. The relationships of individual actors are complex and “parasitic” relationships occur not only in the use of lawful products by Internet users, but also in the use of Internet users’ activities by companies. Sometimes all of these aspects are present even within a single process, which is shown, for instance, by the epidemic of the “controlled leakage” of new episodes of television series to the Internet, which is now almost a standard marketing practice before the premieres of new seasons. It is, therefore, impossible to reduce these relationships to the question: “Who abuses who?” – as both Internet users (ab)use producers, accessing free material, and producers (ab)use Internet users, gaining a powerful marketing support in the network basically at no cost. Thus Schaefer’s concept expands the thinking about “cultural participation” and “participatory culture”, rightly pointing out that the roles of users and commercial entities are flexible and interchangeable, and commercial producers also participate in culture. “Participation cannot be assigned only to users who get involved with media and ‘oppose’ a dominant vendor. The original producer and other commercial units – who are either actively involved in the process of modifying the original design or benefit from its outcome – are also part of participatory culture” (Schaefer 2009: 153).

Given the above, one more starting point for us might be the concept of peer re-production. Yochai Benkler describes commons-based peer production as “radically decentralized, collaborative, and nonproprietary; based on sharing resources and outputs among widely distributed, loosely connected individuals who cooperate with each other without relying on either market signals or managerial commands” (2006: 60). Peer re-production works in a similar manner: anonymous Internet users share their resources (disc space, network connections, stored files), exchanging them in a non-hierarchical and out-of-the-market mode.

RESEARCH RESULTS 1. ALTERNATIVE CIRCULATION OF CONTENT IN POLAND – THE CASE OF TELEVISION

To analyze the “extended culture industry” and “peer re-production” of contemporary media in Poland, we will focus on the content of television, mainly on American television series viewed on the Internet and via the Internet.

There are several reasons for such a choice. Firstly, it seems that the television industry, based on a business model that is different than in the case of the music and film industries, is more open to “domesticating” “piracy”. Secondly, series in TV networks show internal contradictions of the extended culture industry. Although they potentially bring losses to producers, they potentially generate the revenue of other companies in the “ecosystem” that are sometimes associated with the traditional media business (a website named Popcorner could be found in the online portfolio of Agora, publisher of the quality print daily *Gazeta Wyborcza*; it focused on TV series and information about new productions, many of which were unavailable in lawful circulation in Poland when the website existed).

The TV series case is also interesting because it shows how pieces of content circulate among the media (understood not only as technology platforms, but also as reception practices: a series’ episodes are often viewed differently on television than the same content downloaded from the Web). Over time, much of the “pirated” content is broadcasted on Polish TV stations. However, as it turns out, waiting several months for legal free access is unacceptable for many Internet users.

We have chosen this example also because it allegedly generates up to half of the traffic on p2p networks (see the anecdotal evidence – Ernesto 2008) and there are certain groups in Polish society (especially big-city, educated youth) for whom foreign TV series are part of a certain fashion. Interestingly, TV series are watched by young people who do not have any television sets and antennas to receive television signals and who declare that: “All that could be interesting for me on TV, I find on the Internet” (Filiciak et al. 2013).

Finally, this example shows the non-obvious connection between the global and the Polish circulation of the media. In this case, Polish Internet users – in many different ways which are discussed later on – become the audience of American television stations. These stations belong, however, to the era of post-network television, where the traditional channels of distribution have been fragmented to many alternative forms, ranging from thematic television channels, through the sale of television content on DVDs and online, to informal circulation, associated especially with the development of p2p networks and “pirated” streaming services, which will be the subject of further analysis.

Post-network television is still, in fact, the era of “network television,” but the meaning of the word “network” has changed, relating today primarily to the Internet, which is becoming a basic interface to access television content for many people, especially the youth. These changes, moreover, are being converted into new business models – although the end of centralized broadcasting limited by the state borders is a problem for television stations, it also creates new opportunities to reach new audiences, such as the global middle class (which is the basic audience of American cable networks producing series circulating on the Internet). The organizations owning the rights to content are not the only ones that benefit from these opportunities – as exemplified by the IiTV.info website career in 2010, the year significant also because of famous Megavideo’s prosperity.

In principal, the IiTV.info website offers to Poles what Hulu.com offers to Americans with the difference that Hulu.com does it legally, because it has developed a proper business model (ad-supported video on demand), has the rights to content and publishes advertisements. Even at the time of this article going to print, there are hardly any legitimate counterparts of Hulu.com in Poland, although websites offering content broadcasted by individual television stations already function here. The local Polish start-up IiTV.info had no rights to content and in 2010, it was almost exclusively a “cover” for Megavideo, a global “pirate” site, which allegedly operated from Hong Kong, where the Western standards of intellectual property protection did not have to be used (due to the lack of academic sources on Megavideo, see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Megavideo>).

In Europe, Megavideo was popular particularly in Italy, which will be shown later on based on somewhat anecdotal data. The activity of IiTV.info is well illustrated by the recent *Boardwalk Empire* series (Polish premiere in 2011). In Poland, it was aired on pay TV a few months after the U.S. release, but all the episodes had been available through Megavideo by that time. In principle, audiovisual market producers do care about their products popularity, but they do not turn a blind eye to “pirate” practices. In the TV series segment, “publishers” are less


effective: when Polish distributors were advertising *Boardwalk Empire* in a spectacular multimedia advertising campaign, the links to all the episodes had already been available on the IiTV.info site (stored on Megavideo and similar hosting and streaming websites). Moreover, these episodes had already been there before the Polish television began to create demand for the series. Thus the selection of the IiTV.info example for the needs of this article is not random, but dictated by its proximity to global Megavideo, allegedly operating from a non-Western location at that time.

To see website performance in the Polish population, it is justified to begin by asking what is said about IiTV.info in the results of Polish Internet audience research, widely accepted by the interactive industry (always focused on website audience figures). It should be remembered that the commercial standard of website audience measurement is funded by publishers, which have interest in maintaining the “ad-supported” model challenged by “piracy”. The commercial standard, despite the discussion which ensued in the Polish media industry in 2010 and which was followed by the consultation process in the joint industry committee, is accepted by all the participants of the Internet advertising market and is not rejected by scholars from outside of the commercial Internet circles – though its potential is not fully used by Polish academics. Therefore, we are in favor of the opinion that even with inevitable errors this largely automated measurement causes, the Megapanel PBI/Gemius research is an authoritative source of knowledge about the websites and preferences of Polish Internet users (“Polish” in the sense of connecting to the network from the Polish territory and performing at least one “page view” per month from the Polish territory). Files with the results can be downloaded from http://gemius.pl/pl/login_megapanel.

What are then the figures concerning the IiTV.info website in comparison with other sites? According to Megapanel, Polish Internet users generally watch the content of undefined rightholders or the content where the issue of property rights is not mentioned. Figure 1 shows a graph of website traffic dynamics of four sites in 2010 on a monthly basis. It shows an increase in the number of users (named “real users” in this methodology) of websites providing access to files, some of which are presented mainly as streaming, and some in the form of links to files for download. The number of IiTV.info users amounted to hundreds of thousands of “real users” over the year 2010. And the number of Megavideo.com users is several times greater than the number of IiTV.info users according to the graph. It is clear that the model presented by Torrenty.org (provides torrent files – metadata for p2p networks) and Speedyshare.com (makes it possible to upload and download large files) is maintained at a stable level, or even leads to declines in the scale of the results of 12 months. The number of users of files available for streaming through IiTV.info and Megavideo.com is growing. IiTV.info is a specialized website


that contains only links to foreign TV series, often unavailable on Polish television, which are located primarily on Megavideo, often without resolving the issue of the rights to the content.

Figure 1. Number of "real users" of websites with the content of undefined rightholders or the content presented without addressing the issue of property rights in 2010. Source: Megapanel PBI/Gemius, 2010



Another chart (Figure 2) shows the age structure of iTV.info "real users" – whose number grew rapidly – that sustained over months. It is evident that the films accessible through this site were watched mainly by young people, aged 15-34.

Figure 2. Dynamics of age structure of iTV.info "real users" in 2010. Source: Megapanel PBI/Gemius



Other available sources of knowledge concerning the audience of specific websites such as Google AdPlanner or Alexa, although even more anecdotal from the methodological

viewpoint, also confirmed the global popularity of sites that do not have the rights to broadcast their content in Poland. Additionally, they help to situate this knowledge in comparison with other countries. Google Ad Planner is obviously an imperfect website ranking, because its methodology is not entirely clear. For example, a domain with pop-up surveys which is not a website at all is listed there among the most popular Polish websites (it ranked 17th in December 2010). Among the top hundred sites most often visited by Polish Internet users were listed such websites as Sciaga.pl with ready school essays and homework materials or sites linking mainly to movie files and music, e.g., Torrenty.org (<http://www.google.com/adplanner/static/top100countries/pl.html>). It is hard to find similar sites in the ranking of the top U.S. sites (<http://www.google.com/adplanner/static/top100countries/us.html>). According to Google AdPlanner, Megavideo.com ranked 37th among the hundred most visited sites in the ranking of Italian Internet users (<http://www.google.com/adplanner/static/top100countries/it.html>) and 87th in the ranking of French Internet users (<http://www.google.com/adplanner/static/top100countries/fr.html>).

The positions of two of the above sites in various markets are presented in Figure 3, which shows differences in the popularity of the sites depending on the country. The data, unless otherwise indicated, come from Alexa.com, which means that they are based mainly on the measurement of traffic from web browsers on the computers of people who installed the toolbar. The sample is then skewed in the direction of those users who demonstrate a specific pattern of use and this methodology can easily be undermined. However, the table may still serve as an illustration of the phenomena being discussed.

Figure 3. Megavideo.com and IiTV.info websites positions in audience rankings by Alexa.com and Google AdPlanner (as of March 2011)

<i>Megavideo.com Worldwide Traffic Rank</i> (http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/megavideo.com)	
Italy	18 (37 according to Google AdPlanner)
Spain	19
Mexico	32
Peru	33

France	36 (87 according to Google AdPlanner)
Belgium	37
Argentina	42
Colombia	42
Israel	45
Switzerland	47
Chile	49
Venezuela	51
Japan	66
Brazil	76
Poland	77
Canada	79
Pakistan	90
Algeria	100
United Kingdom	149
Australia	180
India	220
Germany	245
United States	253
South Korea	264
Turkey	268
Netherlands	286
<i>IiTV.info Worldwide Traffic Rank</i> (http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/iitv.info)	
Poland	107
Ireland	4,112
United Kingdom	19,538
Germany	47,546

Figure 3 shows that according to Alexa.com data, Megavideo was 77th among the sites visited by Polish Internet users. The local IiTV.info website, based on the pieces of content

aggregated in Megavideo, which are shown in a structured and indexed way, most often with Polish subtitles, reached especially the Poles using the Internet on the Polish territory (107 position). Abroad, it probably reached Poles working there (very low positions in the rankings relating to three European countries with large numbers of Polish immigrants).

RESEARCH RESULTS 2. FREE ACCESS: THE OPINIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF POLISH INTERNET USERS

We want to point out some issues from a pilot study preceding the above analysis and the IiTV.info growth. The study was carried out in the first half of February 2009 with the computer-assisted web interviews (CAWI) method. This topic was broadened as part of the project under the working title "TV Series," later named "TV without TV sets?" by us. The purpose of this study was an attempt to capture a wide sample of TV series viewers and assess initially various ways of TV series consumption. The survey link was sent to the users of one of the top Polish horizontal portals by e-mail (the title of which was "Do you like series? Don't you like series? Tell us about it"). The resulting sample was non-random, consisting of 1303 completed surveys, of which 1206 were filled out by series viewers. The main research question was whether television without TV sets, based on accessing successive episodes online, is becoming an important way to access TV productions in Poland in the first decade of the 21st century.

The survey results confirmed the changing pattern of cultural content consumption by Internet users. The study itself was conducted to provide an overview for the national scientific conference "The new generation of television series and the Polish audience" (12-13 March 2009). The sample was consistent in terms of size of place of residence with the profile of Polish Internet users in the research named "NetTrack", which enriched the data on IiTV.info we got from our main source, i.e. Megapanel PBI/Gemius, but was not consistent with that study in terms of age structure. Therefore, the conclusions cannot be generalized to the whole population of Polish Internet users. The survey was intended to initiate a reflection on the contemporary ways of participation in culture, previously absent in the broad mainstream of Polish humanities. As younger Internet users (who were an under-represented age group in our study) download content from the Web more often than others do, the actual number of people who download files may be larger than in our study.

The results showed that 80 percent of the respondents watched series on television according to the TV guide, whereas any of online ways of accessing content was declared by 39 percent of all the respondents. The ways of accessing pieces of content via the Internet were: watching a series from a file downloaded personally from the Internet (26%), from

a received/borrowed CD or DVD with episodes downloaded from the Internet (16%), and watching a series online using websites which provide streaming services (11%).

Some results indicate highly local properties of series consumption: the most popular Polish TV series was chosen by almost twice as many respondents as the most popular foreign series. The high number of viewers watching TV series on their own (55%) suggests that the consumption of series has no longer the function typical for linear television, i.e. the function of a social ritual. The key was, however, the projective question. In the survey, we used questions directly asking about downloading, but being aware that many respondents may feel uncomfortable about them and, in consequence, might not be honest, we also asked: "Do your friends download TV series from the Web?" "No", replied 14 percent of the respondents.

It is particularly interesting as we know that this is a sensitive issue: we learned from the questions about watching TV series that 26 percent of the respondents watched television series downloaded from the Internet and we also know – from the open questions at the end of the survey – that the respondents declared their concerns about the anonymity of the survey (which is typical for respondents approached by e-mail). Therefore, the number of respondents accessing content without due diligence in terms of intellectual property rights was probably between 26 percent (those who declared watching TV series from the files downloaded by themselves) and 47 percent (those who pointed to their "friends" in the key question) of the total number of series viewers in our sample. In the group of people younger than 24 years of age, 66 percent of the respondents watched television series according to the TV guide and 87 percent watched them in some online-related ways. Watching the series was the respondents' daily or almost daily activity.

One-fifth of the series viewers described themselves as "TV series fans", and almost each fan would read an online message board for a given series. The fans' most frequent creative activities were entries on those message boards. In their answers to the open questions, the respondents emphasized the lack of advertisements and the voice-over (a common alternative to subtitles on Polish television) as well as the possibility to control the time of viewing. Their expectation of control was revealed in the frequent repetitions of the words "I want" in their open statements. Many respondents stressed that they wanted to watch the episodes immediately after their release on American television.

CONCLUSIONS

We are aware that the issues presented above should be further studied through an even more detailed historical analysis and fully conclusive quantitative surveys should be conducted on

a random sample and followed by qualitative research deepening our understanding of the issues. But even this research, which is not the best in terms of data quality, has touched upon two issues, in which the problem of “piracy” is situated, and has led us to some conclusions.

The first issue is the old “center” and “periphery” of global media flow processes and their relationship with the current legal standards. The second issue are the tensions between the dominant and non-dominant discourses in the academic way of describing changes in the media as an increase in Internet users’ creative activities. The real – not so creative – use of the Polish Web points to “peer re-production” and leads to re-imagining the culture industry as an “extended culture industry” that is linked to global transfers of media content. We presented data on the mass scale of this phenomenon. Some other data, both from desk research and our own survey among Polish Internet users, validated these figures. It turns out that sharing American television series on the Polish Internet is a mass phenomenon, especially among young people. This confirms the generational determinants of “peer re-production.” As demonstrated above, the extent of Polish “piracy” centered around television content already in 2009-2010. It involved a substantial part of society and in the case of young people it was a big part of this age group. It is clear that the ethical judgment of these practices is absolutely not part of the cultivated top-down criticism of “piracy” for a large number of Internet users.

This leads to the conclusion that conceptualizing access to audiovisual content primarily as access mediated through legal channels of content distribution makes a huge part of the cultural experience of Polish Internet users disappear from the field of vision. It is hard to even call them a “gray area” because in terms of both the scale and the perceived quality, it is a phenomenon that is already competitive with the traditional model.

It is no longer a margin, but a new mainstream of culture, against which the legal restrictions turn out to be surprisingly vulnerable. Unlike legislators, however, we are in a more comfortable situation as researchers – “piracy” in the online edition opens a new and intriguing area of reflection for us in which the content is not only commodities; attached to the exchange of messages, it turns from products into free tokens circulating in the social networks of the network society.

It is symbolic that television – until recently the iconic national medium, operating in a centralized model of broadcasting – is subject to this change. Today, pieces of television content circulate in informal networks, bypassing the law and national boundaries, and are surprisingly effective in meeting the needs of Internet users. Abigail de Kosnik, analyzing the content of television “piracy,” suggests that if customers want to have access to them through a single interface and expect a format that will work on any programming platform, and also

expect that content can be transferred freely between devices, then (...) such customers are condemned to pirated content. Perhaps, as it often happened in the past, “legal services can model their protocols directly on established pirate standards, as they are hardly secret” (de Kosnik 2011: 13).

It should be noted, however, that while some of our comments relate primarily to p2p file-sharing networks, there is also a clear trend towards professional (although still illegal) intermediaries offering customers more convenient free (although usually ad-supported) access through streaming services. So perhaps Internet “piracy” is not a step towards the autonomy of consumers, but only a transition period towards the establishment of new models of mediation in access to content? This question is difficult to answer today. However, it appears that Internet users being participants of peer re-production will become part of the culture industries on a permanent basis.

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